





ARE THESE THINGS SO?  
OR  
THE TRIUMPH OF DARWINISM



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OR  
THE TRIUMPH OF DARWINISM  
AN INQUIRY INTO RELIGION  
AND ITS ORIGIN

BY  
P. J. DEAR, M.A.(Oxon.), F.G.S.

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TO

ALL WHO SEEK THE TRUTH  
FOR ITS OWN SAKE

“ You must give the devil fair play, Boxor.  
Until you have heard and weighed his case  
you have no right to condemn him ” (the  
Bishop, in *Getting Married*, by Bernard Shaw).  
It is only fair to explain that the Bishop is  
represented as holding that marriage is  
irregular unless solemnized according to  
the rites and ceremonies of the Church of  
England, but has almost heretical views  
about divorce.



## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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## EDITORIAL PREFACE

As the author informs us at the outset of his Introduction, this portly volume is the product of half a century's collection, compilation, and collation of material. The avowed object of his undertaking is not only to vindicate the Doctrine of Descent on its originally biological side, but also to demonstrate that the principle and process of Evolution are universal alike in inorganic and organic Nature. In its ground-plan and as exemplified in its method it is reminiscent but not imitative of Pierre Bayle's famous *Dictionnaire Historique et Critique*. The witnesses for or against the author's basic thesis are, so to speak, put in the box, and the gravamen of their testimony is cited. Dear differs from Bayle in openly identifying himself with the unorthodox or positivist side, but he is scrupulously fair in giving each party an adequate and equitable hearing. As the text consists chiefly of quotations threaded on a slender strand of commentary, there is inevitably much repetition, and often the involution is such that it is well nigh impossible to pick out quotation from annotation. It has not been possible to eliminate all redundancy, because the same quotations are used to illustrate or support different aspects of the magistral argument.

Whenever possible, quotations have been compared with the sources from which they are derived, for verification, and correction where necessary. Due acknowledgment of permission to reproduce borrowed copyright matter is made elsewhere. Even in its incurably promiscuous state, the book

## EDITORIAL PREFACE

has a cumulative evidential and logical value. It is a remarkable example of the patient and persevering industry and of the single-minded, life-long devotion of its author to his enlightened standards and exalted ideals of truth, liberty, and justice, and of his "sole intent" to bequeath the fruits of his self-denying labours for the benefit of humanity.

# BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

PHILIP JOHN DEAR, M.A.(Oxon.), F.G.S.

1854-1934

PHILIP JOHN DEAR, the author of the present volume, youngest son of the Rev. Robert Dear, Rector of St. Mary Woolnoth, Lombard Street, City of London, was born on February 2nd, 1854. He was educated at the Merchant Taylors' School, London, and, at the age of seventeen, with the object of entering the ministry of the Church of England, won a scholarship for Balliol College, Oxford, and graduated there in Arts. His elder brother, Robert Dear, M.A., at that time a Fellow of Merton and Tutor of St. John's College, Oxford, had the reputation of being one of the University's most brilliant scholars. He was the guide and mentor of Philip. Unfortunately, when in the Austrian Tyrol on a summer vacation, he died of enteric fever, at the early age of twenty-six, and thus there ended untimely a life rich in promise.

This tragic loss had a profound and lasting influence on the outlook on life and career of Philip. Correspondence between father and son reveals Philip's abandonment of faith in orthodox religion and the deflection of his interests and aims into the channels which flowed into the launching of the scheme of *Are These Things So?* The following year his father died at the early age of forty-eight years, and Philip was obliged, for financial reasons, to leave the University and take up coaching. Later he returned to Oxford, and became assistant to the Professor of Physiology. Scattered through the following

chapters will be found autobiographical allusions to this and other passages in his life. Dear was a Fellow of the Geological and Archaeological Societies, and contributed a number of articles to the Proceedings of these learned bodies. He was a brilliant and versatile conversationalist, had a great love of music, and was also a clever painter in water colours. The closing years of his life were spent in Edinburgh working on the building up of the material for this book, the production of which was with him a ruling passion. He died at his residence in Edinburgh in March, 1934, at the ripe age of eighty.

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## PART I



## INTRODUCTION

*Multaque praeterea tibi possum commemorando,  
Argumentum fidem dictis condadere nostris.*

—LUCRETIUS, *De Rerum Natura*, lines 400–1.

The question at issue is ultimately one for philosophic discussion, but before the philosophers have a right to speak science ought first to be asked to tell all she can as to ascertained facts and provisional hypotheses. Then, and only then, may discussion legitimately pass into the realms of philosophy.

—SIR J. JEANS, *The Mysterious Universe*.

The Bible is a sort of incarnation, the divine clothed in the human.

—W. ROBERTSON SMITH, *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*.

The distinction clearly made in all the schools between the sacred writings and revelation must be considered as an inalienable conquest of modern theology. There is no one now who does not admit this truth, which would have seemed intolerable to our fathers—namely, that the Word of God is in the Bible, but that all the Bible is not the Word of God.

—SABATIER, *The Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 52–3.

Knowledge excludes fancies. Fancies—pious it may be, but still fancies—are apt to come floating in to all unoccupied ground, and thus unsettle and bewilder the mind. Thorough discussion of phenomena, even when it does not yield much positive result, is useful for laying ghosts.

—PRINCIPAL RAINY, *The Bible and Criticism*, 1878, p. 46.

Our study begins and ends with Man.

—RESCHER, quoted in Smart's *Second Thoughts*, 1916, p. lxi.

I BEGAN this book in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, some fifty years ago; I was then sitting upon what might be described as the very growing point of one of the most progressive of the sciences and it became ever clearer to me that the account given in the Bible, or at least the version given of its teaching, even by eminent theologians at a great university, could not be squared with the facts which were daily becoming increasingly probative as to the real history of our earth and of the animals and plants upon its surface. At that time, although some men had spoken with some candour and courage as to their own views on this question, there was no such body of declared opinion as we can now find, without any research or trouble, in the acknowledged authorities on the subject. It was then a matter of argument and of debate, in which the weight of orthodox theology seemed hopelessly

## INTRODUCTION

at variance with the growing testimony of physical science. Pusey still dominated one at least of the Universities, and a great part of the Church. His coadjutors, Cardinal Newman, Bishop King, and Canons Liddon and Bright, admitted no questioning of substantial Biblical correctness. Even Bishops Lightfoot, Westcott, and Ellicott gave no decided support to sceptical suggestions; while Wordsworth and Burdon contradicted them with fierce intolerance. It seemed then as if any representation of the position of science would need to be proved in a way which would carry conviction to the thinking men of the country, or at least to those who had studied the subject. Here a difficulty arose, for the majority had not had any chance of learning the data requisite for a correct decision. It would be needful, therefore, if one wished to carry them along in sympathy with the argument of the book, to lay before them evidence in a form which they could assimilate without undue effort of mind.

This presented an obstacle which I found myself unable and unequal to surmount: that the first elements of several abstruse studies must be set out with a simplicity, and yet with a profundity and correctness, which probably no one man has been competent to master. In certain sciences, again, Prof. Huxley had attained an excellence which it was almost impossible to rival, and still less to excel: he had, perhaps, an intolerance of opposition which made him at times seem almost prejudiced; but his capacity was so far beyond mine that even where he fell beneath perfection it was not likely that anyone could do better. For here the point arises whether it was enough merely to state the view to which oneself had arrived, or if it was incumbent on one to put also what might be alleged by others on their side in order to do full justice to both. The opinion, which might at first sight seem to be right beyond question, when it comes to the actual performance, seems beyond the power of mortals. Your own decision you feel to be just, and your heart is engaged in putting it with all the force of which you are capable; that of others appeals to them, but of necessity affects you less. Huxley was justified in those matters in which he makes positive assertions by a plenitude of knowledge and a matured judgment which one of inferior powers might not safely emulate; but for this very

reason it would be even less secure to try to hold an impartial balance between combatants who both excelled.

About this period continued ill health caused me to give up active work in theoretical science, and the leisure thus obtained, while calculated to be favourable to a quiet attempt to put the matter with precision and equable care, at the same time withdrew to a great extent the opportunity of learning the views of others with accuracy, and estimating the weight of their reasons. Yet what was thus withdrawn in one direction was compensated for by a fuller knowledge in another; for, looking into the subject to learn more precisely the position taken by theologians, I found that a considerable body of them, and these perhaps those whose learning and reputation entitled them most to be heard and regarded, had changed greatly from the attitude maintained when I was a student in that branch. For they had to a great extent assimilated and acknowledged the very results at which I had myself arrived in the pursuit of science. It did not, therefore, seem so necessary to attempt the almost impossible task of stating without prejudice the two sides of a controversy in which I myself had formed a very definite conclusion. Yet I could not close my eyes to the fact that a very large number of men and women, especially the bulk of the clergy, were not ready or prepared in any way to accept such advances. They had been trained in the old ideas, and had not come into contact with new ones, except in the form of rumours and stray reports, which they found themselves able to put aside with ease as mere "surmises" or casual expressions of aberrant intellects.

Still, as time went on, the acceptance of these pronouncements by men of light and leading came to be more clear and more outspoken; and the problem on many points really was now exclusively to give a plain account of the controverted opinion, and to show that the dictates of science had been accepted by those whose verdict could not be put down to prejudice or want of care. In pursuing this course the fact opened out that such complaisance to a great extent sprang from or was accompanied by a view of the origin and sacred character of the Scriptures which to no small degree differed from that which had been prevalent even a few years before. Science, on the one hand, had thrown light on this issue and

had taught that exact expressions of truth on physical subjects could not be found, and was not to be expected, in books written in primitive times. On the other hand, examination of the books themselves had shown that they were in great part compilations put together with no exceeding care or insight; they often contradicted themselves; and they were mutually incompatible.

For both these reasons, it was felt by those who were competent to judge—and for this object Hebrew scholars had an obvious advantage—that the old rigid insistence on minute correctness, and even tolerable consistence with fact, could not be maintained. Here then there arose an altogether new point. It was no longer to be debated what was the precise teaching of science, and whether this could make itself in any way congruent with the text of Holy Writ, as we had in former times striven to do. The issue was rather: What is, indeed, the content and meaning of Scripture, and how far is it veridical as a revelation of truth? “It is the work of men—the writing of their hands—the thought of their minds; are then these thoughts so far guided as to be above error?” The answer of theologians to-day must be taken as plainly agreeing that “the view held, from the Reformation till quite recently, in most countries is not one which can bear serious investigation; that, as a fact, there is no such freedom from mistake; the only question is, how far the error extended.”

This is not, indeed, a new view, but the meaning of it has of late become much more clear; the Church, in effect, had always held that there was much in the Bible which needed an interpreter; yet it had practically maintained that if one could get at the right understanding of it one would arrive at the real truth. Many, too, who did not in any way hold with this view of the Church as guide to a right comprehension of Holy Writ took up nearly the same position, by a depreciation of man’s powers to grasp the mysteries of Nature and of revelation. They reached very much the same view, while they really denied any interpreter capable of solving the riddle. They were like those condemned by Christ, who would neither enter themselves nor allow others to do so; but when it became sufficiently clear that the growing knowledge of Nature and of history made some things stated to be absolutely

impossible, and others to be true only if allegorized and taken in an unnatural sense, the fiction could no longer be persisted in.

It was no longer enough to say, “Poor, weak, puny man, who are you, that you judge the words of the Infinite, or put a limit on the power of the Almighty?” It was clear that somebody else had been doing this, and had put it in a way incompatible with the authority claimed for it. This was really no new discovery. As early as the third century of our era it had been seen plainly by Origen and others that in it there were things which were not right, things which would not bear examination from a moral, or even from an historical, point of view; things which were incompatible with the notion of a just and wise Ruler of the Universe, a consistent and rational author of the different portions of revelation; that the Pentateuch had parts which could not even be the work of a single man, and did not reflect the thoughts of a good one; that the Psalms and other books were not in all places of a high tone of morality; that the dealings of Israel with other nations were hardly to be defended as the actions of a civilized and humane people. That, in fact, either the deity worshipped by that nation was a bad one, or that the “Chosen People” had given an incorrect and garbled account of his commands to them, so that when they said God had spoken and given orders the question might justly be raised how this had been effected, and whether the Hebrews were right in the interpretation they put on it.

From this standpoint the step was a short one to the question: What warrant had they for their belief in the divine inspiration of their sacred books, and what evidence did they offer that these had been kept intact and free from corruption? To all these questions an answer was very early given—namely, that the evidence adduced was insufficient to be credited in face of such obvious objections. Indeed, many in the early Church went so far as to assert that the God of Israel was really a very inferior deity, or even a demon; and that most if not all of the messages purporting to have come to man from this source were rather wiles of the evil one, intended to mislead and to injure man, than the word of the All Wise calculated for human comfort or guidance. It is not at all hard to see how

such a view would arise: the Christians were persecuted and maligned by the Jews. By a long and protracted effort they shook themselves free from the obligation of respecting the Mosaic Law; their polity in every way was a denial of the manners and customs of the Hebrew people and of usages said to have a divine origin. It was inevitable in denying and rejecting these things that they should cast doubts and raise objections to the account given of the authorship and authority of the traditional ideas and usages, and this was certainly done in a very sweeping and outspoken manner.

In the second part of this book I propose to deal with the development of doctrine and the settlement of belief in the Church. Abundant evidence will be adduced that Christians did not look on Hebrew writings or dogmas with respect or even toleration. Indeed, they repudiated them root and leaf and branch, in a way which makes it clearly evident that there was no fixed opinion of their divine and infallible warrant. Even those who held them in higher esteem so dealt with them by allegory and similar methods of interpretation as to show plainly that they had not any confidence in their literal meaning being in any sense the word of God, or containing a truth of supreme importance to man: a mystical message was feigned as underlying the obvious bearing of the words; but, as no authoritative version of this was pretended, it came to be almost the prerogative of any man, or at least of any writer, to suggest his own exposition of each passage. Of the same order are sermons to-day, in which words are taken apart from their context and are applied to wholly different events; just as Joseph Chamberlain came to own that he used numbers, not as a proof of correctness or as evidence of the truth of his ideas, but merely as illustrations of what he meant, and examples of what might be true, if things were ordered as he thought they ought to be. Such homiletical methods may be very useful to express the thought of man, but hardly warrant its being regarded as a truth of God. As Harnack puts it, “the fathers not infrequently spoke by way of argument (*διαλεκτικῶς*) things which were not; and, in their eagerness to enforce the truth, not seldom wandered into the paths of error; and got near to falsehood at times.” “Forgery of a pious, and perhaps of a deliberately deceptive kind, appears to

have been too rife even at the earliest periods; and as evidence, in our sense of the word, was then hardly understood, and was not easy to obtain, the witness of the spirit was made to do duty for it: this came, practically, to be that anything which commended itself as good and serviceable to the people of those days was looked on as inspired by the good spirit, which had not yet come to be personified as the Holy Ghost; but was tantamount to saying that the spirit of man approved of, received as true, and endorsed the matter about which question was made."

These sophistries seemed good to such trimmers. In a word, they believed their spirit was the good spirit, their doxy was orthodoxy; other people's was readily condemned as heterodox. It was in a certain way a struggle for existence and a survival of the fittest; which might seem fairly satisfactory and cogent to any who accept the whole teaching of the Church, but which is made illogical and absurd by its sudden cessation at some indefinite and very variously estimated time, at least to those who hold with the views which have been prevalent among the most rational nations since the period of the Reformation. With such believers is ever present the insuperable difficulty that they must realize that a message from above has been so carelessly communicated and so faithlessly preserved that, almost before the breath was gone from the first person who received it, it had become subject to considerable doubt what it was that was really delivered, and what its meaning might be to mankind. Thus, as ages rolled on, it was so overlaid by concretions of superstition and human imagination that at last it had become, as the formal professions of faith of Protestant bodies affirm, allied to lies of a "dangerous and damnable" nature, which made it the instrument of the evil spirit to deceive mankind, in place of the means of the good one for enlightenment.

Such a survival of the fittest seems perilously like a persistence of the unfit, an endurance of the false and baseless. It will be said, however, "the wheat and the tares grow together, and this is in accordance with the words of its author"—a view sponsored by G. K. Chesterton. Yet no careful farmer allows tares in his crops; it is typical of the East, rather than of the scientific and rational ways of the West; it is the slipshod

fatalism of indolence and ignorance, not the careful provision and foresight of knowledge and prudence. The wisdom of a clever ruler or man of business is gauged and estimated by his prescience and provision for future emergencies; his success in this is tested and recognized by the avoidance of mishaps and mistakes in his affairs, which overthrow his calculations and falsify and defeat his projects. A railway or other company whose undertakings constantly miscarried or were marred by irregularities and unexpected events would soon forfeit confidence and custom; a king whose country was subject to invasions and other calamities would not be reckoned wise or knowing in his counsels; nor would any one in any walk of life be regarded as reliable, or as one whose opinion was worth seeking or following, who did not take common precautions to prevent evils which were foreseen from marring or even ruining the good effects of his efforts.

It would seem therefore that these supposed prophecies are rather an aggravation than a palliation of the ills spoken of. It is true, of course, that perfection can be looked for nowhere, at least on earth; but trite generalities of this kind are apt to be cited especially by those who feel that they can make out no good case by discussing particular instances. The presence of evil in the world may readily be admitted as a necessary condition of good; work may be essential to prevent idleness, and its consequences of tedium and mischief of many kinds; but work becomes hard only where it is in excess and against the grain. Even this may be defended as an incentive to ingenuity and inventiveness, which learns, by patience and contrivance, doing things in better ways, to get rid of the burden of overwork and excessive exertion. Still, all this is something quite different from what is really meant when evil is spoken of as an objection to the accepted theory of the universe and its causation: it is the needless and objectless cataclysms, destroying beyond all chance of improvement those who are their victims; such calamities cannot be spoken of with truth, or with sense, as "the shadows which make up the beauty of nature's pictures."

When a suffragette with a hatchet hacks an Italian masterpiece no one is so foolish as to pretend that it is in any way improved; though the injury to the sharpness and freshness of

its carving, worked on a Cathedral by the lapse of time and the action of frost, may really add a charm, which was wanting in its newness. Even a picture matures; and many an "old Master" would hardly earn the present extravagant praise it receives, if seen in its pristine glory of new paint and varnish. The stains on statues are not a detriment as compared with the dazzling whiteness of new productions; the golden hue of antiques is part of their merit; the fractures may even add an interest to discover how the original pose was contrived. Yet, if any one planned to attack the gems of the Vatican, to knock them in pieces or daub them over with stains, "Vandal" would be a mild term of abuse; criminal would rather be used to describe the action. Ruskin says, perhaps if we cared less for those images of gods in stone, we might care more for that of God, in the flesh; meaning, I conceive, not Christ, but mankind; for the "Seer of Coniston's" heart was always in the right place, though his head went often wrong.

Ruskin, and no doubt Jesus also, would have cried, "Out on you," to dilettante pseudo-amateurs of beauty and of art, who profess to be so horrified when a canvas covered with paint is chopped by a hysterical female, or feminine male; but who stand by unmoved, or at least so far unaffected that they will not give the price of a new hat or coat to prevent, as far as they can, the ceaseless and appalling devastation wrought in our midst by the *tubercle bacillus*. Nay, their sympathies for their dogs are such that they attempt to prevent proper trial being made of appropriate remedies, so that we may learn to ward off this scourge from the most downtrodden and ill-used classes of our fellow-men. For it is the weak, and those who have never had a fair chance in life, who are specially liable to this fell disease and other like afflictions. It is very easy to say it is their own fault, their own want of care and industry and cleanliness; but, if my reader had been brought up in a crowded court, where the sun scarcely came at all, where fresh air is a thing unknown, where water has to be fetched from a pump outside, where there are no baths, and no boilers to heat them, where all live in a single room, where nakedness is an outrage and towels do not exist, perhaps he also might not be exactly clean, or very healthy. And if incessant work at a poorly paid rate had been one's lot from child-

hood, so that at the earliest time it was needful to take one from school to earn at least as much as one ate, want of knowledge and care would not be greatly surprising. Such conditions breed and teach carelessness, despair soon makes any attempt at better things hopeless, any struggle to rise forlorn.

But, beside this, there has never been, for such victims of circumstances, any incentive or idea of rising or throwing off the conditions which, like chains, bind them down; they are not merely the most helpless, they are the most ignorant of mankind; and with few exceptions their only notion of benefiting themselves or rising would be by means forbidden by law, or otherwise discouraged. One might as well urge dogs to be decent, wolves to be gentle, lions to be considerate, or savages to be humane. It is true that all these stepchildren of Society are playing their part in the evolution of the world; but their function is not an exalted one in the scale of the spiritual, and all of them are more or less happily oblivious of the disadvantages from which they suffer.

Others hardly less thoughtless may say, "Why not raise them by a grand effort and place them, once and for all, on a higher level?" "Can a leopard change its spots? Would you send it to school, and wash it, to accelerate this? Or would you bring a pig into your drawing-room? It may be wrong to keep it in a sty in filth; but you cannot change its nature by any such heroic means. These all have their place in Nature, and fill it with fair satisfaction; you cannot hoist them out of it, like barrels, by a steam crane."

If you could get the children apart from their parents, it is possible that a sudden elevation might be attained, but you can't get non-parental human beings. In a way they are their parents, chips of the old block, and of the old blockhead, without the mental capacity to learn; and in many cases without even the bodily power to work. They never had a good day's work in them, and so have never had a good day's pay; and have never had a real stomachful of good wholesome food—two- or three-penny worth from a cookshop is the best they have ever had, and seldom that two days running. The children of such parents do not start fair in life; they are never up to the scratch; they are handicapped before they are even born; they come into the world weak and liable to disease,

defective in body and still more in mind. The children of rustics have a better chance in the world as it exists; they would, probably, have less in such a scheme as is suggested: they come of a mentally dull race which has adhered to the soil because it is of the soil, unenterprising, without imagination, or ambition, or desire to do better.

The state of society is a great sifting machine which roughly puts men into their right places; the bright and energetic are near the top, the apathetic and dull are at the bottom. No upheaval can be successful; a man must pull himself up, or he will only sink again. By this it is not meant in any way that you should not try to help, but that your success will depend much more on what you find there than on what you can do yourself, though you may give invaluable help. For this very reason, you must not be discouraged if you do not succeed, for success is possible only in certain cases. But even with the rest a great process of education is taking place at the hands of Nature; by degrees they are learning, and slowly rising. It is a great school, in which a few blows and a great many rubs are got, and a small portion of knowledge; still this is handed on from parent to child, and the whole in time becomes leavened.

All this educative pain and sorrow is quite different from that needless and purposeless destruction which every now and then seems to fall upon the world by chance, when whole cities and districts are so completely swallowed up that not one remains to tell the tale or to enforce the moral. Famines and pestilences have swept off whole nations or whole tribes, and these by no means the worst specimens of the race: for it is not the *blasé*, the callous, or the case-hardened who have been thus blotted out wholesale; it is rather the primitive, child-like people, lacking experience, and wanting in caution and thought for the future. Cities steeped in crime and indifference, like Rome, Paris, Calcutta, London, and New York, suffer from no such visitations; the West of Ireland, the remote parts of India and America, have felt the full blast of destruction. It is ignorance and apathy which expose men to such calamities, not wickedness or wanton rioting; it is the passive faults which are responsible for them rather than the active sins of men. And, just as a reckless and indiscriminating punishment has fallen on those who are by no means the worst of mankind, so

in the history of the Church delusion and misguidance have been the lot of those who leant towards faith and passive subjection. The virile and those who thought for themselves have wrenched themselves free from the thraldom of false beliefs and foolish practices. The analogy between religion and the world, insisted on by Butler, has really a very diverse cause from that which he gives; it is due to the fact that the Church is really only part of the world, and so of necessity suffers from the same affections and disorders as the whole of which it is a part. The men who struggled and reasoned, and fixed its tenets and manners, were men of the world essentially; and their work was worldly, fashioned to the figure of this world.

That I may not be charged here with making assertions which have no weight of evidence beyond my own words, I think it well to give a few quotations from Harnack, the Professor of Church History at Berlin; who, though in many ways more advanced than the exponents of the subject among us, is accepted by them as a welcome ally who has adhered to "English methods" in the wilderness of German speculation. His *Outlines of the History of Dogma* was written so long ago that it has ceased in any way to astonish, but is accepted as a commonplace book on the subject. It was reiterated and reinforced in his *History of Dogma*, some years later, so it may be taken as the matured opinion of one who was in every way qualified to judge, and whom time has after a considerable lapse marked with the seal of its deliberate approval. "Theology, and with it the Church, seemed to be irretrievably swallowed up in the current of the times" (*Outlines*, p. 198; Hodder & Stoughton, 1893). "This fact with others is to be considered: that the fathers frequently wrote διαλεκτικῶς; and that the official literature (synod literature), in an increasing measure, bristles with falsifications, and is permeated with conscious untruth and injustice" (p. 211). "Constantine first called an oecumenical synod and declared its decisions to be without error. Slowly the thought of the infallible authority of the Nicene Council crept in during the fourth century, and was later on transferred to the following councils" (p. 218). "Things came thus to be decided more and more according to authorities: which one indeed frequently first created" (p. 219). "When at last the

Nicene doctrine gained the victory, it was accomplished only because the Nicene Creed itself had become a piece of antiquity and because one endeavoured, poorly enough, to deduce from the Nicene all later formulas by giving out (as Irenæus had once done) as prescribed, together with the text, also a definite exposition of the same ” (p. 221).

“ As the pagan temples were re-consecrated and made into Christian churches, so was the old paganism preserved as angel-, saint-, image- and amulet-worship. The religion whose strength had once been the abomination of idols, finally surrendered to idols and became in a certain measure morally obtuse ” (p. 312). “ It sanctioned the Old Testament, though originally prescribing a spiritual interpretation of it; but the letter of the Old Testament, which in fact expressed a subordinate religious stage of development, became more and more powerful and made advances to the inferior tendencies of the Church, which it then appeared to legitimize. The acts of baptism and the Lord’s Supper, conceived as mysteries, opened, in general, the doors and windows to the inroads of the mystery-nuisance ” (p. 323). “ The antique idol and amulet business made itself at home, but as relic- and bone-worship in the most disgusting form ” (p. 314). “ The Church opened its doors to that boundless desire to live in a world of miracles, to enjoy the holy with the five senses, to receive miraculous hints from the Deity ” (pp. 314–15). “ Thus originated the frightful image-controversy, which lasted more than a century. In it the emperors fought for the absolutism of the state, and had as an ally only a single power, the military; for the remaining allies—namely, religious *enlightenment* and the primitive tradition of the Church—which spoke against the images, were powerless ” (pp. 316–17). “ The *Roman* bishop became in an increasing measure the decisive authority. The history of dogma in the Middle Ages is the history of the dogma of the *Roman Church* ” (pp. 326–7).

“ If we collect the fourth-century evidence of crude sensuous superstition intimately combined with Christian piety, we might believe that it could go no further. And yet it did go further from century to century, as anyone can easily convince himself by reading the tales of saints and relics, among which those of the Oriental Monophysites are the worst. . . . Theology

became more defenceless, because it had to adapt itself to sacred ceremony. The worst gift bequeathed by moribund antiquity to the Church was the ritual of magic and the monstrous number of great and little aids in need and means of atonement” (*History of Dogma*, iii. p. 159, *note*; Williams & Norgate, 1897).

“Exegesis became a kind of black art, and Augustine was not the only man who was delivered from Manichæan, by Biblical, Alchemy” (*ibid.*, p. 199). “The belief in inspiration was necessarily attended by the duty of pneumatic or allegorical exegesis. This sacred art was then practised by all, who were able thus to disregard the results of any other kind of exposition. . . . To discover prophecy everywhere, to get rid of the literal meaning where it was obnoxious, and to repel Jewish claims” (p. 199). “Definite detailed regulations were attributed to the Apostles, individually or collectively, whenever they were required for the discipline or cultus of the time” (p. 212). “In order to realize the possibility of such an unabashed invention of regulations cloaked with the authority and name of the Apostles, we must remember that, from the second century, writings bearing on discipline were in existence, called διδαχαι or διατάξεις τῶν ἀποστόλων; and that these, having no individual impress, were thoroughly adapted for constant remodelling and expansion” (p. 212, *note*). “All these trivial definitions, which betray a low state of legal and moral views, and which one would gladly attribute to barbarous nations, had become the property of the Church before the incursions of the Germans” (p. 311).

If these things are correct—and they will in the main be denied by none who really know the circumstances—they may be taken as showing that the evolution of religion was of the same nature as that of the most worldly states. Canon Sanday comforts himself with the belief that all was overruled for good: this no doubt was so in a way; development progresses in spite of apparent set-backs, and however much it may resemble “Devil-up-ment,” as the Hindoos pronounce the word, eventually works out for the best. This certainly does not mean, however, “best for those who are crushed out in the process”; the inferior may be superseded by the better, and so progress is made, but the blotting out of the worse is not in itself made better by the survival of the superior.

The English have much to answer for in the destruction of savage races, and probably none greatly regret the disappearance of these. This does not make their extermination by machine-guns, small-pox, measles, and whisky any more pleasing to them, or a subject to be bragged of by others. And when such methods are alleged to have been used by the All-loving, either in the placing of Israel in Palestine, or in the building up of a church as a witness of His goodness, one can only think and say plainly that some mistake has been made in the matter. Few to-day are earnest in urging that it was true in the former case. The Book of Joshua is now fairly admitted to be a fictitious and poetical account of a conquest which is shown by the story of the Judges and early Kings to have been in fact a very slow and never very complete acquisition of the promised land. Canon Driver's successor as Regius Professor of Hebrew at Oxford says that it is dubious if we have any writings of the age. Mr. Stanley A. Cooke, for many years Secretary of the Palestine Exploration Fund, hints, and that not obscurely, that as truth the whole story of the Exodus is open to question as a historical event, the fact lying beneath it being that Palestine was in subjection to Egypt; and that, by a long and fluctuating struggle, Israel emerged from the Egyptian darkness of her bondage to these masterful oppressors.

Canon Driver shifted "The Exodus" from 1491 to 1200 B.C., because the Tel-el-Amarna letters make the former date impossible, for the district was then in the hands of the Egyptians, and could not have been conquered by a sudden invasion without any record of the event. But his new date upsets the whole Biblical chronology, and brings the matter too close to the age of David to allow of the rise of legend. The tale, then, takes its place with other national epics, with the stories of Arthur and Alfred, of Barbarossa, and of the Paladins. It is obvious to anyone who studies the books of Samuel with care and an open mind that there are mixed up in them various legends of very unequal value and hardly compatible histories. The story of Goliath is sandwiched in between accounts which are clearly from different sources; and later on one of David's "Great Men" is said to have killed the giant. The Authorized Version adds, in italics, "the brother of" in II Sam. xxi. 19, without any warrant

whatever. It is just one of the cases where the doings of the servants are attributed to a king by the adulation of after ages. David is said to have been "a youth ruddy from the sheep-fold," and unknown to Saul, whereas in the previous chapter he is "a man prudent in council and valiant in war," and the King's armour-bearer. The whole passage points to a subsequent addition.

Samuel himself acts as a high priest, but was not of the family of Aaron, or even a Levite—yet he was as a child apparently sleeping in the room with the ark, which should have been in the Holy of Holies, had any such place then existed. Actually, with the Exodus (or indeed even if this is true in a modified sense) the whole story of the building of the Tabernacle vanishes into the land of dreams. No such elaborate structure, with large castings of metal, was possible in the wilderness, no trace of it can be discovered in the earlier histories. When David plans a temple, and brings the ark to put in it, there is no place for it to rest in, and, for a period, it is left at the house of an Edomite. When at last Jerusalem is conquered, and a temple is built, it does not appear to have been either the only place of worship in the country or to have held any exclusive position in the capital. Solomon, in spite of his reputed wisdom from heaven, erected there shrines to the gods of his many wives, and through all the period of the Kings a similar state of things seems to have prevailed. Like Benares, the holy city was a location for many deities and very various rites. The Law clearly did not exist; it was not taken even by the first kings as their guide in life; and the ceremonies enjoined by it, especially the Passover, were obviously not of force till much later. We are told that it was discovered in the temple in the days of Josiah; this really was the Book of Deuteronomy, which is inconsistent with other parts of the so-called Mosaic dispensation, and would have been disregarded had they been then in existence.

The Book of Chronicles is plainly a late compilation of dubious value. The Law was put into its present form under Ezra and Nehemiah after the captivity, in which the whole ritual and records of the nation were thrown into confusion, and were to a great extent reconstructed on the authority of Ezekiel, the prophet. This was exactly one of the cases in which the "spirit of prophecy" was allowed to take the place

of knowledge and care. If this then be the case with the law, it is quite certain that the whole cannot be the work of one man, previous to the occupation of Palestine, nor could the code have been "read to the people" at a single sitting, though prolonged many days. (The Pentateuch was read through every three years in the Synagogues. *Vide* W. Robertson Smith, *Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, p. 160.) It seems almost needless to go to the trouble of showing at any length that the parts of it which encroach on the sphere of science are not to be accepted as standards of fact, or to be admitted as the limit or rule of its inquiries. When a preacher said, "A child could learn more from Genesis in an hour than learned men had discovered in all the rest of time," he was displaying his own ignorance rather than the folly or presumption of those he took it on himself to criticize without the knowledge or acumen needed for so weighty an undertaking. Still, I have thought right to a small degree to set forth the accepted position in science. I am not without warrant, in using this term, for I have gone through the whole contest: in my childhood, I heard the theory of Evolution scouted as ridiculous and unworthy even of notice. Then the *Essays and Reviews* came out, and in its first article one who afterwards became the chief pastor of our official Church gave in his adhesion to the new doctrine and applied it to the history of religion.

To-day the doctrine of Evolution is the foundation of the teaching of every medical school, though at first, in France at least, and in America, it met with considerable opposition. It has been an example of its own teaching of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest; and for a time the struggle was a very fierce one. It was different altogether from the pretended survival of the fittest in ecclesiastical questions; here no emperors with armies behind them dictated formulæ, no lying priests imposed their nostrums by forged evidence and make-believe miracles; the struggle was one of pure reason, of observation and of experiment, and by degrees the right prevailed. It is idle for theologians to say it is only a theory; they know full well that theological tenets are mere theories; indeed, no one, at least outside the Church of Rome, really credits the very dubious Councils of the fourth and later centuries with infallible guidance. We are told in the Acts

of the Apostles that in a solemn assembly, attended by Peter and Paul, James and John, and all the men of mark in the Church, fresh from the unction of the day of Penetcost, four injunctions were laid on Christians. Nevertheless, three of these are not, and never have been, looked on as authoritative. Harnack strives in vain to prove that " blood " is put for murder, getting rid of " strangled things " as a spurious addition ; but he has failed to carry opinion with him. If, then, this Council of all the Apostles is not regarded as binding on the Church, it seems to be absurd to credit later Councils with greater power, because a Roman Emperor of dubious piety thought his own ends would be served by having it so regarded. I am quite sure of one thing at least : that not many laymen to-day will be convinced by any such questionable assertions.

We may take it, then, that there are two theories : one constructed by the most unheard-of processes, in the age of ignorance ; the other the outcome of the great age of science which has won its way by the sheer force of truth against a most determined opposition from Churchmen, from the older men of science, and from the great mass of the people. Even now the main body of those classes, including most women and country parsons, and ill-educated and unreasoning persons of various kinds, remain ignorant of the matter, or not fully persuaded. There is nothing surprising in this ; some minds are so ordered that they cannot come to any conclusion, some, too, have not the knowledge or the brains needed for logical thinking. Others have not the earnestness, nor a care for serious questions sufficient to make them go to the trouble of thinking the matter out. In short, people are in general so deficient in scientific training that they are quite incapable of forming any opinion of value on such an abstruse question. They take their views at second-hand in this as in other subjects. The old, for the most part, hang on tenaciously to what they learnt in their youth ; by degrees they are replaced by those who have been taught more modern conclusions by newer teachers. The formation of these is the prerogative, one might almost say, of a few who have had either the power to keep their minds open to new ideas, or who have received them as first, fresh impressions in youth.

The number of people who really judge for themselves is very

small. It needs a peculiar type of mind, capable of weighing evidence and reserving judgment until really convinced. The majority, even of those who appear so very firm in their tenets, have in practice adopted them ready-made from their parents, their clique, their sect, their school, or their university. One man of what is called strong character may mislead a generation; one who is justly revered for his discoveries may obscure the light for centuries. The most pernicious of all types is the common one which takes its views and opinions from its surroundings, and, without ever asking their basis or cogency, fights ardently for their truth. This is the stuff of which persecutors and wagers of "holy" wars are composed; very valuable so long as rightly led; very fatal when swayed by hot-headed and unwise counsels. Curiously enough, this is the very type of man who commands common praise; he is said to be staunch, reliable, one on whom you can count; he will not take the bit in his teeth and bolt. Still, it is from the clash of opinions that the spark of truth is struck out, and there must be the stout men at arms, as well as the able leaders. When it is feigned by some muddle heads that Gothic cathedrals were built by a crowd of workmen, who each did what seemed best in his own eyes, it is clear that such people have no notion of the way in which stable erections can be contrived; though we may not know the architect's name, nothing is plainer than that every great building has one determining mind, which decided the dimensions and calculated the strength needed for a structure of such size, and the cost of it.

So every moving thought has first occurred to one mind; it finds an echo in others, and touches a string in the common heart of mankind. The spirit of man responds to what it feels right and suitable for the occasion, but unfortunately this seldom or never takes place at once; it generally has to make its way against the solid opposition of all the older crystallized members of the community, whose brains have grown rigid from the thickening of the walls of their arteries, so that fresh, warm blood cannot stir up the sluggish movements of their minds. It is usually the high priests of the nation who rouse the populace against the newer, saner strivings of younger men. Their religion binds them to antiquated forms and beliefs, their very patriotism may misguide them into the

## INTRODUCTION

notion that what is, is right, that anyone who sets himself up against the powers that be is an agent of darkness and a fomenter of strife. Yet, by a stroke of Nemesis it is often these very men who are themselves the first to appeal to arms, who do not stick at underhand and discreditable methods of maintaining what they are convinced is the cause of God and of righteousness. They are so little impressed by the power of their own belief or the potency of faith that they are ever ready to enlist the soldiers of Rome against the offspring of heaven.

History repeats itself because the mind of man is always the same. We have seen this at the beginning of our era, in the age of Constantine, of Justinian, of Theodosius, and of Charlemagne; in the action of the Catholics against the Arians, the Nestorians, the Albigenses, the Waldenses, and the Huguenots; in the Thirty Years' War, in our own struggle for freedom, and in that of Italy, Germany, and Spain; in the French Revolution, in the Reform Bill, and in the abolition of Tests. From age to age new questions arise and emerge, new ideals are erected; the foolish ever hark back to the exploded, and try in vain to maintain what they stupidly regard as the only standard of right. The "fight for the flag" depends, after all, on what flag? it may be only a silly piece of embroidered silk, a flimsy gaud to catch the eyes of women and men-milliners. The Oxford Movement, however sincere in the hearts of its leaders, came to be in the end very much a question of altar-flowers, banners, and pretty costumes for clerics. Its leader took it out into the wilderness and left it there, and for the most part its followers had not the acumen to see that they must return with him to the bondage of Egypt, or go forward boldly to the promised land. It shilly-shallied about under priests who made it golden calves, and pretended to build for it a tabernacle in a desert of sand; but the spirit of divination was not with it, and it has bequeathed its mantle to the Salvation Army, that misbegotten evangel of the last century, which seeks to revive all the forgotten superstitions of the past, and to weave them into a network of cobwebs to entangle the mind of the future. The one, like the other, has reckoned without its host. When the good man of the house sees, as he will before long, to the dwelling that they have tried to

creep into, like a thief in the night, he will make short work of their nostrums and antiquated delusions.

To show how little all this is a figment of my own brain, there are subjoined a few more quotations from Harnack's *Dogma* translated into English, under the auspices of Professors Cheyne and Bruce, so that it may be accepted as a recognized authority. "The Emperor at first gave the Council a free hand, though he at once put a stop to private wrangling, and he energetically interfered at the most decisive moment, and, in the character of a theologian, himself interpreted the formula to be adopted" (IV. p. 50). "The correct faith had triumphed, and the Bishop of Alexandria. The Council of Nicæa is the first step taken by the Bishop of Alexandria in aspiring to the primacy of the East" (IV. p. 59). "The three so-called ecumenical creeds are consequently all 'apocryphal.' The Apostles' creed did not originate with the Apostles, though so far as its basis is concerned, it belongs to the post-Apostolic age; the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed originated neither in Nicæa nor in Constantinople, but in Jerusalem or Cyprus, though it got its main contents from Nicæa; the Athanasian Creed is not the work of Athanasius, nor are they ecumenical; on the contrary, it is at most the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed which can be so termed, since the East knew nothing of the other two" (IV. p. 136). ✓

"A human nature made divine which nevertheless remains truly human is a *contradictio in adjecto*. What those in after times succeeded in doing was accordingly not to give a clear explanation, but simply a paraphrase which as formulated was by no means perfectly suited to express the thought, and whose value consisted in this, that it surrounded the speculative theologians with a hedge and prevented them from falling into abysses" (IV. p. 143). "The history of dogma has to be regarded almost exclusively in its connection with politics not merely after the Council of Chalcedon, but already previous to this. The forces which from 444 onwards determined the great decisions and actions were throughout political" (IV. p. 196).

"Every one who attempted to state his Christological views ran the risk of being regarded as a heretic, while on the other hand people found it possible, when they so desired, to

give a favourable turn to every dogmatic utterance. It threw the East into a state of confusion and made of Christology an armoury of poisoned weapons for the warfare of ecclesiastical politics" (pp. 197-8). "The Emperor had now got what he wished. He had shown that he ruled the Church, and he had got a formula according to which he was able henceforth to decide what was orthodox and what was heretical" (IV. p. 221).

The Rev. F. D. Maurice, Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge, writes of Justinian (*Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*; Macmillan, 1872): "The Trinity with him was not a belief, but an opinion. Men were to hold right opinions upon it and upon all other subjects. If they did not, they were to be coerced. But, like everything else in Justinian's mind, this doctrine belonged to the region of decrees. It was true, because certain councils, and he the Emperor, who was or ought to be higher than they, had said it was true. Why should men not accept it as much as any edict concerning services or the price of provisions?" (I. p. 405). "The comments of the infidel historian upon Justinian and upon the Bishops of the Fifth Council of Constantinople, who registered his edicts against Origen, Theodore, Theodoret, and Ibas, are instructive and valuable. 'If these men,' he says, 'were already in the fangs of the dæmon, their torments could be neither aggravated nor assuaged by human industry. If in the company of saints and angels they enjoyed the rewards of piety, they must have smiled at the idle fury of the theological insects who still crawled on the surface of the earth. We may venture, perhaps, to ask whether in such company they will not rather have wept to think what work these theologians were sent upon the earth to do, and what they were actually doing; to think, supposing them endued with the gift of foresight, what miseries were preparing for the Church, which was at this moment so inflated with pride and cruelty. These observations are a proper and necessary introduction to the subject of Justinian's dealings with the Platonical School'" (pp. 406-7).

"When in the fourth and fifth centuries the masses streamed into the Church, it was not in a position, in spite of catechetical instruction, to exercise any control over them, or to examine the (mental) luggage of those desiring admission. Nay,

more, the monks who in the same period had with such extraordinary rapidity obtained full charge of piety, moved in this world of demons and angels, and cherished the ancient mythology under a Christian name. To live in the sphere of pure and impure spirits, to be visited, refreshed, strengthened by the former, and to be tempted and assailed by the latter, soon was held to be a sign of a heroic Christianity" (Harnack, IV. p. 307). "The one God, whom the people had never understood, threatened to disappear, even in the view of refined theologians, behind the whole complicated intermediaries who appeared more tangible, and therefore more trustworthy" (p. 307). "The Gospel to the Hebrews had already, indeed, made the Lord say, 'My mother, the Holy Ghost,' but this thought was as yet sexless, so to speak, and was besides never made use of in the great Church" (p. 308).

"They [the new Platonists] thought that if Ideas were, as Plato said, substantial, not mere notions of our minds, they must come to us in some real actual form; they must come forth from the primary substance, and present themselves to us. Thus the Platonic Ideas or Ideals are transformed into that host of spiritual persons, secondary gods, angels, dæmons, heroes, souls, which are everywhere flitting before us in the writings of the later doctors. You are never quite certain what guise these personages may put on" (Maurice, *loc. cit.*, I. p. 394). "The Lord's Supper became the centre of an ever-extending circle of material sacred things which could be seen, heard, tasted, smelt, and touched" (Harnack, p. 309). "Further, the senses which seek to perceive and therefore do perceive that which is holy, become dull and blind in presence of that which is actually perceptible, and dazzle the reason. The reason became accustomed to a fabulous world of wonders, and more and more lost all rational standards. Even the most cultured fathers from the fifth century ceased to be capable of distinguishing between the real and unreal; they were defenceless against the most absurd tales of the miraculous, and lived in a world of magic and enchantment" (IV. p. 310). "At the sixth Council a Monothelite offered to prove the truth of his confession by writing it and placing it on the breast of a dead man, when the dead would rise up. *The Fathers of the Council accepted the test*" (IV. p. 310).

"The impulse to mystagogy, and the misguided craving to feel the proximity of the deity, without being or becoming a new man, were to blame for this decline and fall" (IV. p. 310).

"It may be said in many respects that the orthodox now taught with regard to Mary what the Arians had taught regarding Christ, she was a demi-god mediating between God and men" (IV. p. 316). "From this point the veneration of relics and pictures slowly crept in again. But from the fifth century it was greatly strengthened and received a support unheard of in antiquity, through the dogma of the incarnation and the corresponding treatment of the Eucharist. Christ was the image (*Eἰκὼν*) of God, and yet a living being—nay, a life-giving spirit (*πνεῦμα ζωοποιόν*). Christ had by the incarnation made it possible to apprehend the divine in a material form, and had raised sensuous human nature to the divine: the consecrated elements were *eἰκόνες* of Christ and yet were his very body" (IV. p. 318). "A brisk trade was carried on in the seventh and beginning of the eighth centuries in images, especially by monks; churches and chapels were crowded with pictures and relics; the practice of heathen times was revived; only the sense of beauty was inverted" (IV. p. 319).

"None of his successors had mastered the Church, like Justinian; and it was the aim of the iconoclastic emperors to reduce it to complete subjection to the State, to make it a department of the State. They sought at the same time to have a State Church into which they could force the sects, Jews and Mohammedans, without imposing what was most obnoxious to them, that which made official Christianity into heathenism—the worship of images" (IV. p. 319). "The Emperor appointed a patriarch favourable to him in Constantinople, and sought to get the Pope of Rome into his power. The latter, in his letters to him defending the images, emphasized the points, first that there were *χειροποίητα* (images made with hands), which had been prompted by God, and were therefore sacred, and, secondly, *ἀχειροποίητα* (not made with hands), as e.g., the picture which Christ had sent to Abgar" (pp. 321-2). "The majority played the hypocrite from dread of the Emperor in declaring that the veneration of images was a work of Satan, introduced into the Church of the pure doctrine, in order to seduce men from the lofty

adoration of God; or in describing painting as the sinful art by which the incarnation of Christ was blasphemed" (IV. p. 324). (Cf. Synod of Constantinople, A.D. 754.) Their words were: "'We also believe that we speak apostolically and have the Holy Spirit.' They had, in fact, uttered fine propositions, and used words which had ceased for centuries to be heard so distinctly in the Greek Church; but did they themselves believe in these words?" (IV. p. 325). "It [the 'science of the Church'] attacks all questions with a parade of freedom from prejudice; but anything inconvenient it surrounds with a thousand invented difficulties. It is proud of its free thought in matters of no importance, and hides itself finally, when hot pressed, behind a brazen stare. It characterizes its friends as 'well disposed,' *homines boni*, and slanders its opponents. Where evasion is no longer possible, it states the inexorable historic fact as a major premiss; to this it adds a minor taken from its prejudices, and then it solves the syllogistic problem by the aid of piquant conceits. It can be incredibly frivolous and again pedantically learned, just as it suits. Only one question does not occur in its catechism, and it is always hard to drive it home, viz., What is historical truth? That is the science of Jerome" (IV. p. 341).

"Theophilus saw that his power in Egypt would be shaken if he did not rely upon the masses of stupid and fanatical Coptic monks, the anthropomorphists, in whose circles a material God was defended in doggerel rhymes, and the ancient apocalyptic literature was greedily read. Theophilus wheeled round, abandoned, and that with strong personal feeling, the admirers of Origen among the monks, and, with the approval of Rome, hurled his anathemas against him. Jerome, ever on the alert to blot out the stain that attached to him from having once venerated the great theologian, translated into Latin Theophilus' slanderous Easter epistle against Origenism, although he must have seen through its calumnies. In Constantinople, however, the fight waged by Theophilus against his former friends, the Nitrian monks, was followed by that agitation of which Chrysostom was a victim. It was the first violent attempt of the Alexandrian Patriarch, who by his alliance with the masses had won a secure position in his own diocese, to get possession of the

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Constantinopolitan patriarchate, the capital, and whole Church of the East" (IV. p. 342). "The orthodox Church was determined to vilify and then to bury its own past in order to maintain undisputed the fiction that it had always remained the same" (IV. p. 343, *note*). "Trifling monks, who excommunicated and denounced each other, talked big, and there sat at Constantinople an emperor who, himself a theologian, thirsted for the fame of creating a uniform science as well as a uniform belief" (p. 348).

"The religious policy of Justinian and the fifth Council had accordingly the same significance for the (orthodox) East as the so-called Gelasian decree for the West. In the former as in the latter history was extinguished and theology fettered" (p. 349, *note*). It has to be conceded that these few quotations are at once too much and too little. They are not enough, nor is their source, however reliable, sufficiently wide to carry complete conviction to those who are not already familiar with Church history, and the very peculiar and far from satisfactory methods by which the belief of the faithful was created and consolidated. This, however, is a matter of common knowledge, which the following passage from *Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, by Charles Bigg, D.D. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913) fully confirms.

"The commotions that ensued form one of the most painful episodes in ecclesiastical history. There was zeal for truth, no doubt, in the victors; but it was a base and cruel zeal. Origenism was laid under the ban in the synods of Alexandria and Cyprus. In Italy, where Origen was as yet only known by versions of his exegetical writings, the translation of the *De principiis* caused a storm that was allayed only by the condemnation of Origenism and the disgrace of Rufinus at the instigation of Jerome. In the East the quarrel of the bad Theophilus with the Nitrian monks led to a far more deplorable catastrophe. Expelled from Egypt, the monks found shelter at Constantinople. Theophilus eagerly caught the opportunity of humbling the rival Patriarch, and, aided by the wounded vanity of the empress Eudoxia, drove the holy Chrysostom to exile and death. Of his two allies, one, Epiphanius, repented too late, when he learned from Eudoxia's own lips the nature of the service expected from him. But Jerome

was not dismayed by the tragic issue. He exulted over the ruin of a great and good man, whose only fault was that he had extended the hand of charity to the hunted exiles, whose innocence Theophilus himself was not ashamed to acknowledge when once his vengeance was secured. ‘Babylon,’ Jerome wrote to his accomplice, ‘is fallen, is fallen’: Babylon was Chrysostom. The same excited state of feeling continued during the next century and a half” (p. 275). “*Tantaene animis cœlestibus iræ?*” For these are no obscure men or unknown matters; they are the very leaders of the Church, who received the name of “saints,” and they are identified with the crucial questions of theology. It was for Theophilus that Gibbon coined the phrase “a bold bad man”; of how many ecclesiastics and Popes might not the same words be used without much error? They think they are fighting for God, and anything is excusable in such a cause; but surely Cæsar’s view that the Gods can look after themselves is nearer truth; yet conceit as to their importance will deceive the best of men, and lead them into preposterous positions in defence of what can stand on its own merits.

On the other hand, I have feared that perhaps I gave too much, but the hope of ever getting to the second part of this book is now very small, and it seemed better to put a little too much here, by way of anticipation of what may never be completed. Even in the first part I have not accomplished what I set out to do, for when I saw that the question was not so much what had been proved by science, as what had been accepted by theology, that virtually it was a matter of consent by surrender, I set myself to collect all the passages I could which made this clear, meaning to work them up into a collected account of the whole position. But for want of time I have found this is hardly practicable; and so, lest all should be lost, I determined to do what I could, and for the rest to throw my notebook at the head of the public, leaving them to pick out of it what was of value and to learn from it what lessons it had to teach. Here arose a difficulty, whether I should give the passages as for the most part I myself had gathered them—that is, all from the same book together—or whether I should attempt some arrangement according to subjects. This, which was what I first intended, seemed

certainly the right method; but when it came to execution, it appeared almost impossible to link up those from different books successfully. Few of them treated only of a single subject; in many a number of different headings was mixed, and could not be divided without much repetition and verbal change of a sort, which, however carefully done, gave loopholes to objections.

Moreover, there is in every writer a sequence and a continued interest, an assumption in later passages that the arguments and facts of what has gone before are known, and light is cast back upon these by what follows. To me this is possibly more apparent, as I have worked through the whole, than it may be to those who read only the parts. Still, I was loth to lose the connection, though I fear it may be deceptive, producing to my mind a fuller meaning of disjointed passages than others can easily get from them without a knowledge of their context. My hope, however, is to lead those who are interested, or in any way puzzled by the excerpts, to refer to the originals, and to satisfy themselves. This is only fair to the writers, who have stated the problems before them. I have borrowed their accounts with great condensation, though I have striven always to give their views correctly, and for the most part in their own words; but it was not possible, nor would it have been just to them to do so with the explanations they offer of any difficulties. Here they must be left to tell their own tale. If their own words are not quoted in full, their position is not rendered clear. If in science, which is my own line, I found it well nigh beyond me to give both sides, to do so in theology would have been an unwarrantable presumption for which I was wholly unfitted. I quite see that such a method is open to many drawbacks, since there is no real logical connection between many of the passages, though I have endeavoured, as far as may be, to secure a verbal one, so as to make the sense appear to run on, and not be broken up in a way which would make the book unreadable, if not unintelligible. Indeed, it is feared that in places the meaning has been occluded by the even flow of the sequence. It is very hard to put together a mosaic in this way without padding and apart from alteration, except of the smallest kind, and yet to preserve a continuous narrative.

The book is not meant for the man in the street, neither is it addressed to experts; it is for those who take intelligent interest in these issues and will give a fair amount of time and pains for their comprehension. Occasional bits of Hebrew and Greek may appear at first sight inconsistent with this; but they are rarely enough brought in, except where a passage would be mutilated by omission, or the meaning seemed better attained by their use, or where they have become technical terms like the crackjaw names of science, or the nomenclature of foreign nations which cannot be left out if exact precision is to be attained. Some knowledge of languages is so common now that no apology need be made for this; still, it has been kept in strict limits, and an explanation of its bearing is generally given. I am fully aware that what may seem quite clear to me may not be so to others. This may proceed from two causes: I may not have grasped the point myself, but may have thought all quite simple where acuter minds and sharper wits may discover much that is open to debate and capable of various meanings. I am certain this must very often be the case—I do not profess to be an expert in these questions—and no doubt there is not seldom a reference to obscure matters in sentences which to the common eye appear quite clear and obvious in their meaning. Besides this it is hardly possible, in going through so many books, taking parts from them and piecing these together like patchwork, that here and there a sense should not have been given to some in which they were not meant by their authors to be taken, or even one which they cannot fairly be said to bear. No man can shake himself free from his environment. If a cleric reads medical or legal books, he is apt to put on them very curious interpretations; you always get from all you read very much what you take to it. It has been said that every man seeks his doctrines in the Scriptures, and each finds his own there. If you will look at a view by stooping down so as to see backwards between your legs, or even by looking at it with the head very much on one side, as when lying on the ground, the colours are all changed, everywhere there is a blue tint not noticed when the head is upright. This is due to the watery vapour in the air, and we appear to have got so used to it that we discount its presence automatically in general; but

if you go to a foreign country for about six weeks you—or at least I—can see the true colours, which by degrees fade; then if you come home you will see them here, till they fade again by lapse of time. I believe this is a result of fatigue of the retina, whereby anything seen for a long time becomes less clear; or at any rate what you are used to ceases to strike your attention.

Harnack has made it abundantly clear in matters theological —namely, that use sanctified new notions, and practice produced toleration of fresh beliefs. The exponents of every branch of knowledge start with a congeries of commonplaces; these, which form the basis of the subject, are necessary foundations on which to rear their teaching. As a matter of fact, many of them, so far from being certain, as is commonly assumed, are the very points on which discussion has raged incessantly; hence a double pitfall: the expert may turn on you and say, “ You are quietly assuming the fundamental questions on which the whole matter turns ” (cf. *Civilization*, E. Carpenter), or he may, with real or feigned indignation, upbraid you for rejecting or at least casting doubts on the accepted axioms of reasoning, while really you are only feeling that they are not quite to be taken for granted as easily as he seems to think. The Church, indeed, has practised both these methods extensively; it has slipped into tenets quite unconsciously, by mere chance, or by the machination of people who were pulling for something different, and cared nothing what the effect might be on the beliefs of posterity. Having then got to such a position by the most dubious means, she has turned on doubters and said: “ This is the Catholic faith, which except a man keep whole and undefiled he cannot be saved.” Hence a farrago of prejudices, the bases of which are buried in the darkest ages of the world’s history, remnants of superstitions dating from primeval man, superstructures of argument and ceremony derived no one knows whence, Platonism piled on Judaism, Aristotle on Christ, Constantine on St. Peter, Justinian on St. Paul, and the whole rounded off just when the break up of the Roman Empire by the German incursions made the barbaric notion of human sacrifice again accepted by leading minds, and the fiction of purification by blood was rife in all districts of the world then of importance.

The “invincible ignorance” produced by these factors was such that any dogma which appealed to these horrible materialistic fancies was hailed at once as heaven-sent, and any who had the boldness and the sense to oppose them were branded as heretics, and were fortunate if they escaped with their lives: their books were tabooed as unclean; their opinions were stigmatized as the work of the Devil, they themselves were labelled as wicked, and their objects were represented as a criminal desire to lead men from the truth and to involve them in a final maze of diabolic error. The sword of the State was called in to suppress all question, and before long a barrier of accepted rubbish was set up to block the advance of all commonsense. In Protestant countries there can be surely no difficulty in admitting this; even Romanists grant that it is practically true, but they save their faces by an assumption that it was overruled by the Spirit for good. Canon Sanday also shelters himself behind a figment, or let us say a garment of fig leaves, which he fondly thinks was made for him by God; but he admits that it is a bad fit, and that he does not feel comfortable in it. Sir E. Ray Lankester once called angels “celestial poultry,” and, judging from the pictures of them in Southwold Church and elsewhere, you cannot help seeing that the term is an example of his happy talent for nomenclature. In the imagination of Churchmen, sartorial spirits contrived a vesture for the human mind of equal fitness. The seams are for ever giving way, the buttons always coming off with violent explosions, which alarm the souls of the wearers, though the increased ventilation of their persons lets in the light and air of truth. Curiously enough, this very want of elasticity and accommodation to the needs of those for whom these vestments were fashioned is adduced as an argument for their superiority and divine origin.

I have read a tale of a lady who in a French château met a man who by sheer insistence compelled praise of his worn and much-patched shoes, on the ground that they were the original seven-leagued boots cut down and deprived of their peculiar efficacy. So the fact that these heaven-sent clothes split and gape, whenever force is applied to them in any way, is adduced as a reason for accepting their divine

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## INTRODUCTION

manufacture. “Where,” say the praisers, “can you find suits which in warm weather will open like this at the seams and let in air and light?” “But they do not close up again as it gets cold.” “Well, no, that you have to do for yourself; but it is only a cobbling, and we have had plenty of practice at that.” “Would it not be better if the things closed of themselves, and you opened the seams when more room was needed, or fresh air required?” “No doubt it might be, but it has not pleased. . . .” “Your clothes, then, do not allow for growth, but you have to put on a patch as you get bigger and older.” “Yes, that is so; but on the whole they do with a little contriving and turning about, so that people should not see the patches of new material we had to put on. You can’t have everything perfect; and a mend or two, where you can put your hand over them, do not count.” Hoity-toity! but a tear down the whole back, and one rejected as no good, and the other as worn out and useless, were it not for a pinafore on the front to hide your nakedness, seems hardly well described as a few unimportant patches. No doubt Luther and Cranmer, and others by aid of Parliaments, and Knox, and like secular powers have thrown a decent covering over the nude, and have presented the bride in a marriage garment of sorts, which may pass muster with State officials; but somehow, when you come to examine it carefully, you find it hard to profess that the king’s daughter is all glorious within, though there may be an outward seeming of splendid apparel of copes and chasubles, of mitres and of pastoral staves.

It is said that religion in France went out in a blaze of pulpit oratory. With us it seems to be going in a grand procession to the light of altar candles and the fumes of incense, with splendid music and costly robes and sumptuous churches. Yet our prelates cry, “Peace, peace,” when there is none; and they only stifle the still small voice by their crying, forgetting, as they always have done, the precept, “My servant shall not cry, neither shall he strive.” “In quietness and in confidence shall be your strength.” Science has gone on quietly and calmly; and the day is here. She has conquered, and she will conquer; the other has yielded, and will yield, till there is nothing left to give up. Then the religion of science

will replace the science of religion, and the veil which darkens the eyes of man will vanish in the air. The whole reminds one of the old ballad of the "Boy and the Mantle," which split if worn by any who were false. The fact is that Christianity was not really new. It is, in truth, a mere patchwork of fragments, derived from many sources. Of course, men must speak in the languages they know, and think also in the manner commonly prevalent in their age. In things of the mind you cannot put a new piece on to an old worn-out garment, unless the stuff already there is sufficient to support the addition; otherwise, the fresh part will not consist with the original fabric, but will fall out, or rather will never be received at all or be assimilated. The whole notion of gods coming down from heaven; of divine beings who suffered and were slain, and rose again, and ascended into heaven; of atonement by blood, and reconciliation by their death, were commonplaces of the time in vogue all round the Mediterranean. Christianity owes to Roman and Greek paganism "its conception of salvation, its mode of understanding the Christ and the essential rites, baptism, and the Lord's Supper." In the mysteries, "the initiate participated mystically in the trials of the divinity; thereafter he was associated with him in his joy and in his triumph; he saw the god and was united with him" (Alfred Loisy, *Hibbert Journal*, 1912, p. 47, Vol. 10).

"In the worship of the Great Mother at Pessinus, the initiate takes on the person of Attis. The lover of Cybele was a dying God, like Osiris; his passion and resurrection were duly celebrated" (p. 48). "Each of these cults was a system of salvation, which a god was supposed to have instituted at the beginning, either by his own will or by the simple fact of his example and of the lot which had fallen to him" (p. 49). "What concerns us now is to ascertain how the Christianity which displaced them was also a mystery, conceived in its general lines on the same model as these of which we have just been speaking" (p. 50). "Very different, surely, from the Gospel preached by Jesus of Nazareth. The scheme of Messianic salvation, of which the Galilean prophet thought himself the destined head, became a myth of universal salvation, which the historic existence of Christ served to fix upon earth and in the time order" (p. 51). "He was a saviour-god, after

the manner of an Osiris, an Attis, a Mithra. Like them, he belonged by his origin to the celestial world . . . like Adonis, Osiris, and Attis he had died a violent death; and like them, he had returned to life" (p. 51). "The Christian myth was no more a fact of history than were the pagan myths; the Heavenly Man of Paul was no more real a person than Attis; the idea of universal salvation procured by the death of Christ was no more consistent in itself than that of salvation by the death of Osiris" (p. 52). "The historical Christ has from the Apostle's point of view passed into the mystical, and the works and teaching of the ministry are surpassed, almost eclipsed, by the wonders of the life with God" (H. B. Swete, *The Ascended Christ*, p. xiii.)

"The divinity of Christ is entirely spiritual. The life in which it is manifested carries no external signs of the God-head. The complete mediation of God by man is the essence of the Christian Incarnation." Current ideas about God, together with the enthusiasm of faith, combined to form the various Messianic and Logos Christologies in which the growth of a pious belief in Christ's divinity robed itself for that age. If you presuppose devotion to a gifted Jewish prophet, martyred cruelly for the messianic cause, that core of fact, set inside the religious temperament of the first century, corresponds in historical theology to the nucleus of physical incident which gave rise to the miracle-narratives, e.g. about the raising of the dead. The process which developed the one will account for the development of the other. "Though no miracles accompanied His entry into, or presence in, or departure from the world; though He did not think or speak or act otherwise than as a man; though He yields nothing to historical analysis but human elements; yet in Jesus Christ God is incarnate—discovered . . . by the insight of faith." This also is practically Canon Sanday's position (quoted from *Miracles in the New Testament* by the Rev. J. M. Thompson, by Prof. J. Moffat, *Hibbert Journal*, January, 1912).

Considerable light is thrown on the position of the Catholic Church by that of the geologist, Werner, in Germany. He was a sort of scientific pope issuing dogmatic opinions, gathered from all kinds of sources, and based on all sorts of evidence: this hotch-potch of conclusions without sufficient premises

was diffused over the whole earth, and for a long time it retarded and prevented the true growth of knowledge by a false and inconsistent tangle of suppositions. According to Professor Sir A. Geikie, to whose classical *Founders of Geology*, pp. 215-418, the following references and quotations apply: "Well might the inquirer retire in despair from such an encounter. In vain would he have sought an explanation . . . he would never succeed in extracting an expression of doubt, or an admission that the *ipse dixit* of the Freiberg professor could for a moment be called in question." "It was announced dogmatically as a body of ascertained truth, about which there could be no further doubt or dispute. . . . We are also convinced that the solid mass of our globe has been produced by a series of precipitations formed in succession (in the humid way)" (p. 215). "I do not suppose that in the whole literature of science a better illustration could be found of the advice 'When you meet with an insuperable difficulty, look it steadfastly in the face—and pass on'" (p. 219). "Ten years of reflection had only served to make him more positive in maintaining an opinion which the most ordinary observation in his own Saxony ought to have enabled him to disprove and reject. . . . When we remember the long and patient labours of Desmarest before he announced his conclusions regarding the volcanic origin of basalt, we cannot but wonder at the audacity of Werner in discarding these" (p. 223). "That volcanic action had been in progress from the very beginning of geological time, and that it had played an important part in building up the framework of the land in many countries all over the globe, were ideas that seem never to have occurred to him" (p. 225). Prof. Jameson, Werner's mouthpiece in Britain, wrote: "The volcanic state appears to be foreign to the earth (*Geognosy*, p. 93)" (p. 226), and adds: "We should form a very false conception of the Wernerian geognosy were we to believe it to have any resemblance to those *monstrosities* known under the name of 'Theories of the Earth' (p. 42 of *Geognosy*)" (Geikie, p. 211).

"Never in the history of science did a stranger hallucination arise than that of Werner and his school when they supposed themselves to discard theory and build on a foundation of accurately ascertained fact. . . . Assumptions were made for

which there was no ground, and these assumptions were treated as demonstrable facts. The very position to be proved was taken for granted" (p. 212). "He adopted the old idea that the whole globe had once been surrounded with an ocean of water at least as deep as the mountains are high" (p. 214). "The habit of confident assertion seems to have blinded Werner to the palpable absurdity of some of his statements" (p. 216). "The theory of a primeval universal ocean that over-topped the mountains, which formed the basis of Werner's teaching, led in every direction to . . . manifest contradictions and absurdities" (p. 217). Steno, Leibnitz, and other older writers had conjectured that the water found its way into vast caverns in the earth's interior; Jameson, professor of Natural History at Edinburgh, says: "Although we cannot give any very satisfactory answer to this question . . . we may be fully convinced of its truth; and are so, although we may not be able to explain it (*Geognosy*, p. 82)" (p. 219). "Even if [Werner's] ocean had been a mass of boiling water, it could not have held all these rocks in solution, and have deposited them, as successive precipitates" (p. 220). "He seems never to have realized that any reservoir of energy is stored up in the interior of our globe" (p. 228). "He does not appear to have seen any difficulty in understanding how the desiccation and rupture of the rocks were to take place, if the sea still covered them" (p. 229). "Werner adopted the leading ideas of his system in an early part of his career when his personal knowledge was extremely limited" (p. 230). "Werner's system might temporarily suffice for the little kingdom of Saxony" (p. 231).

"His disciples . . . in proportion as their observations have multiplied, have added, and are continually adding, new improvements" (p. 231, *note*). "This patching up of the system may have saved it in appearance, but a moment's reflection will show us that it was fatal to Werner's fundamental doctrine." Dr. Filton (*Edinburgh Review*, Vol. XVIII, p. 95, 1811) said: "They were mere 'subterfuges' by which the force of facts was evaded" (p. 232). "He never wrote a single lecture . . . never could bring himself to write fully on any subject" (p. 233). "He kept himself out of controversy" (p. 235). But his doctrine began to fall into disrepute

even before the death of its author. "One by one the faithful began to fail, and . . . those who had gone out to preach the faith of Freiberg came back convinced of its errors" (p. 331). "The whole system of the Freiburg school, with . . . its dogmatism and its bondage to preconceived theory, is suggestive rather of the dim lamplight and confined outlook of a mine than of the constant and unfettered contact with the fresh and open face of Nature. 'The Wernerian school obstructs progress . . . by supposing the order already fixed and determined when it is really not, further inquiry is prevented, and propositions are taken for granted on the strength of a theoretical principle' (*Edinburgh Review, ut supra*, p. 99)" (pp. 239-40.)

From many indications, I think Sir Archibald agrees with me; I know his learned brother did. The real cause of the parallel is that both depended on a notion that the Bible teaches absolute truth. This is derived from the Jews, who applied the ideas of classical writers on inspiration to their own Scriptures, which are very faulty both in science and history, and even in morals and theology. To the classics inspiration was mainly due to Bacchus, the god of wine, and nobody would be inclined to question vehemently the effects of this source of inspiration: "That it leads to wisdom and all truth" no one would be likely to maintain. Modern spiritualists seem to think it refers to automatic writing; which, however, can hardly be said to afford information of great value, or to commend itself as a source of knowledge as to other spheres of life, or the spiritual world, in the highest sense.

It matters little whether it is a schoolgirl who says, "She knows the world was created 6000 years ago, and wholly destroyed by a flood 1655 years later; that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, were saints, and the Jews peculiar favourites with the Almighty"; or whether a pseudo-man of science (W. Whiston, 1690) proposes by elaborate calculation to fix November 18, 2349, as the very date of the deluge (Geikie, p. 67). Or the Catholic Church, in the plenitude of its wisdom, during the Dark Ages, determining things of which Christ said, "No man, not even the Son, but only the Father knoweth"; and forbade his disciples to seek knowledge upon

them. Even as late as the last century men had to take care that their views, at any rate if put into print, did not run counter to the words of Scripture as settled by the Councils, with the aid of the Holy Spirit, although this holy help failed egregiously to produce holy lives in the prelates who composed them. All through the sixteenth and seventeenth, and far into the eighteenth century, the only escape from conflict with the dogmas of theology was to assign all anomalies to the deluge; which "undoubtedly hindered the advance of rational conceptions of the fundamental facts of geological history" (Geikie, p. 48). "Monks in Alexandria, monks in Antioch, monks in Jerusalem, monks in Constantinople, decide peremptorily on orthodoxy and heterodoxy. The bishops themselves cower before them" (Milman, *Latin Christianity*, Vol. I, p. 310). "The contending sects having found, in the duty of crushing religious liberty, the solitary tenet on which they agreed" (Lecky, *History of European Morals*, Rationalist Press Association edition, p. 84). "The political and organizing genius of the Roman ecclesiastics impelled them to reduce belief into a rigid form; the genius of St. Gregory guided the movement" (p. 85). "The Benedictines think (with Hallam) that the eighth century was, on the whole, the darkest on the Continent; though England attained its lowest point somewhat later" (p. 85, note). "Europe sank into an almost absolute torpor till the rationalism of Abelard, and the events that followed the Crusades, began the revival of learning" (p. 85).

"The period of Catholic ascendancy was, on the whole, one of the most deplorable in the history of the human mind" (p. 87). "The belief in the guilt of error and doubt became universal, and that belief may be confidently pronounced to be the most pernicious superstition that has ever been accredited among mankind" (p. 87). "[Roger] Bacon applied himself with transcendent genius to the study of nature. Fourteen years of his life were spent in prison, and when he died his name was blasted as a magician" (p. 89). "The medieval credulity had also a more direct moral influence in producing that indifference to truth which is the most repulsive feature of so many Catholic writings. The very large part that must be assigned to deliberate forgeries in the early apologetic literature

of the Church we have already seen. . . . This absolute indifference to truth whenever falsehood could subserve the interests of the Church is perfectly explicable, and was found in multitudes who in other respects exhibited the noblest virtue" (pp. 89-90). "When credulity is inculcated as a virtue falsehood will not long be stigmatized as a vice. . . . Another important moral consequence . . . was the great prominence given to pecuniary compensations for crime" (p. 90).

Evagoras, "on his conversion . . . gave Synesius three hundred pieces of gold to be distributed among the poor; but he exacted from the bishop . . . a promissory note engaging that he should be repaid in the future world . . . [and he] commanded his sons, when they buried him, to place the note in his hand" (p. 90). "To give money to the priests was for several centuries the first article of the moral code" (p. 91). "Lors de l'établissement du christianisme, la religion avoit essentiellement consisté dans l'enseignement moral. . . . Au cinquième siècle on l'avoit surtout attachée à l'orthodoxie, au septième on l'avoit réduite à la bienfaisance envers les couvens (*Sismondi, Hist. des Français*, II. 50)" (p. 91, *note*). "People compounded for the most atrocious crimes by gifts to shrines of those saints whose intercession was supposed to be unfailing" (p. 91). "Every cathedral or monastery had its tutelar saint, and every saint his legend, fabricated in order to enrich the churches under his protection" (p. 92—quoting Hallam—*note*). "The religious history of several centuries is little more than a history of the rapacity of priests" (p. 92).

"To teach that the world must be many thousands of years old was plainly to contradict the received interpretation of Scripture that not more than some 6000 years had elapsed since the time of the Creation" (Geikie, p. 44). "The fossiliferous formations, many thousand feet in thickness, contain a long record of geographical changes on the face of the globe, and of a marvellous succession of organic types which required a vast series of ages for their evolution. . . . It was singularly unfortunate for the progress of this branch of science that it should have aroused such ecclesiastical antagonism" (p. 48). "Aristotle had decided against any universal flood, and the authority of this philosopher was then about as potent as that

of Holy Writ." Yet, Fallopio said (in 1557) "the potsherds of Monte Testaceo at Rome were in like manner natural productions of the earth" (p. 52). But Steno, though a prelate in 1677, wrote in 1669 that fossils "were produced in exactly the same way as living plants and animals are produced now" (p. 55). "Steno's treatise stands out far above all the writings of his own or previous generations in respect to the minuteness and accuracy of his observations of Nature" (p. 59). But "he was hampered . . . by the prevailing theological doctrine that the earth could not be more than some 6000 years old" (p. 60). Robert Plot, in 1677, gave "seven reasons for rejecting the idea that fossils owed their form and figure to the shells of the fishes they represent"; but are "*lapides sui generis*" (p. 77). This phrase is used also by Ray (1627-1705), who "could scarcely escape . . . the ecclesiastical prejudice of his time" (p. 73). "In discussing the Biblical narrative of the Creation, Buffon boldly asks what we can possibly understand by the six days, if not six periods of time . . . seeing that no fewer than three of them had passed away before the sun was fixed in the firmament" (p. 91). He placed the separation of the Old and the New worlds 10,000 years before his time (p. 95). Scheuehzer (1672-1733) discovered "at Oenigen a skeleton which he had no doubt was a relic of 'one of the infamous men who brought about the calamity of the Flood'" (p. 99). A curious muddle, for why a calamity, if from God? Fossil fishes, he said, are "the irrefragable witness of the universal Deluge which by the care of Providence" is placed before unbelievers (p. 100).

"The primeval belief that Nature was governed by impulsive and capricious divinities, interfering continuously with the sequence of events, had for centuries disappeared from the creed of all reflective men, though it still found a rhetorical expression among the poets" (p. 40). "The rise of Christianity at first offered no impediment to the freedom of philosophical inquiry. The fate of the Roman Empire and the inroads of the barbarians arrested for centuries the progress of natural history investigation. When this progress was resumed towards the end of the Middle Ages, a new spirit of intolerance had arisen, from which Antiquity had been free" (p. 41).

Curiously enough, the tendency nowadays is, if anything, reverting to the notion of an *omnium gatherum* of divinities. Becoming conscious that the ordering of things is not all-wise and just, and that results do not always turn out as expected, we are dubious as to the autocratic rule of the world. Prof. Peirce is especially strong on the want of fixed regularity in events; and goes as far as to say that the effects we see are not so well regulated as if they were left to mere chance (*Chance, Love, and Logic*, p. 112). In a *Food Commission Report* there occurs the curious assertion that the demand of millions and the effort of thousands to meet it produce a perfectly regular supply to a great district like London, without any regulating mind. "There is no God; unless man can become God" (Swinburne). To the Theist God appears as the root; to the Pantheist as the flower of things. Thus, practically, God is man's highest ideal; but this development in what follows is expounded in a way that seems hardly consistent with the old faith as accepted by the Church and set out in the creeds.

The subjoined citations are from *The Sufficiency of Christianity*, by Dr. R. S. Sleigh; being an abstract of the teaching of Dr. Troëltsch of Berlin. The book was suggested and approved of by Prof. Mackintosh of Edinburgh and Prof. Fulton of Aberdeen. It may therefore be looked on as expressing the view of many modern neologists, and, together with the published views of Prof. J. Y. Simpson of the New College, is certainly a gnomic revelation. "Just because Christianity is thus an historical phenomenon, it is not possible to bring forward any theoretical proof that it must remain the highest religion for ever with no possibility of its being surpassed. . . . It is in all its phases an historical phenomenon, with all the qualifications of such a thing, and cannot, and ought not, on that account to be considered absolute, changeless, complete" (p. 109). "A serious use of the principle of historical development makes it impossible for us to think of a 'revelation' or a 'personality,' complete and perfect at the outset, and historically unconditioned. . . . Christianity has from the outset exhibited, not merely its immanent consequences, but also its appropriative capacity in the taking up of new elements." In "the Pauline ideas of grace and Church, which cannot

directly be derived from Jesus, there has been appropriation. There was also appropriation in the taking up of the Platonic and Stoic elements of ancient civilization, by which alone Christianity to-day retains its practical and cultural power. There was appropriation in the Reformation. . . . We must be perfectly fair with history in this matter, and give honour to whom honour is due, and rid ourselves of the conceit that all the valuable elements of European civilization are the product of Christianity, or that they are its cut flowers. All these appropriations cannot possibly be taken as illustrations merely of something given and consciously known at the start . . . they are to be viewed as effects of the spirit of Christ, but they are not expressed in the original form and, what is more, they are not even directly present there. . . . It is not possible, however, to view them as the simple working out of a germ, for the germ is a transcendental ethic which cannot entirely pass over into a purely humanistic ethic without losing its primordial birthmark."

"The Absolute, which Jesus thus placed in the Kingdom of God, was soon transferred to his person. Such a transference was natural, indeed inevitable, on the part of the primitive Church, because then all were in the 'naïve' atmosphere. . . . It is actually but one more illustration of the mythic and syncretistic attempts of all religions to fortify their naïve Absolutes when they have been shattered" (p. 118). "Quite apart from the historical question of the precise form and content of Jesus' claims, it is not possible from the nature of the case to take them entirely at his own estimate, as some of so-called Bible students attempt to do. His view of disease, his thought of divorce, and of the immediacy of the Kingdom's advent are abandoned" (p. 122). "Jesus is not usually supposed to be quite trustworthy in his interpretation of sin, especially as resulting from the existence and operation of a personal devil" (p. 123). "If it be that in the first days of the faith certain traits of Pauline thought magnified the Exalted Christ, these, as belonging to the apostle's cosmological speculations, are inferior to other traits" (p. 129).

"He has nothing to say about the civic virtues as such. These virtues have a different history, for which we must go to Greece and Rome rather than to Israel" (Sanday, *Hibbert*

*Journal*, October 1911, p. 104). "The event of capital importance in modern Europe was the achievement of the secularization of life and of the State with a eudæmonistic and purely utilitarian ethic derived from Stoic sources in the deliberate repudiation of the Mediæval-Catholic ideal of life" (Sleigh, p. 150). "The Gospel had no programme of social renewal. . . . Christianity from the start developed from within, throwing off her sociological formations, so to speak. . . . There never was any thought of a Christian transformation of the State right up to the Reformation, notwithstanding Constantine and Catholicism. Church and State simply existed side by side" (p. 156). "A new mundane ethic, eudæmonistic and utilitarian, confidently assumed its independent power and right to deal with all earthly concerns" (p. 156).

"He, however, would be a rash man who ventured to prove that there is such a thing as unity of witness or of statement either within the New Testament or in Christian history on any of the dogmas of Christianity, the Christological not excepted" (p. 183). "But it is just as obvious that the pleas for the greater recognition of the Sovereignty of God come perilously near the old Hebraic and Calvinistic conceptions of Divine Caprice" (p. 223).

"There is, for one thing, no all-inclusive law of uniformity either for Nature or for the universe. It is merely a logical postulate, never an experimentally demonstrated proposition" (p. 44). The "idea of 'Special Providences' and of 'supernatural' insteppings seems to suggest an 'absentee' God . . . as a glorified Aladdin with his lamp" (p. 47). "We agree with Troëltsch that the idea of an *ex abrupto* and absolutely supernatural instepping of God into the historical realm is an insult to extra-Christian religious experience, and in flat contradiction to the plain facts of historical life and to the legitimate interests of knowledge" (p. 101).

"Religious experience . . . has a conviction that its views are absolutely true, but whether this 'absolute feeling' . . . is a fancy or an illusion, or whether it does actually contain an element of truth, is . . . a question for epistemology" (p. 117). And, "though Jesus happens to affect us in this way, we must not endeavour to establish an insuperable cleft between him

and other helpers in the good life, nor blind ourselves to the naïve limitations of his absolute claims. They cannot be taken entirely at his own estimate. As a matter of fact, their limitations have already in several directions been falsified by history" (p. 119). "We may think of an eternal truth supernaturally given to man and preserved within a universal Church, or we may think of aspects of truth exhibited by a variety of Churches. The former idea of truth will not bear examination" (p. 157). "Our Gospels and the documents out of which they are composed were written at a time when the expectation of the end of the world was very strong. The minds of the writers were full of it. . . . But does it equally reflect the mind of Him to whom it is referred as speaker? . . . I should have little doubt that the writer fully believed that he was recording a genuine saying." "But St. Matthew at least took the saying eschatologically. In his version it is not 'the kingdom of God' but 'the Son of man' who comes with power. That is quite unambiguous; and in that sense we cannot say that the prediction has been fulfilled. . . . Not a little Old Testament prophecy came far short of the reality" (Sanday, *Hibbert Journal*, October 1911, pp. 107-8).

Sufficiently to justify my saying to them: You cannot rest here; you must either go forward to the promised land, boldly, or back again; into the house of bondage, in Egyptian darkness. "We are being taught by recent scholarship that almost every Christian belief is the sublimation and, still more, the capitalization into eternal values, of dreams or mythologies that filled the world of that time." "You have scenery sketched in from the notions current at that time about the world beyond death, and you have the truth which Christ used these to teach. . . . He may have shared these popular beliefs, as He knew but of a flat earth and a revolving sun. . . . They were but fuel for His Flame" (P. T. Forsyth, "Revelation and the Bible," *Hibbert Journal*, October 1911, pp. 248-9).

Every man of science or enlightened views has to state these views constantly, in such a way that those who do not and cannot really enter into his thought may yet get the gist of his meaning with fair accuracy; and, if he put it into writing, so to guard it and surround it with conditions that an astute legal or logical reader may not be able to draw from it a sense

opposed to his teaching. But we are told that when the All-Knowing, Infallible Wisdom had to communicate a message to man, it was not possible so to couch it that it should not be liable to misinterpretation or engender beliefs and customs altogether contradictory to its intent; that in an age which worshipped Aristotle and produced the legislation of the Roman Empire, which has survived as the basis of all modern law, it was beyond the power of the Almighty to find fit agents to define the scope and bearing of His revelation. No man of sense and forethought would so treat a document that was concerned only with his goods and chattels; and if he thought he had a word of wisdom for mankind he would use the utmost endeavours to make it clear, or at least beyond mistake by faulty interpretation. Yet this is but part of a larger question; we have been assured that man was so truculent that order could be established and maintained only by a dispensation of volcanoes and earthquakes, varied now and then by devastating floods, to teach them to admire and adore the mercy of the All-loving Father (*v.* Wordsworth, *Genesis*).

What would we think of a schoolmaster who could not keep order except by periodically blowing up the schoolhouse, pupils and all? Would we not say that there was want of order and foresight about his methods and a lack of skill in the treatment of subjects? A country with constant revolutions (in Turkey, they refused an engineer's telegram which spoke of 30,000 revolutions in an hour), any business that had perpetual mishaps, would be justly discredited; would, indeed, soon cease to exist, for people could put no confidence in it; by mere action of economic laws it would be ended, and "others fill its office." But when it is a thought, a matter of theory itself, the mere fact that it does not square up with reality does not seem to affect men's minds; they do not "mind" this. Yet to-day we read: "Relentless Nature which brought the floods must be left to complete her ravages; and only when her toll of millions has been taken can human endeavour step in and save what remains: in the provinces, the deaths will unquestionably exceed 2,000,000; in Wuchang alone 1000 die daily" (*Edinburgh Evening News*, August 24, 1931). Is, then, Nature independent of God? Those who

have “prayers for fine weather” can hardly say that, but the thought of millions of poor and simple people face to face with horrors almost too terrible to imagine will move all humanity to pity.

As a matter of fact it is just the most feckless and helpless of mankind, those who make no provision for mishaps and take no thought to cope with such contingencies, who are subject to this treatment. Justin McCarthy, describing the debate in the House of Commons on February 17, 1866, on the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in Ireland, writes, “Mill . . . put the matter effectively enough when he observed that if the captain of a ship, or the master of a school, has continually to have recourse to violent measures to keep crew or boys in order, we assume . . . that there is something wrong in his system of management.” “No Englishman who puts the question fairly to his conscience will deny that if he were considering a matter that concerned a foreign country and a foreign government, he would regard the mere fact as a condemnation of its system of rule” (*History of Our Own Times*, Vol. IV, p. 215). It is in keeping with Asiatic notions to imagine things are ordered by an irresponsible power and that Man has only to submit to what he, do what he will, cannot alter or avert; but we to-day have learnt other ethics than this. Fairness and justice are due to everyone alike, and it does not atone for injustice and moral evil generally to allege that all will be set right in another place. Even the remedy that is alleged elsewhere is not a satisfactory solution of the problem. There is sorrow and suffering that is of no advantage in any way; we are learning to avoid this, and nobody now suggests that there is anything wrong in trying to get rid of needless pain. There is something so absolutely absurd in the “ascetic” view of the problem. We are sure that outside a benighted and evanescent clique no argument would be raised in its defence. We are all agreed that every means should be used to relieve and diminish anguish; we should scout and reject with the utmost scorn any idea that there was a merit in enduring or permitting any preventable or curable ill, or that there is a call to endure what can be avoided, or to put up with what can be remedied, even at great trouble and expense. Fifty years ago a different view seems to have

been held; we were to accept all with thanks as the action of an all-knowing and loving Father, which, though not understood by us, was really all for the best. For myself, I feel bound to protest—the theory “will not wash,” and I believe the eyes of many others are also opening to this fact. In our youth we were taught it, in a once-popular “goody-goody” tractate for juveniles, where a father places his children in a beautiful garden, but abounding in lions and poisonous plants and insecure buildings. What would an earthly judge say to a father who did this? Culpable homicide would be the mildest verdict; and it might be wilful and premeditated murder.

A few quotations will show its “choice” quality: “I was very glad that they had not ventured to enter the wood; for, though they saw them not, I could see the bright eyes of a serpent gleaming from beneath the myrtle on which the butterfly was resting: he seemed to be waiting anxiously for the coming of the children; and I doubt not there was poison in his fang.” But, “I discovered that there were false meteor lights in the Garden of the Shadow of the Cross; doubtless they were put there by the enemy of the King in order to tempt the children to taste the poisonous fruits.” “Then there was a laugh as of fiends in the air, the earth opened beneath the feet of Self-deceit, and she and her flaming torch and whited garments were swallowed up; Wayward ran hastily out of the wood. But it was too late; the lion that had lain in wait made his fatal spring and seized on his prey.” This apparently refers to the Jews—but there seems to be a sly hit at the Church of Rome in it—and as these for the greater part of its existence constituted the “Church of God,” the inference is curious. “His Father did not suffer his strength or sight altogether to fail, but he was allowed continually to feel the ill effects.” “I saw that he staggered as he walked, and often stumbled and well-nigh fell. The meteor lights still continued to hover around him, throwing deceitful shadows on secret poisons and hidden snares. Many a time did he pause long before he could distinguish the true image from the false. I soon lost sight of him, so I cannot tell what befell him then.”

As a child I have often cried over this book, my sympathy being with those who came to a bad end. Such books seem to

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have been in favour in that Victorian age—Mrs. Gatty's *Parables from Nature*, for instance. My mother was one of those women who appear to think that there is merit in suffering; my father was bred up in the Evangelical School, though he came to dislike it; my brother was of the schoolmaster type whose maxim is that “ pain should be connected with wrong-doing ” from the very beginning.

“ O Thou, who Man of baser Earth did'st make,  
And who with Eden didst devise the snake,  
For all the sin wherewith the Face of Man  
Is blacken'd, Man's Forgiveness give—and take ! ”

*Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám*, translated by E. Fitzgerald.

It is true that such is the teaching of St. Paul (Rom. ix. 21); but the very gravamen of our charge is that it does appear in the more authentic parts of Scripture. We no longer credit that man was placed in the Garden of Eden. We know that he began to struggle with Nature, almost on a level with the brutes, and that he has gradually risen by long-continued efforts. “ The mills of God grind slowly, but they grind exceeding small ”; and by degrees man is learning how to save himself and others from those mills.

We were told that all this was needed in order to breed up a race of worshippers of their own free-will: but was free-will necessary to lions and tigers to crouch and spring out from ambuscades, to nightshade to produce atropine, and to hemlock and henbane? It is not free-will to man only, as clerics represent; but freedom all round, to earthquakes, to volcanoes, to floods, and to fire.

Butler's argument from an All-loving to a “ revelation ” is convincing; but when we examine the alleged message from heaven, we are in much the state of a king who has been surfeited with praises of a bride engaged for him, when he sees the reality. Even St. Paul's epistles are not certain as to their text; the burden of them is the worthlessness of the Law, the need of freedom from ritual, codes, and dogmas. The apparent fixity of the Greek text from which our version is made obscures this; but if one hears that part of this was due to re-translation by Erasmus from the Vulgate, *defuit fides*, the Hebrew is less certain; there, we are told, “ it was reconstructed after the Captivity.” Parts, e.g. Joshua and Chronicles, were not

written till then, and some books are patchworks by different writers put together by mere chance. Similar methods seem to have held with the New Testament: Acts is a marked example with its sudden changes from "they" to "we" and its perpetual quotation from the LXX (*e.g.* xv. 17), where the Hebrew will not support the contention based on it. It is plain that all the acts and words of the Church were in Greek, and it is not curious that Luke, as an Hellenist, should use this version; but it throws a significant light upon "Inspiration" by the Holy Ghost. It is erroneously said that Wolsey wrote, *Ego et rex meus*. He was really condemned for putting himself on a level with the king, *Rex meus et ego*. In Acts we have "the Holy Ghost and we" (xv. 28); and the use of words in several places show that if there had been any distinct message of the Spirit, there would have been no doubt or cause for hesitation. Of xvi. 6-7, Prof. Plumptre says, "In some way, by inner promptings, by visions of the night, or by the inspired utterances of converts who had received the gift of prophecy, revelation is received." As to the speeches "We may notice two points, to begin with. They are all very short, too short to have been delivered as they stand, and for the most part the style in which they are written is that of the historian" (Rev. A. C. Headlam, *H.D.B.*, Vol. I, p. 33). "These speeches, then, although written in the author's style, are clearly authentic" (p. 34). "This . . . does not prove that the writer is necessarily as trustworthy in the earlier portions of the history, where his sources of information were less good. It does suggest that he would get as accurate information as possible, and reproduce it correctly" (p. 32). In regard to the speeches, *Encyclopaedia Biblica* states: "It is beyond doubt that the author constructed them in each case according to his own conception of the situation. In doing so, he simply followed the acknowledged practice of ancient historians" (Vol. I, p. 47). "Apart from the 'we' sections no statement merits immediate acceptance on the mere ground of its presence in the book" (Vol. I, p. 46). Sir W. Ramsay, who speaks of Luke as an historian of the highest grade, says "that for its earlier portion its value depends on the value of the sources used." To me, Harnack has shown conclusively that these were St. Mark and Philip, who had a strong bias towards the miraculous. "Positive

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proofs of the trustworthiness of Acts must be tested with the greatest caution" (*Encyclopædia Biblica*, Vol. I, p. 46). Philip's daughters are said to have raised someone from the dead; as to which I would ask, "Who certified this?" In one of the cases recorded we have Christ's word, and in another St. Paul's, that they were not dead; but there is always a leaning towards miracles.

The Rev. A. C. Headlam speaks of Acts as a complete work that fulfils its object and reaches its own end. Our quarrel is not with the men who wrote the books, but with the view that they were led by the Holy Ghost. None can think that it is a satisfactory history of the early Church, or even of Paul's life; it is only part of each, and leaves much to be desired. The fault is not so much with what is written as with what is not. A great part of the Bible is taken up with "Epistles" that ordinary men do not read, and still more with the Prophets, and with genealogies and dubious stories that could hardly be read in public. I have had to do with an eccentric who thought it right to go through the whole Bible at family prayers. A nice mess he made of it, and anything but an "improving" effect on the domestics, who were alternately shocked and bored.

If anyone has doubts as to all this, it is needful only to read Archdeacon Charles's *Revelations*, or Dean Farrar's *Book of Daniel*, in which we are told that a collection of stories was made, after the style of the *Arabian Nights*, for "edification," and "to encourage the Hebrews at a time of persecution under Antiochus Epiphanes." To these pieces "Bel and the Dragon" and "Susannah and the Elders" are not unfit accompaniments, also the "Song of the Three Children," which is recognized as such by the Roman Catholic Church. We are assured that it is modelled on the "Story of Joseph," which raises a suspicion that this also is a fiction: in other words, a fine specimen of the Eastern story-teller.

When *The Times* and the *Illustrated London News* agree that the 12th Dynasty was reigning in Egypt 2349 B.C., the date commonly assigned to the "Flood"; that other lines of kings preceded 4004 B.C., usually given as the era of the Creation; and that these two tales were current also in Babylon, with precisely similar detail, the feeling is justified that they, too,

are the results of Eastern tale-teller's efforts. This inference is greatly strengthened by the discovery that Sinai and Palestine were in the possession of Egypt at the time calculated for the Exodus; which makes the Book of Joshua, and even the more sober accounts of Judges and the so-called "Law of Moses," impossible. When we reflect on events, the passage of the Red Sea, the ascent of the mountain, said to be Sinai, the writing by God Himself of the Commandments on stone, the crossing of Jordan, and the fall of Jericho, we can only say that any such prodigies do not occur in our experience. Even the lives of David, Elijah, Elisha, and Hezekiah exhibit features which are altogether outside what we ever knew to have happened. With regard to many things like these, a fair agreement is being arrived at, that they did not occur as related and could not have had the approval of the Almighty and All-merciful. For even a good man and a wise one could not give his sanction to such deeds or thoughts, so that the name of the Deity has been abused, to cover what were really very questionable proceedings of men. Therefore the conclusion is that the Hebrews were fabulists then, as they still are. The Eastern atmosphere pervades the whole history, and the morality of the semi-savage nations deforms the mentality of the period. Even the Psalms, which have been a manual of religion in all ages, are notoriously tainted by the same tone of mind. Many parts are no longer read in churches, which do not affect a rule of going regularly through the whole in a given time; and even these contrive to use the objectionable portions at times when they will not be widely heard, and comment on them is unnecessary. Our whole view of the theology has changed. We no longer credit a God who is partisan of one nation or favours particular persons. The nearest approach I have heard to this was a Scot, who said "the Lord had saved him from putting his whole fortune into a bad investment," though apparently careless that half of it should be lost. You will constantly be told "that good food and other things have been lost and spoiled because of the Lord's will." Chimneys fall and do mischief, soot may get into things or they may be burnt; but it is all the "will of God," and you must submit with patience.

This certainly tends to carelessness and want of enterprise;

## INTRODUCTION

the fault is not yours, it is from above, and you are absolved personally. Parallel to this may be set the Kaiser's position with regard to the War. He figured as very religious, and preached on occasions; yet he plunged the world into one of the most awful calamities that have befallen it. Popes and holy men have deliberately let loose little hells on earth. The Crusades, the Inquisition, the extermination of the Albigenses, the persecution of the Waldenses, the ambition of William the Conqueror, and the Spanish adventurers in the New World. Yet apparently the Heavenly Father issued no warning, and took no trouble to prevent such awful catastrophes. But the writings of the "historic school" of theology reduce all this to an utter absurdity. Transgression of a law, which according to their methods never did exist, caused the Almighty "to be up early in the morning," to "send prophets" and plagues even to those who did not do what they knew nothing about, but slavery in America and the East excited no action of the All-loving. Alexander, Cæsar, Commodus, Caracalla, Louis XIV, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon were allowed to pursue their course without protest. "The notion of a pure primitive religion, that degenerated into formalism and mere observance of ceremonies and tabus, is contrary to all experience of history and men's manners" (Dean Strong, "Ethics," *H.D.B.*). This means that we are faced with the notion that for neglect of a barbaric code of religion and morals the chosen people were dispersed and the chosen place destroyed; prophets were commissioned whose message does not in many cases conform to what we should think a high ideal, since it preached hatred and contempt for races whose beliefs and practices are being shown to be very similar to those of the Hebrews. "Hating and hated" is traditionally the Jews' maxim.

The fact that these nations were really their nearest kindred, that Moab and Ammon, Edom and Canaan, Tyre and Sidon, and even Babylon and Egypt were closely allied in origin and beliefs to them, seems only to have increased their dislike. No attempt, so far as we know, was ever made to lead these people to higher or purer views; they were simply condemned and sentenced like noxious beasts to extermination. It is true that all this is in keeping with the usual ordering of the

Universe; Butler's *Analogy* logically applies to it; but does this in any way make it better or more commendable—nay, even excusable? As Aristotle says, no one is willingly vile; those who realize that higher ways are possible, strive, if only at times, to reach up to what they think better. It is rather the ignorance and carelessness of men that lead them wrong than any set determination to do what is evil. For we at least recognize that evil means "to the disadvantage of mankind," and few could persuade themselves that this was for their benefit, but when the idea was that a great potentate enjoined what he liked, then of course he must be obeyed, and for the effects of his commands he alone was responsible.

This is all put in a most picturesque setting in *The Poet at the Breakfast-Table* by Oliver Wendell Holmes (David Douglas, 1884): "Geology began turning up fossils that told extraordinary stories about the duration of life upon our planet. What subterfuges were not used to get rid of their evidence!" (p. 14). "Seriously maintaining that this skeleton never belonged to a living creature, but was created with just these appearances; a make-believe, a sham, a Barnum's-mermaid contrivance to amuse its Creator and impose upon his intelligent children!" (p. 15). "A dozen years ago people said Sh! Sh! if you ventured to meddle with any question supposed to involve a doubt of the generally-accepted Hebrew traditions. To-day such questions are recognized as perfectly fair subjects for general conversation; not in the basement story, perhaps, among the rank and file of the curbstone congregations, but among intelligent and educated persons. . . . If for the FALL of man science comes to substitute the RISE of man, Sir, it means the utter disintegration of all the spiritual pessimisms which have been like a spasm in the heart and a cramp in the intellect of man for so many centuries" (p. 17). "The Pope put his foot on the neck of kings, but Calvin and his cohort crushed the whole human race under their heels in the name of the Lord of Hosts. It seems to me all right that at the proper time, in the proper place, those who are less easily convinced than their neighbours should have the fullest liberty of calling to account all the opinions which others receive without question" (p. 25). "I do not now feel quite so sure that the contemplation of all the multitude of remote worlds

does not tend to weaken the idea of a personal Deity" (p. 31).

I dare not be a coward with my lips  
Who dare to question all things in my soul (p. 44).

I am not humble; I was shown my place,  
Clad in such robes as Nature had at hand;  
Took what she gave, not chose; I know no shame,  
No fear for being simply what I am. . . .  
But for their sake who are even such as I,  
Of the same mingled blood, I would not choose  
To hate that meaner portion of myself  
Which makes me brother to the least of men (p. 43).

"I suppose one man in a dozen—said the Master—ought to be a sceptic. That was the proportion among the Apostles, at any rate" (p. 51).

This is my homage to the mightier powers,  
To ask my boldest question, undismayed.

They all must err who have to feel their way  
As bats that fly at noon; for what are we  
But creatures of the night, dragged forth by day,  
Who needs must stumble? . . .  
Thou wilt not hold in scorn the child who dares  
Look up to thee, the Father, dares to ask  
More than thy wisdom answers (p. 44).

"The only good reason for believing in the stability of the moral order of things is to be found in the tolerable steadiness of human averages" (p. 74). "It is very curious to see how science . . . without minding what somebody else has said, or how some old majority vote went in a pack of intriguing ecclesiastics—I say it is very curious to see how science is catching up with one superstition after another" (p. 76).

The God who plagued his people for the sin  
Of their adulterous king, beloved of him,—  
The same who offers to a chosen few  
The right to praise him in eternal song  
While a vast shrieking world of endless woe  
Blends its dread chorus with their rapturous hymn. . . .  
I claim the right of knowing whom I serve,  
Else is my service idle; He that asks  
My homage asks it from a reasoning soul.  
To crawl is not to worship (p. 88).

The beams of our rude temple; first of all  
Must frame its doorway high enough for man  
To pass unstooping. . . .  
We demand to know him first, then trust him and then love.

When we have found him worthy of our love,  
 Tried by our own poor hearts and not before. . . .  
 Try well the legends of the children's time;  
 Ye are the chosen people, God has led  
 Your steps across the desert of the deep  
 As now across the desert of the shore. . . .  
 They told of cities that should fall in heaps;  
 But yours of mightier cities that shall rise  
 Where yet the lonely fishers spread their nets,  
 Where hides the fox and hoots the midnight owl (pp. 88-90).

"He had been taught strange things, he said, from old theologies when he was a child, and had thought his way out of many of his early superstitions" (p. 92). "'The *non-clerical* mind in all ages is disposed to look favourably upon the doctrine of the universal restoration to holiness and happiness of all fallen intelligences, whether angelic or human.' . . . Since Burns dropped the tear for poor 'auld Nickieben' that softened the stony-hearted theology of Scotland" (p. 125).

If we are only as the potter's clay,  
 Made to be fashioned as the artist wills,  
 And broken into shards if we offend  
 The eye of Him who made us, it is well. . . .  
 Is there not something in the pleading eye  
 Of the poor brute that suffers, which arraigns  
 The law that bids it suffer? (pp. 127-8).

God has left that mighty universe, the Soul,  
 To the weak guidance of our baby hands,  
 Turned us adrift with our immortal charge,  
 Let the foul fiends have access at their will,  
 Taking the shape of angels, to our hearts,  
 Our hearts already poisoned through and through  
 With the fierce virus of ancestral sin.

. . . and being heirs  
 Of all the dullness of their stolid sires,  
 And all the erring instincts of their tribe,  
 Nature's own teaching, rudiments of "sin,"  
 Fell headlong in the snare that could not fail,  
 To trap the wretched creatures shaped of clay  
 And cursed with sense enough to lose their souls. . . .  
 He will not blame me, He who sends not peace,  
 But sends a sword, and bids us strike amain  
 At Error's gilded crest (pp. 129-30).

"The doctrine of heritable guilt, with its mechanical consequences, has done for our moral nature what the doctrine of demoniac possession has done in barbarous times and still does among . . . barbarous tribes for disease" (p. 141). "Do we not all hope, at least, that the doctrine of man's being a

blighted abortion, a miserable disappointment to his Creator, and hostile and hateful to him from his birth, may give way to the belief that he is the latest terrestrial manifestation of an ever . . . upward striving movement of divine power?" (p. 142). "Oriental manhood finds the greatest satisfaction in self-abasement. There is no use trying to graft the tropical palm upon the Northern pine" (p. 143). "As to the excellent little wretches who grow up in what they are taught, with never a scruple or a query; Protestant or Catholic, Jew or Mormon, Mohammedan or Buddhist, they signify nothing in the intellectual life of the race" (p. 144). "As for *power*, we are outgrowing all superstition about that. We have not the slightest respect for it as such, and it is just as well to remember this" (p. 145).

"The crimson sash, the broad diagonal belt of the mounted marshal of a great procession, so cheap in themselves, yet so entirely satisfactory to the wearer, tickle my heart's roots" (p. 150).

Alas! how much that seemed immortal truth  
That heroes fought for, martyrs died to save,  
Reveals its earthborn lineage, growing old;  
And limping in its march, its wings unplumed,  
Its heavenly semblance faded like a dream! (p. 166).

Does He not smile who sees the toys  
We call by sacred names, and idly feign  
To be what we have called them? He is still  
The Father of this helpless nursery brood,  
Whose second childhood joins so close its first (p. 170).

"'Nature' and 'Grace', as handled by the scholastics, are nothing more nor less than two hostile Divinities in the Pantheon of post-classical polytheism" (p. 193).

Could hate have shaped a demon more malign  
Than him the dead men mummied in their creed  
And taught their trembling children to adore! (p. 202).

Condemned to be the sport of cruel fiends,  
Sleepless, unpitying, masters of the skill  
To wring the maddest ecstasies of pain  
From worn-out souls that only ask to die (pp. 201-2).

Would that the heart of woman warmed our creeds!  
Not from the sad-eyed hermit's lonely cell,  
Not from the conclave where the holy men  
Glare on each other, as with angry eyes  
They battle for God's glory and their own  
Till, sick of wordy strife, a show of hands  
Fixes the faith of ages yet unborn (p. 204).

It is unlikely that any person of common sense now pays much attention to the Book of Daniel, or to "Revelations"; but it is astonishing that those writers who have done so much to loosen and undermine the foundations of orthodoxy should still appear to accept the superstructure of theology erected upon single verses of Scripture which they show to be open to the gravest question. Yet it is an open secret that two former ministers of contiguous parishes in Edinburgh declared that they did not believe what they preached in the pulpit. It is possible to think a great deal of insincerity is covered by "discreet" silence; Bacon admitted with abject humility that he had done things which were open to profound suspicion and condemnation, and we need not be surprised if smaller men have perpetrated still smaller meannesses. There has been an appalling amount of falsehood in the religion of all ages. When men persuade themselves that they are upholding the honour of heaven there is no length to which they will not go either of cruelty or deceit. The old view of classic times, that the wrongs of the Gods were the affair of themselves, was the outcome of a cynical and *blasé* disposition. When people think their own interests are closely involved with those of their deities they will tolerate no infraction of the ceremonies or beliefs that they imagine were enjoined by decrees from above. Christ was divine because of His humanity; the Church has been inhuman by reason of its divinity. Our aim should be to get rid of this divinity, which has been the excuse for battle, murder, and all uncharitableness and brutality for long ages in this world; and which seeks to prolong the same feeling into eternity, by its awful and inhuman doctrine of hell in a world to come.

If men would consult their hearts and their own good sense they would quickly shake themselves free from the hideous thoughts which antiquated and barbaric tradition has imposed on their credulity. "Burke declared that the system which lays its foundations in rare and heroic virtues will be sure to have its superstructure in the basest profligacy and corruption" (J. H. McCarthy, *History of Our Own Times*, Vol. IV, p. 312).

Then stirred within him a tumultuous joy;  
The demon whose delight is to destroy  
Shook him, and shouted with a trumpet tone,  
"Kill ! kill ; and let the Lord find out his own !"  
(Longfellow, *Torquemada*, "The Theologian's Tale.")

Dr. Littledale, commenting on Canon Farrar's *Eternal Hope* (*Contemporary Review*, April 1878), says: "The popular theology which teaches that man's doom is irreversibly fixed at the moment of death, and that, if he be unrepentant at that particular instant of time, he is lost for ever . . . puts God on a moral level with the devisers of the most savagely malignant revenge known to history—the deed known in Italy as *la gran vendetta*. This differs from ordinary assassination in that the murderer does not strike his victim down at any time feasible, but dogs his steps till he finds him fresh from the committal of some sin accounted mortal in Roman Catholic theology, and then slays him before he has had a moment for repentance, or confession, so as to ensure his damnation as well as his death. . . . The horror with which we read of such a crime ought to make us all careful lest we should give our assent to the teaching which predicates it, only on an infinitely vaster scale, of the just and merciful God " (p. 178).

Actually neither this, nor verbal inspiration, nor the Virgin-birth of Jesus, has ever been pronounced as the doctrine of the Church which all must receive. It is true that we now have a Pope who claims to be infallible; but it is commonly held that this applies only when he assents to dogmas passed by a general council. For myself, I am sure that ideas like these cannot be based on such credentials. Already, half a century ago, H. Rogers, Isaac Taylor, Sir Leslie Stephen, Mallock, F. D. Maurice, and Archbishop Whately, with Tennyson, Browning, Dean Stanley, Kingsley, and Francis Peek called them in question. Ruskin, in one of his *Letters to a Working-man*, animadverts on the fact that Keble's last public appearance was to enforce the belief in everlasting torment; and Carlyle avows that in his later days he could no longer credit the devil or hell, in spite of early prejudice. "I see not one ray to disclose to me the reason why sin came into the world; why the earth is strewed with the dying and the dead, and why man must suffer to all eternity" (Rev. A. Barnes, *Practical Sermons*, p. 123). "I acknowledge my inability (I would say reverently) to admit this belief, together with a belief that 'God is love', that 'His tender mercies are over all His works'" (John Foster, "On Future Punishment"). *Dictum horribile, fateor* (Calvin, *Instt. v. Farrar, Eternal Hope*, Excursus IV). The

Jews never held this. "There is not a word in the Talmud that lends any support to that damnable dogma of endless torment" (Dr. Adler, quoted *loc. cit.*). "He will not retain His anger for eternity" (Psalm ciii. 9). "Nothing seems more incompatible with a true Biblical tradition than an eternity of suffering and chastisement" (Chief Rabbi Michel, *Le Judaism*, C. IV, 590).

In the Middle Ages there was a low materialism quite opposed to any spiritual conception. The hymn, "Jerusalem, the Golden," with its "shout of those who triumph, and song of them that feast," its "gates of pearl, and streets of gold," is typical of the earthly view then taken of this paradise. I would suggest that Christ's aim was "to reconcile the world to God and not God to the world"; and that when people attain the "Beatific Vision" they will see what fools they have been to stand aloof from the all-loving Father and follow their own wills. That they have lost, in this life and the next; and this loss is irreparable, and so eternal. Regret for it can never die; the flame of sorrow never be quenched. Yet the soul will be saved and rejoice, for ever; this gives exact justice to all. "The choice of sin produces the results of it. So far as it is embraced, it carries its own penalty; yet, to have got home at last is an infinite blessing, which surpasses all other considerations. Though perhaps the reward might have been greater if the fault had been less, still 'the love of God passeth all understanding'; and though shame at the folly and waywardness of life may survive as a detraction from the feeling of perfect satisfaction which might otherwise have been attained, it rather acts as an addition to the thankfulness that pervades the mind of the 'saved,' from their own sin" (Sir Francis Peek).

As early as 1877 Mallock posited the question thus. He would not perhaps then have asserted such views in a dogmatic way; but the trend of thought and research in these matters has since gone far beyond the position taken up at that time, and has to a great extent confirmed the opinions expressed with so much force of illustration and argument. "Let us but glance to begin with at what criticism has accomplished on the Bible. The Biblical account of the creation it has shown to be an impossible fable. To many of the sacred books it

has assigned new dates and origins. To passages thought prophetic it has given the most homely meanings. . . . Looked at in the common daylight, and judged by a common standard, stories that we once accepted with a solemn reverence, seem childish, ridiculous, and grotesque, and not unfrequently barbarous. . . . The Bible, if it does not give the lie itself to the astonishing claims that have been made for it, contains nothing, at any rate, that can really avail to support them. This applies to the New Testament just as much as to the Old. And the consequences are here even more momentous. . . . For the miracles of Christ, and for his superhuman nature, they can bring no evidence that even tends to be satisfactory; and even his daily words and actions it seems probable may have been inaccurately reported, in some cases perhaps invented; and in others supplied by a deceiving memory. When we pass from the Gospels to the Epistles a kindred sight presents itself. We discern in them the writings of men not inspired from above; but with many disagreements amongst themselves, struggling upwards from below, influenced by a variety of existing views, and doubtful which of them to assimilate. . . . The materials of which they formed their doctrine we can find in the world around them. And as we follow the Church's history further and examine her great dogmas, as they grow more defined and articulate, we shall be able to trace all of them to a natural origin. We shall see how, in part at least, men conceived the idea of the Trinity from the teachings of Greek Mysticism; and how the idea of the Atonement was shaped by ideas of Roman jurisprudence. Everywhere in the holy building supposed to have come down from God we discern fragments of older structures, confessedly of earthly workmanship" (*Contemporary Review*, March 1878; pp. 714-15). As to which the writer suggests, as apparently sufficient answer, that a building may be of superhuman architecture although we can trace every brick in it to earthly factories. But the cases are not the same; the words answer to the bricks, the thoughts are what we have a right to expect to exhibit clearly their celestial authorship. The whole illustration amounts to pressing an analogy beyond what is in any sense legitimate. If he had said, "the house is of earth earthy, but the food you get inside is spirit," one could not

reasonably have denied the spiritual nature of the refreshment: whether it was good is another question which would be the subject of experience and its duty to decide.

(The ensuing references are to, and the scattered extracts from *Short Studies*, by J. A. Froude, Vol. I, pp. 21–238; Longmans Green, 1867.) “If men are not entirely animals, they are at least half animals, and are subject in this aspect of them to the conditions of animals” (p. 182). “Plato and Aristotle were equally satisfied that the secret of all the shortcomings in the world lay in the imperfection, reluctance, or inherent grossness of this impracticable substance”—eternal matter. In the Catholic Philosophy, “Unless the body could be purified, the soul could not be saved . . . without his flesh, man was not, or would cease to be. But the natural organization of the flesh was infected with evil, and unless organization could begin again from a new original, no pure material substance could exist at all” (p. 186). Hence the need of eating the body and blood of Christ, in a material sense; and all the materialistic dogmas which cumber that Church with incredible tenets. “Religion from the beginning of time has expanded and changed with the growth of knowledge. The religion of the Prophets was not the religion which was adapted to the hardness of heart of the Israelites of the Exodus. The Gospel set aside the Law; the creed of the early Church was not the creed of the Middle Ages, any more than the creed of Luther and Cranmer was the creed of St. Bernard and Aquinas” (p. 207). “We are fed with the professional commonplaces of the members of a close guild, men holding high office in the Church, or expecting to hold high office there; in either case with a strong temporal interest in the defence of the institution which they represent” (p. 210). “As if serious inquiry after truth was something which they were entitled to resent. They treat intellectual difficulties as if they deserved rather to be condemned and punished than considered and weighed” (p. 210).

“Science has engendered, and the closer knowledge of the value and nature of evidence has notoriously made it necessary that the grounds should be reconsidered on which we are to believe that one country and one people was governed for sixteen centuries on principles different from these which we

now find to prevail universally" (p. 211). "Were it proved beyond possibility of error that the Pentateuch was written by Moses, that those and all the books of the Old and New Testament were really the work of the writers whose names they bear . . . we should not have advanced a single step towards making good the claim put forward for the Bible, that it is absolutely and unexceptionably true in all its parts. The 'genuineness and authenticity' argument is irrelevant and needless" (p. 212). "The credit which we give to the most authentic work of a man has no resemblance to that universal acceptance which is demanded for the Bible. It is not a difference of degree: it is a difference in kind; and we desire to know on what ground this infallibility, which we do not question, but which is not proved, demands our belief. Very likely the Bible is thus infallible. Unless it is, there can be no moral obligation to accept the facts which it records; and though there may be intellectual error there can be no moral sin in denying them" (p. 213). "Bad arguments in a good cause are a sure way to bring distrust upon it. The Divine oracles may be true and may be inspired; but the discoveries at Nineveh certainly do not prove them so. No one supposes that the Books of Kings or the prophecies of Isaiah or Ezekiel were the work of men who had no knowledge of Assyria or the Assyrian priests" (pp. 213-14).

"The history of the early world is a history everywhere of marvels. The legendary literature of every nation upon earth tells the same stories of prodigies and wonders, of the appearance of the gods upon earth, and of their intercourse with men. The lives of the Saints of the Catholic Church, from the time of the Apostles till the present day, are a complete tissue of miracles resembling and rivalling those of the Gospels. . . . Some are as well authenticated as facts of such a kind can be authenticated at all. The Protestant Christian rejects every one of them, rejects them without inquiry, involves those for which there is good authority and those for which there is none or little in one absolute, contemptuous, and sweeping denial. The Protestant feels it more likely, in the words of Hume, 'that men should deceive or be deceived, than that the laws of nature should be violated.' At this moment we are beset by reports of conversations with spirits, of tables

miraculously lifted, of hands projected out of the world of shadows into this mortal life. An unusually able, accomplished person, accustomed to deal with common-sense facts, a celebrated political economist, of rigorously business-like habits, assured this writer that a certain mesmerist, who was my informant's intimate friend, had raised a dead girl to life" (pp. 214-15).

Professor Freeman, who criticized Froude's work with scathing severity, writes of "à Becket" (*Contemporary Review*, April 1878): "No doubt there is much truth in Mr. Froude's remark that 'the atmosphere of legend in which his history was so early enveloped renders them all suspicious.' Yet it is sometimes instructive to trace the growth of a legend, to see how a perfectly credible and probable story may, by a very slight change, be turned into a miracle. A story is told by Roger of Pontigny, and, more shortly, in the French Life by Garnier of Ponte Sainte-Maxence, of a remarkable escape from a fearful death which happened to Thomas in his boyhood. He falls into a mill-stream; he is drawn near to the wheel; just at that moment the miller happens to stop his wheel, and the boy is saved. . . . Here is something in which we can hardly blame men for seeing a special providence; but there is nothing miraculous. And we may be sure . . . we have the story as it was told by Thomas himself. . . . No wonder, then, that in Edward Grim's hands the providential delivery becomes a miraculous one. Instead of the miller happening to stop his wheel just at the right moment, the wheel now stops of itself. . . . Anyone who knows the temper of hagiographers will understand how, without any conscious invention, without any conscious rejection of evidence, the miraculous version, differing so very slightly from the unadorned fact, would seem to be not only the true but the only possible version" (pp. 116-17). Grim, who knew à Becket only a few days before his martyrdom, would naturally be inclined to "surround all his acts with any amount of marvel and miracle" (p. 117). "Mr. Froude takes the recorded twelfth-century course and improves it according to nineteenth-century notions" (p. 118). "He improves the name Richer into the more familiar Richard, and so writes his place-name as to suggest that he never heard of the town of Laigle" (p. 120). "Mr. Froude no doubt

does all this under the same kind of unhappy necessity of departing from his authorities which follows him in all matters great and small" (p. 135).

If this is true of a great writer of history who succeeded Freeman in the Chair of Regius Professor of the subject at Oxford at the end of the nineteenth century, when all his sayings were reported by newspapers, anxious to get striking copy to attract readers, is there any reason to hold that obscure authors at the beginning of our era, without any of his advantages and facilities of comparison and verification, were less liable to error and mistake or wrong judgment? And when you go back perhaps a thousand years earlier, when the science of composing a book was quite undeveloped, can you believe that the accounts given are more likely to be accurate and carefully considered? This is the position which the Historical School has to face; and they try in the manner recounted by Freeman to extract from fanciful and miraculous stories a rational tale of what probably were the facts as they actually happened. Of course, some sort of narrative can be put together in this way, and if the events are not of any serious moment, it is accepted as good enough for the purpose; but no one would place implicit reliance on what somebody thought could somehow be got out of a hugger-mugger manuscript, by omitting half what it says and taking the rest just as it suits your theory to regard it. Freeman may be better than Froude, but against all the authorities he makes the coronation of Harold at Westminster, on the plea that the burial of Edward the Confessor and this coronation could not have been in two different buildings on the same day; I should have said they could not possibly have been in the same one. The very omen would forbid. This was suggested to me by a Roman Catholic, and his feelings were probably much more in unison with those of bygone ages than my own.

Then, Harold's title was open to question, and he certainly would not have been crowned anywhere but where Kings of England always have been—in St. Paul's. The mere preparation of a building for a funeral would make it an impossible place for the coronation. But Freeman uses the detail of William the Conqueror's coronation for that of Harold. Would it not have been wiser to confess that we have no

precise account of what was done in a hurry, and that the alteration of the succession sufficiently shows the reason why no such evidence exists? That for a graphic tale this inaccuracy should be tolerated is only natural; but there is in it a want of judgment that goes beyond anything we should expect of one who finds fault with the charming writer for putting the facts of mediæval story into the language of to-day. There may be errors of taste and want of skill in doing this; yet Froude is read by hundreds who hardly know his rival's name. Such popularity and the methods of seeking it may be open to just reproach; but it implies a merit that should not be lightly overlooked. Professor Capes says of Felix that he cannot have been wholly without good points, for he married three queens, and must be reckoned as a man who excelled in the views of those days, however paltry these may have been.

"The writer or writers of the Books of Kings are not known. The books themselves are, in fact, confessedly taken from older writings which are lost, and the accounts of the great prophets of Israel are a counterpart, curiously like, of those of the mediæval saints. In many instances the authors of the lives of these saints were their companions and friends. Why do we feel so sure that what we are told of Elijah or Elisha took place exactly as we read it? Why do we reject the account of St. Columba or St. Martin as a tissue of idle fable? Why should not God give a power to the saint which He had given of the prophet? We can produce no reason from the nature of things, for we know not what the nature of things is; and if down to the death of the Apostles the ministers of religion were allowed to prove their commission by working miracles, what right have we, on grounds either of history or philosophy, to draw a clear line at the death of St. John—to say that before that time all such stories were true, and after it all were false?" (Froude, p. 216).

"To pray is to expect a miracle. When we pray for the recovery of a sick friend, for the gift of any blessing, or the removal of any calamity, we expect that God will do something by an act of His personal will which otherwise would not have been done, that He will suspend the ordinary relations of natural cause and effect; and this is the very idea of a miracle"

(p. 217). In reference to Jesus: "There is no evidence which a jury could admit that He was ever actually dead. So unusual was it for persons crucified to die so soon that Pilate, we are told, 'marvelled.' The subsequent appearances were strange, and scarcely intelligible. Those who saw Him did not recognize Him till He was made known to them in the breaking of bread. He was visible and invisible. He was mistaken by those who were most intimate with Him for another person; nor do the accounts agree which are given by the different Evangelists" (p. 218).

As to "St Paul's account of his own conversion . . . if a modern physician were consulted about it, he would say, without hesitation, that it was an effect of an overheated brain, and that there was nothing in it extraordinary or unusual" (p. 219). We should have expected that he "would have at once examined into the facts otherwise known, connected with the subject of what he had seen. . . . St. Paul, however, did nothing of the kind. He went for a year into Arabia, and when at last he returned to Jerusalem, he held rather aloof from those who had been our Lord's companions, and who had witnessed His ascension. He saw Peter, he saw James; 'of the rest of the apostles saw he none.' To him evidently the proof of the resurrection was the vision which he had himself seen; it was to that which he always referred when called on for a defence of his faith. Of evidence for the resurrection . . . there may be enough to show that something extraordinary occurred; but not enough . . . to produce any absolute and unhesitating conviction; and inasmuch as the resurrection is the keystone of Christianity, the belief in it must be something far different from that suspended judgment in which history alone would leave us" (pp. 219–20). "On human evidence, the miracles of St. Teresa and St. Francis of Assisi are as well established as those of the New Testament" (p. 220). "Experience shows, without exception, that miracles occur only in times and in countries in which miracles are believed in, and in the presence of persons who are disposed to believe them. No miracle has ever been performed before an assemblage of spectators capable of testing its reality; neither uneducated people, nor even men of the world, have the requisite capacity; great precautions are needed, and a

long habit of scientific research. Have we not seen men of the world in our own time become the dupes of the most childish and absurd illusions? And if it be certain that no contemporary miracles will bear investigation, is it not possible that the miracles of the past, were we able to examine them in detail, would be found equally to contain an element of error? . . . We do not say a miracle is impossible; we say only that no miracle has ever yet been proved. Let a worker of miracles come forward to-morrow with pretensions serious enough to deserve examination. Let us suppose him to announce that he is able to raise a dead man to life. What would be done?" (p. 221). "An experiment, however, should always admit of being repeated; what a man has done once he should be able to do again; and in miracles there can be no question of ease or difficulty. . . . The power to perform them is delegated or belongs to particular persons. But who does not perceive that no miracle was ever performed under such conditions as these? (quoted from Renan, *Vie de Jesus*, Introduction, pp. li-ii. Ed. Paris, 1863)" (p. 222). "The Gospels themselves tell us why M. Renan's conditions were never satisfied. Miracles were not displayed in the presence of sceptics" (p. 222). "If we attempt to establish the truth of the New Testament on the principles of Paley—if, with Professor Jowett, 'we interpret the Bible as any other book,' the element of miracle which has evaporated from the entire surface of human history will not maintain itself in the sacred ground of the Gospels, and the facts of Christianity will melt in our hands like a snowball. Nothing less than a miraculous history can sustain the credibility of miracles, and nothing could be more likely, if revelation be a reality and not a dream, than that the history containing it should be saved in its composition from the intermixture of human infirmity" (p. 223). But "the account of the creation of man and the world which is given in Genesis, and which is made by St. Paul the basis of his theology, has not yet been reconciled with facts which science knows to be true. Death was in the world before Adam's sin, and unless Adam's age be thrust back to a distance which no ingenuity can torture the letter of Scripture into recognizing, men and women lived and died upon the earth whole millenniums before the Eve of Sacred History listened

to the temptation of the snake. Neither has any such deluge as that from which, according to the received interpretation, the ark saved Noah swept over the globe within the human period" (Froude, *loc. cit.* p. 224).

"The inspiration of the Bible is the foundation of our whole belief; and it is a grave matter if we are uncertain to what extent it reaches, or how much and what it guarantees to us as true. We cannot live on probabilities. The faith in which we can live bravely and die in peace must be a certainty, so far as it professes to be a faith at all, or it is nothing" (p. 225).

"We thrust the subject aside; we take refuge in practical work; we believe perhaps that the situation is desperate and incapable of improvement; we refuse to let the question be disturbed. But we cannot escape from our shadow; and the spirit of uncertainty will haunt the world like an uneasy ghost, till we take it by the throat, like men" Froude, *Essay on A Plea for the Free Discussion of Theological Difficulties*, 1863 (p. 226). If this was the case so long ago, has it in any way become less crucial or less urgent now, when we find the newspapers asserting that Kings of Egypt lived and held power even in Palestine before the reputed date of the Flood, and even of the Creation; when by accredited chronologists the date of the Exodus has been altered because the period assigned to it by universal consent is proved to be out of the question, from Egyptian predominance in that region at the time?

One can now, I think, see the reason for Freeman's dislike of Froude's views. "Except Kingsley, Froude, and Stanley, I hardly know of any English writer who has written with a hearty and appreciative sympathy of our great national apostle John Knox, and our noble army of martyrs, the Covenanters." "To meagre English intellects, Elijah and Elisha and all the prophets must remain equally mysterious. . . . I readily admit that there is a great want of grace and taste in our religious services; that our theology is often shallow and our Scripture expositions crooked for want of a solid foundation of learning." "Notable performances in the pulpit are generally more remarkable for rhetoric than for reasoning, and not seldom show a desire to compensate for the want of substantial knowledge by impudent speculation and shallow subtlety" (p. 106). "But the fire, from

whatever quarter sprung, blazes out most potently in the Scottish, as distinguished from the English pulpit" (p. 109).

All places have their gods: in Irvine, Ayr,  
 And grey Kilmarnock you will surely find  
 On wall and signboard proudly pictured there,  
 A mighty master of the songful kind,  
 The ploughman Burns. That strong dark eye,  
 With swelling love surcharged and lightning-ken,  
 That freeman's look, that front of majesty,  
 Stamp him for worship from all meaner men:  
 And all are wise who worship, worshipping  
 Their natural lords, where each to each is bound,  
 In apt dependence from the meanest thing  
 To Nature's topmost feat with triumph crowned,  
 And all are lifted one step from the sod,  
 Drinking more strength from souls more near to God.

—PROFESSOR W. S. BLACKIE, article in *The Scot*, pp. 108-9, 112.

When I got to this point, I realized or imagined that the question would turn on the philosophy of the matter. I have struggled with this for twenty-five years, and cannot say I am much wiser or more settled in belief. When you consider that the central point of psychology is that we do not really know anything, that our senses are adapted only for recognizing appearances, this is not out of the way. The quiddities of epistemology are mere word-spinning or word-splitting which are no better than gibberish. Man is endowed only with faculties and aptitudes for the requirements of common life. Speculation about the true inwardness or transcendence of the cosmos may conceivably serve as some sort of mental discipline or ingenious exercise in logic-chopping, but cannot open new avenues to knowledge of "Reality." It may be objected that some things that are not material are yet surely known; two and two always make four. This has been, and still is more questioned. It is so only if the four are precisely similar, but no two things in the world are exactly alike; yet surely a thing cannot be, and not be? If this is so there is an end to Darwin's hypothesis; for its very basis is that everything is becoming.

The old juggle, that "at any particular moment a thing must be in a particular place, and that to be in a place means at rest in that place," would deny all movement. It is on a par with the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise, that other quip of Greek cleverness that never affected anyone,

## INTRODUCTION

albeit its proof is as perfect as the algebraic one that 2 equals 1. What we have arrived at is a doctrine of "*As if.*" It has been said that if the Church, instead of asserting infallibility, had claimed to be obeyed as if infallible, it would have been only what we all have to allow as to Acts of Parliament; and soldiers still more with the commands of officers; they have the responsibility, we submit. Ours not to question why; yours not to make reply. Possibly even Scripture might have been credited with infallible authority if it had not been alleged that it was divinely right. But when obvious errors are put into the mouth of Christ, and stories told that cannot be reconciled, like the nativities of Matthew and Luke, and the date of the crucifixion as given by John and in the Synoptics, and the utter confusion of the post-resurrection events and visions, it was too dubious. An Oriental despot of unlimited power might order the destruction of the whole human race, the extermination of the people of Palestine, and the annihilation of the cities of the plain; but even Abraham, with his imperfect moral sense, could demand that "the Ruler of the Universe should do right," and that a handful of good people should prevent wholesale destruction of the wicked. It is the want of knowledge and power that forces us to act in ways that are very unjust to some who are subjected to us. We must do what we can, and a method which is not defensible must be used, because no other offers; but it is said Noah was six hundred years old at the flood; and it is calculated that the ancestors of anyone to-day must have been as many as the whole population of England at the Norman Conquest. Admitting that this figure is fallacious, yet in 600 years the offspring of Noah would have been a tribe and not a mere family. Was none of them worthy of being saved except three sons and their wives? Only Lot's daughters—not even their husbands—were spared; and his wife was subject to a miraculous doom for an offence of a most venial kind. These are, however, stories of the sort that are common in folk-lore and fairy tales; and we have no reason to believe that either of these are historic, any more than that the Canaanites were blotted out. They are fictions of the priests invented in the bitterness of the Captivity, explanations of natural events that did not imply any moral obliquity: just

as the Tower of Babel was the first building struck by lightning, which could not fail to be regarded as the action of Heaven.

Canon Driver and others say bluntly that the affair of Lot's daughters is an example of the Jew's nastiness towards rival races. In other cases they seem to have put their own prejudices into the mouth of the Almighty. When men of this status speak openly of the Old Testament as not a correct record of events, but as an example of the use of fiction for teaching the truth, that it embodies folklore and manifestations of the animus of the Hebrews, was written nobody can tell by whom, and scarcely when, one can only conclude that its interpretation must be governed by present-day ideology. Views change, and we cannot, however much inclined, uncritically accept those of authority and tradition. Inasmuch as precisely the same claims are preferred for the genuineness and authenticity of the New Testament, the results of a critical examination of these so-called credentials demonstrates that it is a patchwork of fragments clumsily assembled no one knows how, when, or by whom. Even the Pauline epistles have been forged or tampered with, else why the warning ascribed to the apostle about "letters said to be from us"? At the alleged date of the origin of the New Testament canon the process of allegory and symbolism was rife. For example, Melchisedek is described as "without father or mother" simply because none is mentioned, and also as "Priest and Highest," just as Balaam is styled "prophet of the true God." All these facts and considerations conspire to prove that it was an age in which the conception and making of records were obscure and confused in the extreme. On the mythopœic side it stands on about the same level as the legends about King Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table. Nobody of any standing or reputation in our own times has the hardihood to maintain that the Bible is divinely inspired. Among other decisive disproofs of that dogma it is sufficient to adduce the quotations from the book of Enoch, in Jude named as the seventh in descent from Adam, and the endless incorrect quotations in the "Pauline" epistles, often from the Septuagint. These have actually been invoked to support the claim in question, but really dispose for ever of the pretence that these documents or their reputed authors are infallible.

## INTRODUCTION

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My indebtedness alike to authors and publishers for the use of valuable material derived from various sources as illustrations of the thesis of the following book is so wide and deep that any enumeration of them is impracticable. I trust, however, that by directing attention to a large number of works, some of which are now merely of historic interest and value, the references to them may serve to give a new impetus and publicity to the study and elucidation of old but still-living problems and issues. In all cases in which the quotations are numerous, I have been careful to give specific references to the originals. Any omissions are inadvertent, and for them I crave the indulgence of those concerned.

# CHAPTER I

## THE BEARINGS OF SCIENCE ON RELIGION

### ASTRONOMY

*La raison, dis-jé, prendra un jour en main l'intendance de ce grand travail et après avoir organisé l'humanité, organisera Dieu.*

—RENAN, quoted *Contemporary Review*, August 1878, p. 185.

Away fond dupes, who smit with sacred lore,  
Mosaic dreams in Exodus explore.

To you, I sing not; for I sing of Truth:  
Primeval systems and Creation's youth.

—H. and J. SMITH, *Rejected Addresses*.

AMONG many sciences I have chosen to begin with astronomy, partly because it is the oldest, partly because it is the widest, of the sciences, taking us away from this earth into the boundless realms of space, widening and deepening our view of the Universe and giving us a true knowledge of man's position in it. It is, too, a science of which I know comparatively little, and so can speak of it only in general terms. It seems to me better first to treat of those subjects of which my own knowledge is superficial and by degrees to lead up to those with which I have some detailed acquaintance. Moreover, it was the first of the sciences which came into hostile contact with religion. It was with reason, though perhaps with the wisdom of the serpent, that the Church of Rome set its face steadfastly against the discoveries and doctrines of Galileo. Her judgment upon them was that “The proposition that the sun is the centre of the world and immovable is absurd, philosophically false, and formally heretical, because it is expressly contrary to Holy Scripture.” “The proposition that the earth is not the centre of the world, nor immovable, but that it moves and has also a diurnal motion, is absurd, philosophically false; and, theologically considered, at least erroneous in faith.”

This declaration, I believe, though it has never been

definitely laid down as a rule of faith, still remains uncancelled as the view taken by the chiefs of that Church. Though her teachers, with that casuistry for which they have ever been distinguished, no longer give it prominence, I have met Romanists who argued that Galileo and the whole of modern science have set themselves to impose on mankind a gigantic falsehood—to the detriment of true religion and morality. Those who speak thus can know little of the spirit in which science is pursued; they must be ignorant of the self-denying lines and self-sacrificing labours of its votaries. Religion itself has not been able to create a greater enthusiasm than that evoked by the pursuit of truth, while the ardour which she has aroused has not seldom been far less pure and far less elevated in its objects. In the cause of truth men have in every age surrendered the chance, nay the certainty, of worldly gain; they have given themselves up to lives of the most laborious study, the most incessant toil, often that they might ascertain the facts of some quite unimportant detail of some out-of-the-way question. Fame could hardly be gained in such a quest, fortune was out of the question; the results were known to few, they were misunderstood and misrepresented or disputed by many. In time they may have established their correctness, but the authors of them have too often been “oppressed by black night,” and failed to see the triumph of their mental offspring. Men of letters have told again and again the tale of the five pounds Milton received for *Paradise Lost*; they have recounted the story of those whose lives have been shortened by the neglect from which their efforts have suffered; but can the art of the penman show anything to compare with the ordeal and imprisonment of Galileo, the martyrdom of Servetus and Bruno, or the death of Young, the advocate of the wave theory of light, who was absolutely hounded into the grave by the opposition which assailed his views, until at length his memory was vindicated by the great German physicist, Von Helmholtz, who triumphantly demonstrated their truth. Now, people hardly understand how men of sense could have held the opposite, corpuscular theory, although it was supported by the great name of Newton.

I admit that in narrow lines enthusiasm is apt to lead men into delusions, and make them follow will-o’-the-wisps of their

own imagination and fancy; but I do not know that the apologists for religion can safely throw stones at scientific men on this score. When science is spoken of it does not mean the conclusions of this or that man, but rather those views which, having gone through a long struggle for existence, have from general consent proved themselves fittest and best by their survival. Yet even if a man's conclusions are wrong, so long as he has worked honestly and fairly his labour is not lost; for it is the facts of science that are important and not the deductions which are drawn from them. Every man who has discovered a fact has helped to rear the edifice of truth, though he has added but a single brick to it; nay, those who have merely verified facts or disproved the fancies of others have done a signal service. The lives of many men are spent in this way, going over the work of others with improved implements and wider knowledge to test the conclusions arrived at and to try if at any point they can make an advance on them. Some of these are actuated by enthusiasm for religion, some of them have opposite feelings; thus every assertion, every experiment, is submitted to debate by rival factions, each eager to prove the others wrong. Moreover, each man is anxious to establish his own reputation for acumen and accuracy, and thus to secure for himself one of those positions which offer emolument and opportunity for completer study, and so is ever ready to criticize and carp at the opinions of his rivals. Thus what may perhaps be looked on as an unworthy motive and uncharitable method really conduces in the long run to the advancement of knowledge and the completion of truth; so much so that among scientific men the advocates of religion have earned for themselves an unenviable notoriety, by backing up views and facts which they have considered favourable to their own position rather than by seeking to find truth for its own sake. Such a method is really the reverse of faith; it runs on the assumption that the revelation of God in the world can contradict His revelation of Himself by His prophets. If the words of a prophet do not march with the facts of Nature, the Lord has not spoken by him; but he deceives himself.

Newton, whose work on gravitation is universally accepted and counted as a proven truth, was wrong in his theory of

light, and so delayed the progress of knowledge on this subject for a century or more. Others likewise, whose general credit has been established by the consent of ages—and the absence of contradiction by those who are in a position to form a correct judgment may be taken as the criterion of accepted truth—have erred grievously in certain points. Believers in David as a “ man after God’s own heart ” can hardly refuse to assent to this. It is not to the point that I and those who think with me would place an altogether different meaning on these words. For the same methods of exegesis which would withdraw from him the express and peculiar approval of the Almighty would also to a large extent question the right of the prophets to speak in the name of Heaven. Each act, each word, must stand or fall by itself; if it contradicts our feeling of right, if it enjoins acts or maintains views which are repugnant to moral sense, it cannot be the voice of the All-good, nor the expression of his will. If it exhibits sentiments or applauds feelings which are un-Christian and inhuman, the author was mistaken in thinking he spoke the words of God, or his hearers were mistaken in attributing such a belief to him. Those who are afraid of following the truth wherever the truth may lead them will soon find that they are following falsehood, unless they are so blinded as to believe lies.

As Charles Kingsley says: “ Those who set their religion above truth will soon come to set their own opinion above either.” In this way religious men of science, and still more religious men with some smattering of scientific knowledge, have kept on seizing hold of and bolstering up any view that seemed to favour their conception of truth ; they have supported one another and united themselves into a phalanx to oppose others in a way which suggested too forcibly that their object was victory by any means, rather than the truth and nothing but the truth. They have imputed motives to and impugned the honesty of those who differed from them, while in reality they might have learnt a lesson of single-minded devotion and laborious research from those whom they thus vilified. Men who resort to such means lay themselves open to suspicion, and, however successful for a time the method may be with the unlettered herd, the final result is to destroy their own

credit and authority; though this rightful nemesis is often slow in overtaking those who use disingenuous ways in support of religion, by reason chiefly of the unscientific nature of the audiences to whom they appeal. If men of science adopted the same tactics speedy exposure would await them at the hands of their own brethren, and the pseudo-religious would take care that their discomfiture was speedily known to all the world. To allege, therefore, that scientific men willingly and intentionally make misstatements in order to damage their opponents or to undermine the basis of religious belief may be dismissed as worthy only of those who would themselves resort to such methods, or who are so ignorant of the world as not to know that such a course would quickly defeat its own object. ✓

On the other hand, one may rather claim that there is a religion of science, the object of which is truth, and which is spread as a sort of Church throughout the world; an *ecclesia* which does not indeed hold diets of worship, but which is not wanting in assemblies; and of which it may also be said that where two or three are gathered together there is the spirit of truth. This Church does not pretend to any infallibility and summons no oecumenical councils; it makes no attempt to settle questions once and for all in a summary way, but allows the truth to work like leaven till it permeates the whole mass, and produces conviction in all by its own intrinsic power. The Darwinian theory is a notable case in point. It started by the concurrent thought of two independent men of science, was given to the world in their joint names, and at once attracted the attention of experts; but was assailed with bitterness and fixed prejudice by theologians and people in general, especially by Prof. Sedgwick. The late Archbishop Temple and his colleagues, in *Essays and Reviews*, stood out as a brilliant exception, having the acumen to recognize its evidential weight and philosophical implications, and the skill to apply its principles to theology and history. Temple's position in the Church of England is the verdict of time on the correctness of his views. But it was only by slow degrees that the Doctrine of Descent won its way, strongly opposed as it was at first in this country, and still more so in America and France. To-day it has become the basis of all medical

and scientific teaching, is accepted all over the world by those who understood it; and as Professor Sir Edward Poulton, himself a good Christian, has said, has come to that pitch of perfection that it can be made foundation of verifiable prediction. This is that form of demonstrative proof which has established astronomy as almost one of the exact sciences, because it can predict years, and even centuries, beforehand that certain things will happen on the day and at the hour foretold. Moreover, it has been able to announce, "There is a planet, as yet undiscovered, in such and such a place in the heavens," and at or about that place at the time named the body was found, of the size predicted within limits satisfactory to all reason. So from the generalizations of the Darwinian doctrine it has been possible to lay down that somewhere, at some time, animals have existed which had certain characters; and these one by one are being found, bearing approximately the inferred characteristics. In addition, it is possible to see that certain variations can be induced artificially, and by care and skill these are actually produced.

To return to the subject proper. It was, as I have said, with reason that the Church of Rome looked askance at the teachings of Galileo, for by them man was dethroned from his central position in the Universe; his world, no longer the cynosure of creation, became a mere speck among gigantic spheres and infinite distances; the sun and stars no longer revolved around him like courtiers round their king, and the earth became an unimportant satellite holding a secondary place, even among the bodies which encircle the sun. The effect of this alteration on the relations of man to the Universe was, I conceive, more vividly realized when it broke on the mind in its astounding freshness that now after the lapse of centuries, when thought has become accustomed to its contemplation. Then it must have seemed as if one who had fancied himself lord of all he surveyed had received a message from some unknown region to bow before a superior power and acknowledge himself as subordinate. As the last of the Abbasides, or the effete ruler of the Eastern Empire, or, as in our own day, the Emperor of China, received a rude shock from the challenge of despised and disregarded enemies, so mankind found themselves suddenly ousted from their position

of pre-eminence into one of comparative obscurity; and since that day the tide has flowed ever higher and higher. The earth is a mere hanger-on of the sun, which before then man had regarded as a glorious slave created merely for his service. The sun itself is but one, and not an important unit, among a galaxy of similar and more splendid orbs. The boundless realms of space, as far as the most powerful telescope can penetrate, are filled with myriads of suns; and even beyond the reach of the most perfect instrument a luminous haze betokens the presence of still further millions of gleaming spheres. To some of these our sun is but a pigmy, and many of them have companions as stupendous as themselves careering round them, while trillions of smaller orbs have doubtless escaped the notice of our lenses. Of these some may be inhabited—the evidence yielded by other planets is a strong support of this theory—and it is hardly probable that among so many worlds the earth alone is peopled. Our position is like that of Defoe's immortal Crusoe, who, when he thought he had his island to himself, was awakened from his dream of security by footprints on the sand and the remains of the feast of cannibals. Man can no longer boast himself the centre, the sole object of creation, for whom, and for whom alone, the whole was formed. Ignorant as we are of the facts and conditions of these countless worlds, we must still feel that our earth is only one in a crowd, and merely a little one, one in the crowd that looks on, not the hero, the potentate whom it has collected to gaze at and admire.

This change in the position of man has a most weighty bearing on the question of religion. The old question, "What is man that Thou regardest him, or the son of man that Thou art mindful of him?" may be asked with redoubled force when the light of science has thus deposed him from the place of pre-eminence as centre of the universe to one of minor consideration and importance. What indeed, among so many worlds, so many suns, with worlds circling round them, is this little globe of ours? Why should we be selected out of myriads for special consideration, for peculiar intervention, for abnormal revelation? These thoughts may perhaps fortify the feeling of religion, they may strengthen the sense of gratitude to, and adoration of, the Deity who has thus selected us

out for favour and has remembered us among such teeming multitudes, so that not a single hair of the poorest and feeblest and most ignorant child falls to the ground without notice, revealing that this little world has received the utmost care, the tenderest thought of the All-loving. At the same time, it cannot be denied that it affects greatly the probability of such interference. What was only likely when this world and its inhabitants were of supreme importance in the universe seems altogether improbable when it has become one among teeming myriads.

We now take our time from the heavenly bodies; our days, months, and years are measured by their motions. For the past, though a few eclipses, comets, and other celestial facts are noted in history and form invaluable landmarks in fixing dates for the whole prehistoric ages, geology affords the measure; if it quickens the tune, biology follows its steps; if it slows down, an equal delay occurs in the movements of its partner. Eight or ten times the geologic period is asked for organic evolution, and the length of the one varies in keeping with the pace of the other. "This fact should be borne in mind, that biology demands no particular period of time; the rate of variation and change in the organic kingdom depends on circumstances which have not been fully made out, and which differ greatly in diverse cases." Prof. Geikie says of geologists of the last century: "After all, it was not the time that chiefly interested them, but the grand succession of events which the time had witnessed. That succession had been established on observations so abundant and so precise that it could withstand attack from any quarter." It had taken as firm and as lasting a place among the solid achievements of science as could be claimed for any physical speculations. Whether the time required for the transmission of this marvellous earth-history was some millions of years more, or some millions of years less, did not seem to the geologists to be a question on which their science stood in antagonism with the principles of natural philosophy, but one which the natural philosophers might be left to settle at their own good pleasure.

## GEOLOGY

I put geology in the second place for much the same reasons that I put astronomy in the first, because I have only a very amateurish knowledge of it, and, therefore, can merely speak in general terms. Just as astronomy leads us to infinite space, so geology may be said to lead us to infinite time. It makes no difference whether the duration of man on the earth be fixed at thousands or millions of years. Even the lowest estimate is inconsistent with any system of chronology which can be constructed from the Old Testament. Men never thought of drawing out the records there given beyond four to six thousand years until geology made demands which could not be ignored. The attempt that has since been made to stretch the old notions and obvious calculations bears witness rather to the conviction on the part of its authors that the dictates of geology could not be gainsaid, than to their candour, or the feasibility of squaring up the account in Genesis with that given by science.

The question is not merely one of man; for though the apparent assertion of Holy Writ that the animals and man and the whole earth were created at or about the same time may not be considered strictly cogent, yet it is distinctly stated in the more reputable parts of the Sacred Record (Rom. v. 12; vi. 23; I. Cor. xv. 23) that death came into the world with Adam, whereas geology shows that it existed long before man or any of the higher animals had appeared on the scene. The chalk cliffs consist of thousands of feet of minute organisms of which each one has died and left its skeleton as a platform on which subsequent deposits were laid. If it be said that there is no proof that man did not exist in some part of the world at the period of the chalk formation, little would be gained by this. For the result would be to make man's age on the earth far longer than palæontologists have dreamt of, and altogether inconsistent with the account given of his history in the book of Genesis and confirmed by the Gospel of St. Luke. Besides, below the chalk are strata, several miles in thickness, containing fossils of by-gone creatures which have been slowly deposited from the sea.

The time required for these formations has been variously and cannot be exactly estimated; but no one, I believe, who

has studied the subject at all would venture to reckon it less than hundreds of thousands of years; hundreds of millions has been more commonly held. There can be no question that these materials were thus deposited by the sea; the action of water is obvious, for the remains are those of marine species. It used indeed to be contended that deposits were the remains of former worlds which had been swept away, and that a new creation had signalized the advent of man. This was a position which was stoutly maintained for many years; but now, I conceive, not a voice would be raised in its support, except perhaps in an out-of-the-way village or in a country pulpit, by a very young man or a very old one. For, as in other things, extremes meet in this. Inch by inch the battle has been fought, little by little the orthodox have drawn back their feet, overwhelmed by a weight of evidence which they could not resist effectually.

The whole development has obviously grown like a tree; few and simple forms to begin with, more and more complex appearing in time. There is no point at which it could be said: “Here is a perfect world which has ended; here is a new one which was begun.” One form is gradually developed out of another; the worse dies out, the better survives. It is no tale of ill-considered creation and petulant destruction which the record of the rocks tells us; it is one grand series of improvement, step by step, from the lower to the higher—from the less perfect gradually to the more complete. So much so that there is no place left even for the Flood: there has been no sudden destruction of the whole terrestrial life of the globe; there has not been a second dispersal. What this would mean it is not easy to explain to those who do not already possess a fair knowledge of these sciences; but one may put it shortly thus: Certain lands have peculiar animals and plants, as for instance the kangaroo and other marsupials in Australia. These are connected with similar forms in adjacent parts, and with the fossils of the district; and there is no sudden break in the geologic record when one might say: “The previous forms were here swept away and a new set succeeded them.” This is merely applying to separate districts what has already been said as to the whole earth, that there has been one uniform, unbroken progress of development from the earliest remains we find to

those species which exist in the present day. It is, in fact, to assert only the particulars out of which the universal has been built. The existing forms correspond to the geologic; they are therefore either their lineal descendants, or, in each district, forms have been replaced corresponding to those which previously existed there in such a way as never to produce any incongruity. This is a position which, I believe, no one would venture to challenge. Even orthodox clergy have ceased to assert a universal deluge—of which, I may say, there are no signs, and which could hardly have happened without leaving the most evident traces.

In fact, this legend of a deluge 4000 to 6000 years ago, covering all the earth, is one on which science is ready with perfect confidence to take its stand. If there were no other difficulty, the number of animals at present in existence could not, by any amount of crowding, be preserved in an ark of the size stated—they could not even have been packed in, two of each, like herrings in a barrel—to say nothing of food and other necessaries of life. Eight people could not possibly have attended to them (fifteen times as many are needed in the London Zoological Gardens), and long before the end of the voyage the sanitary state of the place would have been something which will not bear thinking of. Moreover, it is impossible that the present distribution of plants and animals should have resulted from it. The whole idea, in fact, is ludicrous, and its origin in Babylonian myths is now clearly demonstrated. The suggestions which have been made of a partial flood seem to be open to the same objections, and at the same time to be distinctly contrary to the plain words of Scripture. Nothing bearing the faintest resemblance to the Flood described in the Bible has ever happened, certainly within historic time, and the occurrence of such a universal deluge is no longer maintained by those who are looked on as leaders. It may be perhaps some tradition of geologic floods which appear to have been far greater than any which have occurred within the memory of man; but Sir George Airy, for many years Astronomer Royal, gives up the notion of a universal flood. In *Lux Mundi*, a book edited by Bishop Gore, one of the most earnest and learned members of the bench, the same view is taken; and the late Archbishop Temple was

joined in *Essays and Reviews* with those who held opinions still more radically at variance with orthodoxy.

Sir George Airy supposes that the whole depth of the water was 15 cubits (27 ft.); in which case one cannot see the need of making so much fuss over the inundation; animals could perfectly well have taken care of themselves, and the birds certainly could not have been in the least affected. Airy thinks the event refers to a flood in Egypt, where an excess of water of about 20 ft. covers the eminences and causes great damage and destruction of life. Apparently he makes Noah an Egyptian. The writer in *Lux Mundi* thinks it was a flood in the Euphrates valley, and that Noah was an Assyrian, but makes no suggestion whatever how a local flood there of sufficient depth to resemble, in any way, that described in the Bible as covering the mountain tops and destroying all life could have been kept up at the sides. To me all such suggestions appear just miserable subterfuges which show that their authors are convinced of the truth, but have not the courage to speak out their conviction plainly—that it is a mere myth.

There is an inaccurate notion, due mainly to Hugh Miller, that the account of the Creation given in Genesis is in its main outlines correct from a scientific point of view. This is hardly the case. I do not know whether the reader has ever asked: “What is meant by the firmament, and the waters above it?” No such structure exists; the ancients thought that the blue vault of the skies was a sort of dish-cover over a flat earth. This solid structure they called the “firmament”; above it was heaven and the storehouses of God, and in it were pierced holes for the stars, by which the glory of these shone through. This is a perfectly definite meaning of “firmament”: a firm, solid structure. “The firmament (*οὐπαρός*) is solid, consisting of air compacted after the fashion of ice by fire. . . . The astonishing doctrine that fire freezes can only be explained by the elements close kinship with the attracting force of love” (*The Religion of Philosophy*, by F. M. Cornford, p. 233). A similar view is held in Abyssinia at the present day (Noel Buxton, *Contemporary Review*, July 1932). But, as we have now discovered, the vault of heaven is but space, and the clouds, the reservoirs of rain, are below and not above it. Again, Hugh Miller makes the Carboniferous period represent the third

day, in which the plants were created. Curiously enough, a namesake has written an account of a dream, in which he supposes himself carried back to this very period (*The Dreams of Mr. H. the Herbalist*). In it he figures the sun and moon, fishes, scorpions, and toad-like reptiles—that is, highly developed animals—and lest there should be any mistake about it he adds in a note that the details refer to the earliest Carboniferous period, and that they are exactly correct and embody the latest information.

Actually, the animal and vegetable kingdoms grew up side by side, keeping pace with one another. At the earliest period of which we have knowledge (we are not likely ever to know much of still earlier formations, for they have been so acted on by heat that any organic remains are destroyed, and some thirteen miles of strata have been superimposed) both animals and plants existed, though of lowly forms, invertebrates and algæ practically all marine. In the Silurian age vertebrates first appear; and in the Devonian freshwater forms and amphibia, together with mosses, ferns, and pines. To these phyla are added reptiles and monocotyledonous plants in the Permian, and marsupials, mammals, and exogens in the Oolite, at which period also birds first make their appearance—and not before reptiles, as stated in Genesis. The descent of birds from reptiles is now completely proved; so that there can be no doubt that the order there given is incorrect. Man does not appear till the Diluvian period.

Further to argue the matter is to kill an already dead dog—the first chapter of Genesis is obviously an addition by a different hand; the name of God used in it is Elohim, a plural, and not Jahweh. I do not doubt that before long it will be shown clearly, like the account of the Flood, to be of an heathen, Babylonish origin. This is now admitted to be the case, and is an example of how the hypothesis of Darwin leads to verifiable prediction. “The modern critic begins by disarticulating two Creation narratives, of which the first, comprising Gen. i, ii, 4, belongs to P, the Priestly Narrative, while the second (Gen. ii. 4—iii. 24) is referred to J, an older stratum, the date of which may be assigned probably to the ninth century B.C. The Creation narrative of P outlines a cosmogony which was the inheritance of all the Semitic peoples,

set down in this instance about the time of the Babylonian captivity, say 500–450 B.C., by a learned and pious Israelite” (J. Y. Simpson, *The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature*, p. 232; Hodder & Stoughton, 1920). “It is not helpful to think of Creation as an event at some definite point in time. . . . ‘We cannot therefore say that there was a time when God had not yet made anything,’ concludes the evolutionary Augustine” (*loc. cit.*, p. 236). “The pages of Genesis and the data of scientific books are incommensurate” (p. 236). “The Creation narratives were capable of suggesting an idea of immediate creation to those who had no other conception of that process” (p. 235). (The Book really begins at the fourth verse of the second chapter, including the Story of the Fall and covering a second version of the creation inconsistent with the first.) Bishop Wordsworth’s somewhat claptrap remark, “Shall we not believe the Creator delivering to us the records of Creation? Can any venture to affirm that he is able to draw a line of demarcation between the physical phenomena related in Scripture and the spiritual doctrines which are taught there?” is balanced by the ambiguous words that “Imagination is the handmaid of Faith,” and that “Scripture affords the best food for Imagination.” It is very pleasing to ignorance and laziness to imagine that they can excel patience and toil by a royal road; but the Greek of old saw more truly when he said that the Gods had placed labour and trouble before the gateway of knowledge as guardians. It is very tempting to think that the truth is contained in the Authorized Version of the English Bible, and that all that is needed is to take the first addle-headed interpretation of its words that occurs to you in order to have a complete guide and *vademecum* to all sorts of very difficult questions. A man speaking in Hyde Park is reported to have said: “What did St. Paul want with Greek or Hebrew? Good plain English was sufficient for him.” This may be apocryphal, yet it represents pretty well the position of not a few to-day, as the treatment of the Revised Version shows.

In this connection Dr. Roberts, a member of the New Testament Company, says: “Alterations were made only from changes in the Greek Text which it was found necessary to adopt, or changes of translation which fidelity to the original

seemed to require. It is sufficient gain that it got rid of the spurious verses, I John v. 7-8, due plainly to desire to uphold the doctrine of the Trinity, which occur in no manuscript of any repute or antiquity before the fifteenth century. There are words in the original due to the imagination of Erasmus alone."

But this view ignores the whole history of the Bible and the way in which it was written and put together. Those who are "lightly persuaded" may be happy with the happiness of Festus, but they are not likely to be endued with a beatific vision of the truth. And when the good Bishop goes on to say, "The Pentateuch is one book, in five parts," one can only think that he had not studied it with exceeding great care. His simple method seems to be, whenever he finds himself in difficulties, to escape by a gush of preaching as to the value and efficacy of childlike receptivity. Even Mr. Gladstone, in his *Impregnable Rock of Holy Scripture*, lent the great weight of his name and honoured position to bolster up a theory which a few years have demonstrated to be untenable. It is true that, as Hugh Miller states, there were three periods:—

- (1) The Carboniferous, in which plant life abounded.
- (2) The Mesozoic, in which great sea-monsters prevailed and birds first appeared.
- (3) The Cainozoic, in which land animals were predominant.

But the first period certainly did not precede the creation of the animals or of the sun. The fiction of a mist obscuring the latter has to be invoked to gloss over this anomaly, and is a patent example of the obfuscating methods resorted to in order to make that seem the truth which is not so.

The Mesozoic period was essentially the age of reptiles from which the birds are developed. These reptiles die out in the third period, as also do the plants of the first; and the monsters are replaced by the now existing forms of animals and plants. This, then, it may be said, was the period of "the Creation"; but to this happy thought Hugh Miller gives a complete quietus in the *Testimony of the Rocks*. He had no doubt that evolution had been a long and slow process, that animal and vegetable forms had been evolved in a chain

of unbroken sequence and not by any miraculous destruction and specially contrived renewals. As Haeckel puts it: "The result attained in attempting to exhibit the relationships of the mere forms of organisms by a tabular classification is explicable only when regarded as the expression of their actual *blood relationships*; the *tree shape of the natural systems* can only be understood as the actual *pedigree of the organisms*" (*History of Creation*, by Ernst Haeckel. The translation revised by Professor E. Ray Lankester, M.A., F.R.S., Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford; Vol. II, p. 353. King & Co., 1876). Both of these were eminent men of science and experts in this subject.

#### BIOLOGY AND PHYSICS

The tale told by biology is the same as that of geology; it demands even greater length of time. Professor Sir Edward Poulton, in a set of lectures delivered at Oxford, put the period required for the development of the animals at not less than five thousand millions of years, basing his estimate on the fact that certain forms have not changed greatly within geologic ages, and that at least ten times as long is needed for development up to these forms as for evolution since then. This of course is but a rough estimate, and is only a personal opinion, although that of one who is well able to speak with authority, who will not be suspected of speaking unadvisedly or with biased views; but I think it must be considerably modified in face of the results obtained by researches on the lines of Mendel's theory.

On the other hand, it has been argued, notably by Lord Salisbury, at the Oxford meeting of the British Association, that in terms of physics no such duration of the earth could be admitted, because long after such a remote period the earth would have been so hot that life would have been impossible upon it. Lord Kelvin calculated that the earth must have been fluid 100,000,000 years ago, having regard to its shape and the effects of the tides and the moon. These act like a friction strap on which a force of some millions of tons is pulling; hence the rotation of the earth is becoming slower to the extent of twenty-two seconds in a century. Accordingly it must have been one-seventh faster 100,000,000 years ago,

and the centrifugal force rather greater. But the shape of the earth is nearly what would be caused by its rate of rotation now. It is argued, therefore, that the earth must have been solidified when it was turning at something like its present speed. This contention entirely leaves out of view the fact that the crust of the earth is elastic and has changed shape *pari passu* with its rate of rotation. Even Lord Kelvin long before his death had ceased to press his view. A second argument is drawn from the cooling of the earth. It is calculated from the temperature at the surface of the planet and its increase in such depths as are accessible that at 150 miles down it would be about 7000° F., and that this is approximately the original heat of the whole. These estimates seem to have rested on faulty data; the depth needed to attain this temperature is more nearly 1500 miles, for heat from the centre keeps up the temperature at the periphery. Lord Kelvin admitted this, and that 400,000,000 years at least would be required for the cooling to the present level. It was upon the coincidence of the two estimates that the force of the argument depends, and both have been proved to be open to objection and are no longer maintained by the eminent men of science by whom they were originally advocated. I have thought it necessary to mention them as they were brought forward by one holding so prominent a position on such an important occasion.

A real difficulty arises from the problem of the sun's heat. Von Helmholtz suggested that the sun was fed by matter coming to it; but the whole of the planets would not keep it going 50,000 years. Streams of meteors sufficient to keep up its heat would retard the journeys of the comets, and the sun's mass would be so much increased that the length of the earth's year would be altered. Moreover, all this assumes that the sun loses heat uniformly, whereas the stars show great variations. The sun, too, may have had an atmosphere which would have saved loss considerably. Still, Professor Newcomb reckoned that if the sun's heat were a quarter less than it is water on the face of the earth would be frozen and development would be impossible. On the other hand, if it were only one half greater water would boil; and the same effects would be produced by a small alteration—less than

20 per cent. ( $1/5$ th)—in the distance of the earth from the sun. It is possible, however, that in earlier times the sun's heat may have been less, and the difference might have been made up by the earth's own heat. Sir Thistleton Dyer put forth the view that "heat and light cannot radiate into nothing"; that the attraction of the earth influences it; that it, like the radiations of electricity, goes from one object to another. Here arises a difficulty about the light from fixed stars, which started a thousand years ago or more; meanwhile the earth has been moving 1,000,000 miles in two days. But light would travel such a distance as this in five seconds, so that the curvature of its path from such a cause would be inappreciable. Mr. E. B. Clarke declared plainly that the sun's heat goes chiefly to the bodies in the solar system; and "Einstein's theory" involves the curvature of the path of light in a strong gravitational field.

But all such questions are now relegated to the region of empty words by the discovery that several at least of the constituents of the earth are disintegrating—that uranium is becoming radium; radium, helium; helium, polonium; and this last is probably turning to lead. "Instead of regarding the hundred or less elements which exist to-day as manufactured, created, once for all time, we rather regard them as existing *because* they have survived. All other forms less stable than those we recognise as elements have been weeded out" (F. Soddy, *Radium*, p. 223; John Murray, 1909). "The evolution, or rather devolution, of matter, its continuous change, the generation and destruction of atoms—all of the things which seemed impossible in Clerk Maxwell's day we know to be going on before our eyes. . . . At first glance only the material universe gives the impression of a permanent and finished creation. In reality, the now-familiar remorseless operation of slow, continuous change moulds even 'the foundation-stones' themselves. By this last step the doctrine of evolution has become universal, embracing alike the animate and inanimate worlds" (pp. 220–1). "No theory of evolution can be formed to account for the similarity of molecules, for evolution necessarily implies continuous change. . . . The exact quality of each molecule to all the others of the same kind gives it, as Sir John Herschel has well said, the essential character

of a manufactured article, and precludes the idea of its being eternal and self-existent" (do., p. 215; quoting Clerk Maxwell).

"But though in the course of ages catastrophes have occurred and may yet occur in the heavens, though ancient systems may be dissolved and new systems evolved out of their ruin, the molecules out of which these systems are built—the foundation-stones of the material universe—remain unbroken and unworn (Clerk Maxwell, 'British Association,' 1873)" (p. 216). *This is now known not to be true.* "So far, then, as the earth is concerned, a quantity of radium less than in all probability actually exists would supply all the heat lost to outer space. So that there is no difficulty in accounting for the necessary source of heat to maintain the existing conditions of temperature on the earth over a period of past time as long as the uranium which produces the radium lasts—that is to say, for a period of thousands of millions of years" (pp. 236-7).

"The ultra-material potentialities of radium are the common possession of all that world to which in our ignorance we used to refer to as mere inanimate matter" (p. 225).

"Uranium is changing so slowly that it will last for thousands of millions of years" (p. 226). Slow processes of this sort do the effective work of Nature, and the occasional intermittent displays of Plutonic activity correspond to the creaking now and again of an otherwise silent mechanism, which never stops. "Regarded merely as chemical elements between radio-active elements and non-radio-active elements, there exists so complete a parallelism that we cannot regard the radio-active elements as peculiar in possessing this internal store of energy, but only as peculiar in evolving it at a perceptible rate" (p. 228).

"The energy which we require for our very existence, and which Nature supplies us with but grudgingly and in none too generous measure for our needs, is in reality locked up in immense stores in the matter all around us, but the power to control and use it is not yet ours" (pp. 222-3).

"Whether or not the processes of continuous atomic disintegration bulked largely in the scheme of cosmical evolution . . . these processes were at once powerful enough and slow enough to furnish a sufficient and satisfactory explanation of the origin of these perennial outpourings of energy by virtue

of which the universe to-day is a going concern rather than a cold lifeless collection of extinct worlds" (F. Soddy, *Radium*, pp. 234-5).

At the first meeting of the British Association in Oxford, Bishop Wilberforce, in a rather fatuous speech, protested that he should be ashamed to think he was descended from monkeys and jelly-fish. Professor Huxley retorted upon him with overwhelming force that he should be ashamed to get up and appeal to the prejudices of his hearers on a subject of which he obviously knew nothing. Disraeli, with characteristic time-serving, declared that he was "on the side of the angels." *Punch* suggested that he meant the angels of the wrong sort—those whose object and attempt is to obscure and bedim the world. It would appear that Lord Salisbury, at the second meeting of the Association in the same place, emulated his predecessors of both parties in the Premiership by unwarrantable assertions and hastily-drawn conclusions. His double proof has been shown to be faulty on both its lines. These cleverly-balanced and co-ordinated results are too fascinating for the mental equilibrium and judgment of those who are allured by them. There is always a fatal leaning towards the facts which give the effect; for the effects seem to support one another and so a vicious circle is set up.

Accordingly, we may assume that the attempt to prove that the world is not a fit arena for development has failed even in the hands of such able advocates; for Lord Salisbury was a physicist of no mean order, and no doubt he used all the experience which a life of political activity put at his command. Prof. Fleeming Jenkin, an engineer, persuaded Darwin that large variations would be swallowed up by the mere action of mass opposition. Mendel's work failed to attract attention till the beginning of this century, though done more than fifty years ago. It has now been tested by most thorough experiment and shows plainly that, in certain cases at least, a union of dissimilar parents produces offspring in which the peculiar characters of the progenitors are reproduced with almost absolute regularity, in the ratio of 25 per cent. resembling each, while 50 per cent. are a mixture of both. The fact that this does not appear in the first generation has

prevented its recognition; but by keeping the strain pure it has been shown to work out with almost exact accuracy even up to 50,000 examples. It would appear therefore that differences are not so easily eliminated, and the time needed for evolution may be shorter than was hitherto supposed.

I was greatly impressed by the controversy; just as I had been years before by the contention of Hervey Goodwin, Bishop of Carlisle, that a reptile whose forelimbs were partly changed into wings could not have had any advantage in the struggle for existence. Nevertheless, not merely have all the stages of the process been discovered, but there are existing animals, like the flying squirrel, in which this is found to be the case. Half-formed wings, which enable their possessor to get from tree to tree, give an enormous advantage in escaping an enemy—as in Man Friday's dealing with the bear in *Robinson Crusoe*. I have seen two ravens whose wings were clipped play a game with a stork; whereas they could fly backwards and forwards to an island it could only wade, and they were able to keep it in the water as long as they liked. Also, with many other suggestions as to what would be advantageous, we cannot really tell from *à priori* reasons what will prove of benefit in the long run; isolation and other peculiar conditions may alter the effect in a way altogether unexpected. Who, for instance, could suppose that a bird like apteryx, in which the forelimbs were wholly suppressed, would survive at all? Still, there are many large birds whose wings have become useless for flying, and in a number of cases the difficulty is to say of what use they are at all. In islands and places liable to storms of great severity animals have small wings; and even flies have come to be without them because of the risk of being carried out to sea. Many of the Phasmidæ are wingless, or with the upper wings rudimentary, although in the Carboniferous period they were well developed. In the same period some Neuroptera had three pairs of wings, and even now some of the "Mantids" have wings on the prothorax. To-day the thorax of insects is always of three "fused segments"; in the Carboniferous age this was not generally the case, pointing probably to less fusion of the nervous system; but there are legs on all the segments and wings on two or three. Cases of the sort are common.

In the same way Alfred Russel Wallace urged that primitive man could not have benefited by the upright position, or the difference between his hand and foot, and drags in a higher intelligence to account for them. He was unwilling to admit that the higher intelligence was that of man, though he might have learnt from the animals that the erect posture was not assumed at once and that mental power grew by degrees, as indeed it does in every man. First, as a baby he may be said to be thoughtless; then, as an infant with intermittent cerebration; as a youth with growing power of thought; while even as a man this may be very defective and disjointed. Wallace overlooks the fact that the bodily side of mind and its mental side vary mostly in inverse proportions, that as the power of thinking increases there is lost that of attending to details. This is expressed in language by the word "ideation." Just as in art you cannot get the effect if you strive after precision of detail, so in thought in order to arrive at striking results it is needful to suppress, to forget the particulars on which they are founded; neither the teller nor the hearer can embrace the whole truth—much must be omitted. Lord Salisbury's position was very similar when he argued that no cause had been shown for evolution, that selection cannot be demonstrated or imagined, and asked: "How are the best brought together?" No one asserts that they were; evolution sets up no standard of fitness. It never supposes that this is the best of all possible worlds; on the contrary, it presupposes the very reverse—that it is able to improve, or at least progress. For natural selection does not imply that species which survive have any intrinsic perfection; their superiority consists in more complete adaptation to their surroundings. Those which were most suited to environment survived in the struggle for existence, to the extinction of those that were less so. This, of course, would take place most in islands or other places where the less adapted could not easily escape unfavourable conditions. Thus the theory comes very much to be that those survived that did survive, which cannot be denied. In other words, that those better fitted to their environment had an advantage which, in the long run, enabled them to oust their competitors.

Saxons and Celts are very nearly alike, but the former

have forced the latter into the corners of the earth: whether from superior numbers, better weapons, or firmer organization and stricter adherence to it, are questions very interesting to investigate, but not essential to know in order to pronounce definitely that the polity of the Saxon is better for purposes of national progress than that of their competitors. Nor would it make any difference from the point of view of development if it were really the combination of the two that has prevailed, which indeed is probably the truth. The fact that it prevailed is proof that it was fittest for the circumstances obtaining in the places where it has survived. Yet I have known a man not without cleverness read before a Society of Actuaries a paper in which he attempted to discredit the theory on the ground that there were many cases in which the fittest did not survive; that even the lower animals of inferior grades so guarded their offspring, and so herded together in packs and communities, that worse types and specimens were able to survive their superiors. He could hardly have known Darwin's books, for no one could urge more strongly than he does that what one may call the "brute force of Evolution" was tempered by the social and family habits of the higher types: that after a point development became a matter of mental rather than of bodily qualities, that morals and customs came in which told in a decisive way in the struggle. Also instincts were developed, as the crystallized experience of bygone generations, and many contrivances followed, which the reader of the paper seemed to consider were the special results of divine interference, but which are really just ordinary cases of the better method gaining the day by survival and conquest of its rivals. He seemed to think that all battle must be on the stricken field: he did not appear in the least to grasp the fact that the principle is active to-day amongst the most peaceful, in all its force; that perseverance, industry, concentration, temper, wisdom, knowledge, and cuteness are as much its agents and weapons as claws and teeth have been in ages past. The tongue is now as potent, or more so, than the club amongst savages, and dogged persistence more powerful than muscular strength has ever been.

The question has been raised, "Did the Germans win the Battle of Waterloo?" The correct answer is, "It was won

by the Duke of Wellington"; he might have failed without them, they would certainly have failed without him; so I have repeatedly heard the suggestion, "Granted as perfect a chain as you please between man and the lower animals, how do you know the progress was upward, and not the reverse?" Well, simply if you knew anything of the matter you would not ask. Canon Driver gives the adjoining table, which is correct as far as it goes, and certainly does not overstate the case; it shows clearly an ascent. He was not afraid of the truth being stated.

The earliest bird, *Archæopteryx*, in the oolitic slates of the Mid-Secondary, has teeth and clawed wings: even now in young fowls there are claws to the wings, according to Mr. Pyecraft; in the Cretaceous, *Hespeornis* has teeth and a tail with several vertebræ; and so *Ichthyornis*, though it has powerful wings. The fauna recorded from Cambrian and Ordovician times is invertebrate; fishes appear with certainty in the Gotlandian, and dominated the Devonian seas and lakes. Amphibia were well developed by the close of the Carboniferous; and the rapid progress of the generalized reptiles of Permian times led throughout the Mesozoic era to an overpowering empire of reptiles of specialized and often gigantic forms. The first recorded bird is Upper Jurassic, and is clearly a descendant of the reptiles (G. A. J. Cale, F.R.S., *Common Stones*, p. 13).

The oldest reptile—*palæohatteria*—occurs in the Permian, long before birds; the oldest known fish is in the Silurian, but fishes certainly originated long before as primitive small forms. Rays and sharks occur in the Devonian, and of Appendiculata which are very complex and specialized all classes are found in the Silurian. "The first recorded lung-breathing fish is from the lower Devonian (although it may be expected that a Silurian Dipnoan will come to light some day)" (J. Y. Simpson, *Man and the Attainment of Immortality*, 1925, p. 222). For the first time animals left the waters and made possible a new line of development in the Devonian. In the Permian come the first Reptiles; their footmarks can be seen distinctly in the rocks (Dorothy Davison, *Our Prehistoric Ancestors*, p. 5).

The foregoing outline represents approximately the order of development. As to details, every day new discoveries

	Periods.	Animal Life.	Vegetable Life.
<i>Eozoic</i>	1. Laurentian.	<i>Eozoon Canadense.</i>	Doubtful. Indications of plants not determinable.
	2. Huronian.	Age of Protozoa (lowest marine animals).	
	3. Cambrian.	Invertebrata: Age of molluscs, corals, and crustaceans.	<i>Marine plants (seaweeds, etc.).</i>
	4. Silurian.	In 4 fishes begin.	<i>Earliest land plants.</i>
	5. Devonian.	Fishes abundant (but no modern species). Earliest insects.	
	6. Carboniferous	<i>Amphibians</i> begin (species allied to frogs, newts and water-lizards, some of the last large crocodile-like creatures). <i>Insects</i> (spiders, beetles, cockroaches, etc.).	<i>Coal plants</i> : chiefly tree ferns and large mosses (flowerless plants) pines, and cycads.
<i>Paleozoic</i>	7. Permian.	Earliest true reptiles.	
	8. Triassic.	Earliest marsupial mammals.	
	9. Jurassic.	Age of monster reptiles and of birds.	<i>Earliest modern trees.</i>
	10. Cretaceous.		
<i>Mesozoic</i>	11. Tertiary.	Age of extinct mammals. First living invertebrate.	Age of palms and dicotyledonous Angiosperms.
	12. Post-Tertiary.	Age of modern mammals and Man.	

<i>Tertiary</i>	1. Eocene.	<i>Orders and families</i> of mammals now living (e.g. ancestral forms of the horse, the deer, and the hyena) represented, but not living genera or species.
	2. Miocene.	<i>Genera</i> of animals now living represented, but not species.
	3. Pleiocene.	Living species of mammals begin to appear; but are still rare, extinct species abundant.
	4. Pleistocene.	Living species more abundant. Man appears. Extinct species rarer.
	5. "Prehistoric."	Living species (including Man) abundant. Animals domesticated, and fruits cultivated. Only one extinct species (the Irish elk).
<i>Post-Tertiary or Quaternary</i>	6. Historic.	No extinct species. Historical records. Driver, <i>Genesis</i> , p. xxxviii.

produce variations of these, for science has no "faith once delivered to the saints"; it is a living, growing organism. Perhaps before these pages are issued from the press the whole series may be shifted back from the strata named to earlier ones. It is not likely that the relative order will be greatly changed, for this represents the evolution of the organic kingdom. Just as in architecture, if you have eyes you can see that there is a certain structural advance in buildings, those of one age exhibiting an improvement and modification of those that went before, the way of making the roof being in many cases absolutely diagnostic of the time when the structure was put up. In all true arts indeed, if really alive, even in painting and sculpture when looked at from a distance over long periods, such a sequence takes place. Similarly there is a structural relation between organic beings which tells plainly of a development, one from the other, making it quite obvious that they must have followed one another approximately in a certain order.

Every metazoon begins as a protozoon; even the protozoa are often multinuclear (e.g., *Opalina* and *Amœba quarta*). Haeckel and Max Schultze define a cell as protoplasm with a single nucleus—"a multinuclear cell is a contradiction in terms." Division of the nucleus is a prelude to division of the cell body, the beginning of the multicellular condition. In a young Opaline there is one nucleus which divides mitotically; then the body increases in size, and after a time divides into young forms with four or five nuclei, which fuse in the cystic stage. In *Amœba quarta* there is no division; in plants a single mass of protoplasm may have thousands of nuclei at the growing points, which rapidly divide; and similar things occur even in the higher orders of animals, and pathologically in tubercle and other new formations. There may even occur what Sedgwick calls "a reticulum of protoplasm with nuclei at the nodes." Bone and cartilage cells and all unstriated muscle partake of this nature. Growth always consists of nuclear division; the protoplasm may remain concrescent, as in developing ova of arthropods, myxomctes, and coetoblastic algæ. Thus one of the impassable barriers erected by ignoramus is surmounted. In the same way, the opponents of Evolution attempted to set

up a division between animals and plants. Actually the two are precisely the same at their outset, and *Volvox*, an advanced form, has been bandied about between zoologists and botanists, who could not decide to which kingdom it belongs. *Euglena* and *Chlamydomonas* are in the same position to-day. "Particularly in the regions where science and theology directly impinge does he [the average man] find the incompatibility to be greatest" (J. Y. Simpson, *Spiritual Interpretation of Nature*, p. 1). "Animal and plant alike in virtue of their cell structure are composed of that fundamental linin-chromatic network whose functions are synthetic, contractile, and nervous" (p. 77). "All this fundamental metabolic activity, then, is in some way controlled for the good of the individual . . . internal secretions or hormones which, as the result of their distribution throughout the body by means of the circulatory system, act as chemical regulators of organic function, as also with regard to the activities of the nervous system" (p. 76). "The extraordinary changes in the individual should make it easy to believe in change in species. Such change is the mode of Nature" (p. 78). "We may speak of life in general, but we never know it except as the special phenomena of a particular organism . . . the supreme example is found in man, with his characteristic awareness of individuality, and the possibilities involved in its complete attainment" (p. 81). "Organic evolution occupies but a moment in inorganic evolution. . . . Evolution is the history of changing forms, organic or inorganic, as affected by unchanging laws" (p. 104). "Yet fixity of type was the catchword of science in the middle of the last century; the everlasting hills are still the joy of poetry" (p. 105). "In Evolution men have come to perceive the divine method of creation in time, even as gravitation concerns the relations of things in space" (p. 107) "If Evolution implies continuity, it is inconsistent with the idea of 'any breaks' in the succession. A clear understanding at this point would mean the solution of half our difficulties" (p. 108). "An older apologetic filled in the 'breaks' with divinity, but what it fondly considered to be its strongholds proved its most vulnerable points" (p. 109).


Breaks are commonly cited at the commencement of the

evolutionary process, at the appearance of life, at the dawn of sentiency, and at the awakening of self-consciousness. "They are supposed to occur at periods about which we have no knowledge, and of which we can never hope to learn the exact conditions. . . . The belief in such a natural origin of life is an exigency of thought" (p. 109). "A break has been removed" (p. 110).

The suggestion has been made that life was brought to the earth on a meteoric stone. These are not "red hot" below the surface; on the contrary, Lord Kelvin said they were there really many degrees below zero. The heating depends on the way they reach the earth; if they move in the same direction with it there is much less friction. But if life once came this way why should it not come many times? Hence a brilliant suggestion that specimens of living organisms developed elsewhere had been brought from other planets. This bosh may be looked upon as the last resort of those who must bring in something miraculous. A previous idea was that a high form of life had been brought and had developed backwards as well as forwards; but the branching of the orders altogether forbids such a view. The life on earth is all part of one system, all akin. As the Bishop of Colombo urged thirty years ago, it is true that, so far as our knowledge goes, the world starts as a "going concern"; that in the oldest rocks there occur existing genera of foraminifera, sponges and corals in the Silurian, echinoderms and gephyrea in the Cambrian; yet the higher classes of mollusca, appendiculata, and vertebrata have arisen since.


Perhaps all species except vertebrates existed in the Cambrian, and Chiton (Mollusc) is the same to-day as at its first appearance in the Cambrian; but, as Darwin warned us, the geologic record is very imperfect, and at the sea bottom there may be older formations. The earliest forms are really very recent. Of the twenty-one phyla of Sir Edwin Ray Lankester only nine have left fossils. Under such conditions it is not possible to trace the exact course of evolution. We know quite well that Moslem architecture arose from Byzantine, but the steps by which it did so are as yet not clearly made out. The records are in Arabic which has never been searched through for this purpose; the buildings are many

of them in out-of-the-way and dangerous parts of the earth, where travellers do not care to loiter or make drawings. Analogously we can see from existing specimens that there is a clear link and connection between all plant and animal forms; but the exact course of the stream down which life flowed has not yet been mapped out. One great gap is filled by the fact that the Tunicata have a dorsal nerve tube, gill-slits, and the notochord of Chordata, though these may not be permanent through life. On the other hand, the absence of paired organs of sense, of jaws, and of prehensile organs puts them very low in the scale of animals; they have not even the metamerism of worms and other annelates; but this may be a secondary simplification, of which many examples occur. Their connection with Amphioxus is very clear and precise; with Hemichordata it is less so. Mr. Garstang expressed their relations to a very simple ancestor in three phyla as follows:—



All this will probably be clearer to the plain man if put thus:— Sea-squirts, very simple animals, like leather bags with two holes through which they propel the water and thereby live and move and have their being, start in life as tadpoles, exactly like those of frogs, till they settle down as a sort of dilapidated golf-ball, some forms retaining a rudiment of the backbone all through life. Thus vertebrates are connected with invertebrates, unicellular with multicellular, and animals with plants. All the higher orders are perhaps symbioses of unicellular and multicellular, in which the uni-

cellular is the senior partner and dominates the firm, for it carries with it the heritage. This may be put in a diagram thus:—



where the human beings are mere carriers, or nurses, to the germ-cells, which conjugate, divide, and propagate. The unicellular has been called an "immortal," while man ends in nothing in space. These "germ-cells" are the true soul of Humanity, and constitute the real metempsychosis. The character of a race, or of a man, depends on the education of such hereditary substance. Humanity cannot be found in perfection in a German Junker-class, which was heathen a few centuries back. The "tiger and ape" of Tennyson are hard to get rid of. Culture will break down on trial if a long evolution has not produced it. The truth must be in the soul, the divine in man: the potentiality of good, the standard of right feeling, by which a chord vibrates in our hearts when we sense the righteous.

## CHAPTER II

### ANATOMY AND PSYCHOLOGY

*Tangere enim et tangi, nisi corpus, nulla potest res.*

—LUCRETIUS, *De Rerum Natura*, Book I, line 304 tr.

“Why should man be an exception to any of the Laws of Nature? Nature knows him simply as an animal—Sub-kingdom *Vertebrata*, Class *Mammalia*, Order *Bimana*.<sup>1</sup>”

—DRUMMOND, *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, p. 99.

*Sibi quisque profecto est deus.*—OVID.

“Are we not all gods to ourselves? and there are deep reasons for this if our animal origin be considered.”

—PROF. J. H. ROBINSON, *Mind in the Making*.

THE relation of Reptiles to the other orders is well monographed in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Eleventh Edition, Vol. XXIII, 1910.

“Reptiles, as known in the existing world, are the modified and in many respects degenerate representatives of a group of lung-breathing vertebrate animals which attained its maximum development in the Mesozoic period. So far as can be judged from the skeleton, some of the members of this group then living might have become mammals by very slight change, while others might as readily have evolved into birds. . . . The class ranks higher than that of the lowest five-toed vertebrates (class Batrachia) in the investment of the foetus by two membranous envelopes (the amnion and the allantois), and in the total absence of gills even in the earliest embryos. It ranks below both the Mammalia and Aves in the partial mixture of the arterial blood with the venous blood as it leaves the heart, thus causing the organism to be cold blooded; it also differs both from Mammalia and Aves in retaining a pair of aortic arches, of which only the left remains in the former, while the right one is retained in the latter” (Dr. H. Gadow, p. 141). “This last point answers completely the question why evolution might not be downward rather than up. Of the two aortic arches of reptiles, birds retain the one, mammals retain the other. If you found

one of a pair of boots in one house, and the other in another, some connection is obvious; and the most likely is that they both come from the same source." "This led to a series of discussions which ended in the idea that the class could be most naturally divided into two great sub-classes, the one culminating in tortoises and mammals, the other in crocodiles, lizards, snakes, and birds" (A. S. Woodman, *loc. cit.*).

On this basis Professor H. F. Osborn, in 1903, therefore proposed the following classification:—

"Subclass: *Synapsida*. . . . Giving rise to the mammals through some unknown member of the *Anomodontia*. . . .

*Diapsida*. Giving rise to the birds through some unknown type transitional between *Protorosauria* and *Dinosauria*."

"These first mammals are derived from a reptilian stock, known as the Cynodonts (or Theriodonts) . . . Birds came from another unrelated reptilian stock, which also gave rise to the dinosaurs" (J. Y. Simpson, *Man and the Attainment of Immortality*, 1923, p. 223).

Here we see anatomy coinciding with geology in placing reptiles before the birds and so making them their progenitors. An attempt has been made to interpret the "creeping things" of Genesis as molluscs or insects; but it is only one of the subterfuges resorted to by those who are unable any longer to maintain the correctness of their former contentions. Such pleas culminated in the absurd suggestion that "moving things that have life" only refers to those that breathe, and that as the lower classes do not respire, it must mean *Pulmonates*. This attempt to lug modern science into the Scriptures is one of the most contemptible phases of "intellectuality," or the lack of it. Bishop Wordsworth has no doubt that "creeping things" mean reptiles; but he troubles his righteous soul as to whether as first created they were venomous. He gives "soul" as the Hebrew of "life," which recalls Dean Burgon's view that the animals have souls; but he did not define how far he thought this extended, whether there would be souls of fleas and other noisome creatures in the next world. He probably got over this by his habitual assumption that all to whom he objected would be in a different place from himself. The truth is that neither the writers of the Bible

nor its interpreters had any real knowledge of Nature, or any grasp of the relations of the various orders to one another. In point of fact, the birds are the latest in origin of all classes of animals—a *cul de sac*.

It would be redundant to argue further the question of the lower orders. I am sure no one who understands the question now has any doubt that they are all intimately connected. It is only when it comes to man that assent is withheld; and unfortunately it is just at this point that the proof becomes so hard to bring home to those who are not versed in anatomy. Amongst the specialists I believe there is but one opinion; even the clergy have come to recognize the truth; nor would it be difficult to produce numberless quotations admitting it from their writings. The question therefore has to be faced, What is the bearing of the connection of man with the animals on religious belief? Mr. Pyecraft, the well-known writer in the *Illustrated London News*, March 22, 1923, says: “To speak of the relationship of these great apes and man: in bone, muscle, and nerve they are the same, differing only in relative proportion of parts. The differing facts are those of degree, not of kind. We are all derivations of a common stock; man rose superior to all his lower kin by the fact that he has reason.”

Firstly, I think it cannot be denied that this affinity is altogether inconsistent with the account in Genesis: it is a rise, and not a fall. This may indeed be got over by saying that at a certain point of development a soul was given to man, who was thus raised to a little lower than the angels; and that after this he fell. Like most of the answers of religion to science, however, it labours under the objection of being *ex post facto*. It is like the jury masts and sails which mariners set up when by stress of weather they have been obliged to sacrifice their proper complement; but, unlike such sailors who look to such aid only for temporary help, those who put forward this plea have no hope that it will be superseded by something better; they are hopelessly shipwrecked, and can only run before the wind in a water-logged condition. The plea is one that would never have been thought of, and would have been scouted with indignation, had it not been forced upon special creationists by overwhelming necessity. Indeed,

I can hardly believe it is put forward in whole-hearted sincerity; at any rate it will not satisfy science.

"The fall is a myth—that is to say, in the sense that the world was a perfect world until the introduction of death, sexual troubles, sorrow, and pain, by the sin of Adam, or any other similar fellow" (Sleigh, *The Sufficiency of Christianity*, p. 177; J. Clarke).

As the body of man has developed so also has his mind; the beginnings of all his feelings may be plainly seen in the higher orders of the brutes; and as to a fictitious soul, which is supposed by some to exist apart from the mind, the feelings, the will, it is impossible to deal with what gives no evidence of its existence. The words used to express it are all derived from the breath; and, as will be shown later, the whole notion arose from this. In the human brain there is a small body called the pineal gland; Descartes, the author of the Cartesian philosophy, thought this was the seat of the soul, from which it squirted the nervous fluid down the neural tubes and so made the muscles act as it willed; he even gives a picture of the homunculus, as he calls it, at this work. It is really the rudiment of a third eye at the back of the head, which occurs in Rhyncocephalia, Sphenodon (*Hatteria*), and lizards, and also in the larval form of lamprey; but not as an eye in any other fish, though probably all with a large parietal foramen once had it. In some lizards the scale over it is still more or less transparent. The Theriodonts had it, and probably some of the Dipnoi and the early amphibians. Its utility in these days of bicycles, noiseless motor-cars, and butchers' carts would be obvious; but in bygone times, when savage beasts were liable to spring on their prey from behind, its value must have been still greater.

Again, in the four-footed animals the legs and spine form a sort of trestle, from which the intestines are slung as from a hammock. When monkeys came to stand upright this arrangement was upset, hence the pot-bellied appearance of the higher apes and I know not of what ills to mankind from the viscera being lumped together and pressing on the contents of the pelvis. Indeed, the origin of evil might plausibly be assigned to the rebellion of men against the habits which had become fixed and useful among animals during the lapse of

myriads of centuries; but, in truth, no such sudden change took place. We have learnt from geology that slow, continuous causes really produced the effects which used to be attributed to cataclysms and convulsions of Nature. All the advances in the realms of life have been gradual, a little here and a little there, step by step, and line upon line, and seldom or never by any phenomenal advance or catastrophic destruction.

The doctrine of evolution does not hang on any suppositions of this sort, but on hard anatomical facts. There is a small muscle in the arm of man, the *palmaris*, the function of which is to tighten up the fascia of the palm so as to prevent the blood-vessels being pressed on when anything is grasped; it is one of the group of muscles which close the hand and acts together with them automatically. A very beautiful piece of mechanism, you may say, and a conclusive proof of design. In the leg, however, there is a similar one, the *plantaris*, which does not go to the foot at all, but is a sort of poor relation of the great *Tendo Achillis* to the back of the heel. It is hard to believe that a muscle about the size of a finger can aid greatly those which form the whole bulk of the calf; indeed, it is sometimes absent without disadvantage; but in the Quadrumana it is functional, as in the hand, for they grasp with their feet also. This is an example of the sort of fact that makes the pet clerical notion that development might be downwards rather than upwards quite out of the question: the contrivance is a splendid one in monkeys; in man it has become useless, and even harmful in the leg, for by over-stress the little muscle may get strained or torn, and incapacitate instead of benefiting the owner.

Survivals of this description are common; the most patent examples of it are perhaps the teats on men. I have never come across any rational explanation of these apart from the theory of development. There is what may be called a typical mammary arrangement, in a row like a page's buttons, on each side, as in a pig or dog; in cows only those in the loins survive and have become greatly enlarged; in man only those on the breast; and the distinction of sex functions being comparatively late, a rudiment remains in the male, which at times is capable of acting, but more commonly is only

liable to cancer. In rare cases there may be three or more rudimentary teats, in almost the places they would occupy if polymastia were the rule in man as in the animals. The effect is neither ornamental nor useful, and can hardly be set down to design. This view is in keeping with all we know of the constitution of men—their whole anatomy, every bone, every muscle, every nerve and vessel tells the same tale. Just as the relation of the parts of the face, the ears, eyes, nose, and mouth correspond to and reproduce that of the other animals, so all the internal parts are in relation to those of the lower orders. They are intelligible as the products of inheritance from these; they are wholly incomprehensible as a scheme specially contrived for man.

The remains of gill-slits in the neck are a heritage from fish which survive in frog and other similar forms in the embryo stage, but disappear on the formation of lungs. In man they do not extend beyond an early stage in evolution generally; but in some cases they may remain as an opening in the side of the neck which it is very hard to get rid of. A surgeon told me he had operated three times before he could get one of these clefts to close up. Another of these survivals is a channel from the back of the tongue down into the chest; a most objectionable rudiment, which it is exceedingly hard to rectify. It exists in most in the form of a solid cord; but in some remains patent. Meckel's diverticulum in some individuals, and the coecal appendix in others are all other instances of such vestiges. The latter is considered so prejudicial that in America it has been proposed to remove it in babies as a routine practice. The whole intestine of man is liable to constant variations, which may have the most fatal results. These can, for the most part, be traced to a similar arrangement in the lower orders, which has become useless or harmful in man.

The spinal accessory nerve coming from the cervical region of the spinal cord goes mainly to the muscles of the neck, so that till lately it was hardly understood why it was a cranial nerve at all. It, however, gives a branch to the vagus which goes to the heart; this in the amphibia is situated in the neck, and is still so in the embryos of the higher orders. For this same reason the laryngeal branches of the vagus have been

carried down into the chest, and have to come back again, up to the throat. That peculiar aberrant structures of this kind, some of which are just a nuisance, should have been specially "designed" is a theory which cannot be made to hold water. Even the orthodox, confronted by anomalies of this kind, have resort to the plea that an enemy hath done it, thereby bringing in a dualism by a side wind. On Darwin's hypothesis all is plain sailing: the arrangement of the face goes back even to the molluscs; the differentiation of the teeth into incisors, canines, and molars to the Theriodonts, which present many points in common with mammals, of which only one rational explanation can be given—that they had a common ancestor. Other examples are the entepicondyloid foramen, the tendency of the quadrate to fuse with the quadro-tojugal, so that the lower jaw comes to connect with the squamosal; and the five digits with three joints each. All vertebrates with brains have ten cranial nerves, of which the fourth goes to one muscle of the eye, the trochlear, and the sixth to the external rectus, or abducens. There are two sets of teeth in all mammals above monotremes; in all above edentata the molars are milk-teeth. The possibility of any two distinct animals having all these characters in common by chance is too absurd to be considered. Not less ridiculous is the assertion of a providence which made the teeth of man similar to those of the extinct reptiles with amphicœlous vertebræ and clear remains of the notochord, which may be traced down to the tunicata, and yet left remnants of gill-slits and other entirely useless structures. "Everything points to man being derived from a form similar to the Insectivora," by gradual evolution.

To many this pedigree of man will appear wholly incredible. They are willing to admit that invertebrates are all closely allied; they do not refuse to consent to the vertebrates being all akin. They see that the tadpole-larval form of sea-squirts unites the two, that the notochord of these and amphioxus persists in the lampreys, and for long even in bony fish; that the amphibia connect the aquatic forms with the terrestrial; that a dog is obviously the near congener to an ape, that he stands and thinks and hesitates, just like his human master, and finally jumps to a conclusion, without any very obvious

reason. But to put together such different forms as man, with his upright, heaven-regarding face, and the creeping, long-snouted hedgehog is too much for their credulity. If they were told that man came down from heaven as an angel, and lost his wings by getting them smeared over by the mud of earth; that he was once an ethereal, god-like being, but had become enslaved by the demands of his stomach and the desire of his eyes, this would appear to them in accordance with the traditions of the race. "The probability of things lies not in Nature, but in our minds. The degree of probability is an index of the degree of knowledge" (J. Y. Simpson, *The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature*, p. 19). The Greeks held similar views; the Peruvians believed their Incas to be children of the Sun. All nations have embraced such myths; but the anatomy of man makes wings an absolute impossibility: if of a size to support his weight the muscles needed to move them would make him the shape of a bird.

Besides, wings in all bony animals have arisen from modification of the fore-limbs, and it is the possession of a hand that has given man his supremacy; no doubt this preceded the development of the brain. Even macaques can throw stones with fair skill, but the most learned monkey has not got beyond counting up to four or five. The first step seems to have been that the thumb became capable of bending inwards, so as to grasp a nut or other object; the next was to rise from the ground, so as to look around. Both of these movements may be seen in a squirrel, rat, or beaver; and they imply that observation and reason are taking the place of mere instinct. This is a sort of second departure in nervous tissue; the growth of the brain shows that the animal is less dependent on hereditary and more on acquired knowledge. An animal acts by instinct always in the same way under the same conditions, whether the effect is appropriate or not. This is an old system, which has to be got rid of, and the growth of the cerebral hemispheres over the cerebellum is probably co-ordinated with this advance. Huxley had a redoubtable encounter with Owen over the last point when it was shown that Owen had depended on ill-preserved specimens as a basis for his contentions. By the above-mentioned acquirement, strength and speed became less important, and various

changes were produced in the limbs, the most notable of which is the twisting of the two bones of the arm on one another whereby the hand can be directed forward in place of being always with the claws or nails to the front, as in the four-footed animals. The beginning of this adaptation can be seen in a cat, which has much more differentiation between the hand and the foot than a dog, and its brain is more complex. Even a frog has a distinct power of grasping with well-formed thumbs, though it makes little use of it except for embracing the female.

Of this habit of love, indeed, it is not easy to say how far it extends; even some of the plants seem to have it, but they always act in the same way under the same conditions, as Sir Edwin Ray Lankester puts it. We brag greatly about our affection; but it is an instinct we share with the very lowest of the animals: the snails have quite lively erotic scenes, and even unicellular organisms exhibit adumbrations of this passion. Every man starts as a unicellular plastid—the gametes, though microscopic, carry to the children all the mental and bodily peculiarities of the parents; they may never see them, may never know one word or thought of father or mother; they may be brought up by strangers in a foreign land, with different beliefs; yet this mere speck of protoplasm will produce in them the tone of mind, the habits of body, the expression of face, the colour of eyes, the curl of hair, the form of hands, the action of feet, or any other physical or mental character of either parent, or of an earlier forbear.

In man is no structure except the extensor primi-internodii pollicis and the peronius tertius which is not represented in the chimpanzee, orang, or gorilla. The object of the latter muscle is to pull the outside of the foot up. It is easy to see why it should be developed in man, who walks on the sole of his foot, and not on the side of it, like apes: I cannot see any use for the extensor primi-internodii pollicis, but it is unimportant, and might easily be derived from the muscles round it. Many modifications of the limbs have occurred from various conditions of life. Animals are digitigrade, without an ulna or clavicles, with long scapulæ and olecranonæ, and the toes aborted for speed. The horse, which is derived from a five-toed ancestor in the Eocene, is a good example;

also the deer family; the fibulæ are reduced, the astragalus is deeply grooved, and the muscles are absent in the lower part of the limbs, while the third trochanter is well developed. In the Quadrupedæ—as they are wrongly called, for they have quite distinct feet, differing from hands—and in man the muscles go down to the extremity; the ulna is not aborted, the scapula is broad, clavicles are present, the olecranon is small, the fibulæ are strong, the digits five generally. The plantigrade type is adapted for flexibility and precision of movement and erect posture: the pelvis is wide, the femur long, the tibia short, the great toe not opposed, the astragalus flattened in the proximal facet.

The Anura include the familiar frogs and toads, which always have four limbs. "Throughout the vertebrate animals there exist structures bearing analogy to our own ears, whose function might therefore be supposed to be auditory. But in the lowest vertebrates the only structures of the human ear represented are the semi-circular canals, and these suggest a static rather than an auditory organ. The cyclostomes, eel-like and semi-parasitic forms classed below the true fishes, have a pair of sacs one on either side of the head, containing mineral bodies, and each leading into one or two semicircular canals. In the true fishes the sac has two chambers, marked off from each other by a constriction. Three semicircular canals open from the foremost chamber, two lying in the vertical plane and one in the horizontal plane. The chambers contain 'statoliths' and fluid" (Washburn, *The Animal Mind*, pp. 114-15; Macmillan, 1908). "The reptilian ear does not differ markedly from that of amphibians" (p. 119). "In the frog the ear has a tympanic membrane lying at the surface of the head. A single bone, the columella, with one end against this membrane, lies across the middle ear. The internal ear is not essentially different in structure from that of the fish; there is no cochlea" (pp. 117-18). "The cochlea is supposed to be the portion of the human ear in which the power to distinguish pitch is localized. Yet birds have no cochlea, though if we grant that animals which produce sounds are those which are able to hear them, some birds at least must be capable of pitch discriminations of wide range and great acuteness" (p. 119).

" In some of the coelenterates the possibility of a specific auditory sensation quality has been suggested by the discovery of a peculiar sense-organ. While varying in its structure in different genera and orders of coelenterate animals, this organ consists typically of a small sac filled with fluid and containing one or more mineral bodies " (p. 106). " In the Crustacea the function of the statocyst organs has been the subject of much dispute. They are in this group of animals sometimes closed sacs with statoliths, sometimes open sacs containing grains of sand. . . . There is usually inside the sac a projection bearing several ridges of hairs, graded in size, which tempt to the hypothesis that they respond to vibrations of different wave-lengths, as the fibres of the basilar membrane of the human cochlea are supposed by the Helmholtz theory to do. . . . The weight of authority is in favour of regarding the 'sac' in crustacea as a static rather than an auditory organ " (p. 108). " Nevertheless, Bethe and Hensen are both inclined to believe, as did Delage, who first called attention to the static function of the statocysts, that they may be auditory organs also " (p. 109).

The foregoing outline of the evolution of the "auditory organ" is in terms of the data and doctrine of the most eminent specialists on the subject. It is difficult, if not impossible, however, to make verbal descriptions of morphology intelligible and convincing to the lay reader. But we do know with certainty, and can demonstrate with fossil specimens, how birds were evolved from reptiles and the horse from *Hyracotherium*, *Eohippus*, and *Hipparrison*, so that we can join up in an unbroken series the extant with the extinct forms of the genus *Hippus*. Thus, without any detailed, practical knowledge of anatomy on his part, an inspection of museum pieces ought to satisfy even the unscientific observer of the mutability of species and of their descent from more generalized types.

Formerly there were supposed to be insuperable barriers between animals and plants, between uni- and multi-cellular organisms, and between vertebrates and invertebrates, and this emboldens the attempt to draw a wide line between the mind of animals and that of man. For instance, Descartes says in a letter to the Marquis of Newcastle: " As for the understanding or thought attributed by Montaigne and

others to brutes, I cannot hold their opinion. . . . They act by force of nature and by springs, like a clock which tells better what the hour is than our judgment can inform us. And doubtless when swallows come in the Spring, they act in that like clocks" (Washburn, pp. 14-15). "All that the honey-bees do is of the same nature." With this compare Shakespeare: "So work the honey-bees, creatures that by rule of nature, etc." *Per contra*, in a course of lectures in Edinburgh, Professor Thomson of Aberdeen insisted on the opposite view that "all nature is full of intelligence and moral attributes"; and Darwin writes: "'Only a few persons now dispute that animals possess some power of reasoning. Animals may constantly be seen to pause, deliberate, and resolve'" (p. 15). "The danger besetting the attempt at a purely physical explanation of animal behaviour is that the facts shall be unduly simplified to fit the theory. Thus Bethe's effort at explaining the way in which bees find their way back to the hive as a reflex response, or tropism, produced by 'an unknown force,' is highly questionable; the facts seem to point toward the exercise of some sort of memory by the bees. It is always possible, further, that the tropism is accompanied by consciousness" (p. 18). E. Wasemann writes that man "'stands through his reason and freedom immeasurably high above the irrational animal that follows, and must follow, its sensuous impulse without deliberation.' (Translation [St. Louis, 1905] of his *Vergleichende Studien*, 1897, Freiberg"; Washburn, p. 19.)

Professor Edgar, of St. Andrew's, told me that his dog, having been attacked by some geese, avoided the place where this had happened, but was not afraid of other geese. Finding, however, that all of them were quick to resent intrusion, he in time came to see that it was not a local matter, but depended on the psychic qualities of the birds, and thereafter gave them a wide berth. This was a true case of learning by experience, just as a child does, and of modifying behaviour in consequence of the lesson learnt. If the bodily constitution of man is derived from animals—and few will now be prepared to deny it or care to do so—I cannot see good ground for refusing to admit that the mental character is also founded on that of his animal ancestors; and even, to a certain extent, his moral

disposition and ethical outlook on the world rest on their experience and the views that they formed as to their surroundings. It is impossible accurately to judge of the mental power of an animal; we can only make a guess, from its behaviour, what its thoughts are, and our conclusion is apt to be materially influenced by imagination and warped by prejudice, from affection to our pets, and exaggeration of their wonderful insight; and the less intellectual a man is himself, the more he is inclined to magnify animal intelligence.

Bethe puts his views thus: "Psychic qualities cannot be demonstrated; even what we call sensation is known to each man only in himself, since it is something subjective. We possess the capacity of modifying our behaviour [*i.e.*, of learning], and every one knows from his own experience that psychic qualities play a part connected with this modifying process. Every statement that another being possesses psychic qualities is a conclusion from analogy, not a certainty; it is a matter of faith. If one wishes to draw this analogical inference, it should be made where the capacity for modification can be shown. When this is lacking, there is not the slightest scientific justification for assuming psychic qualities" (*Die Anatomische Elements des Nervensystems*, Biol. Cent. Ed., 18, s. 843; quoted by Washburn, p. 20). The strict inference would seem really to be: as of necessity all knowledge is mental, and we can have none except of mind and in mind, we have no real warrant that anything exists outside our own minds, except another mind or minds. That is to say, we know mind, and nothing but mind, and can only hypothecate something similar; but I think the phenomena of the Universe warrant the conclusion that it is a muddle-headed sort of mind. Cicero's opinion that the Maker of the world was beneficent, but had too much on his hands to attend to details, has at least the merit of being unprejudiced by antecedent beliefs, the most potent source of misjudgment.

As Washburn says (*Animal Mind*): "The actions of our fellow men resemble our own, and we therefore infer in them like subjective states to ours; the actions of animals resemble ours less completely, but the difference is one of degree, not of kind" (p. 23). "The mental processes in other minds, animal or human, cannot indeed be objectively ascer-

tained facts; the facts are those of human and animal behaviour, but the mental processes are as justifiable inferences as any others with which science deals" (p. 27). "Black and white may for all we know depend for their quality upon some substance existing only in the human retina" (p. 24). "We must interpret the animal mind humanly if we are to interpret it at all. Yet we know that it differs from the human mind, and that the difference is partly a matter of complexity" (p. 25). "The search for food, the care of the young, and the complex activities which further welfare, are made up of reactions involving 'choice' between stimuli; and if the simple 'choice' reaction is on a par with the behaviour of chemical atoms, so far as proof of consciousness goes, then adaptation to an end, apparent purposiveness, is in a similar position" (p. 28). "Thus the mere fact that an animal reacts to stimulation, even selectively and for its own best interests, offers no evidence for the existence of mind that does not apply equally well to particles of inanimate matter."

Of course, there is a great difference; but so is there between a savage and an educated man. We can hardly credit that people should believe that stones are alive, or that they are themselves the children of wombats and cousins of kangaroos. I know that the witty man, in his own conceit, will at once reply that this is precisely what I am trying to make him accept, but this involves a complete misunderstanding, or mis-statement of the tenets of development. A man develops out of a child, a child is evolved from a single cell; just as a tree is from a seed, which contains no trace of its future growth, but the hereditary substance has in it the norm and potentiality of the freely developed animal or plant. The wombat and kangaroo, or, to use more common instances, a jelly-fish or a snail, have not the power of producing a human being; nor has any extant animal. An Indian cannot beget an Englishman, though we are certain that they are both of the same family. I doubt if a negro can exactly think the thoughts of a European. Absolute division does not preclude kinship, though it does make near union out of the question. The mind of a child produces that of an adult; it is itself the outcome of two minute cells, which can no more be said to think or to have ideas than any other piece of embryonic

protoplasm. The power of thought develops in the unit as it has grown in the race; just like the body.

In this connection I do not think that "Recapitulation" can be used as a convincing argument. It gives indications which are interpreted by our theory of evolution; but the development of mind in every individual repeats the process in the race. If it is not a proof, it is at least an example that such an expansion is possible. Consequently, it is useless to urge that animals have no ideas, or, as it has been put, "memory" or "general" ideas. The introduction of the adjective is a clear proof that the position is practically given up. It simply means that the ideas of animals are not precisely the same as ours, though they are similar, and it is only a question why and how far they differ from ours, just as it is with those of infants and undeveloped races. "The inventor holds to his problem, the student to his task in spite of distractions, because of the consequences which he thinks of as likely to result. It seems unlikely that attention in this final form occurs among the lower animals. While ideas are probably present to some extent in the minds of the higher mammals, they are hardly so far freed from connection with external stimuli that the animal can shut out the world of sense from its consciousness, and dwell in a world of ideas" (*Washburn, Animal Mind*, pp. 294 sq.).

This is a very careful statement in a book which summarizes the known facts for the use of students, and has no ulterior motive of forcing a particular view of them. Again, "many facts concerning the instincts of animals—that is, their inherited reactions—indicate that these are extremely rough adjustments of behaviour to environment until refined by individual experience. Hudson observed, for example, that newly-born lambs on the South American plains had a tendency to run away from any object that approached them, and to follow any object that receded. They would follow his horse for miles as he rode along and would run away from their own mothers when the latter moved towards them. He explained this as adapted to the fact that ordinarily their first duty on making their appearance in the world is to keep up with the receding herd, while an approaching object is more likely to be an enemy" (p. 291). "Later this rough adjustment is

modified; lambs learn by experience not to run away from their mothers, and not to follow indiscriminately any leader" (p. 291). "There are, as we have seen, various ways of learning by experience; slow ways that do not involve ideas, and the rapid way that does. The great advantage of man over most of the lower animals is not so much in the fact as in the method of his learning" (p. 284).

"The prolonged period of human infancy is of advantage to the intellectual life of man because it means plasticity, the absence of fixed instincts that would take the place of acquisition by individual experience" (p. 283). "It would thus seem as though one condition which must be fulfilled, if movement-ideas are to play an important part in a creature's experience, is that the animal should, for a time at least, be set free from the pressure of the practical hand-to-hand struggle for the means of existence, and thus enabled in safety to attend to its own movement sensations" (p. 282). "A very striking difference between man and most of the lower animals lies in the immensely greater number of different movements . . . that man is able to perform. When we think of the enormous variety of muscular adjustments of which the human race as a whole is capable, and compare it with the limited power of an earthworm to react upon its surroundings, the small extent of its motor repertoire, the gulf that separates them is highly impressive. And the conscious experience of an animal must be profoundly modified by the number and variety of the motor co-ordinations it has under its control. Not only because sensory discriminations in general involve differentiation of motor reaction, but because that breaking up of the crude mass of sense impressions into smaller masses which we will call the perception of external objects depends so largely on what the animal is able to do with objects. Think, for example, of a creature able to move in response to its environment, but not able to alter the relative position of different features of that environment; not able, in plain words, to pick up a single object and move it about. 'Objects' for such an animal simply would not exist" (p. 279).

"Cole, as we have seen, has observed behaviour in the raccoon that well might be regarded as involving ideas.

Despite the difficulty of proving that animals have memory ideas, it is not likely that any such gulf separates the human mind from that of the higher animals as would be involved in the absence from the latter of all images of past experiences" (p. 272). "That ideas occur in far less profusion and with far less freedom of play in the animal mind than possesses them at all than in the human mind; that even the highest animal below man lives far more completely absorbed in present stimulations than does the average man, seems also practically certain" (p. 273) (v. *Jour. comp. Neur. and Psych.*, Vol. 17, p. 211). "Preyer again observed a very pretty instance of this sort of behaviour in the star-fish. He slipped a piece of rubber tubing over the middle part of one of the arms of a starfish belonging to the species in which those members are very slender, and found that the animal tried successively various devices to get rid of the foreign body—to wit, the following: rubbing it off against the ground, shaking it off by holding the arm aloft and waving it pendulum-wise in the air, holding the tube against the ground with a neighbouring arm and pulling the afflicted arm out, pressing other arms against the tube and pushing it off, and finally, as a last resort, amputating the arm. This, says Preyer, is intelligence, for the emergency is not one normal to the animal, and it is adapting itself to new conditions" (p. 215). This is a dubious inference, because the arms of a brittle starfish must be very liable to seizure, or they would not break off so easily; and certainly such a series of attempts to get free would not have been made the first time, for this implies long experience. If you put a paper bag over a dog's head it will go through much the same actions, except the last; and even a brainless frog will try to remove an irritation to its skin by a regular sequence of movements. It would be needful to know if the above-named acts were always done in the same order; if so they were allied to the "spinal cord" action, and have no mental significance, but are part of a widespread reflex instinct. It is hard to believe that animals without the rudiments of a brain can think or devise methods of action; these appear to arise *pari passu* with the development of this.

"The reactions of animals to stimulation show, as we review the various animal forms from the lowest to the highest,

increasing adaptation to the qualitative differences and to the spatial characteristics of the stimuli acting upon them. It is therefore possible to suppose that the animal mind shows increasing variety in its sensation contents, and increasing complexity in its spatial perceptions. But, besides this advance in the methods of responding to present stimulation, the higher animals show in a growing degree the influence of past stimulation. While a low animal may apparently react to each stimulus as if no other had affected it in the past, one somewhat higher may have its reaction modified by the stimulation which it has just received. An animal still more highly developed may give evidence of being affected by stimuli whose action occurred some time before; and finally, in certain of the vertebrates, perhaps, as in man, conduct may be determined by the presence in consciousness of a memory idea representing a past stimulus" (p. 205). "The higher vertebrates could give us much insight into their minds if they could only speak. We are, however, restricted to the inferences we can draw from movements and sounds that are made for the most part without the intention of communicating anything to us" (p. 4). "The search for food, the care for the young, and the complex activities which further welfare, are made up of reactions involving 'choice' between stimuli" (p. 28).

"Animals as high in the scale as dogs and cats learn to solve problems analogous to that of the combination lock so slowly that we cannot infer the presence of ideas. Are we, then, to conclude that these animals are unconscious?" (p. 34). "The structure of the lower animals differs increasingly from our own as we go down the scale. At what degree of difference shall we draw the line and say that the animals above it may be conscious, but that those below it cannot be? No one could possibly establish such a line" (p. 36). "We know not where consciousness begins in the animal world. We know where it surely resides in ourselves; we know where it exists beyond a reasonable doubt in those animals of structure resembling ours which rapidly adapt themselves to the lessons of experience" (p. 26). "We can say neither what amount of resemblance in structure to human beings, nor what speed of learning, constitutes a definite mark distinguishing animals

with minds from those without minds, unless we are prepared to assert that only animals which learn so fast that they must have memory-ideas possess mind at all" (p. 36).

As will be seen later, this psychology runs exactly parallel with Canon Sanday's view of inspiration; which subsumes that at first there were glimmering intuitions of the truth, but that by degrees more rational notions prevailed, a great deal of folklore and superstition surviving amid the brighter light of revelation. In the end we come to perfect day; yet even then there is much perversity, the unruly wills of men and their defective understanding obscuring and distorting the pure effulgence of heaven. This is due essentially to the fact that the human mind is not capable of seeing things as they really are, but can appreciate only what appears to it to be right; hence the necessity for the training and education of the races of mankind so that their eyes may see and their hearts accept the riches of grace poured freely before them. A pretty theory, consistent enough with the facts with which it pretends to deal. Whether it will quite commend itself to modern thought may well be questioned, for what it gains in an intellectual point of view it loses, surely, from the moral side. Granting, as Archbishop Temple argued in *Essays and Reviews*, that you cannot bring home to anybody convictions that are not consistent with the already laid foundation of belief in the intellect, it is yet open to urge that we have found to-day that Japanese, Chinese, Burmese, Indians, Maoris, and negroes are able to grasp the intricacies of bacterial science. We see that Turks, Arabs, Egyptians, and many other supposedly backward people seem quite ready to enter into complicated plans of political organization, though it may be evident to us that they have not the moral substratum of character which is essential if such projects are to be practically successful. It has taken us centuries to get to that position of equilibrium where we can debate controversial points without drawing our swords to solve difficulties. This is more a matter of tolerance, and of a conviction that things will work out right in the end, than, at present, of exact grasp of their bearings.

This is very like the Canon's theory of Church Councils "being overridden by divine grace," with the result that "discordant desires led in the end to the truth"; but surely

nobody can think that in these Councils toleration and forbearance decided the decrees, or courtesy towards opponents was an item in the proceedings. They rather furnish samples of the intolerant methods of the Jews, surviving in Christian times, with the overbearing ways of the Roman Empire added to them, and the military ideas of the Middle Ages reinforced by the dogmatism of the Church. There is certainly something very curious about this "inspiration by scraps" popping up and down, like a school of porpoises. Surely it brings the Bible down to the level of ordinary books, for no serious writer is without occasional inspiration when he speaks "better than he knew." That is the voice of humanity making itself heard in the words of an individual that go to the hearts of other men and wake up thoughts of better things; the common feeling of mankind telling the common sorrows and common hopes, and urging to mutual kindness and self-sacrifice. "If the individual exists, it looks as if it can only be a spiritual creation." There is "no individuality on the physical side of things—simply a physical stream, providing as the result of certain relations and activities of its parts, opportunities for the development of individuals, which if they are really individuals can only be so in some spiritual regard." "The real individual is an aggregate, and at each stage in the advance of life there has been development of a more complex and harmonious type of aggregate." "'We can even join the hind part of one tadpole to the front part of another and the product may grow into a complete frog, derived from the halves of two distinct species'" (*J. Y. Simpson, Man and the Attainment of Immortality*, pp. 212-13 and note).

Up till the middle of the last century, just as people thought that there were "definite orders of animals and plants, once and for all, created," and a permanent structure of the earth laid down for ever, so they imagined that the mind was endowed with certain faculties which would remain the same as they always had been. The notion of development, mental as well as physical, had scarcely dawned on the intellect of men, any more than it has now on that of animals, or children, or savages.

"The human mind has always been prone to invest abstractions with an illusive reality. . . . It never seems to have

occurred to them that the powers of understanding, willing, imagining, etc., instead of existing at the outset, might have arisen as the result of a long series of changes, each of which paved the way for the next. . . . Just as the geologist is guided by a definite succession of strata which require definite series of changes to account for the transition between them, so the psychologist ought to be guided by a definite succession of forms successively assumed by the products of mental process, which also require definite series of changes to account for the transition between them" (*Stout, Manual of Psychology*, Allen & Unwin, pp. 18-19).

Stout avows "his special interest in the development of mind," and says he meant to write a book on it. Thirteen years later this is repeated in the third edition, but many years later still it is unaccomplished. Yet he wrote what he declares nobody would ever again attempt: a book on the whole subject. When an expert like this failed in twenty-eight years to carry out his earnest desire, it may be pardonable if I am able to give only scrappy accounts of mental evolution, and even a mere superficial sketch of morals. Older writers took these things for granted; mind and manners were there, and their existence and origin are unquestioned. Carlyle and Ruskin wrote of "Eternal Verities" and "inevitable truth," but as they grew older they changed their tone. And to-day it is realized with growing conviction that everything is in a flux, that all changes in time, that there are no fixed laws and no necessary conclusions—at least, in the external world. Certain things are observed to be almost fixed, so that we are justified in calling them "Laws of Nature." Actually our powers of knowing are not enough to warrant our saying that they always have been and always will recur. *Non, si male nunc, et olim* refers to the future, as to which we can only draw inferences from the past. The sun and its course in the heavens and the fact that all men die are perhaps the two things of which we can be most positive; but the sequence of day and night is not cause and effect, only mere succession. Death is not the result of life; it arises from the struggle for existence. What Arnold calls "Something not ourselves that makes for righteousness" seems to imply that, quite apart from our desires and plans, there are events which experience shows

to have recurred regularly for untold ages; and wisdom consists in recognizing this, whereas many men and women are set on their own wills, and think they can disregard the teachings of Nature and the verdict of facts. Hence, though the evolution of mind and the progress of morals may not be reduced to a schematic system, or the exact line in which it took place be clearly recognized, still the conviction is firm that in one way or another it did take place, and certain traces of the manner in which this happened are evident. For example, we begin with organisms like the bacteria and amoëba which display activity, and may be supposed therefore to have desires and feel satisfaction in their fulfilment. We go on to others, as hydra and sea-anemones, which close up and show plainly an aversion from some things and a wish to avoid them. This may perhaps be thought an over-statement, but Prof. J. A. Thomson has declared distinctly in favour of the view that intellect and intelligent action can be traced even in the lowest orders. At any rate, a little above this level, worms and snails exhibit clearly pleasure and pain, a desire for venery, and a determination to avoid unpleasant conditions.

No one can suppose that such brainless animals feel distinct conscious effects so as to meditate and provide against them; though the nearly allied species of ants and bees do lay up treasure upon the earth, and strive to prevent thieves and adverse conditions from spoiling their store of good things. Fish apparently can get little of what we ourselves should call the "rewards of love," as they do not look for reciprocity in their amours; but when you come to birds either all the poets are wrong and the whole popular idea is a mistake, or else the obvious indications of care and affection do really point to the fact of mutual regard and of solicitude. It is true that memory in these creatures is not long-lived, so that perhaps none of them thinks of its mate again after the breeding season, and certainly not of its offspring; nevertheless, there are facts which appear to tell in a different sense, if we may regard what happens in confinement as a criterion of the mentality of life in a state of Nature. As to cats and dogs, "cat-and-dog life" points to a recollection of bygone disagreeables. By pleasant memories "happy families" show plainly that these too can be overcome. Surely nobody can

watch a dog hesitating which path to take, which way to act, without believing that some incipient intelligence guides its conduct. The view of Hobbes, that animals are mere automata, depends on metaphysical refinements which do not commend themselves to ordinary commonsense. He is inconsistent in pulling up short at mankind; if actions are all the necessary outcome of motives, then this is true of men as much or nearly so as of the lowest brain-endowed creatures. The only question is as to the type of motive which has influence and determines conduct. Here none will maintain that Fagin and Bill Sikes stand on the level of Howard or Christ. It may be urged that they are capable of learning and being trained; so also are the lower orders. It is this very capacity of variation and improvement that makes development credible, and without which it would be really impossible. The contrary idea is a survival of the old static view of the universe, by which all things are conceived as fixed and changeless. Certain types were "created," each according to its kind, which was good in itself and approved of by a sort of law as of the Medes and Persians. This notion implies a stupendous miracle to keep all constant and invariable to begin with, and another to set them in motion later; for there is only one state possible if identical equilibrium is to be preserved permanently, whereas there are infinite possibilities of something different. Logically this requires the return of the sea or the sky to a previous condition, each wave and every cloud exactly as it was once before. The odds against it are the square of infinity to the cube-root of nothing.

Nobody believes in the uniformity of inorganic Nature, though there are indications of it in crystals and the combinations of elements in compounds. According to our notions these are the highest types of material things just because they do act thus and are not merely inert. In our view when you get to organic Nature, the higher you go the more variation and the less uniformity do you find. "Variation, by chance" is universal, and the only possible scheme. "The metaphysical axioms are imitations of the geometrical axioms; and now that the latter have been thrown overboard, without doubt the former will be sent after them. . . . That there is an arbitrary element in the universe we see—namely, its variety.

This variety must be attributed to spontaneity in some form" (Peirce, *Chance, Love, and Logic*, 1923, p. 175). "At any time, however, an element of pure chance survives" (p. 177).

"The principle of universal necessity cannot be defended as being a postulate of reasoning" (p. 188). "Try to verify any law of nature, and you will find that the more precise your observations, the more certain they will be to show irregular departures from the law" (p. 190). "I do not believe that anybody, not in a state of case-hardened ignorance respecting the logic of science, can maintain that the precise and universal conformity of facts to law is clearly proved, or even rendered particularly probable, by any observations hitherto made" (p. 191). "The principles of mechanics are undoubtedly natural beliefs; but, for all that, the early formulations of them were exceedingly erroneous. . . . The adaptations of Nature, beautiful and often marvellous as they verily are, are never found to be quite perfect" (p. 192). "At present, historical criticism has almost exploded the miracles, great and small; so that the doctrine of necessity has never been in so great vogue as now" (p. 181). Yet, obviously, if any law cannot be established it is impossible to prove an exception to it; you cannot say that a thing is not natural if you do not know, and you cannot know, the limits of natural events; nor indeed, in the ages in which miracles were of common occurrence, was it ever supposed that the events stood outside the operations of Nature, but only that they were beyond the expectation of the observers, which in many cases merely amounts to the account of one person.

"To make single individuals absolute judges of truth is most pernicious." "Reasoning should not form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibres may be ever so slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected. . . . The only justification of an inference from signs is that the conclusion explains the fact. To suppose the fact absolutely inexplicable is not to explain it, and hence this supposition is never allowable" (Peirce, *loc. cit.*, p. 3). How many theological doctrines would be cut out by this rule if rigidly applied? For it has been rubbed into us time and again that the highest things are beyond the scope of poor mortal minds; and yet: "Phi-

losophers have been less intent on finding out what the facts are, than on inquiring what belief is most in harmony with their system" (p. 55). "To accept propositions which seem perfectly evident to us is a thing which, whether it be logical or illogical, we cannot help doing" (p. 35). "That we ever do discover the precise causes of things that any induction is absolutely without exception, is what we have no right to assume" (p. 122).

And this holds good of man also. A writer who had lived in the New Hebrides for six months states that he never could see any difference in the inhabitants, or distinguish one from another, although the photographs he gives of them present very marked features, and the population of the various islands are of different origin—some Polynesian, others Melanesian. All records of savage life tell the same tale: that fashion is supreme and any change from it is resented as disrespect to man and Gods. W. B. Carpenter describes an idiot, "who could endure nothing out of its position in space or its order in time. If any new thing was done to him at any minute of the day, the same thing must be done, at the same minute, every day thenceforward. . . . Yet he had no knowledge whatever of the measurement of time by clocks and watches. . . . He occupied himself much in making paper cuttings, which were remarkable for their symmetry" (W. B. Carpenter, *Principles of Mental Physiology*, 4th ed., p. 349; King & Co., 1876). Even among ourselves, what are called the "lower classes" are conservative of customs and tenacious of fixed ideas far beyond their superiors in education.

The "upper ten thousand" show the same character; they also, from freedom of constraint, are ill educated and little affected by growing belief in improved methods and ways of doing things. They cling to the customs of their ancestors and resent suggestion of change, whereas those who rise and make a position for themselves in the world are freed from the tyranny of "home-born" ideas, and see more plainly the fallacy of those held by associates whom they meet in their new life. The professional and commercial classes live by adapting themselves to externals, by a struggle for existence and the success of the best adapted. Their whole course of life is one long natural or unnatural selection, it may be of the

most shifty, the most heartless, the most self-seeking, but yet of the most adaptable, the least impulsive, those who are self-controlled. It is just members of this class who are specially liable and sensitive to the opinion of others, and fashion their conduct so as not to outrage public feeling or common views, not in the mere follow-your-leader method of the other two orders named, but in a deliberate, carefully-pondered, and intelligently-adopted manner calculated to ensure their welfare. This indeed is the very foundation and cause of betterment; the emotional are impulsive and preserve little consistence of thought or action; the more steady-going, who regard the ultimate end to themselves and to others and avoid offence by attending to behaviour, create and maintain a recognized manner of conduct. This consensus of man, in facts, opinions, and morals, is the nearest approach to truth we can attain. It is the outcome of mental development, precisely parallel to that of organisms: each idea has to run the gauntlet in opposition to its fellows and congeners, and those that prove fittest survive, propagate, and beget successors.

For countless ages the question "What is truth?" has been raised by all sorts and conditions of men, but no very definite or satisfactory answer has been obtained to it. One person thinks that his views embody it completely; another fancies he has discovered the exact reply; but no one commands the entire credence of mankind to all his teaching. Nevertheless, by degrees a body of accepted truths is being piled up which in time all man seem likely to receive; and so common-sense philosophy is constituted by consent. It is odd that this occurs perhaps most in those things which appear to be least susceptible of clear decision. "To fulfill the ordinary and obvious duties of life is with respectable members of society a mere matter of course" (Stout, *Analytic Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 140), whereas, with questions of fact, the point is debated whether they are not figments. As to matters of opinion, each man holds to and defends his own as correct. This is quite contrary to common views; children and savages, and untaught people generally, think the facts they recognize are beyond dispute, and many believe their view of them to be self-evident, and so needing no proof or consideration. This is due, at least partly, to the thought that they agree

with the common beliefs accepted in their time and country.

We may compare this with the "colonial" form of the lower orders, in which from a substratum common to the whole, polyps and other organisms grow up, each having a comparatively independent existence, so that a part divided off will form a new group. In some cases the individuals are specialized, one as a mouth, others as tentacles; some as gonads, some as organs of sense. Here propagation is less free; but, as in plants, almost any part may grow and form a new centre for a fresh growth, like the old one. Cases occur in which each polyp has a separate life, but the whole colony moves like a snail or worm. These forms appear to be essentially the basis of the higher orders, individual animals changing or degrading into cells, some of which may become almost inorganic as epithelium or bone. This alteration of the unicellular to multicellular, of divided organisms into combined, takes place in many ways. This is one of those debatable lands over which there have roamed and ruled the tribes of the traditionalists.

"Conscious process is throughout conditioned by prior conscious process, and this is only intelligible if we suppose that past experience leaves persistent after-effects, which continue when the corresponding consciousness has ceased. Inasmuch as mental process involves the operation of these residual traces, it is not a conscious but an unconscious process" (Stout, *Analytic Psychology*, p. 2). "There is no direct means of tracing the connection between a mental fact and the corresponding physiological fact" (p. 4). "Men who lived before the development of physical science, and those who at the present day live outside the sphere of its influence, being continually confronted by material changes not easily traceable to mechanical antecedents, assume that they are due to spiritual agency. The sun moves without being pushed; therefore the sun is alive" (p. 5). "We may define psychology as the science of the development of mind." "Development is accumulated modification; it involves the persistence of the product of past process as the basis of succeeding change. . . . In order to study mental evolution we must examine the series of successive stages. There are psychological strata as

well as geological strata" (p. 9). "So far as they are known these are data for psychology. So, too, are all works of imagination, e.g. the *Iliad*, or *Hamlet*, or Grimm's *Fairy Tales*, and all the rules of conduct, e.g. Roman law, the Brahman ritual, the four books of Confucius and Mencius. . . . The comparative study of the religious and other beliefs of primitive races has the same kind of psychological value, and the same holds good as regards their technical and artistic productions" (p. 10). "It is not the world as it ought to appear, but the world as it does appear, which is the outcome of psychological development; and this is constituted as much by illusions and delusions as by correct perceptions and beliefs" (p. 12). "No general principle can be legitimately accepted on the evidence of introspection or retrospection alone, unless it has been corroborated by a consensus of experts" (p. 14).

"For each of us the existence of minds distinct from our own is, from the standing ground of logical and reflective consciousness, a matter of inferences" (p. 15). "Just as, in physical science, we account for observed facts by assuming unobserved conditions, so, in mental science, we must transcend experience in order to explain experience. Only part of the factors which determine mental processes are definitely recognizable in consciousness. The rest, even if they are not unconscious, are at least undiscriminated" (p. 16). "Definite details can only be reached as the cumulative results of a long course of systematic introspection, carried on from generation to generation, and constantly tested by an appeal to the consensus of experts" (p. 17). It is implied in the very conception of an individual mind that present conscious process is throughout conditioned by prior conscious process, and this is only intelligible if we suppose that past "retentiveness is the determination of future change by the products of past process. As thus defined, this process has a very wide range of application, extending to matter as well as to mind, and to inorganic as well as organic bodies" (p. 254).

"In historical knowledge, on the contrary, we have to do with a series of changes taking place in a corporate object which is regarded as maintaining its unity and identity from a certain point of view, in spite of the modifications which it undergoes. This is the standpoint of the geologist in tracing the history of

the earth, or the biologist in tracing the transformation of species. Now, all such investigations depend for their interest and value on retentiveness, on the determination of each new phase in a series of changes, by the persistent results of previous change" (p. 256). "The same holds good in an even more conspicuous way of the development of living organisms. Here we find immensely complicated series of changes following each other in regular gradations, according to a predetermined plan. The predetermination depends ultimately on a pre-formation which exists at the beginning of the process. . . . Thus a comparatively formless germ becomes gradually differentiated by a process of segmentation. Parts that are afterwards to become fully articulated are at first thrown off as rudimentary and comparatively shapeless masses; and this process goes on until by a regular series of transformations the adult organism is evolved from the embryo" (p. 256).

"The evolution of the brain is part of the evolution of organic life in general. . . . The special function of this organ in the economy of life is to adapt the body to comparatively irregular variations in the environment, and to adapt it not merely at the moment when these conditions come into actual operation, but also to make provision in advance for future emergencies. . . . The initial pre-formation is supplied by the hereditary structure of the brain"; but it has a subsequent history of its own, of the greatest interest and importance. "And the subsequent development is one of differentiation and integration. Retentiveness also plays a quite analogous part. . . . The importance of the pre-formation at any given stage of the process is quite analogous to its importance in the development of the embryo. The specific nature of possible changes is throughout predominantly determined by the internal arrangement of the material system itself, as given at the outset by heredity and as modified by the course of subsequent development. Further, the importance of internal condition becomes greater as the process of evolution advances, as definite habits of thought and action come into being" (p. 257). "Physical influences which are operative produce effects widely different in kind from those which they commonly produce in other bodies, and of an intensity and complexity altogether out of proportion to their own intensity and

complexity. The movement of a feather across the skin may throw the whole organism into violent disturbance. The reason is that the cells of the brain are storehouses of pent-up energy, and that the effect of the stimulus mainly consists in breaking down a pre-existing tension, and so transforming potential energy into kinetic" (*Analytic Psychology*, p. 258).

"Other animals co-operate in work and play, but only men co-operate in thinking" (Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, p. 576). "The period of childhood is mainly occupied in attempting to reproduce the modes of action current in the Society to which the child belongs. Every child in learning the language of its ancestors assimilates in outline the whole system of ideas, the whole system of conceptual analysis and synthesis, which has been acquired by the mental and bodily activity of past generations. Language put into their mouths and which they must e'en use, settles points for them, once and all" (p. 577). "Even the play of children is penetrated through and through by this imitative character. Children can take the place of their elders in the next generation only by learning from them the ways of acting which are necessary for the general scheme of social organization. By this process they acquire not only bodily dexterities, but also systematic combinations of ideas" (pp. 577-8).

"Now, the lower animals do not in this manner create an environment for themselves by their own intelligence. . . . Hence the educational influence of an environment moulded by human hands to embody human designs does not affect the animals which dwell with man. . . . The external world as an ideal construction is a social product" (pp. 578-9). "Ideal combinations which arise in the individual mind can become permanent parts of the ideal structure representing the real world only if they are entertained by other minds also, and so become current in the society to which the individual belongs" (p. 579). "It is true this ideal structure is in process of constant development; and that, as it grows, it rectifies itself, excluding ideal combinations which had previously formed integral parts of it, and receiving into itself others which it had previously rejected" (p. 579). "An isolated individual appearing in the strength of his own private judgment is in opposition to the established social order, and he

is accordingly regarded by society much in the same way as a lunatic or criminal, the only difference being that he is considered to be harmless and amusing. . . . In more primitive communities, such as we find among savages, the general stock of ideas is assimilated by each individual, and all are its guardians. . . . Thus the pressure of society upon the individual is incomparably more coercive" (p. 580). "Ideal activity is on the whole more occupied in finding reasons to justify tradition, or to explain its apparent inconsistency with actual experience, than in further developing and improving the ideal scheme which has been handed down from generation to generation" (p. 580).

"Without the awakened spiritual sensitivity, the 'miraculous' event may mean no more than a natural phenomenon in time and space" (Simpson, *Spiritual Interpretation of Nature*, (p. 309). The "Hebrew word [for creation] . . . is often used of the regular production of terrestrial forms of life" (p. 233). "Even if the old Hebrews had known all that we know, had understood all the steps in the divine progressive march of events, yet they would have seen God in all of them" (p. 235). "From the date of the burning of Giordano Bruno till the middle of the nineteenth century, Special Creation became the orthodox teaching of the Church" (p. 238). "A spirit that received superlative expression in Milton's account of the Creation, in *Paradise Lost*" (p. 239). "'Bacon certainly had no idea that the existing species of plants and animals represent those originally created by God' (Aubrey Moore, *Science and the Faith*, p. 174), and his general standpoint was later shared by Buffon, Lamarck, Treviranus, St. Hilaire, Goethe, and other early transmutationists" (p. 240).

John Wesley wrote: "The polypus links the vegetable to the animal; the flying-squirrel unites the bird to the quadruped; the ape bears affinity to the quadruped and the man. Mankind have their gradations, as well as the other productions of our globe; there is a prodigious number of continued links between the most perfect man and the ape" (*Wisdom of God in the Creation*, Vol. IV, pp. 60-92). Wesley's views were apparently derived from Bonnet, *Conjectures as to Future Happiness*. "My object," said Darwin, "in this chapter is to show that there is no fundamental difference between man and the

higher mammals in their mental faculties" (*Descent of Man*, p. 99; quoted p. 251). H. S. Jennings says of Ciliata: "In these *creatures* the behaviour is not as a rule on the tropism plan—a set, forced method of reacting to each particular agent—but takes place in a much more flexible, less directly machine-like way of trial and error" (p. 253 of Simpson). S. O. Mast says: "The light reactions of *Stentor ceruleus* . . . cannot be explained by the . . . tropism theory" (p. 254 of Simpson). "The genetic connection between invertebrate and vertebrate, whether through worm or ascidian . . . is unassailable; and once the vertebrate brain has been definitely established, the progressive development is marked and unmistakable" (p. 257). "We can no longer sharply contrast the human mind with that of the lower animal" (p. 260). "Abstract and concrete ideas are not so absolutely unrelated to one another as the usual definitions imply. . . . Man shares the capacity in common with many lower forms of having linkages arise in his mind between 'situations or sense impressions and acts'; only the ability to learn by selection of impulses, a power of freedom that emerges very slowly and is still evolving, is very much greater in his case" (p. 261). "The distinction so apparently broad-based as that between abstract and concrete ideas is shaded out when we realize that some of the higher mammals have generalized ideas of certain objects; the dog has a concrete generalized idea of man" (p. 260). "Till the end of the first year the intellect of the infant is largely of the animal type, the sole apparent difference being in the quantity and quality of the associations: reasoning and ideational life have not yet arisen" (p. 262).

"As we ascend the animal scale, intelligence seems to replace instinct. In man . . . instinctive action is not the outstanding feature; he is *par excellence* the educable animal" (p. 264). "As a matter of fact, no sharp absolute distinction can be drawn between instinct and intelligence, and, in the arena of modification, disentanglement, and correlation of instinctive impulses, intelligence gradually takes its rise" (p. 266). "Man, by contrast, is phylogenetically of yesterday compared with the insect. Consequently there has been little grooming or definite moulding of his instinctive impulses, and, further, this

function of environment is increasingly taken over by the highly developed consciousness. . . . In fact, their instincts are a partial reflection of the mind of the environment in its ultimate sense" (p. 268). This is the story of human development. "By slow degrees man wins the truths that set him free at once from the torment of mental fears and the tyranny of natural forces" (p. 115).

"We can demonstrate along particular lines a progressive advance in cranial capacity, to which there must have corresponded a definite mental evolution, which is represented in the individual life-history. In the pre-natal stages the human brain passes through phases broadly comparable to the brain of the fish, of the reptile, and of the marsupial, and of the young anthropoid" (p. 262). "If human reflexes are perfect, man's primary instincts certainly are not; indeed, his most characteristic instinctive impulses require definite guidance and development, and the same is true of all creatures" (pp. 264-5). "The *ensemble* of facts, accordingly, seems to indicate that the characteristic consciousness which we associate with man has evolved like any other character. . . . If the cell had got food without labour, there would have been no effort on its part, and so no development of consciousness" (pp. 266-7).

"If the Protozoa were really immortal . . . the waters would ere long have been choked up with them. If death had not dogged the footsteps of life from the beginning, the Protozoa would have used up all the assimilable material, and no higher form could have come into existence by that way. Mortality is an essential prerequisite of immortality" (p. 80). "It is calculated that one of the bacteria would within five days fill the ocean with its progeny to the depth of one mile, if unchecked" (p. 80). "Later a stage came, not exactly definable, when within that sphere of instinct the original diffuse consciousness began to focalize and condense into consciousness as we know it, expressing itself as intelligence . . . namely, its timeless ability to disengage and recombine impresses from sensations received at different times, for the present good of the organism . . . herein lies the possibility of education. The bionomic value of such a power is at once evident. . . . By means of sensation, it becomes symbolically aware of aspects of the environment, for the subjective qualitative sensations of

colour are transmuted by it out of differing quantitative ethereal vibrations" (p. 267).

"Freewill and consciousness alike are progressively developing faculties. . . . We thus conceive of a diffuse consciousness accompanying the instinctive impulses that express the life of humbler forms" (p. 268). "Certain facts in the comparative physiology of the vertebrate nervous system tend to show that in the lower forms (amphibia) a certain degree of consciousness presides over the functions of the spinal cord, which in mammals is devoted to reflex actions" (Minot, "The Problem of Consciousness," *Science*, Vol. XVI, p. 392). "The real difficulty in supposing that instincts are directly due to intelligence is the fact that most of them have reference to generations yet unborn, of which the individual insect has no knowledge" (p. 265). "'Learning' consists in the elimination of useless responses, and the better recollection and application of useful ones . . . in the anthropoid apes, the progress in these particular directions increases with continued approximation in structure to the human brain, whose lowest type may be placed in a not unnatural comparative relationship with them. Especially with finer discrimination in touch, and the progressive liberation of the forelimbs from purely locomotor to prehensile and tactile functions, do we find a correlation in cerebral advance that begins with lemuroid forms, and is continued through the Primates group to man" (p. 259).

"At the level of the class Aves we have reached a brain whose comparableness to the human brain is much more marked than at any lower stage, particularly in the development of the cortex, whose regional study has so greatly added to the understanding of the localization of definite functions.

. . . Yet, as the human being makes unconscious associations, we cannot state definitely what degree of consciousness illuminates the new mental associations of the bird" (p. 258). "The growth of the association areas means an increase of plasticity, escape from a single inexorable response to stimuli. The initial responses under the new condition are as yet, however, really neither purposive nor intelligent, but still on the method of 'trial and error.'" (p. 258). "The bird can adapt itself in some considerable degree to new situations, but the adapta-

tion is probably due to the selection of one of several associations of sensory impression and impulse—that one which has a pleasing issue" (p. 258). "In the case of fishes, amphibians, and reptiles . . . the faculty of 'associative memory'—the capacity for making new linkages—has also been demonstrated, but the degree of consciousness involved is still without any strict criterion" (p. 257). "The closer degree of correspondence between the lower mammalian brains and human brains intensifies the conclusions tentatively advanced in connection with the avian brain. Association of impressions with impulses is clearly demonstrated, together with that externally determined selection of one particular impulse which proved beneficial . . . a definite degree of related consciousness of these associations can hardly now be doubted" (p. 259). "Habit and instinct owe their existence to such inertia; in it are some mainsprings of character" (p. 70).

On these points the opinion of an authority who stands between the living and the dead is almost beyond value, and is fairly conclusive. Simpson's position as teacher in a theological college puts him above suspicion of weakness. To me the proof of development of mind, though we observe it always in children, and animals show different stages of it, seems harder than that of morals, of which we have a permanent record in history and of which the various races of man exhibit conventionalized specimens. So much is this the case that it is fairly well accepted that the initial substance of the universe involved mind. In the words of Huxley's dictum, "primordial matter must have been endowed with the potentiality of all its effects." But the crux of evolution is that it ends in something that was not there originally, just as in psychology the generating factors in "mental chemistry" disappear in producing a new product (Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, p. 123). The question is just the old one of the hen and the egg. Did mind produce matter; or matter, mind? And the answer seems to be, "No matter, never mind."

In their standard *Text-Book of Geology* (1915) Pirsson and Schuchert make it plain that American men of science, from a different angle than that of their congeners on this side of the Atlantic, have arrived at the same conclusions confirmatory of the Doctrine of Descent. These authors adduce

evidence from palæontological research and discovery in the American continent that goes to prove a continuous evolution of the species of animals and plants from simpler to more highly specialized forms. For vastly long intervals essentially resembling external and other conditions have obtained as to the principles and methods of the process. The presence of graphite in the Archæozoic period is presumptive evidence of the existence of a lowly plant life at a time when a smoke-like haze pervaded our atmosphere. The telluric forces then in operation differed in degree, but were of the same kind as those now at work. Denudation to bring about the topographical features of the American continent and of the planet as a whole must have occupied an immense time. In the lower Cambrian division occur all the main phyla of the invertebrates, and, as fossil fishes appear in the Middle Ordovician horizons, even vertebrates must have had their origin earlier. One of the most extensive inundations revealed by the geological record took place in Middle Devonian times, when deposits of enormous thickness were formed over wide regions of the earth. Following on the elevation to dry land of a large proportion of these submarine masses, the land flora and fauna gradually multiplied. Many species of invertebrates were ushered in, and some species of fishes as precursors of the mighty host of vertebrates. Devonian forests were devoid of insects, but they abounded in the Carboniferous age. Contrary to a long-standing belief, there was no sunless age. This and other gratuitous assumptions were inspired and perpetuated by the Genesiac cosmogony.

In the special case of the function of respiration there is an evolution from respiration for the exchange of carbon dioxide for oxygen, through the limiting membrane of an unicellular organism to the swimming-bladder of fishes, the almost embryonic form of which is found in a pair of pouch-like outgrowths from the pharynx, and thence to gills, and ultimately to lungs. In the Permian period there were no sound-emitting insects, and amphibians and reptiles abounded. The former were among the earliest land animals. The duration of their ascendancy was a comparatively short one, and was followed by the much longer one of the reptiles. In

the American strata the whole stock of Palæozoic reptiles disappears at the close of Triassic times. The Stegocephalia, a group intermediate between amphibia and reptiles, possessed a structure known as the "pineal eye," now a rudiment in the mammalian brain. Reptiles filled all the rôles since taken by birds and were the progenitors of the mammals, one of the earliest types of which was the "beast-tooth" Thereodonta, of the Triassic age, which had a wide range over Africa and Europe. This period was one of profound and pervasive progressive development in the organic world. The first definite appearance of a true bird was in the Jurassic strata—namely, the archeopterix, which had many reptilian characters.

As to flora, angiosperms had taken the lead at the close of the Cretaceous era, and in the Kenozoic age oceans and continents assumed the configuration and distribution of the modern land and water system. The classical contribution of American palæontology to animal evolution is the discovery of the series of fossil remains of ancestral forms of the horse, from a proto-hippic species no larger than a cat, with functionally active-toed feet, to the much more highly differentiated extant form. In the evolution of man the human type of leg and foot were developed long before the brain assumed its distinctively human structure and functions—*e.g.*, Pithecanthropus, and the other typical fossil skulls of the races of ancient man. In human embryology there are successive blurred and transient phases of structure—*e.g.*, the gill-slits and the embryonic, reptile-like heart, which, as Haeckel elucidated, are recapitulative of the ancestral stages of human evolution.

Our human ancestors had to adapt themselves to changing conditions, especially in their migrations, such as clothing as protection against the rigours of climate and the inventing of tools and weapons for the arts of life and war. In America, as in Europe, scientific research and discovery have led to revision of the chronology of the older physicists for the age of the earth—in the light of the unexpected factor of radioactive substances in the crust of the planet, in the maintenance of its internal heat. Geologists are now free to make much larger drafts on the bank of time, to the extent of a thousand

million years, back to the point when our oblate spheroid first attained its present diameter. This extension also provides the biologist with an ample margin for the transmutation of species and its resultants in the existing terrestrial fauna and flora.

## CHAPTER III

### THE ANTIQUITY OF MAN

THE following extracts are from the *Antiquity of Man* (Williams & Norgate), by Sir Arthur Keith, F.R.S., formerly Conservator and Hunterian Professor in the Royal College of Surgeons, England; 2nd Edition, 1925:—

“The problem of man’s antiquity may be approached from another point of view, that of the human anatomist. . . . The anatomist has to trace man into the past by means of fossil skulls, teeth, and limb bones—intelligible documents to him, but complex and repulsive hieroglyphs in the eyes of most people” (p. xxi). “How long the Neolithic period lasted in England we cannot yet say with any degree of certainty, but we are all agreed that it came to an end about 2000 B.C., when bronze became known to the men of Western Europe” (p. 2). “Settled communities are only possible when the land is tilled and cattle are domesticated” (p. 3). “Agriculture was the slow and laborious invention of the Neolithic age. It does not cut the Neolithic age any shorter, if we suppose—as we must suppose—that agriculture was not evolved in Western Europe. In a distant part of the world man did . . . discover the art of bringing plant and beast into his service” (p. 3). In “1852 Darwin had not then published the *Origin of Species* (1859), but the *Vestiges of Creation* was passing into a tenth edition. Orthodox minds were being disturbed by the discovery of facts which seemed to be at variance with Biblical tradition. The antiquity of the Mickleton skull became a matter of public controversy. A learned Scottish clergyman publicly censured Prof. Baden Powell of Oxford University for countenancing a ‘pre-Adamite’ date for the Mickleton skull” (p. 62). In 1822, Dean Buckland, then reader in Geology at Oxford, “was able to explain the occurrence of a human skeleton side by side with the bones of extinct animals in a manner satisfactory both to himself and the men

of his time. The animals were pre-diluvian; they had been swept within the Paviland cave by the great Flood through which the ark rode in safety. The human remains were post-diluvian; they had been buried there by people who had settled in Britain after the universal Deluge. It was then an article of faith that man did not exist in Western Europe before the Flood" (p. 67). "The discovery of the remains of a human being as the contemporary of extinct animals was more than even the open well-balanced mind of Sir Charles Lyell could admit in 1833. Schmerling's work, like that of other pioneers, had to wait for a new generation" (p. 69). "If, however, we regard Dr. Schmerling as a competent and truthful observer—and I think the time has come when belated justice must be done to him—then we must conclude that a human type can be reproduced for many generations and over a long period of time, and still remain almost unchanged" (p. 70).

"It was the discovery at Aurignac which convinced Sir Charles Lyell that man went beyond the Neolithic horizon, and with his conversion the new conception of man's antiquity made rapid progress. Eight years later, in 1868, M. Lartet's son, Louis, discovered the actual men of the Aurignacian culture" (p. 73). "As early as 1869, M. Gabriel de Mortillet elaborated an orderly classification of the cave cultures; but the exact position represented by the culture of the caves at Aurignac and at Cro-Magnon was not finally settled until 1905, when the Abbé Breuil finally proved that at least two periods of culture, the Solutrean and the Magdalenian, intervene between the end of the Aurignacian and the dawn of the Neolithic period" (p. 76). "We have no reason to suppose that the transition from the Palæolithic to the Neolithic period was marked by the appearance of a new or higher type of man" (p. 79).

The following extracts are from Prof. Keith's *Ancient Types of Man*, 1911:

"The Cro-Magnon race was discovered at a period when, under Darwin's influence, anthropologists expected to find man becoming more primitive in mind and body as his history was traced into the past. The discovery at Cro-Magnon showed that the evolution of human types was not an orderly

one, for in size of brain and in stature the race which flourished in the south of Europe at the close of the Glacial Period was one of the finest the world has ever seen. Yet they must have been grim-visaged and savage looking men" (p. 66).

"The common ancestral stock from which every modern race is descended must have been negroid in nature. It is possible that the Neanderthal type of man may represent such a stock" (p. 100). "The Grimaldi people are the earliest negroid type so far discovered; yet they are so modern and highly evolved in character that we cannot suppose them to represent a common ancestor of European and African races" (p. 62). "Dr. Verneau had no doubt about them; in his opinion they represented a negroid race, one not previously discovered in Europe" (p. 98 of *The Antiquity of Man*). "To me these characters suggest that they are only an aberrant Cro-Magnon form, perhaps primitive, but nevertheless true members of the Cro-Magnon race. That race, in the proportion of its limbs and in certain features of the face, does show negroid traits" (p. 100). "The presence of negroid features in these early Europeans sends the mind seeking for the cradle of the Cro-Magnon stock in the direction of Africa to the fertile lands of the old Sahara" (p. 101).

"If I had to seek for the people which most nearly represent the Cro-Magnon race in the modern world, I should seek them among the tall races of the Punjab of India" (p. 101).

"If we accept the degree of antiquity I have presumed, some fifteen thousand years, and allow forty generations to each thousand years, then we see that racial characters can be transmitted for six hundred generations, and still retain their essential features almost unchanged" (p. 123). "The inference we draw from the discovery at Halling is that a human type may be transmitted over a long period of time and remain almost unchanged as regards size of brain and cranial characters" (p. 125). "Skulls of the Langwith type are still quite common among the English people of to-day; they were also in evidence in England of the Aurignacian period, say 17,000 years ago or more" (p. 132). "The characters of the face of the Gibraltar skull are primitive; a number of its features recall the corresponding parts of the gorilla. The bridge of the nose in its length and breadth and the manner in

which the root bends upwards into the supra-orbital ridge are more like the gorilla form than is the case in any other cranium of the Neanderthal type" (p. 127 of *Ancient Types of Man*; Harper & Brothers, 1911).

"The discovery in Aveline's Hole shows us that England was not isolated in late Palæolithic times. New blood reached her from the Continent; new fashions in culture and manners of living arrived, and replaced old cultures and former customs. At the same time wild animals from the Continent also came to make a home in England as her climate changed" (p. 143). "At Kent's Cavern we have evidence of a closing phase of the Palæolithic culture, and just enough of one of the men of the time to show that he was not different from those found in other English caves" (p. 148). "Long as is the period which has elapsed since Arctic conditions last ceased, the type of man represented in the caves of Derbyshire and Somerset has persisted, with his body altered only in minor details" (p. 154).

The La Chapelle man "had many characters which may justly be called simian or primitive, but he had others which cannot be so classed, such as the size of the brain and the relative proportion of the limbs" (p. 175). "The base of the Gibraltar skull is remarkably straight and simian in its conformation" (p. 182). "The world of ancient man, although its population was small, yet contained a large diversity of types" (p. 183). "The Naoulette jaw, like the Gibraltar skull, had to wait until the beginning of the twentieth century for its real nature to be recognized" (p. 185).

"Huxley became interested in fossil man through Sir Charles Lyell. . . . His final judgment was to the effect that, ape-like as many of the characters of the skull were, Neanderthal man was merely an extreme variant of the modern type of man (*vide Man's Place in Nature*, and *Nat. His. Rev.* IV. 429)" (p. 188). "A contemporary of Huxley's, Dr. William King, Professor of Anatomy, Queen's College, Galway, reached an opposite conclusion; but his quietly worded verdict was rendered ineffective partly by the vigour and emphasis of Huxley's statement, and partly because at that period men were not prepared for a prehistoric world peopled by different species and different genera of mankind. 'So closely,'

Prof. King wrote, ‘ does the fossil cranium resemble that of the chimpanzee as to lead one to doubt the propriety of generically placing it with man ’ ” (pp. 188–9). “ Prof. King did not know, however, what we are now well aware of, that Neanderthal man had a large and complex human brain, that he was a skilful artisan, that he buried his dead and held certain beliefs regarding death. If he had known these things he would not have written: ‘ The Neanderthal skull is so eminently simian. . . . I am constrained to believe that the thought and desires which once dwelt within it never soared beyond those of the brute ’ ” (p. 189). “ The discovery of the Spy men in 1886, so similar in all their characters to the prototype found at Neanderthal, dissipated the idea which was held by many anatomists that the peculiar characters of the Neanderthal cave bones were due to the chance incidence of disease or to a disordered form of growth ” (p. 189). “ As is well known, there is a close superficial resemblance between the skulls of man and anthropoid ape during infancy and childhood ” (p. 197).

“ What happened at the end of the Mousterian period we can only guess, but those who observe the fate of the aboriginal races of America and of Australia will have no difficulty in accounting for the disappearance of *Homo neanderthalensis*. A more virile form extinguished him. He suddenly appears in Europe—from whence, future investigations may disclose; the one thing we are now certain of is that he was not suddenly converted into the modern type of man ” (p. 199). “ Traces of a Mousterian culture—the culture practised in Europe by Neanderthal man—occur in various parts of Northern Africa ” (p. 199). “ Although the brain of Neanderthal man equals or exceeds that of the modern type of man in point of size, yet in its general conformation it resembles the brain casts taken from anthropoid skulls ” (p. 202). “ To find a counterpart of the platycephalism of Neanderthal skulls we have to go outside the limits of human species to the skulls of such anthropoids as the gorilla and chimpanzee ” (p. 202). “ To find eyebrow ridges like those of Neanderthal man, great continuous horizontal bars of bone, overshadowing the orbits a supra-orbital torus, we have again to refer to the anthropoid skull ” (p. 203). Neanderthal man had eyebrows

of the anthropoid type. The Neanderthal type and the modern type of man share the great and exceedingly complex inheritance which is common to the human family.

"We should find, if we accept a 'polyphyletic theory' of man's origin, that the great majority of structural relationships were not capable of being thus explained" (p. 206). "The great majority of those structural features which mark Neanderthal species off from modern races are essentially of a simian or anthropoid nature" (p. 207). "We cannot account satisfactorily for the various structural features exhibited by the series of specimens just described unless we suppose the simian to be the ancestral form, and the others—the Neanderthal and the modern—to represent modifications of the simian type. There can be no doubt that, in the region of the chin, Neanderthal man retains a simian condition to a greater extent than does the modern type of man" (p. 209). "In the mastoid region Neanderthal skulls show a series of characters which may justly be regarded as simian in nature and origin" (p. 217). "Indeed, the head is fixed to the neck in the Neanderthal race in much the same manner as in young anthropoid apes" (p. 218). "In ordinary monkeys the pre-pituitary and post-pituitary parts form an almost straight line—there is little or no bending. In anthropoids the bending becomes apparent" (p. 219). "A survey of the characters of Neanderthal man, as manifested by his skeleton, brain cast, and teeth, has convinced anthropologists of two things: first, that we are dealing with a form of man totally different from any now living; and, secondly, that the kind of difference far exceeds that which separates the most divergent of modern human races" (p. 222). Negro people show some approach to the simian forms. "Further, in most of the points in which the Neanderthal man departs from modern man he approaches the anthropoids. His peculiarities are pronouncedly simian" (p. 223). He is mid-Pleistocene.

"Was modern man evolved in some distant part of the world, reaching Europe for the first time in the Aurignacian period? Or was he the original inhabitant of Europe, being ousted during the time of the Mousterian culture by an intrusion or invasion of a foreign and strange species of man (*Homo neanderthalensis*)? It is clear that we must know the past

history of the whole world before we can answer those questions with certainty" (p. 224).

**ACHEULEAN MAN.** "The site which yields the classic implements of this culture (beautifully worked flint hand-axes) is situated at St. Acheul, near Amiens, in the valley of the Somme" (p. 225). "If we pitch the commencement of the Mousterian period, as a provisional hypothesis, at a distance of forty thousand years, we must give forty thousand more to reach the opening phases of the Acheulean period" (p. 229). "The more we get to know of Acheulean deposits in England, with their evidences of mighty alterations in level of sea and land, of great changes in climate and in fauna, the more convinced we become that the period we have been dealing with was one which covered an enormous space of years" say the "Neolithic, 2000–8000 B.C.; Azilian, 8000–10,000 B.C.; Magdalenian, 10,000 B.C.; Mousterian, 20,000–40,000 B.C." (pp. 249 and 224). "When we consider the extent of the geological changes which occurred during the time Europeans shaped their stone implements in the Chellean style, we see that the period must have been one of long duration" (p. 250).

**CHELLEAN MAN.** "For my part, when I commenced a systematic examination of these remains in 1910, my attitude towards them was one of scepticism. The discovery of a man, differing only in details from men now living in England, in so ancient a formation seemed at variance with a belief in the orderly succession of evolutionary stages in man's early history. It was only when I saw that there was no possibility of denying the authenticity of the discovery without doing an injury to truth, that it became apparent to me . . . that the find at Galley Hill had to be accepted as a fact" (pp. 256–7). "In the gravels at Galley Hill the same types of implements were found as at the Barnfield pit. There can be little doubt that the skeleton lay in the lower bed of loam—the one under the Chellean gravel. The stratum belongs to the oldest or basal series of deposits of the 100-ft. terrace. In the basal gravel occur the Strepyan or pre-Chellean form of Palæolithic implements. . . . It is in the deposits of the same period, as M. Rutot was the first to demonstrate, that the early Europeans really applied themselves to stonecraft" (p. 257). "If we accept the discovery at Galley Hill as authentic, we

must also accept the great antiquity of the human custom of burying the dead. We hardly do justice to the men who shaped the Chellean weapons if we hold them incapable of showing respect for their dead" (p. 258).

"The skeleton does not show a single feature which can be called Neanderthaloid, nor any simian feature which is not also to be seen in the skeletons of men of the modern type. The Galley Hill man represents no strange species of mankind; he belongs to the same type as modern man. . . . In any large modern population on the western side of Europe, individuals with heads of a very similar size and shape could still be found" (p. 260). "There are no Neanderthal marks at the symphysis of the jaw; the markings which indicate the origin of the chief muscles of the tongue are shaped and placed as in modern man" (p. 262). "The cast of the brain . . . shows that . . . the areas or lobes which are specially associated with the senses of sight, hearing, and touch were all there; so, too, were the convolutions which are concerned in speech" (p. 261). "Mr. E. T. Newton is perfectly familiar with the degree of fossilization seen in bones from the 100-ft. terrace. He and other authorities regard their condition as evidence of their high antiquity. Besides, there are in the Galley Hill skeleton some minor structural parts which indicate a primitive form of man. The skull is thick, the vault varying from 10 to 12 mm.—altogether an exceptional measurement" (p. 263). "Why is it, then, that anatomists and geologists have been so reluctant to acknowledge the antiquity of the Galley Hill remains? The anatomist turns away from this discovery because it reveals no new type of man, overlooking the much greater revelation, the high antiquity of the modern type of man, the extraordinary and unexpected conservancy of the type. The geologist regards the remains with suspicion for two reasons—first, he has grown up with a belief in the recent origin, not only of modern civilization, but also of modern man himself" (p. 265). "We need not, then, reject the Galley Hill remains on account of modernity" (p. 265).

"Further, at a much later date than the formation of the 100-ft. terrace, a very primitive type of man survived in Europe, such a type as answers exactly to the evolutionist's expectation of a human ancestral form. The discovery of human remains

of the Neanderthal type confirmed geologists in their opinion that Pleistocene man must be of a more primitive, at least of a different type from modern man. Hence the rejection of all remains—such as those found at Galley Hill—which do not conform to this standard” (pp. 265–6). “At Clichy parts of an entire skeleton were preserved; we have clearly to do with a burial—one made probably from a Chellean land surface” (pp. 277–8). “I have cited only this one instance from the ancient valley deposits of Paris, because it is not necessary to prove more than one case, one instance of a modern type of man who lived before the Mousterian period, the heyday of Neanderthal man in Europe. At Grenelle, a suburb of Paris, on the south bank of the Seine, human remains of the same type have been found at an even greater depth, and others of a different type at more superficial horizons. There is no doubt that even in the earliest Palaeolithic periods one hundred and fifty thousand years ago or perhaps more, the culture and the people in the valley of the Seine and in the valley of the Thames were very much alike” (p. 278).

“The European of the Mousterian period, Neanderthal man, from an anatomist’s point of view, was of a most primitive type. He possessed many features which are rightly regarded as ape-like. In the deposits of the two long periods which preceded the Mousterian, the Acheulean and Chellean, probably covering between them a stretch of almost one hundred thousand years at least—the Thames filled up and scoured out its valley twice during that space of time—we have found no trace of Neanderthal man, nor of his ancestor” (p. 282). “We have, in the first place, to conclude that man of the modern type is much older than we supposed. . . . It is clear we must seek for his evolution at an earlier time than the Pleistocene. Neanderthal man is a different and . . . very primitive species of man. . . . In our first youthful burst of Darwinianism we pictured human evolution as a simple procession of forms leading from ape to man. Each age, as it passed, transformed the men of the time one stage nearer to us, one more distant from the ape” (p. 283). “The true picture is very different. . . . Out of that great welter of ancient human forms one species become dominant, and ultimately the whole surviving form” (p. 283).

EOLITHS. "The worked flints collected by Mr. Moir prove that pre-Crag man, man of the Pliocene epoch, had already evolved a series of implements, representing several types as regards shape and workmanship" (*Antiquity of Man*, 1st ed., p. 225). "Recent discoveries in East Anglia carry the history of man in England to beyond the bounds of the Pleistocene epoch well into the Pliocene period" (*loc. cit.*, p. 226). "We have already committed ourselves to the statement that the beginning of the true Chellean culture may be placed at so distant a date as one hundred and thirty thousand years ago. To take us to the beginning of the Pleistocene period we cannot allow more than an additional 70,000 years; even then, as we shall see, the beginning of the pre-Chelles stone-culture is not reached" (revised edition, p. 284). "It is on and under one of the deeper deposits, the Red Crag, that Mr. Reid Moir has found flint implements worked by the hand of Pleistocene man" (p. 289). "If, however, the Ipswich skeleton had shown characters as distinctive as those of Neanderthal man, or as those of the Piltdown man found at a depth of a little over 3 ft. below the surface, would anyone have doubted that its age was older than the deposition of the boulder clay?" (p. 299).

"The fact remains that man had attained a certain degree of skill, a high degree before the deposition of even the forest beds of Cromer, beds which carry fossil remains of Pliocene animals" (p. 306), and "that England was already inhabited by early man before the sea began to pound East Anglia into the Pliocene compound known to geologists as Red Crag. When the first edition of this book was being written in the early months of 1914, the drama of Boucher de Perthes was being acted over again in England. All the men who then held a position of high authority in the world of science received Mr. Reid Moir's announcements with incredulity, all save Sir E. Ray Lankester, whose powerful advocacy forced a speedier recognition of the truth than fell to the lot of the great Frenchman" (p. 308). "A Commission of French and Belgian experts visited the scenes of his labours and acknowledged that the detritus bed under the Red Crag did indeed contain flints which had been shaped by human hands. . . . Thus it will be seen that recent discoveries in East Anglia carry

the history of man in England to beyond the bounds of the Pleistocene epoch" (p. 309). "The Geological book, represented by the deposits of East Anglia, although the best available for our present purposes, is still a sadly mangled volume, one in which there are chapters missing and others very defective" (pp. 311-12).

"In the Heidelberg Mandible we find the usual Neanderthal features of the chin, only that they are more primitive, more simian in their development. If we allow full speech to the Mousterian man, we must, at least, assume the beginnings of such a faculty for Heidelberg man" (p. 331). "We have no shadow of doubt as to its authenticity or significance. We accept as a definite and indisputable fact that there lived a primitive form of Neanderthal man in South Germany in early Pleistocene times, bestial in structure beyond all kinds of men now living" (p. 334).

"We cannot pass Castenedolo by in silence; all the problems relating to the origin and antiquity of modern man focus themselves round it" (p. 334). "In 1883, Prof. Sergi, then a rising anthropologist, visited Ragazzoni at Brescia, and saw the human remains found in the Pliocene strata at Castenedolo, still covered by fragments of the original matrix in which they had been embedded" (p. 336). "Prof. Sergi was impressed by both the discovery and the discoverer. He went with Ragazzoni to the pit, made a fresh section of the strata, and was convinced that all was as Ragazzoni claimed—namely, that he had discovered human remains in undisturbed beds of a Pliocene age. The race was of the modern human type" (p. 337). "The discovery at Castenedolo convinced Sergi that men of the modern type were already evolved in the Pliocene period" (p. 338). "The men of Combe Capelle and of the Grimaldi caves were as highly evolved as any modern people, and yet they may have seen—probably did see—the Neanderthal men. . . . We have only circumstantial evidence . . . but this evidence points to the Pleistocene temperate lands, stretching from Afghanistan in the east to Morocco in the west, lands which are now reduced to sandy wastes, as the homeland of the white man" (p. 339). "It becomes increasingly difficult to accept the geological evidence relating to Galley Hill, Clichy, and Olmo skeletons" (p. 340). "It

is perfectly legitimate for us to presume that the men who appeared in Europe . . . came from the Africo-Asiatic belt" (p. 339). "The Mousterian culture evidently spread along the bridge [over Malta], but whether from Europe to Africa, or in the reverse direction, we cannot tell. In North Africa, just as in Europe, we find the flint implements of the Acheulean and Chellean cultures" (p. 344). "The Sahara is a great racial frontier; north of it we find men of the European type, south of it men of the true African or negro type" (p. 351).

**MAN IN AFRICA.** "Students of Egyptian history are now generally agreed that settled rule, under a dynasty of kings, commenced in the lower valley of the Nile about 3500 B.C. . . . Archæologists began to recognize that certain graves and cemeteries were older than the First Dynasty, were 'pre-dynastic'" (p. 252 of 1st ed.). People buried in such graves were contemporaries of the Neolithic people of Europe (*loc. cit.*, pp. 252-3). "The oldest graves of Egypt have yielded the same type of man as we still find in the valley of the Nile. . . . The ancestral stock of this type has given rise to the European on the one hand, and to the negro on the other" (p. 353, rev. ed.) "Between Cairo and Khartoum we find an intermediate series which link the South European to the negro of the Sudan" (p. 353).

**S. AFRICA.** "The kind of man we are now amongst differs in every feature from the fairer races of Europe, yet their dissimilarity is bridged by an intermediate series which shades from the one type to the other" (p. 356). "Immediately on the outer fringes of the great Kalahari desert, where there still may be seen a people leading a 'Palæolithic' life, the Bushmen. . . . Although some have adopted the black man's wigwam, their real homes are rock-shelters and caves . . . their culture is Aurignacian; they shape their stone weapons, fashion necklaces and other ornaments, paint and engrave, and bury their dead in a way that was fashionable in Southern Europe some 15,000 years ago . . . yet in build of body and brain the Bushman represents a highly specialized type . . . he has departed further from the common simian ancestor than his cousin of Europe" (p. 358). "In colour of skin, in form of ear, in texture of hair, in facial features, and in shape of skull, Hottentots bear a close

resemblance to the untamable Bushman" (p. 360). "It is very probable that the negro was very fully developed in early Pleistocene times, but the evidence from Oldoway cannot be accepted as having finally proved this degree of antiquity" (pp. 354-5).

"The culture of the Bushman is Aurignacian, but there are very clear traces of still older methods of working stone implements in South Africa" (p. 361). "The Chellean, Acheulean, and Mousterian cultures are not sharply divided into separate time periods as in Europe" (p. 362). "Although 6000 miles of jungle, desert, and sea lie between the sites we are now dealing with and those which we visited near Ipswich, yet we meet with the same order of stone cultures" (p. 364).

"In South Africa is being revealed an unexpected chapter in the history of mankind" (p. 374). "We see that this part of the world has been the home of man from remote times. . . . As we trace the ancestry of the African negro backwards in time we shall find him approaching the common ancestor from which his and the European type were evolved. Of living peoples the nearest approach to this ancestral type is represented by the aborigines of Australia" (p. 375). "At Grimaldi, cave life and Palæolithic culture came to an end at the close of the Pleistocene period, whereas in South Africa they have persisted into our own time" (p. 376). "We are driven to demand a long period of time for the changes which brought man from a Rhodesian stage to that in which we now find him. Even if we allow 200,000 years for the duration of the Pleistocene period, which is twice the allowance often assigned to it, the time seems far too short for the evolutionary change we have merely glanced at" (p. 393). "A man's racial origin finds its surest expression in the lineaments of his face. We recognize, in our crowded streets, the Chinaman, Negro, Hottentot, European, and Malay as they pass, but not by looking at the shape of their heads—a glimpse of their faces is sufficient" (p. 394). "In the average Englishman the 'upper' face is 70 mm. long, in the La Chapelle man 87 mm., in Rhodesian man 94 mm. Herein he approached the male gorilla, in which the 'upper' face is 110 mm" (p. 396). "The great bar or torus of bone which crossed his forehead, shadowing his wide capacious orbits, gave his face

a forbidding gorilla-like aspect" (p. 403). "In childhood and youth, as the jaws and neck grow, the base of the skull expands, causing the shape of the brain to alter. The lower or more brutal an animal is in the scale of evolution, the more does expansion of the base of the skull take place. In this respect Rhodesian man represents an early stage in the evolution of modern man" (p. 411). "Many features he shared with Neanderthal man, and there are others . . . which link him to the Java man, the most primitive human type as yet discovered" (p. 416). "From England, Germany, Rhodesia, parts of the earth which are widely separated, we seem to have the same tale. In early Pleistocene times, less than 125,000 years ago, according to many authorities, each of these countries had its particular type of man, but in all of them an equally primitive type" (p. 417). "Rhodesian man nearly answers to the common ancestor we have been in search of, but not quite" (p. 416).

ASIA. Dr. Noetling, in 1894, "while carrying out a geological survey in Burmah, found rudely worked flints which he believed to have come from a conglomerate deposit, one containing fossil remains of early Pliocene mammals" (p. 419). "If India has not yet given us her extinct fossil types, she does possess, among the jungle peoples of Bombay and Madras, a living fossil, or survival, type. Amongst these tribes occur families which have the essential characters of the tropical African, and tell of a time when the great negro stock extended as a belt across the world from the west coast of Africa to the farthest point of New Guinea and beyond" (p. 420).

THE "JAVA" SKULL. The story of the discovery of *Pithecanthropus Erectus* is well known. "If we do not admit that the femur, the teeth, and the calvaria which lay near each other in the bed of an ancient stream are parts of the same individual or same kind of individual, then we must . . . suppose that the femur is that of a man showing a few, minor, ape-like traits; that the teeth are from another human being in which certain simian features were manifest; and that the calvaria belonged to a large-headed anthropoid showing marked human affinities. We cannot conceive that chance could bring three such strange individuals side by side in one narrow

area of the bed of a stream" (p. 421). "Those who have studied the complex structural changes needed to adapt the human body to its peculiar posture cannot conceive that such changes have been evolved twice, once in the human ancestry, and at another time in the forerunner of Pithecanthropus. The natural inference is that the human family of ancient Java and all human races are common descendants of a stock in which the human posture and method of progression were already evolved" (p. 426). In "the skull, when closely examined, its simian rather than its human characters force themselves on our attention" (p. 427), but "every expert will agree with Dr. Dubois' pronouncement that the convolutionary pattern is 'altogether human'" (p. 427, note). "Pithecanthropus should be considered a member of the family *Homidae*." "In anthropoid skulls the bregma itself forms the highest point. In this respect the skull of Pithecanthropus is anthropoid" (p. 431). "The forehead of Pithecanthropus shows many anthropoid features. It is low and receding; the orbits are crossed by a true simian bar of bone, the *torus supraorbitalis*. This gorilla-like feature is one which also persists in Neanderthal man and Rhodesian man. The forehead is very narrow—only 84 mm. when measured between the temporal lines" (p. 431). "In the region of the orbits, and in the manner in which the skull was fixed to the neck, Pithecanthropus had much more in common with Neanderthal man and with anthropoid apes than with men of the modern type" (p. 433). "In Pithecanthropus the head was attached to the neck exactly as in a young anthropoid ape" (p. 432). "In size of brain Pithecanthropus takes a place between the great apes and the various races of man" (p. 433).

"In the frontal region the convolutions are perfectly distinct. The most conspicuous is the second frontal fissure. . . . This seems to indicate that our fossil being possessed already a certain amount of power of speech" (p. 434). "The region of the brain which is connected with the essentially human gift of speech was not ape-like in Pithecanthropus. . . . Dr. Dubois' discovery in Java throws more light on the earliest phases of man's evolution than any other yet made. We were not prepared to find a stage in human evolution where the erect posture was fully developed, and yet one in which

the brain remained in so primitive a condition" (p. 435). "In Pithecanthropus we find a being human in stature, human in gait, human in all his parts, save his brain" (p. 436). "Can we conceive that in the stretch of time between the end of the Pliocene and the middle of the Pleistocene, even allowing 200,000–300,000 years for that space, the brain of Pithecanthropus could have evolved into the modern human form? I cannot credit such a rapid rate of evolution" (p. 436). "It is in this light I would interpret Pithecanthropus; a true survival, into late Pliocene or early Pleistocene times, of an early stage in the true and direct line of human evolution, a stage we may expect to find already evolved in deposits, not of the Pliocene, but of the preceding or Miocene period" (p. 437).

"The Wadjak type is one which seems to bridge the gap which lies between Rhodesian man and the Australian aborigine" (p. 446). "We find a sea voyage of some 400 miles is necessary to reach the nearest part of the coast of Australia . . . early man crossed this wide stretch of sea and took with him his wife and dog for company" (p. 447). "We have in this Talgai lad a very primitive human type. . . . In size and shape the Talgai palate is the most anthropoid ever seen in the human skull. . . . Its most anthropoid feature lies in its 'muzzle-width'—its bi-canine diameter—which amounts to 59 mm. The greatest width of the palate of the male gorilla lies across its canine part" (pp. 541–2). "The Rhodesian and Wadjak palates have the horseshoe or human shape, while the Talgai lad had one with almost parallel sides of the anthropoid type. . . . But in form the canines are altogether human, having none of the anthropoid traits preserved in the canine of the Piltdown man. . . . His place . . . lies in the Australian stem; he is ancestral to the modern aborigine. . . . The Tasmanian native, in spite of a preponderance of negroid traits . . . came of the same stock as the Australian aborigines" (p. 453). "In this continent has come down to us, much changed by specialization of a superficial nature, mammals which are really living fossils, representatives of a very ancient stage in mammalian evolution. In the same way this continent has preserved for us a very ancient type of man" (pp. 456–7).

AMERICA. "Geologists have abundant evidence to prove that, at various phases of both Pliocene and Pleistocene periods, Siberia and Alaska enjoyed a temperate climate and were united by a wide land-bridge. It is then quite possible that some of the early types of Old World man may have strayed into America across this land-bridge. . . . Anthropologists are agreed that the pre-Columbian population of America did enter America from the Asiatic side . . . from the same human stock as has populated the eastern regions of Asia and many islands of the Pacific" (p. 459). In America, as in Europe, the glacial deposits are the treasure-houses of the student of pre-history. "No one can study the Trenton fragments and remain unconvinced that the man who lived in the valley of the Delaware when the Trenton gravels were being deposited was a man of the modern type, and almost certainly of the Indian race" (pp. 463-4). "Before the last period of glaciation modern man, in the form of that highly evolved race—the American Indian—was living on the eastern seaboard of North America. This race . . . represents a branch of the Mongolian stock. . . . The discovery at Trenton gives us, indirectly, the information we stood in need of—namely, that, at an equally early part of the Palæolithic period, men of the modern type were in existence in the eastern part of the Old World" (p. 465). It is plain that "to account for modern man in Europe, in Asia, in America, long before the close of the Ice age, we must assign his origin and evolution to a very remote period" (p. 465). "Lyell was afraid to use the bone found at Natchez as evidence; it seemed to him suggestive of too great an antiquity for man. . . . The plateau at Natchez was, in his opinion, almost as old as the classical 100-ft. terrace at Abbeville" (p. 466). "There is no doubt as to the authenticity of the discovery at Lansing, nor is there any room for difference of opinion regarding the kind of man discovered. The skull is now in the National Museum, Washington. . . . 'All the parts of the skeleton, and particularly the skull, approach closely in every character of importance the average skeleton of the present-day Indian of the Central States' (Dr. Hrdlička)" (p. 468). "The age attributed to the Lansing skeleton is thus older than that given for the Trenton fragments" (p. 469). "Clearly the men

living in Kansas when the loess at Lansing was being deposited had all the physical characters of the American Indian" (p. 469). "The loess men are supposed to belong to the last inter-glacial period. . . . Beneath the deposits of the Kansan glaciation, which preceded the Illinoian, Prof. Winchell has found stone implements of a rude Palæolithic type. . . . The story of the Calaveras skull . . . cannot be passed over" (p. 471). "In Prof. Wyman's opinion there were no signs of an inferior race in the characters of the skull" (p. 472).

"The consequence of accepting the discoveries of Calaveras county as genuine have been well expressed by Prof. W. H. Holmes—'To suppose that man could have remained unchanged physically, mentally, socially, industrially, and æsthetically for a million of years, roughly speaking—and all this is implied by the evidence furnished—seems in the present state of our knowledge hardly less than admitting a miracle'. It is equally difficult to believe that so many men should have been mistaken as to what they saw and found. . . ." (p. 472). "We must be content to return the same verdict for Calaveras, as for Castenedolo [remains] the Scottish verdict of 'not proven.' The reader must not think, because our journey across the States . . . has revealed no strange, primitive, or new type of human being, that it has been made in vain. On the contrary, we have received the most ample confirmation of the conclusions forced on us by the evidence in Europe—viz., that the antiquity of the modern type of man is much greater than is usually supposed" (p. 473). "As to the kind of man discovered by Dr. Lund in the Lagoa Santa Caves, there is no difference of opinion" (p. 478). "Those ancient Brazilians do not differ from tribes still living in South America. The skulls are not unlike those of the low-browed 'Nebraska loess men.' We have in Dr. Lund's discoveries further evidence of the persistency of the American Indian type" (p. 478).

"Certain defects which mar all Amerghino's scientific papers are apparent in his very first effort—a lack of precision and of detail, and particularly a decided tendency to over-estimate the antiquity of all the geological strata of the Argentine Republic" (p. 480). "The oldest and most primitive human ancestor he named *Tetraprothomo*, and regarded the only remains which were found of this ancient human type—an

atlas and a thigh-bone—as of Miocene age. . . . The second and later stage in man's evolution, Diprothomo, was based on the fragment of a skull obtained from a formation which he regarded as of early Pliocene date" (p. 481). "There are the very soundest grounds for rejecting Amerghino's conclusions as regards the age of the stratum and the nature of the cranial fragments" (p. 482). "There is no reason for being surprised at the discovery of a fossil skull, showing American-Indian features in a deposit of Pleistocene age; Amerghino's Diprothomo thus represents a man of the American-Indian type, living in the Argentine during Pleistocene times. . . . Tetraprothomo had also to go by the board" (pp. 482-3). "The result of a survey of the discoveries of ancient man in South and North America leads to the same conclusion, that we cannot trace man beyond a point in the Pleistocene period and that the oldest human remains so far discovered, both of the northern and southern parts of the western hemisphere, are of the same American-Indian type" (p. 483). "Those who have studied the ancient civilizations of America and the multitude of Indian languages are of opinion that . . . they have undergone their own independent courses of evolution. . . . The animals which have been domesticated, and the numerous native plants which had been brought under cultivation by indigenous races in pre-Columbian times, seem to point to an antiquity beyond that revealed by the discoveries of the geologist or of the anatomist" (pp. 483-4). Yet "we have seen no evidence to lead us to suppose that any race preceded the American Indian" (p. 483). "They are not only of the same race; they might belong almost to members of the same tribe" (p. 483). "Unfortunately we do not know the facial features of the Brünn man . . . but of living human types [the Patagonians] seem to be best representatives of the pioneers who made their way into America from Mongolia in Palæolithic times" (pp. 484-5).

"Eoliths were not accepted as genuine products of man's hand until 1888, when the late Sir Joseph Prestwich, a geologist noted for his sound judgment, brought them before the scientific world" (p. 488). "Mr. Dawson regards them as belonging to that period of Palæolithic culture known as the 'Chellean,' or to an indefinite and older period, which saw the

early evolution of the Chellean culture, the ‘pre-Chellean’” (pp. 494–5). “Mr. Lewis Abbot, whose opinion in all that pertains to the geology of the Weald deserves serious consideration, has no hesitation in regarding the deeper stratum as Pliocene” (p. 495). “The Piltdown gravel pockets contain animal remains and human artifacts of two different ages” (p. 496). “No one has a better right to give an expert judgment on such implements than Mr. J. Reid Moir. . . . ‘As these pre-Chellean implements are the latest constituents contained in the Piltdown gravel, the deposit must be very ancient. There is also no doubt that a very long period intervened between the time when the Eolithic implements and the later or pre-Chellean type were made’” (pp. 485–6).

“Had it chanced, however, that the human remains thus recovered had been of a type similar to the men still living in the world, what would have been the result? Judging from what has happened in other cases, the universal verdict would have been that some mistake had been made, so strong is the belief that modern man is of modern origin” (p. 500). The Piltdown skull of Sir A. Smith Woodward “was a strange blend of man and ape” (p. 503).

“To arrive at an estimate of the antiquity of the Piltdown remains, we must also allow for the time which has elapsed since the Pleistocene period ended and our present era began. . . . There is a growing tendency amongst geologists to shorten the length of the Pleistocene period. Beyond any question, the Piltdown skull represents the most ancient human remains yet found in England” (p. 505). “In Mr. Dawson’s opinion, then, it is possible that the Piltdown race may belong to the period preceding the Pleistocene—the Pliocene” (p. 505). “The opinion Mr. Newton formed of the antiquity of the Piltdown remains” was “‘the highly mineralized condition of the specimens seemed to point to their being of Pliocene age rather than Pleistocene’” (p. 507). “The lower jaw, especially in the region of the chin, is marked by certain characters which separate it sharply from the corresponding part of all human mandibles and link it closely with the jaws of apes” (p. 507). “The Piltdown man represents, as the animal remains accompanying him suggest, a Pliocene form” (p. 508). “Mr. Lewis Abbot, who has given as much time

as anyone to master the later geological history of the Weald, expressed the decisive opinion that in the Piltdown gravel two ages are represented. The lower or bottom stratum, which contained the Pliocene remains and human bones, is, in Mr. Abbot's opinion, Pliocene in date; the upper levels, in which the rude Palæolithic implements lay, have been disturbed at a later time, and are to be regarded as Pleistocene in age" (p. 508). "In a subsequent communication Mr. Dawson wrote of the 'dark' or *Eoanthropus* stratum as follows: . . . 'Putting aside the human remains and those of the beaver, the mammalian remains all point to a characteristic fauna of Pliocene age'" (p. 508). "As the first gravel was being laid down the culture of man was represented by flints worked in a pre-Chellean style, and surprising pieces of bone work. . . . No one suspected, until Mr. Dawson made the discovery, that deposits of a Pliocene or early Pleistocene date occurred in the Weald of Sussex" (pp. 509-10).

"We have already mentioned the sub-Crag implements discovered by Mr. Reid Moir. They indicate the existence of human beings towards the middle of the Pliocene period. The Kentish eoliths are more ancient than the sub-Crag implements" (p. 513). "As to the type to which the Piltdown jaw belongs there can be no doubt; both the gonial pit and the simian plate are present. These are ape-like features" (p. 522). "We have thus in this newly discovered form of man a remarkable mixture of simian and human characters" (p. 525). "It seems fairly certain that the tendency in human evolution is to increase the work of the brain and diminish the work of the stomach. An increase of brain power has made the task of our digestive system easier—at least those parts which are concerned in mastication" (p. 526).

"Ever since Darwin impressed the truth of his theory of man's origin on his fellow scientists we have expected to encounter man's progenitors, but no one, so far as I know, ever anticipated the discovery of one showing the remarkable mixture of simian and human characters—such a one as Mr. Dawson brought to light at Piltdown" (p. 533). "Until a few years ago many of our leading authorities believed that Pithecanthropus—a humanoid form with a brain capacity of 850 c.c., little more than half that of modern man—repre-

sented our stage of evolution at the beginning of the Pleistocene period. The same men looked on Neanderthal species as representative of Pleistocene man, while modern races appeared just before the dawn of the recent period" (p. 559). But, "our estimate of the antiquity of the modern type of man must be sufficiently long to give time for the differentiation of this type into the most diverse forms—African, European, Mongolian" (p. 560). "The various features just enumerated in the chimpanzee's skull are also represented in that strange mid-Pleistocene species of humanity—Neanderthal man" (p. 574).

"The result of our examination of the Piltdown skull in profile has been to emphasize its close resemblance in size and conformation to skulls of the modern type" (p. 595). "A survey of those features alone is sufficient to make us realize that the Piltdown race was in some respects highly evolved—at least had departed widely from simian lines of evolution" (p. 599). "The most primitive form" is "that of Pithecanthropus. The geological evidence leads us to believe that Pithecanthropus, the erect, ape-like man of Java, was almost a contemporary of the English Eoanthropus" (p. 599), but "from a comparison . . . we see that Eoanthropus is a totally different kind of human being, one in which the brain development, at least so far as regards size, has reached a modern standard" (p. 600). "The characters which mark Neanderthal skulls are all absent" (p. 602). "A brain cast was made from the Piltdown skull by Mr. Barlow. When this cast is measured, it is found to displace 1195 c.c. of water" (p. 604). "We must promote this early Pleistocene or late Pliocene man to a still higher group" (p. 605). "We have no reason, then, to regard the brain volume of Eoanthropus as dependant on a massive development of the body" (p. 606). "The statement which Huxley made about the ancient human skull from the cave of Engis still holds good of the brain: 'It might have belonged to a philosopher or might have contained the thoughtless mind of a savage.'" "We must always keep in mind that accomplishments and inventions which seem so simple to us were new and unsolved problems to the pioneers who worked their way from a simian to a human estate" (p. 607). "In the last two months of foetal life the human brain passes from a stage

in which the convolutions of the brain have a simple, somewhat anthropoid arrangement to the more complex human form" (p. 612). "We have grounds for believing that the Piltdown man had reached that point of brain development where speech had become a possibility . . . when we note the lower jaw, and the projecting canine teeth . . . one hesitates to allow him more than a mere potential ability" (p. 611).

"In the development of the occipital poles of the brain, this early Pleistocene man shows not a primitive feature, but one which must be regarded as evidence of a fairly high degree of specialization" (p. 627). "A survey of the convolutionary regions of the brain leads to the conclusion that we are dealing here with a simple and primitive arrangement of parts; but not so simple or so primitive as to make us wish to place the Piltdown brain in a class apart from modern brains. To my mind it appears, even in its convolutionary arrangement, to fall within the limits of variation seen in modern human brains" (p. 621).

We have here, in the discovery at Piltdown, a certain assurance that one race of mankind had reached, so far as the mass of brain is concerned, a modern human standard, at the beginning of the Pleistocene period. "During the great span of time which lies between him and us we can well conceive that his brain and skull might have been converted into the forms seen in modern races of mankind. When we come to build up the face our steps are not attended with the same degree of certainty" (p. 637). "If only the mandible and the teeth had been found—two molars or cheek teeth and the canine or eye tooth—the great majority of anatomists would have regarded the extinct being of which they formed part as more anthropoid than human in nature. . . . That we should find a human form which, in some of its parts, retained or exhibited a marked preponderance of simian characters in such a structure as the lower jaw, is not improbable" (p. 638).

"In the discovery at Piltdown, then, there was revealed, for the first time, a human race in which the canine teeth were pointed, projecting, and shaped as in anthropoid apes. That we should discover such a race, sooner or later, has been an article of faith in the anthropologist's creed ever since Darwin's time. Everyone who has made a special study of human

teeth—their form, growth, and eruption—has been obliged to have recourse to the theory of descent to explain the numerous facts which come under the notice of the anatomist" (p. 667). "The developmental history of the human permanent canines also requires explanation. The budding crowns of the permanent teeth are situated at the roots of the milk-teeth, which they are destined to replace, all except the canine teeth. The crown of the upper canine, as in the anthropoid, begins to form far above the other members of the series, under the roof floor of the orbit. The lower canine appears near the lower border of the mandible. A deep origin for the canine is a necessity in an anthropoid. The longer the root of a tooth, the deeper in the jaw must the crown of the tooth be developed; the tip of the root is the last part of a tooth to form, and it is formed at the spot where the crown commenced to develop" (pp. 668-9). "In a thousand years, or less, then a very remarkable change has appeared in the bite of English people; the overlapping incisor bite has become the prevailing form. With the change has come a marked tendency to vaulting of the palate, to a reduction of its area, and to irregularities in the arrangement of the teeth" (p. 670). "The cheeks, which are high and prominent when the biting muscles, the masseter and internal pterygoid, are well developed, become reduced and sunken, giving us our narrow, hatchet-shaped faces, our oval cast of countenance" (p. 671). "The edge-to-edge incisor bite occurs in all primitive human races; it is also the simian form" (p. 670).

"It is certain that the discovery at Piltdown has revealed a human being in which certain anthropoid features were well marked in the teeth and jaws. It is also equally certain that the brain had passed far beyond an anthropoid stage of development" (p. 688). "If merely the nasal bones had been found at Piltdown, anatomists would have agreed that an ancient representative of a negroid race, one with a resemblance to the Australian aborigine, had been discovered. If merely the canine tooth or mandible had come to light, they would have been equally convinced that they had to deal with parts of an anthropoid. If merely the skull-bones had been recovered, *Eoanthropus* would have been regarded as purely human and given a position in the immediate ancestry of modern

man" (p. 699). "If we search the present world for the type of man who is most likely to serve as a common ancestor for both African and European we find the nearest approach to the object of our search in the aboriginal Australian. He is an ancient and generalized type of humanity; he is not the direct ancestor of either African or European, but he has apparently retained the characters of their common ancestor to a greater degree than any other living race. If, then, we accept the Australian native as the nearest approach to the common ancestor of modern mankind, can we form any conception of the length of time which would be required to produce the African on the one hand, and the European on the other, from the Australian type?" (pp. 712-13).

Our knowledge of ancestral forms is confined to almost a single type—the European. The type was in existence by the middle of the Pleistocene period. In some of the ancient Europeans, such as those found at Cro-Magnon and Grimaldi, negroid traits can be recognized. Neanderthal man "was so different from modern man in every point of structure that, in order to account for his peculiarities, we have to represent his phylum as separating from that of the modern human type at an early date" (p. 720). A large brain was not the independent acquisition of Neanderthal man. In the course of evolution, Neanderthal man retained the ancestral simian features of the skull. "It will thus be seen that I look on *Eoanthropus*, as on Neanderthal man, as a representative of an extinct form of man. . . . If we elevate one of them to a generic status, we must do the same for the other three. Hitherto, all modern races of men have been grouped under one species *Homo Sapiens*. The varieties of men which belong to the Neanderthal type are placed under the specific name of *Homo Neanderthalensis primigenius*. If we apply the same standard of classification to the Piltdown type, then the name ought to be *Homo dawsoni*, not *Eoanthropus dawsoni*" (pp. 723-4). "Clearly, Pithecanthropus represents an early stage in the evolution of the human phylum" (p. 724). "All who have made a study of the human body are agreed that we must seek for man's origin in an ape-like ancestor" (p. 730). "Out of that welter of fossil forms only one type has survived—that which gives us the modern races of man" (p. 725). "The

evidence, slight as it is, justifies us in presuming that the human and anthropoid lines of descent separated in pre-Miocene times" (pp. 731-2). "From what we know and from what we must infer of the ancestry of *Eoanthropus*, of Neanderthal man, and of modern man, we have reasonable grounds for presuming that man was approaching the human standard in size of brain by the commencement of the Pliocene period" (pp. 733-4). "The Pleistocene and Pliocene periods are estimated to cover a period of about half a million years. This period, on the grounds defined above, represents the antiquity of man" (p. 734). "The human origin of eoliths is still being called in question, but the more these shaped flints of Pliocene date are investigated and discussed, the greater becomes the number of those who regard them as the work. . . of Pliocene man. . . . There is not a single fact known to me, which makes the existence of a human body in the Miocene period an impossibility" (p. 734).

Earlier Prof. Keith did not hold the same view, for in his book *Ancient Types of Man* (1911) he says: "In the writer's opinion the Neanderthal type represents the stock from which all modern races have arisen. At the first glance the native of Central Africa has little in common as regards build of body, with the native of Central Europe . . . yet the Neanderthal type seems the parent stock" (pp. 118-19).

In this book my guiding principle has been not to rely on anything that is argumentative or inferential. I have stated, with all the clearness and ability I could command, those points which are accepted generally by men of science. Where I felt unable to do this, I have fallen back on the words of others. In what follows, this method will be more fully adopted, for the subjects are not familiar to me, and I do not treat them with confidence.

Prof. Keith's opinion has been altered by the discovery of the Piltdown remains. The orthodox view seems to be that this is an intensely simian type, and such as we might suppose to have gone before and led up to the Neanderthal race. Keith hotly contested this, and has given his reasons in *The Antiquity of Man*. These appear to me to be cogent, and the probability is that man did not develop along a single line, but, like all other types, evolved varieties, some of which dis-

appeared, while others persisted in the various strains of men known to us. This is the very opposite to the unlikely theory that man originated in several places, and yet all these genes travelled on parallel lines. This doctrine may be looked on as the last attempt to limit the age of the human species and to assert that the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest have taken place as a preconceived plan, and resulted in pre-ordained effects.

Such an assumption is really to make the whole a piece of stage-acting—like the terrific fight between brigands and boys, which are arranged to fall out in favour of innocence and virtue regardless of probabilities. The essence of the theory of Darwin is that the effort is real, and results in a victory of those best fitted by circumstances to survive. It is like a stream that takes the line of least resistance. Whether this is the nearest or not, an immediate obstacle of small moment being decisive; though the result is to cause endless difficulties which might have been avoided by a little wise provision. A current of water cannot re-climb a fall to rectify its course, one of electricity can turn back; animate Nature uses both these ways. A line once started never reverts but dies out, if it fails to get on. Yet side branches may take another direction and outstrip that which first went ahead. Prof. Keith's schemata fully expresses this, and is very much more true to Nature than the old view of one continuous progression: "The race is not to the swift always, nor the battle to the strong"; survival may be the reward of those who give the best send-off to their progeny, or to those who vary most in the direction of self-forgetfulness. The twofold business of living creatures is caring for self and caring for others. In the widest sense hunger and love form the subject and counter-subject of the great fugue of life. In satisfying its primal impulses the organism encounters obstacles, and the perennial problem is to adjust relations between the self-expression of the organism and the factors of indifference, or hostility, or conflicting interests in its environment. The struggle takes three main forms: between organisms and their inorganic surroundings, between foes of different kinds, and between those of the same kith and kin. The struggle need not be competitive; it may not be bloody, may not lead to elimination there and then, and may often

be more nearly described as an endeavour after well-being.

Instead of opposing "struggle for self" and "struggle for others," or "mutual struggle" and "mutual aid," it is scientifically sounder to recognize that the concept of struggle includes all the reactions and responses which individual organisms make in face of difficulties. Intensifying competition is one mode, an elaboration of parental care is another, a new departure in social life another; and there are many more, all of which pay. Thus the nightmare picture of the struggle for existence as a "dismal cockpit" gives place to a more accurate one which is more in keeping with the assumption that Nature is not "all welter" or "a moral multiverse." Many forms of organic activity, whether making for self-increase or the welfare of progeny, have nothing to do with the struggle for existence. Neither naturalists nor philosophers have adequately realized the extent to which there is throughout animate Nature a subordination of the individual to the species. A large portion of the energy and time at the disposal of living creatures is spent in activities for the well-being of the family, the kin, the tribe; the struggle for existence is not illustrated when all members of a species meet a familiar difficulty with equal effectiveness, the capacity for response being engraved in the constitution. There is an hereditary awareness of the practical significance of certain things and configurations, and an hereditary impulsion to a precise routine, even among the simplest animals, there is a counterpart of intelligent behaviour, the capacity may be improved by experience, but it is essentially independent of individual experience (*vide Prof. J. A. Thomson, Gifford Lectures, St. Andrews, 1915*). "There has been a process in which the time required has been of no consideration; in which there has been neither rest nor haste: in which bypaths show as much finish as highways; in which broad foundations have been laid so that the superstructure has been secure; in which, in spite of the disappearance of masterpieces, there has been a conservation of big gains. It has had its outcome in personalities who have discerned its magnificent sweep; who are seeking to understand its factors; who are learning some of the lessons; who cannot cease trying to interpret it, even though it may be mistakenly" (*loc. cit.*, Second Series, 1916).

There has been discovered recently a still more primitive jaw, *Sevapithecus Indicus*, in the Sivalik formation of the Middle Miocene. Dr. G. E. Pilgrim contends that it is human; but, like *Dryopithecus*, *Pliopithecus*, *Propliopithecus*, and several others, though it has many characters consistent with this, I think few will accept his position; it may be an early stage of development or a blind alley of evolution; either way it throws light on the path followed by man in his upward course (*Science Progress*, Oct. 1915). To a certain extent Prof. Geikie and Dr. Munro admit similar views to Prof. Keith's. The former writes (*Antiquity of Man in Europe*, Oliver and Boyd, 1914): "The human remains, which now and again have been met with, show indeed that one particular stage, the Mousterian, was characterized throughout by the presence of at least one special type of man. Several races, however, seem to have lived in Europe during subsequent Palæolithic times, but whether these represent just so many different folk-waves coming into our Continent, or whether one race may not in some cases have been evolved from another, we do not know. The oldest human skulls hitherto discovered are of Mousterian age, the earliest find of a tolerably complete skeleton having been made in 1857 in the Neanderthal, not far from Dusseldorf.

"It was at first doubted whether these remains were really representative of a race. The skull had a certain primitive aspect, but it was thought that its simian characters might indicate simply an abnormal condition. So many discoveries of the same type, however, have since been made in different parts of Europe that anthropologists are now quite assured that throughout Mousterian times there lived in our Continent a race characterized by a low retreating forehead, enormous brow-ridges, large round eye-orbits, massive jaws, and fully developed chin. The heavy limb bones are curved, and the whole structure of the skeleton indicates a strong muscular man, some 5 ft. 3 in. in height. Up till recently no skeletal remains of earlier date than these were known. A few years ago, however, an exceptionally massive lower jaw, with pronounced simian characters but a decidedly human set of teeth, was obtained from deposits near Heidelberg, which may date back to the Chellean or even to an earlier stage. Again, the Piltdown skull may possibly be as old as or even older than

the Heidelberg specimen. It is probable therefore that the Neanderthal or Mousterian race was not the earliest to appear in Europe.

" Of Aurignacian man several skeletons have been preserved. He was of a more advanced type than his Mousterian predecessor—the skull being highly developed with a large and lofty forehead, less protruding jaws, and a rudimentary chin. He was also taller (5 ft. 10 in.), the limbs being in striking contrast with those of the earlier race, slender as in modern man. Another race of Aurignacian age is represented by two skeletons found in a cave near Mentone which are described as being somewhat negroid in character.

" Magdalenian man appears to have been of small stature (5 ft. 2 in. to 5 ft. 4 ins.). His skull, however, is shapely and lofty, the eye-orbits [brows?] only moderately prominent, the chin well formed and the face in profile orthognathic " (pp. 46-8). In a note, p. 308, Keith says of the Piltdown skull: " Unfortunately, its precise geological horizon has not been determined." This is rather fatal to his argument; and a good many of the examples cited by him are questioned by geologists. They have put too much weight on anatomical points, but he appears too ready to override geological verdicts in favour of anatomy in cases which are dubious.

We turn next to another standard work on this subject—namely, *Palæolithic Man*, by Dr. Munro (Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh and London; 1912), upon which we propose to draw largely. " Between man and the higher apes there is no room for the existence of an intermediate animal; such a being must have competed for his life either on brute principles, or on those evolved by human ingenuity. Since man discovered, and rapidly utilized, the principles of intelligence and mechanical appliances, there was only one platform for the successful struggle of life. During that period not only had apes remained stationary, or perhaps retrograded; but many of the less progressive human races which sprung into being had also fallen into the background and died out. The law of the survival of the fittest applies to all living organisms, and dominates life in all ages, more especially in the field of existence selected by *Homo sapiens*, where advancement depends on mechanical skill and intelligence " (p. 90). This is *a priori*;

but whatever may be the answer to the question of the precise way man has developed from the lower orders, all seem agreed that the various stages of his advance in culture are alike all over the known world: this implies their long duration, for we do not find any such uniformity to-day, when the stone age and the iron co-exist. Size of brain may not be as important as Prof. Keith is inclined to think it is. Dr. W. L. H. Duckworth (*Morphology and Anthropology*, Vol. I, C.U.P. (1915), p. 120), says of Cercopithecidae: "the main divisions, viz. the New World apes (*Platyrrhinæ*), and the old world group (*Catarrhinae*), including man himself, have been indicated already" (p. 120). "The brain mass may appear unduly great. The clue to this difficulty will be found in a study of the so-called 'Association areas' of the cerebral surface. These also have increased in extent. Such an increase is indicative of the advancing development of the faculty of associating sense impressions, of powers which through evolution culminate in an intellect of human type. Yet the Cercopithecidae are far from having attained that stage" (p. 121). Duckworth's book is a purely scientific one, with the *imprimatur* to a certain extent of the University, for it is specially written to meet the requirements of its examinations; and, when a great teaching body, such as Cambridge, takes up as a fundamental principle of its instruction the position that man is one among various classes of apes, it is surely needless and absurd to labour the point further as a doctrine which must be accepted, *nolens volens*, by the man-in-the-street, who is ignorant.

Cercopithecus occurs chiefly in Africa; but also in Asia. "Tufts of longer hair may develop on the head; and in some species a definite beard is distinctive" (p. 122). The skin may be flesh coloured; all the bare surfaces of the hands and feet being covered by papillary ridges, the direction of which corresponds to those in man (p. 128) and "the dental formula is identical" (p. 129). The plantaris muscle is becoming fused with the tendo Achillis (p. 135); it is never as a separate muscle in gorilla; though this is common in chimpanzee (p. 136). The foot is being adapted for walking; many of the structures correspond with those of human foetuses; and, on the other hand, with the lower orders. The presence of a saphena artery may be noted; all the muscles and cartilages

of the human larynx are present. The left lung has three lobes, as in the right lung of man (p. 147). The interossei of the foot in gorilla generally group round the second digit as in man's foot (p. 186). Branches of the aorta are generally the same as in man (89 per cent.) ; from change in the thorax, by the erect posture (p. 187). A saphena sometimes occurs in man. "The brain of the gorilla is much smaller than that of man, but in regard to its conformation it may be described as providing a sketch-plan of the human organ" (pp. 187-8). It "is to be regarded as showing the amount and the surface-area requisite for the . . . *general* sensory impulses arising from various parts of the surface of an animal nearly equal to man in bulk" (p. 190).

"The motor area of the neo-pallium exhibits a progressive increase in extent, culminating in the human cerebrum. It is to be noted, moreover, that this increased area marks an increase in the variety and range of movements, rather than an accession of strength. And the inferiority of even so highly developed an ape as the gorilla in respect of skilled movements, such as those of the hands, confirms this assumption. Even more significant is the human superiority in the skilled movements of the lips, tongue, pharynx, and laryngeal structures subservient to articulate language . . . the increase in the association areas is predominant over all others" (p. 191). These, "regarded in the light of their history, their disposition, and their extent, provide the best material basis so far known for the physical assessment of psychical differences between the ape and the human being. . . . When compared with the other large anthropoid apes, the gorilla is seen to stand in a position nearer to man than these" (p. 193). "A contrast with the human larynx is distinct, and though the gorilla has advanced beyond the stage reached by the Cercopithecidae, yet the chimpanzee and not the gorilla makes the nearer approach to man in such details" (p. 201). "The line along which the lower limit of the pleura recedes is closely comparable to its human counterpart" (p. 203). "In gorilla . . . the vagina, uterus, Fallopian tubes, and ovaries resemble the human organs" (p. 209). "The spermatozoa of the gorilla . . . is of all the Primates the form most similar to man" (p. 210). "It is to the human cranium that we are led by the

successive stages assumed in the lower and higher quadrupedal monkeys " (p. 232).

" In some respects the *Simiidae* surpass even the *Homidae* in point of structural (morphological) specialization " (Duckworth, p. 238). As animals they have advantages; man has conquered by his mind. The following may be noted as connecting links: " The lower teeth of chimpanzee resemble gorilla, the upper ones those of man " (p. 280). The contrasts between man and the anthropoid apes are associated with functional differences, the human femur is adapted in form to the rotatory movement, like supination and pronation in the forearm—subservient to the prehensile movements of the lower limbs in the ape. The range of extension is greater in man, the human femur being specialized for weight-bearing. The object of the selection of orang-utan in these series has been to provide a comparison between terrestrial man and a distinctly arboreal ape: for the chimpanzee and gorilla are not so definitely confined to life among trees. The result is that in these African anthropoid apes the more purely arboreal characters are a little blurred; this very fact places them in a position nearer to man than is the orang-utan, despite a statement which has crept into books on this subject, and is based on too narrow an anatomical survey. The sacrum is long and narrow with a " simian " notch, due to the second vertebra being narrower than the first or third: this notch is seen in some sacra of Bushmen or Australian aborigines.

Dr. Duckworth contributed an article to the collection of *Essays on Some Theological Questions of the Day* by members of the University of Cambridge (1905), edited by Dr. Swete, Regius Professor of Divinity, in which he says: " When a biologist announces that he has succeeded in explaining any phenomena of life on physical principles, once supposed to apply only to lifeless objects, he is liable to incur the reproach of materialism . . . I wish to record my conviction that such an implication is absolutely incorrect and misleading " (p. 151). " When we study the series of changes thus presented by the phenomena of what is termed by physiologists metabolism, we shall realize the difficulty of fixing with accuracy the exact point of passage from the organic chemical compound to the living cell substance " (p. 171).

The association of this writer with a clique of theologians of anything but advanced ideas puts him into the position of being acknowledged as one whose verdict cannot be ignored, but must be accepted and made the best of, with such grace as is possible. He continues: "The term *recept* refers to the alteration in the mental state consequent upon the advent of a series of sense impressions, the observed sequels of which tend to show that an 'association' of previous perceptions has been elaborated, and is now recalled, in the form of an idea" (p. 160). "Concepts imply that not only has the *recept* idea been elaborated, but that it has been abstracted, that it has been translated into a symbol, and that a name has been given to it" (p. 160). "It is noteworthy that the most perfect forms of concept are attainable only in conjunction with the faculty of speech. . . . The net result of research is to show that the transition from instinctive to intelligent actions is an imperceptible one; and, as we shall have occasion to remark in another connexion, the force of habit or repetition may determine the transformation of what are initially intelligent into instinctive actions" (p. 161). "The psychical manifestations of man owe their origin to a process of evolution. This evolution is no less distinctly demonstrable than the corresponding process as regards the body of man. . . . The comparative study of the human races points in exactly the same directions. And here it must be remarked that as in morphology, so in psychology, the tendency to take our civilized neighbours as the standard of comparison is natural and insidious, but absolutely unjustifiable" (pp. 161-2). "The human races must be taken in their entirety and the range of variation they exhibit must be made the first subject of study. . . . The position of man on the average is considerably lowered by the results of investigation in reference to other races. . . . This becomes the more evident when observations are extended to other forms of life. . . . This statement applies not only to primitive human races to-day, but, so far as can be judged, to man as he existed in the infancy of the human race" (p. 162).

"The general result of the researches of the last forty years leads to a belief in the evolution of the various types of human intellect from lowlier forms of intellect such as those exhibited

in the other animals. . . . An analysis of the views held by Mivart, de Quatrefages, and Dr. Wallace is not a little astonishing. For it appears that the grounds upon which they severally base their rejection of evolution as the mode of development of the human intellect are in turn mutually exclusive" (pp. 162-3). "The human intellect is no more an interruption of the course of Nature than is the human body. . . . Man, judged by his structure, falls naturally into place among the primates. Among these animals man is distinguished by his adoption of the erect attitude in locomotion (with all the structural modifications connoted thereby), and by his great cerebral development. . . . It is only when we pass to observations on the psychical manifestations of the thinking, living man that we meet with the marvellous phenomena which assigns to mankind such an exceptional position" (p. 163).

"No other form of life has ever, so far as we can judge, been able to advance beyond the stage of forming recepts" (p. 164). "Those individuals which persist appear, so far as can be seen, to be better fitted to cope with their surroundings than those which do not persist. The selection is therefore a selection of the fittest" (p. 165). "The endeavour to render an account of the influences which have determined that evolution is far from satisfactory" (p. 169). "Selection when exercised within the society might appear different from selection exercised without. I have little doubt that selection is not abolished, but only masked and restrained" (p. 171). "Of the ultimate source of energy, of its nature, and even of its relation to matter we are at present ignorant. . . . To recognize the bounds thus fixed to our present knowledge, and the uncertainty beyond, is no confession of scientific failure. . . . such an admission is forced from us when we pass beyond the elementary stage of realizing that man is the product of an evolution which has taken place among the mammals" (p. 172). "My endeavour has been to point out the chief results of work within these limits; and to distinguish between what is sure and what is uncertain ground. . . . Although in structure man resembles the beasts that perish, he has so far surpassed them in intellectual development that, superficially at least, comparisons hardly seem to hold.

This statement is not invalidated by the admission that the human mind has been evolved from lowly beginnings: indeed, as I have already pointed out, we have only to watch the growth of the mind in the infant and child to see this evolution repeated before our eyes. But the final conclusion is that philosophers must base man's claims to a supreme position upon his mental and not on his physical characters. Secondly, the past history of man fails to reveal to scientists evidence of sudden degradation like that implied in the expression "fall'" (p. 173). "The general result is a rise in level" (p. 174).

That is to say that the history and origin of man and the earth, as ascertained by science, is quite different from the account of them in the Scriptures; the point then is if these "Sacred books" are so wholly mistaken and incorrect as to affairs of this world, are they to be trusted as to the next? When we come to "Theology," in Part Two of this work, and especially to "Revelations," as dealt with by the Ven. Archdeacon Charles, Canon of Westminster, we shall see that their position here also is open to much question and liable to serious error and grave misstatement. There are, I believe, few who will be astonished when they know the history of the Church, and how the most venerated beliefs have been put together by men who assumed their own infallibility in such matters, while they showed clearly that they were subject to mistakes of an extreme kind in the ordinary affairs of life, and even in common honesty and morality. For instance, it will be shown on the authority of Canons Driver, Sanday, Ottley, and Cooke, all Professors of Theology at Oxford—and their statements are borne out by professors at Cambridge, and in Scotland, France, and Germany—that the story of the Hebrew race and religion was faked and falsified, apparently with deliberation, by their priests and prophets in order to glorify the nation and bolster up a creed which had become antiquated and no longer commanded the assent of the people. Of course, this is defended, on the plea of "further Revelation"; but a message from heaven which needs amendment and "editing" does not appear satisfactory, or worthy of a *deus ex machinâ* of a divine intervention. It reminds one too much of the methods of Mahomet, with his "visions."

[With reference to the stage in human evolution at which our ancestors were denizens of the woods and trees, the author, in what formed the remainder of this chapter in the original text, quoted copiously from *Arboreal Man*, by F. Wood Jones, M.B., D.Sc. (London; Edwin Arnold). As, however, the publishers inform us that Professor Wood Jones has recently written a book which modifies in some degree the conclusions of the earlier work, and the evidence and arguments for human descent are fully set forth in other parts of the present volume, the quotations in question and our author's comments on them are omitted—(EDITOR).]

## CHAPTER IV

### ANTHROPOLOGY AND ETHNOLOGY

*Simia quam sinilis, turpissima bestia nobis*—ENNUS.

ANTHROPOLOGY tells the same tale; human artifacts have been discovered in the alluvial gravels at Chelles, near Paris, in conjunction with animals which are survivals of the Pliocene period, such as *Elephas Antiquus* and *Meridionalis*, *Hippopotamus Major*, *Rhinoceros Merckii*, *Trogontherium*, Cave-bear, and Cave-hyena. These implements are so rude that for long it was disputed whether they were really the work of men; but the occurrence of similar objects in many places has shown their undoubted connection with man, and an antiquity of the order of 500,000 years. From these crude beginnings there has been a steady, though slow, advance: all through the great glacial epoch of the Pleistocene deposits have been found which connect the human with the animal and vegetable remains of the age. It is not proposed here to enter into the debated question of the number of inter-glacial mitigations of the severe conditions of that period, except to show that these rest on and prove a gradual change, alike in the relics of man and of his surroundings. In a word, here also there is evolution and development in keeping with the foregoing facts. We start with the not unimportant point that wherever in the world are found monkey-like men, there also occur men-like monkeys. So striking is this coincidence that, in conjunction with other common characters, it has caused a theory that Africa was in some way connected in bygone ages with India and the islands of Polynesia.

Fifty years back, Huxley wrote:—"It is only quite in the later stages of development that the young human being presents marked differences from the young ape, while the latter departs as much from the dog in its development as the man does. Startling as the last assertion may appear to be, it is demonstrably true, and it alone appears to me sufficient

to place beyond all doubt the structural unity of man with the rest of the animal world, and more particularly and closely with the apes" (T. H. Huxley, *Man's Place in Nature*, p. 92).

So far from being controverted, this teaching has become the accepted basis of zoological science. No one now doubts, as Huxley then said, that "man's lower jaw, his molars, and his brain" put him into the order of "placental mammals." The pelvis of a gorilla is half-way between that of a man and a gibbon, the skull of a *Chrysanthrix* between their skulls, while that of baboons is a link downwards with the dog monkeys; their teeth are homologous, and by gradual changes become like those of insectivora or rodents. Thus we have a complete chain connecting man with dogs and the lower animals. "Be the differences between the hand and foot of man and those of the gorilla what they may—the differences between those of the gorilla and those of the lower apes are much greater" (*loc. cit.*, p. 127). "The orang's foot is still more aberrant; its very long toes and short tarsus, short great toe, short and raised heel, great obliquity of articulation with the leg, and absence of a long flexor-tendon to the great toe separating it far more widely from the foot of the gorilla than the latter is separated from that of man" (p. 128). "The progress of cerebral complexity is traceable through a complete series of steps from the lowest rodent or insectivora to man; and that complexity consists, chiefly, in the disproportionate development of the cerebral hemispheres and of the cerebellum, but especially of the former, in respect to the other parts of the brain" (p. 132). "In the elephant, the porpoise, the higher apes, and man, the cerebral surface appears a perfect labyrinth of tortuous foldings" (p. 133). "As if to demonstrate by a striking example, the impossibility of erecting any cerebral barrier between man and the apes, Nature has provided us, in the latter animals, with an almost complete series of gradations from brains little higher than that of a rodent, to brains little lower than that of Man" (p. 134). "It is most remarkable that as soon as all the principal sulci appear, the pattern according to which they are arranged is identical with that of the corresponding sulci of man" (p. 139). "I by no means believe that it was any original difference of cerebral quality

or quantity which caused that divergence between the human and the pithecid stirpes, which has ended in the present enormous gulf between them" (p. 142, *note*).

"Believing as I do, with Cuvier, that the possession of articulate speech is the grand distinctive character of man (whether it be absolutely peculiar to him or not), I find it very easy to comprehend that some equally inconspicuous structural difference may have been the primary cause of the immeasurable and practically infinite divergence of the Human from the Simian stirps" (p. 143, *note*). "If it is *language* that constitutes man, then our first progenitors were not real human beings, and did not become such till language was formed in virtue of the development of the brain and organs of speech" (Schleicher). "Primitive man, always a social being congregating in family groups, expressed his thoughts by speech and gesture. Man does not speak because he thinks, he speaks because the mouth and larynx communicate with the third frontal convolution of the brain" (André Lefévre, *Race and Language*). "Mr. Darwin's hypothesis is not, so far as I am aware, inconsistent with any known biological fact; on the contrary, if admitted, the facts of development, of comparative anatomy, of geographical distribution, and of palaeontology become connected together, and exhibit a meaning such as they never possessed before" (Huxley, p. 149). "I may add the expression of my belief that the attempt to draw a psychical distinction is equally futile, and that even the highest faculties of feeling and of intellect begin to germinate in lower forms of life" (p. 152).

As Huxley's conflict with Sir R. Owen was over the brain in man and monkeys, it is pleasing to adduce Owen's confession, which is as follows:—"Not being able to appreciate or conceive of the distinction between the psychical phenomena of a chimpanzee and of a Boschesman or of an Aztec with arrested brain-growth, as being of a nature so essential as to preclude a comparison, or as being other than a difference of degree, I cannot shut my eyes to the significance of that all-pervading similitude of structure—every tooth, every bone, strictly homologous—which makes the determination of the difference between *Homo* and *Pithecius* the anatomist's difficulty" (Owen, "On the Class Mammalia," *Journal of Linnæan Society*,

London, 1857). This quotation is apposite here, for in the next stage the question of arrested brain-growth is always coming up. Several skulls and other bones which present a distinctly simian and unhuman appearance have been discovered, yet science has never ventured to assert that they are evidence of the missing link of man with the beasts; for reply is ready to hand that they may be only "throw-backs," or examples of ill-development in a race which, as a rule, was much higher in type.

This occurrence and possibility of reversion is itself a proof of evolution; it is only one instance of the common case that organisms are liable to relapse into a condition usual in a previous phase of development. Still, the gap between the last stage and the succeeding one is so wide that any doubt must receive due consideration; for men were not the offspring of monkeys, and the common parent of the two may date back to very remote ages—beyond the extinct fauna of the Pliocene, in the Eocene perhaps, or the Miocene. During all this vast period there is no trace of man or his progenitors; or, to put it more correctly, none has been found; for the probable scene of his earliest appearance was Africa, or Polynesia, or a district between this and India, possibly now submerged, where investigation has been hardly attempted. Discovery in these, as in other matters, is never free from an element of happy chance, and when a country is well known and frequented the right man is much more apt to be on the right spot. The whole history of early anthropology is obscured and made dubious by the fact that the exact relations of the finds to one another are in many cases open to the question: "Were the human remains so mixed with those of animals that they cannot have come together by chance; are the layers of earth round them undisturbed and in the position in which they were first deposited so as to preclude the possibility of burial, or falling into a crack or chasm?"

When it is remembered that it often happens that they are come upon unexpectedly by workmen in the making of excavations, and, as the evidences cannot be preserved, the account of those who were then on the spot must be accepted and made the best of, it is no wonder that some doubt should have been felt about them, but their increasing number and

the care which has been taken to verify the conditions of each case, have now made it certain that we have veritable relics of the inter-glacial periods. Rude flint instruments have been found, obviously chipped into shape by human hands, at first in the roughest and readiest way, but by degrees with advancing skill; and these are found to bear relation to their position. As might be expected, the oldest in a district are the roughest, and they become more finished and more varied as their production appears to be more recent. In connection with these objects are skulls and other bones, and even if the view is maintained that for the most part they are those of ordinary men, some certainly are not, since they present the appearance of a low, degraded, semi-animal type, with distinctly ape-like characters. If it be urged that they are degraded, that abnormal cases very like them occur to-day in mentally defective and ill-developed individuals, this is in effect to admit exactly what is claimed—namely, that they are the evidence of undeveloped men, who were commoner then than now.

It is on the foregoing grounds that attempts have been made to distinguish races which, as a rule, had these simian attributes. The number of specimens is ordinarily too small to enable this to be done conclusively. The Heidelberg jaw stands alone as the most simian of human bones; the *Pithecanthropus* of Java has not established its claim to be Simian; the former of these is perhaps Pliocene. The classification of the Neanderthal-Spy race rests on a wider and firmer base. Of the Neanderthal skull, Huxley wrote that "it exhibits the lowest type of human cranium at present known, so far as it presents certain pithecid characters in a more exaggerated form than any other; but that, inasmuch as a complete series of gradations can be found among recent human skulls between it and the best-developed forms, there is no ground for separating its possessor specifically, still less generically, from *Homo sapiens*" (*loc. cit.*, p. 207, *note*). Since the discovery of the Neanderthal skull, many similar specimens have been unearthed, and a race that roamed along the river valleys and primeval forests of Central and Western Europe has been identified "as the fabricators of the *coup-de-poing* [a peculiar pointed flint weapon to be held in the hand]."<sup>1</sup> They

had a "cephalic index of 70-75; foreheads low and retreating (platycephalic); superciliary ridges very prominent; chin undeveloped, sloping backwards; alveolar prognathism strongly marked; stature small, about 5 ft. 3 in." Subjoined are references to, and extracts from *Palæolithic Man*, by Dr. Munro, Edinburgh, 1912, pp. 199-273. The earliest remains of this race are of the Moustérien age, but their weapons show a much greater antiquity: the Heidelberg jaw possibly belongs to one of these, if it is not really Pliocene. Of the so-called Magdalénien race, only a few skeletons have been found; they were supposed to be direct descendants of the Neanderthal-Spy race, their "well-filled skulls are an indication of the intellectual advancement that had taken place since their nomadic forefathers entered Europe" (p. 199). "They occupy the same district, enlarged by the retreat of the ice, and have left a wonderful series of manufactures and art products. From the Moustérien up to the Magdalénien there has been a steady evolution in arts, industries, and domestic economy, all leading to higher ideals and greater social comfort" (p. 201). "Judging from their osseous remains and a few sidelights gathered from collateral sources, these early troglodytes must have had a strong likeness to the anthropoid apes of the present day. Their later descendants, who became no mean artists, depict themselves as being covered over with hair, and *a fortiori*, the earlier races would also be hairy" (p. 202).

"The technique displayed in the manufacture of the *coup-de-poing* indicates great progress in manipulative skill since man first took to using external objects as ornaments, tools, and weapons of offence and defence" (p. 204). "Before the Moustérien epoch man was a mere animal with social organizations little above those of his simian ancestors. Now, for the first time, were laid the germs of human institutions founded on the lines of practical utility" (p. 205). "Clothing the person became a necessity to prevent its being frozen up. The disappearance of sub-tropical fruits made hunting their principal means of livelihood, and cooking the flesh of these animals became a recognized domestic duty" (p. 205). In other words, the struggle for existence became severe, and as usual produced rapid changes. "The *coup-de-poing* was

almost entirely discarded, and its place taken by a large flake, worked at first only on one side, known in recent times as *le grand éclat Levallois* . . . the inferior type in the Moustérien levels of Montières . . . the type of Saint Acheul at the base of the *ergeron*, and in certain of the plateau stations associated with *coups-de-poing*" (Commont, *Congrès Prehist. de France*, 1909, p. 205). "If eoliths are to be accepted as the deliberately shaped tools of earlier races there is no objection to, or improbability in, dating them to a very remote period, even to pre-glacial times" (p. 204).

"The Neanderthal-Spy race inhabited a large portion of Central Europe extending westwards to Britain and the Iberian peninsula; . . . These primitive inhabitants lived as isolated family groups, no doubt thinly spread over this wide area; but, after the severity of the climate forced them to seek covered protection, the localities in which caves and rock-shelters were most abundant would become permanent places of abode" (p. 206). In the Aurignacian epoch artistic efforts become common and attain a high degree of skill; colour is used, and in the Magdalénien age effects are produced recalling those of Egypt and Assyria. There is not indeed the solemnity or protection of execution shown by these, but there is an attempt at action and truth which they lack. Few to-day are able to rival these primitive artists in this respect, so that the products of their work are looked on as reliable evidence as to facts of their time—just like the Bayeux tapestry—for they are done by those who were in contact with the events, and who certainly would never have made men with their hands put on the wrong way, as in the palaces of Nineveh.

In Munro's book (Plate XXV and p. 233), there is a photograph of the original and a drawing by a modern hand, and the ancient draughtsman is much superior in technique; though his design was merely scratched on the hardened mud floor of a cavern. "Here we are in touch with modern times; long though the interval may be, no one can call these men semi-simian; they are the superiors or equals of modern savages at least in some respects; and, if that epithet is justified at all, we may say that in this glacial period of the Pleistocene man became men. The Java skull does not seem to merit this description; its brain capacity ranks considerably below

that of man, though higher than any of the anthropoid apes; it happens very closely to resemble that of a microcephalous idiot, and most of the authorities consulted look on it as human, or on the way to become so. With it was a thigh-bone almost certainly human, and some teeth very like those of an ape: this is perhaps what might be expected—that in attaining an erect posture the limbs of man would be changed, while his head would be less affected," (*loc. cit.*). "In the opinion of Manouvrier, Keith, and myself there might therefore exist a form the skull of which had still many simian peculiarities, whilst the femur was to be distinguished from the human bone in quite subordinate and mechanically unimportant characters only" (Dr. Dubois, *Scientific Trans., R. Soc., Dublin*, Vol. VI, 2nd Series, p. 10).

And possibly if more specimens were found outside the narrow limits of Europe so far examined, more such ambiguous cases might occur. "Fossil remains were not intentionally preserved for the purpose of instructing modern anthropologists—a fact sufficiently attested by their fragmentary condition, which makes it often hazardous to draw any inference from the remains. . . . Then again, the associated relics may be tantalizingly scanty, or altogether absent. How much more valuable would have been the information recorded in Dr. Buckland's careful descriptions of the Red Woman of Paviland had the complete skeleton been present. Here we have the ceremonial burial of a tall female adorned with ornaments . . . which are known to have been common in Palæolithic times, and actually associated with remains of the mammoth, rhinoceros, bear, hyena, etc. Had the skull been forthcoming to show that this woman belonged to the race of Cro-Magnon—a fact suggested by the exceptionally large size of the skeleton—there would be no reasonable doubt that the Paviland interment would be a precise parallel to those of the caves of Grimaldi in Italy" (Munro, *Palæolithic Man*, pp. 196-7). [If I am not mistaken, the body was reburied in consequence of a feeling of the authorities as to Christian interment.—  
A U T H O R.]

With these conclusions, Prof. Geikie, F.R.S., in the main agrees; in his "Munro Lectures" (1913), published, as *The Antiquity of Man in Europe*, in 1914, it is clearly shown that

man existed in the Pleistocene period, and must have originated long before then. In his own words: "As the data multiply it becomes more and more evident that the early history of our race is intimately connected with that of the Ice Age" (p. ix). "The researches of anthropologists and archæologists have thrown a flood of light upon the question, and left us in no doubt that the advent of man must be assigned to a very remote period" (p. i). "The result of these investigations has been to confirm the view that the Chellean culture-stage dates back to the second Inter-glacial epoch . . . while the geological horizons of the later culture-stages have also been more or less clearly defined" (p. x). "Judging from what is known of the operations of Nature in our own day—reasoning in short from the present to the past [the geologist] is convinced that the history of the human race cannot be comprised within a few thousand years. Impressed by the long succession of geological changes of which man has been a witness—the notable modifications of the surface brought about by denudation . . . the revolutions of faunas and floras—the geologist is quite convinced of the great antiquity of man, even although he cannot give the precise date of his apparition" (p. 3). "The earliest human relics and remains, the authenticity of which is beyond dispute, belong to that stage of geological history known as the Pleistocene period" (pp. 3-4). "[Later] Mr. J. Reid Moir recorded the occurrence of the Palæolithic types of human artifacts in the Pliocene of England. Should this discovery be fully confirmed, our estimates of the antiquity of man must be greatly increased" (p. 5).

"Now, a widespread and decided change of climate does not take place suddenly; a revolution of the kind affecting a whole continent can only be gradually accomplished" (p. 33). "Such revolutions necessarily imply the lapse of a very long time, and, as prehistoric man was certainly a witness of them, the great antiquity of our race must be admitted. From the evidence I have adduced we cannot, it is true, arrive at any definite conclusion as to the absolute length of the Pleistocene period. . . . All we can be sure of is its prolonged duration" (p. 35). "The general simplicity and rudeness of its artifacts are not the most distinguishing features of the Palæolithic

Age. As we shall see presently, the relics of that age are most frequently met with in positions that plainly argue for them a much greater antiquity than can be assigned to the oldest relics of Neolithic times" (p. 30).

"Each cave, no doubt, contains the record of some portion of Pleistocene times, but no individual cave furnishes a complete consecutive history. Fortunately, however, the evidence of the caves is supplemented and confirmed by that of ancient fluviatile and other accumulations" (pp. 41-2). "Some archæologists recognize two earlier stages than the Chellean—namely, the 'Mesvinian' and the 'Strepyan.' The former of these is represented by simple flakes of flint, evidently man's handiwork, and is further characterized by the absence of the *coup-de-poing*, or hand-axe. The 'Strepyan,' on the other hand, is marked by the presence not only of simple flakes, but of primitive forms of the Chellean *coup-de-poing*. By other archæologists the Mesvinian and the Strepyan are not ranked as independent stages, but included in the Chellean, as 'early Chellean'" (p. 43).

THE AZILIAN STAGE: "Its chief interest arises from the fact that it helps to bridge over the gap which in many places separates the Palæolithic from the Neolithic age. . . . It must not be supposed that the several archæological stages represent well-defined periods of time. . . . Neither do they necessarily represent a succession of different races. The human remains which now and again have been met with show, indeed, that one particular stage, the Mousterian, was characterized throughout by the presence of at least one special type of man" (p. 45). "Of Aurignacian man several skeletons have been preserved. . . . Another race of Aurignacian age is represented by two skeletons found in a cave near Mentone, which are described as being somewhat negroid in character" (p. 47). At Spy, in Belgium, "above the ossiferous deposits comes a mass of yellow clay and angular fragments of limestones. Relics and remains of Neolithic men appear at and near the surface of this yellow clay, but they never occur underneath it. The stony yellow clay thus takes its place in the series between the deposits of the Old Stone period and those which mark the later or New Stone period. It is obvious that here, as in many other caves of North-west Europe, a

break or hiatus separates the Neolithic from the Palæolithic age" (p. 66). "Belgian geologists, therefore, have recognized two stages in the Palæolithic period, an early or Mammoth period, and a later or Reindeer period; which correspond to the Mousterian and Magdalenian stages" (p. 66). When it comes to reducing the chronology of past ages to figures, geologists either decline to make any estimate, or the results of their calculations may differ as 1 to 10 (Carveth Read, *Origin of Man*, p. 66).

SCHWEIZERSBILD—Prof. Geikie continues: "From the caves of Dordogne and Perigord, and those occurring in or near the Pyrenees, . . . French archæologists have been able to construct a succession of culture stages which is found to harmonize in every essential with the results of cave exploration in other lands. The establishment of such sequences is of special importance to the geologist for the invaluable aid they afford in his attempts to unravel the complicated history of Pleistocene times" (pp. 67-8). "Dr. Nüesch has made a rough estimate of the time required for the accumulation of the several deposits met with in this most interesting rock-shelter [at Schweizersbild]. . . . Too much reliance must not be placed on these estimates, and Dr. Nüesch mentions several considerations which might reduce the period to something like 20,000 years or less. But they show at least that many thousand years have elapsed since the first appearance of man at Schweizersbild" (pp. 97-8). "At the Schweizersbild probably no long interval occurred between the departure of Palæolithic and the advent of Neolithic man. It is even quite possible that the latter arrived before the last of the reindeer hunters had vanished from Switzerland. From evidence supplied by certain Pyrenean caves, a similar inference has been drawn. But, even if it should afterwards be ascertained beyond any doubt that Palæolithic and Neolithic man came into contact here and there, it would not follow that this was general throughout Europe. We now know that Palæolithic man retreated from the low grounds of our Continent along with the gradually retiring sub-Arctic steppe fauna, and that Neolithic man came with the succeeding forest fauna. . . . Neolithic man may have been in full occupation of Southern Europe while Palæolithic man was still hunting the reindeer in France and

" It cannot be doubted that during Pleistocene times there was a gradual progression of our race, from an age when only very simple and rudely fashioned stone implements were used, to a time when finely-formed artifacts of bone and horn came to be manufactured by folk possessed of notable artistic talents " (p. 100). " It is quite possible that Palæolithic man and his Neolithic successor may have come into contact in Southern Europe—or, as some suppose, the two may be the same race. On the other hand, it has been suggested that Neolithic man may have been evolved in some extra-European region under a genial climate, and only entered our Continent when the conditions suited his needs. Whether he absorbed or killed out the earlier occupants of the land, or whether they had previously emigrated with the gradually retreating northern fauna, we cannot tell, and may never be able to discover " (p. 229). [Probably he emigrated under pressure of a superior organization.—AUTHOR.]

" It has now been definitely established that during Pleistocene times the race advanced from a very primitive stage, when man used only the simplest and most rudely fashioned flint implements, to a stage when finely formed artifacts of stone, bone, horn, and ivory came to be manufactured by a notably artistic folk " (p. 102). " It is not too much to say that the modification of surface effected since the beginning of the New Stone Age is too inconsiderable to be noticed, when one thinks of the great changes brought about during the preceding Palæolithic period " (p. 115).

" Nothing is more difficult, as Lyell long ago recognized, than to settle the chronology of fluviatile deposits. . . . It is enough, however, for our present purpose to realize the fact that the oldest alluvial deposits are characterized by the presence of the southern and temperate group, while the accompanying human relics are among the most primitive recognized by archæologists. The low level gravels, on the other hand, which must be many thousands of years younger than those of the higher level, were unquestionably accumulated under very cold conditions " (pp. 119–20). " With this picture of arctic conditions we reach the end of the Pleistocene story, so far as that is revealed by the old alluvia of the Thames. . . . The excavation of the valley . . . had been practically completed long before Neolithic man appeared upon the

scene" (p. 121). "At various epochs of the Pleistocene period Palæolithic man might have walked dry-shod from Africa into Europe, and across what are now the English Channel and North Sea into Britain" (p. 129). "The history of the Ice Age is to a large extent the history of the Pleistocene period which witnessed the apparition of Palæolithic man in Europe" (p. 163). "The loess throughout wide tracts has all the characteristics of a wind-blown formation, having yielded . . . many relics of Palæolithic man and plentiful remains of the steppe fauna. . . . But whether it was distributed entirely by northerly winds is doubtful. . . . Under existing conditions foehns descend from the snow-covered Alps, and it is not unreasonable to infer that similar dry but more powerful winds may have swept down from the Alps and other snow-clad mountains during the slow retreat of the great glaciers" (p. 217). "We know that the so-called Ice Age was not one continuous period of intense cold, but was again and again interrupted by long spells of more genial conditions. The Pleistocene period was characterized above all by these climatic oscillations. It consisted, in short, of a cycle or succession of glacial and inter-glacial epochs" (p. 219). "Geologists who had not themselves seen such succession of glacial and inter-glacial beds were for some time sceptical as to the interpretation put upon them by their discoverers. Many were the ingenious attempts to explain them away" (p. 220). "The changes from glacial to inter-glacial conditions and back again to glacial necessarily imply a long lapse of time. And this conclusion is still further confirmed by the considerable amount of valley erosion that was effected by the rivers of inter-glacial times, some of them during such a stage having cut their way down through hard rocks to a depth of eighty feet or even of one hundred feet" (p. 241).

**THE HEIDELBERG JAW.** "Dr. Schötensack describes the mandible as being very massive and without chin projection—quite ape-like, in fact—while the teeth, he says, are without doubt human. The geological and palæontological evidence, although not quite decisive, seems to favour the reference of this ancient human type to the First Inter-glacial or Norfolkian stage" (p. 251).

**THE SECOND INTER-GLACIAL EPOCH.** "It was at the climax

of this genial inter-glacial epoch that the Chellean culture-stage prevailed. The race that now occupied middle and southern Europe, and many wide regions in Asia and Africa, are represented by the most primitive of Palæolithic artifacts. These rudely fashioned stone implements seldom occur in caves" (p. 254). "We cannot but be astonished, therefore, when we realize how greatly the configuration of the land became modified during the occupation of our Continent by Chellean man. The whole surface was lowered—in some places by not less than fifty or one hundred feet—while the excavation of many river valleys was far advanced, and in some cases well-nigh completed in Chellean times" (p. 257). "Its prolonged duration is further shown by profound modifications brought about during the epoch by the slow operation of denudation. This latter is the kind of evidence which appeals most strongly to the geologist, for its meaning cannot be misunderstood" (p. 256). "It must not be forgotten, however, that the Palæolithic 'floors' described by Mr. Worthington Smith as occurring in the high-level river-drifts are likewise of Moustérian age, and are nevertheless characterized by the presence of a well-marked temperate flora. It would thus appear that during the formation of the older river drifts of the Thames district several changes of climate took place. The Chellean stage we should assign to the Second Inter-glacial epoch and the Acheulean to the close of that epoch; while the later gravels with Moustérian artifacts represent the two succeeding epochs—namely, the Third Glacial and the following Inter-glacial" (p. 264).

"Much discussion has arisen as to the cause of this apparently sudden disappearance of the Magdalenian hunters. Some have held and many still hold . . . that a distinct hiatus separates Palæolithic from Neolithic times. Others again believe that no hiatus exists. They point to certain cave accumulations which they think yield evidence of a transition stage. It is an interesting question, which in the present stage of our knowledge cannot be definitely solved" (p. 269). "The very earliest Neolithic relics are associated with the remains of a forest and field mammalian fauna, which we recognize as being essentially the same as that now occupying Europe. The last representatives of the Palæolithic period, on the other

hand, were the reindeer hunters of Magdalenian times, who had as their congeners the tundra and steppe groups" (pp. 293-4). "It goes without saying that profound changes of climate do not take place in the twinkling of an eye. The passage from the steppe conditions of late Magdalenian times to the temperate forest climate which awaited the arrival of Neolithic man implies most probably a lapse of several thousand years. Are there any geological records of the human race having lived in Europe during that long interval? Up till a few years ago that question could only be answered in the negative" (p. 294). "M. Piette's researches demonstrated the occurrence above these Magdalenian beds of younger deposits, representing a culture-stage hitherto unrecognized. . . . The lower layer of these transition stages was termed 'Azilian' by Piette" (p. 295). "The so-called 'Arisian' stage is in its turn overlaid by deposits containing relics of later Neolithic, Bronze, Iron, and Romano-Gallic periods. . . . From the evidence adduced by Piette we can have no hesitation in assigning his Azilian either to the close of the Palæolithic or to the dawn of the Neolithic Age" (p. 297). "It must be remembered that the Azilian is separated from the Magdalenian beds below by four feet of river alluvia. This need not indicate a long interval, but it certainly implies a 'break' of some kind and not a gradual transition" (p. 315, *note* 14). "It may quite well be that Neolithic man appeared in Southern Europe before Palæolithic man had vanished from the Pyrenean region and the two races may possibly have there come in contact. But such evidence as we have goes to show that the older race had departed from Central and North-west Europe long before the advent of Neolithic man in these latitudes. The 'hiatus' recognized by geologists more than thirty years ago has not been bridged over yet" (pp. 315-16).

"When we reflect on the many geographical changes that man has witnessed—the submergence and re-elevation of enormous tracts—the erosion of valleys and general lowering of the surface by denudation; when we consider that he has lived through a succession of stupendous climatic revolutions; that he has seen widely contrasted floras and faunas alternately occupying our Continent—tundras, steppes, and great forests succeeding each other again and again—we must feel

convinced that the few thousand years that have elapsed since the downfall of Babylonian, Assyrian, and Egyptian empires are as nothing compared with the long eons that separate the earliest times of history from the apparition of Palæolithic man in Europe" (p. 300). "On various grounds, the Würm glaciation is conjectured by Penck to have reached its maximum about 20,000 years ago. The evidence goes to show that the immediately preceding Riss-Würm inter-glacial epoch was not less than three times as long as the post-Würmian epoch; while the Mindel-Riss Inter-glacial stage was twelve times longer than that epoch. Thus we have 20,000 years for the duration of post-Würmian times, 60,000 years for the Third or Riss-Würm Inter-glacial epoch, and 240,000 years for the Second or Mindel-Riss Inter-glacial epoch" (p. 301). "Quite recently Prof. Penck has expressed the opinion that the Glacial Period with its climatic changes may have extended over half a million to a million years, and as the Chellean stage dates back to at least the middle of the period, this would give somewhere between 250,000 and 500,000 years for the antiquity of man in Europe. But if, as recent discoveries would seem to indicate, man was an occupant of our Continent during the First Inter-glacial epoch, if not in still earlier times, we may be compelled greatly to increase our estimate of his antiquity" (p. 303).

PALÆOLITHIC MAN. "He was very human: doubtless at the outset of his career a bestially selfish and merciless savage, but gradually developing finer traits with the passing of the ages. It is not without emotion that we look at the beautiful art-work of the Magdalenian reindeer-hunter. And when we remember the conditions under which he lived . . . we may well be astonished at his attainments, as an engraver, a sculptor, and an animal painter" (p. 304). "We do not know for certain whether or not the Cro-Magnons came into touch with the low-browed, slow-footed Neanderthals. The languages of the two races would be quite different" (p. 65) (D. A. Mackenzie, *Footprints of Early Man*; Blackie & Son; 1927).

"That the human species, as we now see it, with its several races, Mongolian, Negro, Mediterranean, represents a Family of the Primates is generally agreed . . . [but], even A. R.

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Wallace thought that the descent of the *Hominidæ* could not be explained by natural causes; yet we cannot regard our existence as a sort of miracle" (Carveth Read, *The Origin of Man*, 2nd edition, p. 1). "In the Miocene, Europe, Asia, and Africa became united. These physiographic changes may have affected climate . . . but from the Oligocene onwards there was a gradual fall of temperature, slow at first, but ending . . . in the cataclysms of the Glacial period" (p. 11). "Anthropoids are first met with in the Miocene and in Europe: *Pliopithecus*, allied to the gibbons, in the Lower; and *Dryopithecus*, related to the chimpanzee, in the Middle Miocene" (p. 14). The differentiation of these genera must, then, have happened earlier, and therefore that of the human stock, so that this event cannot be put later than some time in the Miocene. "Somewhere, then, perhaps in Central Asia, and perhaps in the latter part of the Oligocene Period, I suppose that an anthropoid, originally for the most part frugivorous, became a hunter for animal food" (p. 18). "The less our ancestor trusted to trees the better for him if he was to fulfil his destiny. . . . The specialization of the legs and feet as it proceeded made possible the specialization of the hands" (p. 19). "The head was less liable to injury when no longer used as the chief organ in combat" (p. 21).

"In that life, too, the defilement of blood made fur inconvenient to animals not apt to cleanse themselves" (p. 25). "There were then no chiefs: the hunt-leader of pack or clan had no authority but his personal prowess, no traditions of ancestry or religion, nor probably the prestige of magic" (p. 23). "A tribe on the Upper Amazon is reported to depilate to distinguish themselves from the monkeys, and the wish to be superior to other animals led a tribe in Queensland to pretend that they, unlike kangaroos, etc., have no fathers according to the flesh" (p. 25). "A party of gorillas is generally limited to the family; and the condition of these apes supplies the only datum from which to judge of the condition of our own ancestor before the differentiation. Man, however, is everywhere, with a few doubtful exceptions—probably degenerate—both social and co-operative" (p. 31). "Man is in character more like a dog or a wolf than he is like any other animal. The society thus formed has in its develop-

ment done more than anything else to promote human life. . . . Some development of the rudiments of speech may be confidently traced to social co-operation" (p. 32). Man "must have discovered the best materials—wood, or stone, or bone—for making weapons. . . . He must have fixed in his mind this series: game, weapons, the making of them, materials where found; and must have learned to attend to the items of the series in the necessary order" (p. 34). "Add to these considerations the development of gesture and rudiments of speech, exacting intelligence for their acquisition and increasing intelligence by their attainment, and the superiority of the lowest savage to an anthropoid is sufficiently explained" (p. 35). "It is impossible to say when the art of making fire was discovered; but it was certainly known to the Mousterian culture—say 50,000 years ago: probably very much earlier" (p. 37). "As everywhere else in the animal kingdom, mind and body constitute one organism, it is reasonable to consider whether the differentiation of the mind of man may not be understood to have taken place under the same conditions as those which determined the transformation of his body" (p. 45). "Whilst none of the great anthropoids has advanced socially beyond family life, man is everywhere (with few and doubtful exceptions) gregarious" (p. 47). "Gregariousness exists widely in the animal kingdom without any utility in attack or defence, but merely for convenience of breeding, or for the advantage of signalling the approach of danger, from any direction, to the whole flock" (p. 49).

"Galton remarks how readily the proceedings of man and dog 'are intelligible to one another. Every whine or bark of the dog, each of its fawning, savage, or timorous movements is the exact counterpart of what would have been the man's behaviour, had he felt similar emotions'" (p. 54). "Most of the higher mammalia can read the state of mind of others, though of widely different kinds, in their expression and behaviour; and many are liable to have their actions immediately affected by signs of the emotional impulses of others, especially of fear" (p. 57). "In a pack of hounds it is not every dog that by giving tongue can obtain a following; some are trusted, and others disregarded" (p. 58). "A pack of wolves relies not merely upon running down its prey, but resorts to

various stratagems to secure it. . . . Failure to co-operate effectually is said to be punished with death. The progenitors of man, beginning with more brains than a wolf, may be supposed soon to have discovered such arts and to have improved upon them" (p. 59). "As to language in the most general sense, as the communication of emotions and ideas by vocal sounds, the rudiments of it are widespread in animal life. A sort of dog-language is recognized, and monkeys seem to have a still larger vocabulary" (p. 71). "All savages live by custom; gregarious animals have their customs" (p. 73). "The utility of keeping the peace within the tribe, no doubt, led to the growth of customs concerning property, and to their protection by the social sanction, and later by the taboo" (p. 75).

"No doubt the affections of family continued from the anthropoid condition. . . . Friendliness and the disposition to mutual aid must be so useful to a hunting-pack that is not merely seasonal but permanent . . . that we may suppose natural selection to have favoured the growth of effective sympathy. . . . The 'slavish virtues' of charity, humility, long-suffering may arise amongst those who are free from rivalry because they have no hope of aggrandisement in wealth or honour, and who have indeed suffered long" (pp. 81-2). "The second of the four conditions assigned by Darwin as determining the growth of the moral sense—reflective conflict between social instinct and the memory of action opposed to it—accounts more especially for 'remorse of conscience'; and the third condition, the pressure of public opinion, explains that tone of 'authority' attaching to conscience on which Bishop Butler laid so much stress. The chief addition which it seems necessary to make to the above considerations as to the growth of the moral sense consists in taking account of the influence of custom, the original foundation of both morals and law. . . . All social animals have their customs. . . . If the family maintained itself within the pack it must have been protected by custom. Under custom everyone in the same circumstances does the same thing" (pp. 83-4). "Public opinion becomes the paramount guide of action not in relation to merely occasional lapses, but as the sanction of custom. . . . In many backward societies no account is taken of intention

in awarding disapprobation or punishment. . . . But no doubt in the early stages of our development it was far more important that there should be definite customs known to everyone (though some of them may have been foolish enough) than that individuals should be left to their own private reflections upon duty" (p. 85) (cp. Old Testament, *passim*).

"How early the moral sense began to form itself in our stock cannot be estimated because it must have been a very gradual process. Probably the rudiments of it appeared in the family life of the ape even before our differentiation . . . before there was much development of mind (for dogs know what theft is) and under pressure of a public opinion which managed to express itself without articulate language" (pp. 85-6). "'Good' is a relative idea. 'The good are good warriors and hunters,' said a Pawnee chief, whereupon the author who mentions the saying remarks that this would also be the opinion of a wolf if he could express it" (p. 86). "After the introduction of agriculture . . . most garden work, probably, was done by women; but in its progress it fell extensively into the hands of men; and then advantage accrued to those tribes that were capable of steady industry and prudence. . . . The more neighbourly and co-operative tended to predominate" (p. 86). "Increasing capacity of forming ideas of remote ends and of co-ordinating various activities in their pursuit implies the inhibition of many aggressive or distracting impulses" (p. 87).

"Each foreseen consequence, good or evil, excites some impulse either reinforcing or inhibiting the action. Reflections, too, upon all the circumstances of our lot have done much to ameliorate it. The 'conditions of gregariousness' have been expounded by the more penetrating and comprehensive minds, prophets, poets, and philosophers, and some disciples have understood them, and have persuaded many to believe. Nor have such luminaries arisen only in the later phases of culture" (p. 87). "Some one man, probably, first saw what injustice is often disguised under the specious equality of the *lex talionis*. . . . Individuals with the gifts of insight and expression to summarize the experience of a whole tribe in memorable words, rude forerunners of the poets, philosophers, and prophets" (p. 88). "Societies are now everywhere held

together by imaginations concerning occult powers. . . . At first by knowledge, strategy, co-operation, and persistence of will, later by devising weapons and snares, evolving language, and discovering the ways of producing and utilizing fire, man found means of entirely changing the conditions of his life. Piltdown man saw, heard, felt, thought, and dreamed much as we do" (p. 89). "As civilization advances, and the smaller tribal companies of earlier periods united in the larger social communities of later days, the individual's destiny becomes more firmly bound up with that of the larger whole. Those qualities tending to the advantage of the community, and so secondarily to that of the individual, are taught and practised from generation to generation" (J. Y. Simpson, *The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature*, p. 272). "Morality evolved, being shaped by human beings even yet in process of acquiring freedom of will and attaining individuality. We have learned a very great deal about the development of morality. There is no such thing as goodness in itself; but there is good thinking, good living, and good serving" (p. 273). "Accordingly, the origin of customs presents no difficulty; no tribe will ever be found without rudiments of morality: therefore morality is more distinctive of man than his religious capacity. Conceivably, certain of the elements that compose the religious attitude may be traced in a modified degree to the lower creation, particularly in such mammalian forms as have been closely associated with man" (p. 276). "Even when we have traced in actual detail the successive stages in the evolution of morality, that would not invalidate the fact, which after all is the only important one, of our possession of such a nature" (p. 277). "That it should be initially, in great part, often debasing presents no difficulty to those who believe in the ascent of man from an animal stock" (p. 279). "As with every character, physical or spiritual, the real problem is not that of survival, but of arrival" (p. 275). "Now when we return to the lowest type of savages, they are found to possess, in comparison with apes, a considerable fecundity of ideas—including a strange collection of beliefs about magic and animism, which entirely misrepresent the course of Nature and the effective population of the world. As to animism (belief in the activity of spirits), they may be said to assume that whatever

inexplicable event is not put down to magic must be due to the intervention of ghosts or spirits" (Read, p. 90). "We must suppose that the commonsense of primitive man or his forerunners increased age by age, as he became more and more perfectly adapted to the hunting life, and that at some stage his imagination began to falsify the relations of things and the powers of Nature. Within the narrow range of his daily life he has a practical sense of cause and effect, as in making tools and weapons, in lighting a fire, in hunting and fishing; but he has no analytic knowledge of the relations involved, and therefore cannot distinguish between causation and coincidence" (p. 91). The world becomes full of invisible agencies that strike like spears, pierce like thorns, poison and heal like certain plants; and (amongst them) certain words and sentences that control events.

"Savages in many cases believe that dreams are real objective experiences, and if in a dream they see a dead man, they assume that he has really come to visit them. Ghosts are at first merely persons met and recognized under peculiar circumstances . . . in spite of their being dead. . . . We can only conjecture the stages through which what at first seemed a natural fact, though strange and unintelligible, the reappearance of the dead, became . . . another source of constant fear and anxiety, at first influencing funeral ceremonies, and later giving rise to rites of sacrifice and propitiation or exorcism and finally, of worship. . . . These two groups of superstition, Magic and Animism, become the dominant beliefs of savage life in relation to all affairs that are not comprehended in commonsense" (p. 92). They are "what Mr. Canning Schiller calls 'half-beliefs.' . . . They are merely adscititious to commonsense actions, his magical precautions increase his confidence without weakening endeavour" (p. 93).

"Belief in imaginary evils waiting upon secret sins exerts, whilst supported by social unanimity, a control upon all kinds of behaviour: it is the beginning of the 'religious sanction.' . . . For a long time there was no special profession of wizard or priest, with whose appearance most of the evil of magic and animism originates" (p. 94). "Adoption of even a primitive agricultural or pastoral life may have made hunting a secondary interest . . . and if society was to be saved from anarchy,

some new form of control must establish itself for the preservation of tradition and custom. . . . The rule of wizards, who are generally old men credited with mysterious powers that make the boldest clansman quail . . . As the belief in ghosts more and more prevails, and ancestral ghosts are worshipped, and ghosts of heroes or chiefs become veritable gods . . . It seems probable that the growth of superstition, or of some superstitions, may have been actually promoted by their utility" (p. 95). "The growth of this tangle of delusions was inevitable, even though they had all been useless or even injurious, as some of them . . . were. However useful superstition may be in promoting tribal cohesion, it may in other ways often be excessive, amounting to a sort of tribal insanity and tending to destruction. . . . That we have owed so much to delusions is a hateful thing to acknowledge" (p. 96).

"Commonsense is always limited to present conditions; it is nourished upon that which happens day by day; and its judgment depends upon the regularity of that sort of experience. . . . And I think that natural selection must have favoured the survival of tribes whose members acquired an innate disposition to fall in with this sort of imaginary control. . . . Imaginations (most of them utterly false) have been an indispensable factor in promoting 'progress'; but they themselves have been modified. . . . Thus have emerged from the lower animism the great religions in which the gods have been moralized and have become the guardians of morals. . . . History was recorded and the sciences were established which were necessary to their worship (as of the sun); . . . and the perfecting of ritual" (pp. 96-7). "Security diminishes the anxiety that was the great occasion of superstitions, and discourages the admission of that disorder in Nature which superstitions imply . . . for most people a sufficient reason for observing the current morality, this social order greatly lessens the need of supernatural sanctions" (p. 98).

We may take it, then, that the Chellean, Acheulean, Moustérien, Aurignacien, Solutrean, and Magdalenian stages indicate not only an advance in the civilization, but also a development of men. From this point on evolution is clear. There may be gaps in our knowledge, lacunæ in the evidence, but no doubt that it was really continuous somewhere. Of

the post-glacial deposits, that of Schweizersbild is famous. Here a succession of animals shows a change from arctic to moderate climate, and with them a series of human products was found, linking glacial man with the Bronze Age. M. Mortillet has added to the above a period, the "Tourassien," connecting them with the Neolithic stage, in which men have become pastoral and agricultural, had learnt pottery and the textile arts, and ground their stone instruments to a polished surface; oxen, sheep, goats, pigs, dogs, and horses were domesticated, and bows, daggers, and other implements invented. In the caves of Poland a complete sequence has been discovered from a flint weapon in the same block of stalagmite with the vertebra of a cave-bear to things similar to those used and made by savages to-day. "Altogether it is, in my opinion, impossible to gainsay the general conclusion that the continuity of human occupancy of these caves has been demonstrated, without any interval of time which could be regarded as a *hiatus*" (Munro, *loc. cit.*, p. 259). Of Schweizersbild he says: "It would appear as if they had gradually adapted themselves to the changes in the environment, passing insensibly from a climate of sub-arctic severity, with its special flora and fauna, to that of modern times" (*Palæolithic Man*, p. 274). "The remains of the lake-dwellings indicate different stages of civilization in the same sites. Around some of the piles, stone, bronze, and also iron articles occur together, showing that settlements founded in the early Neolithic Age passed without apparent break to the metal ages. Like evidence has been obtained from the pile-dwelling in the valley of the Po, although these did not survive beyond the age of bronze. Thus the dwelling opposite Peschiera, on the Lago di Garda, was founded in the Neolithic Age, and was in continuous occupation through the age of copper to the age of bronze. . . . The lake-dwellings were either inhabited from their foundation to their disappearance by the same race . . . or they were invaded by a superior race armed with bronze weapons: a race which conquered the lake-dwellers, drove them into the wilds, or perhaps exterminated them" (E. Clodd, *The Story of Primitive Man*, pp. 155-6).

"Even at this early stage there were two well-defined races

apparently living in harmony with each other—one dolichocephalic and the other brachycephalic. The former, who were greatly in excess of the latter in the western regions of Europe, appear to have been indigenous to the country, being probably the direct descendants of the Palæolithic people, who, so far as can be judged from the most trustworthy anthropological researches, were all dolichocephalic. The latter, or brachycephals, on their first appearance in Europe were not more civilized than the former, but a constant stream of immigrants was kept up, and ultimately introduced improved methods in the cultivation of grain and in the rearing of domestic animals" (Munro, *Palæolithic Man*, p. 286). "Contemporary with them, but outside the areas of their hunting-grounds, these other communities were developing new resources for the supply of the necessities of life among the increasing products of a more ameliorated climate. It is quite possible that certain districts of Europe which were formerly inhabited by Palæolithic hunters ceased, for some reason or other, to be places of resort to man" (*loc. cit.*, p. 286). "The art of correctly interpreting such waifs and strays of the culture and civilization of past humanity which survive to our time is, under the most favourable conditions, surrounded by many inherent difficulties. Nor can it be truly said that its votaries are yet completely emancipated from the influence of the untutored tradition, superstition, and dilettantism which, some half a century ago, vitiating antiquarian pursuits" (Munro, *Prehistoric Archaeology*, p. 291).

The excavations which have been recently made in Palestine, Syria, and Asia Minor have shown, by superimposed remains, a complete series from the Stone Age down to historic times. Whether this implies one continuous race of people, and whether the Stone Age there coincides with the same age in Europe, are questions on which prejudice is very potent. History dates back in these districts beyond other parts of the world; but the tenet that the Bible is the "Word of God" has engendered a notion that it must therefore be precise, and efforts which can only be described as gymnastic have been made to bridge over its lacunæ, omissions, and obscurities. Inspiration, interpreted in a not very scientific way by Archbishop Usher some two or three centuries back, has placed

narrow limits on the historic horizon of the orthodox. The claim of Egypt and Assyria to a duration far longer than any that could be deduced by such means was dismissed with scant reason. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the gap was not well filled up by science.

" Of the eleven different stocks enumerated, seven have been known to us for less than 400 years; and of these seven not one possessed a fragment of written history at the time it came into contact with European civilization. The other four, the Negroes, Mongolians, Xanthochrōi, and Melanochrōi, have always existed in some of the localities in which they are now found, nor do the negroes ever seem to have voluntarily travelled beyond the limits of their present area. But ancient history is in a great measure the record of the mutual encroachments of the other three stocks. On the whole, however, it is wonderful how little change has been effected by these mutual invasions and intermixtures. As at the present time, so at the dawn of history, the Melanochrōi fringed the Atlantic and the Mediterranean; the Xanthochrōi occupied most of Central and Eastern Europe, and much of Western and Central Asia; while Mongolians held the extreme east of the Old World. So far as history teaches us, the populations of Europe, Asia, and Africa were, twenty centuries ago, just what they are now, in their broad features and general distribution " (T. H. Huxley, *Man's Place in Nature*, pp. 237-8). This was written seventy years ago, but was republished within the last thirty-five with this alteration only, that to the last sentence is added, as a note, " We may now safely say thirty or forty, in place of twenty."

" Fully 10,000 years are now required for the strictly historic period in Egypt and Mesopotamia " (A. H. Keane, *Ethnology*, p. 116). " Man's immense antiquity is now accepted by a vast majority of the most thoughtful men " (Dr. Munro, Anthropological Section, British Assocn., 1893), quoted by Professor Keane, p. 140, who also writes, *Ethnology*, p. 221: " Sir W. Flower and Lyddeker in a careful survey of the whole field, reduce the Homidæ to three primary groups—the Ethiopic, Mongolic, and Caucasic, leaving the position of the American aborigines an open question, although ' inclined to include them as aberrant members of the Mongolic type.' "

Keane gives a table (*Ethnology*, p. 224), which is subjoined in a modified form.

	American	Eskimo	
	Mongolo-Tatar	Tibetan      Burman	
(Generalized)	Finno Lapp	Indo-Chinese      Chinese	Annamanese
MONGOLO-AMERICAN		Korean	
		Japanese	
		Malay	
	Indo-Oceanic	Caucasian	Polynesian
PLEISTOCENE PRECURSOR	XANTHROCHRÖIC	N. European	Teuto-Slav      Asiatic-Slav
		Belgæ	Anglo-Saxon
		Teuton-Frisian	Norse
	MELANOCHRÖIC, S. European, Latin races	(Japhet)	Italy
NEGRO	Indo-oceanic Negrito	SEMITIC      Iran	France Spain Portugal
			Georgian
		Armenian	Circassian
	HAMITIC      BERBER	SPANISH MOOR	Egyptian
	Indo-oceanic Negro	Australian	Tasmanian
	African Negro	American	Melanesian
		Bantu	Papuan
	African Negrito	Hottentot	
		Bushman	

This agrees fairly well with the authorities quoted; and with them shows that Shem, Ham, and Japhet, in place of being the three main divisions of the human race, are rather only three branches of one section of it. Ethnology, however, is a very dubious science, especially as to the so-called Caucasian races, in which unfortunately political considerations are involved, and Professor Keane within three years altered his

arrangement of these considerably. Still, Semites and Hamites remain as branches of a branch of one sub-division. Japhet has long ago disappeared as an integer in racial distribution; these terms in fact appear to include only the nations round the east end of the Mediterranean—in other words, merely those known to the Hebrews. "Japhet," indeed, can only be taken as meaning those nations known to the Hebrews which were not of Hamitic or Shemitic origin; but as to all of this the quotations given later from Canon Driver's *Genesis* and Dr. Skinner preclude the necessity of further discussion. Professor Keane's later views may roughly be tabulated as under.

French and South Germans		
(1) Homo Alpinus	Russians	
	Armenians, Kurds, East Persians	
(2) Homo Europaeus	West Persians, Afghans, Hindoos	
	North German, Dutch, Anglo-Saxon	
	South European, Greek (Japhet)	
(3) H. Mediterranensis	Semitic	Italian (Shem)
MONGOL	Hamic	Egyptians (Ham)
NEGRO		Berbers

Keane himself does not put it in tabular form, for the mixture of races is such that it cannot be shown as a tree without inosculations, and certainly not as a diagram on a flat surface, except in a most generalized way; for though the surface of the earth is a plane nations have passed over it in many directions and at various times. Far be it from me to enter into the maze of surmises and conjecture, the cobweb of imaginations woven in the attempt to bridge over the gap between primitive man and historic times. About two great branches of the human race, Negro and Mongol, there is no serious question, since all are in the main agreed. As to the third, dispute is rife; its origin has been assigned to Europe, Asia, and Africa; its ramifications have been distributed all over the world. Germans are said to hold that it is all German, except the French; French that it is French, except the Germans; Italians that it arose round the borders of the

Mediterranean; and Jews that it sprang from the parts round Judæa. Huxley plumps for a modification of Latham's "Sarmatian" theory; Professor Keane seems to try a combination—he inclines to North Africa as the origin of the whole, yet follows Huxley in deriving the most important part of it from the Eurasian steppes. Of course if the race sprang from Africa it must have migrated thence to other lands and may well have got to South Russia. The purest "Aryan" type appears to be in Persia, whence it spread to India and thence to Polynesia. A western extension over Germany to Britain in the place of the Neanderthal-Spy race corresponds to the *Homo Europaeus*.

Northwards from Finland to Japan is spread a great Mongol race which extends southward to meet the above offshoot in Polynesia, and reaches even as far as Madagascar. A branch from this stock went apparently to America in the first Stone Age; for when that continent was discovered there were found in it none of the domestic animals, not even dogs, neither wheat nor rice, and no lamp, sail, or oar, except in very limited districts. All over the continent stone implements have been discovered, answering closely to those of the Old World, though the arrangement of them in time may not be so clearly made out. The languages are of a Mongolic type, but do not approximate to any known form of this language. There are certain small anatomical differences which show that the races must have been separated in very early times; but "the American Pleistocene man was not greatly to be distinguished from his fellows in other regions of the world" (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, "Ethnology," S.V.).

The Eskimo and some other tribes of the east coast are supposed to be of Caucasic origin; but I notice in this connection that Mr. Keane had changed his opinion within the three years between his *Ethnology* and his *Man, Past and Present*. These may have been the Palæolithic men of the glacial age, for skulls similar to the Neanderthal-Spy race have been discovered; and it is almost certain that no connection has taken place since man "learnt to make knives, spear- and arrow-heads, or at least when they knew the art only in its crudest state" (J. W. Powell, *Forum*, 1898) until recent or prehistoric times. The following table is modified from Professor Keane's *Ethnology*:

	Eskimo ?	Kalmuka
	Mongols proper	Skara Mongols Manchua
	Turki Turkmans Osmanli	
	Finno-Tatars Ugrians Bulgars Lapps	
		Finns
		Magyars
	Koreans Japanese	
		Liu-Kiu
MONGOLO-TATARS	Akkads	
(Generalized) MONGOL	TIBETO-INDO-CHINESE Tibeto-Burmese Burmese	
	Shans Siamese	
	Chinese	
	Annamanese	
OCEANIC MONGOLS	Malagasy	
	Malays Javanese	

Similarly, the great continent of Africa, except the region round the Nile where Hamitic and Shemitic races prevail, is occupied by one homogeneous people—the negroes and negritoës. Like the other divisions, this one also extends to Polynesia, which, like Rome, seems to be a sort of sink of nations. The following classification is adapted from Professor Keane:—

		Kalangs of Java
		Sakai of Malay Peninsula
	Indo-oceanic Negrito	Negritoës of India Andamanese, etc.
		Australians Tasmanians
	Indo-oceanic Negro	Papuan of Malaysia Melanesian of the Pacific
(Generalized) NEGRO	African Negro	Western Sudanese
	Niger groups	Central groups Wells groups
		Nilotic groups Zanda
	Bantu	Zulu Zosa Makua
		Basuto Bechuano Waganda
	African Negrito Batwa Bushman Hottentot	Lunda Rua
		Akka

Of all these great races practically no mention is made in the Bible, and, of those mentioned, the affiliations are wrongly given. Just as the Jews thought the world the centre of the universe and that the whole was made for man and man alone, so they held that their nation was the cynosure of creation; their book, the book; their God, the God; though they took no care of the one nor adhered to the other. In fact, until shortly before the exile neither held a position of supreme pre-eminence. The rival system of Israel, the main branch of the nation, made Jerusalem, and Jahweh as the personification of Judah, of less importance: the high places were clearly the national, or at least the popular sites of worship. Samuel sacrificed at them, and so did David and Elijah; the King had one where he was "wont to make offerings"; and under Solomon, and even in the time of the great prophets, Jerusalem was a city of shrines, the home of many deities (Sir G. A. Smith, *Geography of Palestine*). Polytheism was plainly their early practice, and also human sacrifice. Their God was in origin evidently a storm god, like Zeus and Odin; and even in historic times was not separated by any sharp line from the Baals of the Semites around. They were in effect one of the nations of Palestine, not distinguished in a marked way from the surrounding races, each of which they supposed to have its own peculiar tribal deity. This is the common position of primitive people; and the most that is now claimed is that Hebrews developed out of it. The Old Testament shows a gradual evolution of the idea of God. With the victories of David and the foundation of the Temple a tribal god became national. "Who amongst the gods is like our God?" Even then "holiness" was intimately associated with the idea of separation or "taboo." "In the Mosaic period we cannot but recognize the imperfect moral conception formed of Jehovah's character. The wrathful and fiery elements of divine nature are regarded as the most prominent; the Lord is a 'God of hosts,' but in the prophets this includes the hosts of heavens, the stars, and the angels as well as the armies of Israel. After the exile there is a marked advance; "The old popular notion of a territorial and local deity had faded away." He has become the God of the Universe

(Professor Cheyne, in Canon Ottley's Bampton Lectures, p. 203).

"All analogy forbids us to suppose that the religion of Israel was revealed in its completeness from the very first" (p. 205). "Historical science professes to trace the process of revelation, and its account in the main we can scarcely hesitate to accept. The tribal God becomes the God of a nation, and finally the God of the Universe. Each advance in man's moral receptivity renders possible a further disclosure of the divine nature" (p. 205). "The idea of the expiation of sin gradually tended to displace or modify the primitive conception of sacrifice as the creation or renewal of a life bond between the deity and His worshippers" (p. 232). "In the sacrifice of which God received a definite portion, while the worshipper himself consumed the rest, a man entered into table-fellowship with the Deity; he was the guest of his God, and thereby became doubly assured of union with Him" (Cornill, *Der Israelitische Prophetismus*, p. 38). The primitive notion was that those who ate and drank together were "by this very act tied to one another by a bond of friendship and mutual obligation" (p. 265). Further, it was a widespread belief in Semitic antiquity that "by eating the flesh, or particularly by drinking the blood of another living being, a man absorbs its nature or life into his own" (Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, in 3rd edition, p. 313).

Smith proceeds: "It lies at the root of the widespread practice of drinking the fresh blood of enemies" (p. 313). "The Levitical sin-offering is in all essential features identical with the ancient sacrament of communion in a sacred life. . . . How remarkable it is that the great Christian sacrament should embody and consecrate the element of truth which, often in the crudest and most fantastic forms, underlay these ancient ideas" (Ottley, Bampton Lectures, pp. 259, 293). We owe a great deal to Canon Ottley for his outspoken advocacy of the truth, as compared with the ritualistic rubbish in the Bampton Lectures of Bishop Gore; but this last sentence displays a naïve credulity which will hardly be acceptable to the ordinary man who cannot believe that heavenly facts are really and truly associated with the wildest, crudest, and grossest superstitions. The whole argument of the Bampton

Lectures, "that the doctrine of the Church is a development, and a survival of the fittest," depends on the view taken of these tenets. If they are regarded as "the best of all possible teaching," then they may be a result of the struggle for existence and the survival of the most suitable; but this opinion savours of the notion common in theological circles that the contest between organisms for "a place in the sun" was all arranged beforehand, like a stage fight, and the selected favourite came out victor from the battle. This is in no way a true interpretation of Darwin's position, which was reached by observing what goes on in Nature and not by squaring up the facts with preconceived theories, as notoriously exemplified in the above-mentioned literature.

## CHAPTER V

### HYPNOTISM AND SPIRITUALISM

*Tam facti pravique tenax quam nuntia veri.*

“The time has been that, when the brains were out, the man would die.”

—*Macbeth*, Act III, scene 4.

“It is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.”

—*Ibid.*, Act V, scene 5.

If any reliance can be placed on the cases cited in the books on Hypnotism, especially *The Mysteries of Hypnosis*, by De Dubor (London, 1922), no difficulty can be found in explaining all “the facts” of Jewish prophecy, or even accepting any miracles. He says: “It has been the misfortune of the physical sciences to have been for a period in the world’s history monopolized and exploited by charlatans and mystagogues, and to have gained in the process an evil reputation” (Preface, p. 8). “The priests of Egypt, the Bramans of India, and the Magians of Persia . . . used their knowledge to increase their dominion over the unlearned multitude” (p. 1). “Without doubt we are not as yet capable of penetrating into the heart of the mystery, but perhaps the solution has begun to dawn on us” (p. 39). “One should be very careful not to tell people what they are expected to see, for that vitiates the experiment by introducing the element of suggestion and imagination” (p. 40, quoting W. Maxwell, *Psychic Phenomena*). “Experience leads us to infer that suggestion would be competent to produce all the observed effects in cases where the subject, either from previous knowledge of the instrument or process, from the behaviour of the investigators, or from his own personal observation at the time, was aware of the nature of the effect to be expected” (F. Podmore, *Apparitions and Thought-reading*, p. 210). This refers to optical effects, for which “after images” are alleged to be attained, and these are particularly difficult to get in those who are not acquainted with the matter, for they do not

recognize them at all. "Sometimes a story is improved by the narrator that it may the better serve for instruction and edification. This tendency is especially liable to distort the evidence in cases connected with death. It must be remembered that though we may view a coincident hallucination as merely an instance of an idea transferred from a *living* mind, to the percipient it frequently represents the spirit of the dead. From a certain class of witnesses the account of such an incident is as little to be trusted as the text of an apocryphal gospel. It inevitably becomes a *Tendenzschrift*, which reflects not the facts as they occurred, but the narrator's conception of what the facts ought to have been" (Podmore, p. 151).

De Dubor continues: "Although the unlettered majority may exhibit this natural weakness in a high degree, it cannot be said that the cultured few are free from it" (p. 44). "As to witches, the actual testimony on which the alleged facts were believed came from the uneducated; the easy acceptance of this evidence by the better educated was due to ignorance, then almost universal. We know that there is a condition capable of being induced in uneducated persons with extreme ease, in which any idea that is suggested may take at once sensory form and be projected as an actual hallucination (Gurney, *Phantasms of the Living*, Vol. I, p. 115)."

Prof. Richet, as one might expect, denies this vehemently; but a drunken man is always quite sure he is sober. Hypnotized subjects do not remember being put under, and scientific men, above all others, are positive as to their own experiences, though they must have known that scientific facts again and again have been superseded by more careful records of subsequent experiments. To-day we find Newton's incontrovertible facts challenged. Darwin's provisional hypothesis of progenesis has been definitely discarded, and Weismann's germ-plasm theory has undergone considerable modification. De Vries's "Mutations," that one heard advocated in the pulpit not so long ago, are questioned and practically set aside. Charcot and Babinski got notions from their patients at the Salpêtrière, which have been shown to be mere hypnotic suggestion by hystero-epileptics. The old dogma that "animals have no general ideas" now takes the form "that their notions are not only the expression of subjective moods

and emotional states, but also of definite desires and urges. Their gamut of phonetics is entirely subjective and can only express emotion, never designate or describe objects. But they have many phonetic elements which are also common to human language, so that their lack of articulate speech cannot be ascribed to secondary glossolabial limitations" (Köhler, *M mentality of Apes*, 1924). In effect, their language is wholly abstract, and never of concrete facts or things. "No doubt in thought this is somehow represented, but fails to get expression" (*loc. cit.*, p. 317).

Apropos of the case of "S.H.B." reported by Podmore (*Apparitions and Thought Transference*, p. 239), who alleged that by concentration of will he projected his astral body into the bedroom of two ladies, friends of his, the elder of whom awoke in terror to behold it, the publication of the report created such a furore that, on a petition with 14,000 signatures, it led indirectly to the appointment of a scientific commission of inquiry—the silence of Richet and Grasset about so startling an experience is significant as to the credibility of the evidence. Of two much-quoted instances of alleged premonition or clairvoyant prevision—namely, the testimony of Count Hugo Bascheiri that at a séance in Paris he received warning that near the Boulevard des Italiens, about 300 yards from the building in which the séance was being held, the hour being 9.40 p.m., an important person was about to be assassinated; the facts being that at the place indicated, between 9.35 and 9.40 p.m., M. Jaurès was fatally shot; and, secondly, that, also at a séance in Paris, the medium announced that at that very moment Queen Draga was being assassinated in Belgrade—the evidence is highly dubious and the identifications ambiguous, being probably of the *ex post facto* order.

It is like a great deal of Hebrew prophecy where the vowel points were not put in till many centuries after the date of origin of the text, and then difficulty was found in suggesting the right points to be given. Therefore the meaning is to no slight extent one of guessing. This is borne out by the fact that in places the text is almost unintelligible. Were it not for the faking by our translators, and apparently still more by Jewish emendators, as we are coming clearly to see now, the parts that are obscure, would be far more numerous.

The *Septuagint* differs from the Hebrew in many places, and represents an older version. To-day it is looked on as more rather than less correct than this, because it was beyond the reach of these officious parties. The problem has not yet been fully worked out, for the text presents several peculiarities, and presumably has been worked over in the interests of orthodoxy. Nevertheless, by putting two and two together, it is hoped that in time more light will be shed on the original text, and so lead to a revealing view of the methods of official custodians. Unfortunately the "controversy between Christians and Jews" complicates the matter; deliberate falsification has occurred; and when the end desired could be attained by simply adding a dot it would be too much to expect of human nature that this should not often be attempted.

In the Hebrew there is nothing about "A virgin conceiving and bearing"; it is "A young woman shall have a child." Did the Christians alter this, or the Jews? I learnt this from my father, for many years a prominent cleric in the English Church, who also told me of many other dubious passages, and when I asked, "But what do you accept?" he just shrugged his shoulders and was discreetly silent. I might myself have been in Orders if I had not at school been made to learn the Thirty-nine Articles of that Church. When at Oxford I came in contact with Pusey and Liddon, and Bishop King and Bright (and, above all, with Burgon). They pooh-poohed these discrepancies, and a friend, who took all the theological prizes, protested that according to the theologians, "God is without body, parts, or passions," which would make Him just a stock or a stone, minus feeling of any sort; and my own brother said "the article on predestination" was illogical, and could not be made to yield any reasonable meaning. It was hardly to be expected therefore that an ingenuous youth would swallow the Articles wholesale. But bibliolaters have bolted down camels, while straining at gnats. If a man went up in a balloon, and on coming down told us that God wrote the Ten Commandments on tables of stone and gave these to him, but that he broke the tables and had to rewrite the Decalogue himself, we should promptly tell him he was a liar. Why then should we accept this from Jews, whom as to their religious traditions we know to be unreliable? And were they any better "down

in Judee"? They certainly do not seem to have been ready to obey what they professed to be the word of God, or "to walk in His laws that He set before them." Why then should we be more solicitous to maintain what they considered of so little interest that they did not even think it worth while to keep the text in decent form?

With the consonants "t — n" there can be formed tan, ten, tin, ton, tun; and, with a final vowel, tiny, time, tine, tone, tony, tune, and, with one in front, even "atone." With a priestly caste looking out for their advantage, what more likely than that they did make interpretations to suit their own ends? There was indeed a traditional meaning attached to the text; but in the Gospel Jesus is reputed to have said: "You do make the law of no value by your traditions." That this is a true bill is clear from the increase of the priests' dues as time went on; there is no fixity or consistency in these. In the "affair of Draga," the words communicated are "Panca la mort guette la famille," which I should dub as gibberish, but it is translated by Stanley de Brathe "Panka, death lies in wait for the family," and explained as "Panka, the family is in jeopardy," Panka being Draga's father. Manifestly any meaning whatever can be read into so cryptic a message. It is reminiscent, *longo intervallo*, of the latitude of choice in interpretation afforded by the ancient Greek oracles or the later forged Sybilline books. It is true that the date coincides nearly, and Richet says the "chances against this are 500,000 to 1."

Yet, in a competition where a prize of £1000 was offered, over two hundred women put six out of nine dresses in the same order as the three judges. No doubt in this case the element of fashion came in; but, as Peirce says, there is nothing more fallacious than the calculation of chances; it is true only on the average, and may be upset by all sorts of accidents. It may be good enough for the muddled results of telepathy, yet far from proving any occult influence. As to cross-correspondences, Maxwell declares: "It is impossible to admit the intervention of a spirit; we want proof of facts, and the system of cross-correspondence is founded on negative facts and is an unstable foundation. Only positive facts have an intrinsic value, which cross-correspondence cannot show;

not at present, at any rate" (Richet, p. 175, quoting Maxwell).

"This argument of Mrs. Sidgwick's is not very strong; for the subtlety of the subconscious in mediums is sufficient to reconstitute the personality of Myers or of any other person in a most striking manner. Mrs. Sidgwick adds, with very good reason, that more positive proofs are required" (Richet, *loc. cit.*, p. 175). As to Gerald Balfour's examples, "These are certain well-marked cases of cryptesthesia; but whether there is cryptesthesia, or lucidity, or telepathy, these do not in any way imply survival of a conscious personality. On the other hand, Mr. Hereward Carrington concludes (and I quote his words as agreeing with my own conclusions) the total facts 'are all fully explicable upon purely psychological and naturalistic lines. They almost invariably resolve themselves into simple subconscious memory associations. Chance has played a larger part than is allowed for. All these communications, despite the great labour they represent, carry less proof of survival than the séances of Mrs. Piper speaking as George Pelham'" (*A.S.P.*, 1909, XIX, 294). "It seems that this judgment of Mr. Carrington's is justified" (p. 176). Bozzano "concludes that the spiritualist theory alone covers all the facts. But why go so far? Would it not be wiser to say with me that an unusual faculty of cognition exists? It is incautious to go beyond that by referring to its cause and mechanism" (p. 180). "A certain number of cases have been collected by Bozzano. . . . It is probable that most of these give some evidence of cryptesthetic power, but they are often only pantamnesic illusions. In any case they prove nothing as to survival of human consciousness" (p. 218).

"Myers took the greatest possible interest in the problem of survival; he believed and hoped it to be true. He proposed to certain of his friends of the S.P.R. to write certain facts known to them only, in a sealed letter, to be opened when a medium supposed to be in communication with his spirit should have claimed to have read the contents of the sealed letter. The result of the experiment was negative, as Sir Oliver Lodge has testified. The alleged promise of R. Hodgson to return also came to nothing" (p. 219). "Mrs. Piper gradually loses her normal consciousness; then Phinuit or

George Pelham, Myers or R. Hodgson speaks through her. But these personalities, though probably imaginary and arising from auto-suggestion, have astonishing cryptæsthetic powers. The words spoken by them through the voice of Mrs. Piper show telepathy, monitions, premonitions, and all kinds of lucidity" (p. 42). "Metapsychic phenomena should be treated as problems of pure physiology. Let us experiment with these rare, privileged, and wonderful persons and remember that they deserve to be treated with all respect, but also that they must be never trusted" (p. 46). "'Personification' characterizes nearly all spiritist experiments. . . . This personality in spiritist parlance is called a 'guide' or 'control'" (p. 70).

"These personifications are sufficiently explained by the unconscious, which . . . has emotions, ideas, remembrances, will, and feelings quite beyond our consciousness" (p. 70). "I tell Alice, a young girl in the hypnotic state, 'You are no longer Alice, you are an old woman' . . . she assumes the character assigned to her without the ability to throw it off . . . her personality instantly adapts itself to the suggested personality with a vigour and perfection not to be rivalled by the most accomplished actress . . . even the handwriting changes its character" (pp. 70-1). "There is no reason for surprise if spiritist messages seem to come from a real person. The human mind is very prone to create a personality. The phenomenon is the same whether it proceeds from external suggestion, from some exterior event, or from auto-suggestion. It is not metaphysic, but pertains to normal psychology; and when subconscious actions take place they group themselves round the personality that has been created. I compare this to crystallization from a saturated solution—the crystals form round a centre. Similarly remembrances and emotions concentrate upon the personality invented. These spiritoid personalities manifest themselves chiefly in automatic writing or table movements, and (more rarely) by raps. Sometimes they borrow the voice of the medium. The conviction is so thorough, the representation so perfect, and the unconsciousness so complete that the experimenters are won over and cannot suppose that all these psychological phenomena proceed from an imaginary being" (pp. 71-2).

"A woman takes a pencil and writes page upon page  
H 2

without knowing or understanding what she writes in feverish haste; her handwriting is quite different from the normal; she writes and writes for ten minutes, for half an hour, or even longer. . . . She can at the same time keep up a quite sensible conversation with those round her. Everything happens just as if her own personality were replaced by another . . . all are convinced that a spirit has intervened and made his wishes known" (Richet, *Thirty Years of Psychical Research*, p. 72). "The best instance of those alterations of personality is perhaps that of Helen Smith becoming Marie Antoinette, of which Flournoy made a profound study" (p. 72 note). "I will now give some examples of these automatic writings, if only to show the high improbability that they proceed from spirits, 'O Venice, flower-like, what remains of her glory? . . . Where are now the sublime teachings of Jesus? . . . The cross has cast a deadly shadow, deadly because phantoms intercepted its rays' (Pythagoras) . . . 'Why do rays of light fall on me, followed by utter darkness? the vague remembrance of a past that I feel to be cruel, but cannot re-awaken! Oh, the cries of terror, the flowing, steaming blood!' (Fouquier-Tinville). No doubt the words about steaming blood aroused the memory of Mlle. de Sombreuil in the medium's mind, for immediately after Fouquier-Tinville Mlle. de Sombreuil comes on the scene and says . . . 'I love Fouquier-Tinville. I loved him from the moment he saved my life. I recognized his beauty and his own kind of greatness. Yes, I love him! I suffer when people praise my virtue, call him whom I love a monster; O Love, Love'" (p. 73). "Strange apocalyptic answers are attributed to Ezekiel and to the lion of Androcles" (p. 74).

"Sometimes Victor Hugo interrogated the spirits, of course in admirable poetry. One day he addressed Molière." The reply was in "fine verses, but not due to Molière or to Æschylus, any more than to the lion of Androcles. . . . The lion of Androcles was a better poet than Helen Smith's Victor Hugo" (pp. 75-6). "Hermance Dufaux, a girl of fourteen, has given a *Life of Jeanne D'Arc*, dictated by Jeanne, and *Confessions of Louis XI*. Allan Kardec guarantees the honesty of this young girl in her claim to have written these books by inspiration without reference to historical records and

documents. . . . Hermance Dufaux speaking as Jeanne D'Arc resembles Helen Smith who sincerely thinks herself Marie Antoinette or Cagliostro. . . . By cryptesthesia, Hermance, being a sensitive, knows facts, names, dates, and events that have not come to her through her normal senses. Then these metapsychic cognitions group themselves around the personality created by auto-suggestion" (p. 77). "The last hypothesis is that the consciousnesses of Louis XI and Jeanne have not disappeared from the world and write through Hermance. Here we have a terribly incredible hypothesis that cannot even be considered" (p. 78). "These divagations of the subconscious are always markedly religious, as if their purpose were to lay down the lines for the rites and doctrines of a new religion. They are pervaded by a love for humanity which would be touching if it were not expressed as a rhetorical and cloudy philanthropy" (p. 80). "There is nothing, absolutely nothing, to show the presence of any intelligence other than that of the automist" (p. 80).

"They would seem to be the work of poets ignorant of prosody, of philosophers who know no philosophy, of priests ignorant of theology; all of whom make laudable efforts to give us counsel . . . in poetic and nebulous language" (p. 80). "The student of metapsychics requires a *medium*, a human subject difficult to find, easily put off his balance, and highly capricious, who must at all times be handled very diplomatically. But once an experiment has begun it should be carried out as rigorously as one on arterial pressure" (p. 12). "Those who have cultivated it, instead of handling it with scientific exactitude, have treated it as a religion for adepts, an error that has had disastrous results. Spiritualists have intermingled religion and science to the great detriment of the latter" (p. 13). "Miracles and prophecies have played a great part in nearly all religions. Real metapsychic phenomena, putting telekinesis for the miracles and premonitions for the prophecies, are perhaps at the root of some religious beliefs; but what can we build on stories that date back twenty centuries transformed by ignorant and credulous priests? . . . We shall therefore deliberately set aside the miracles of all religions, and all the prodigies connected with the death of Cæsar, of Jesus Christ, or of Mahomet" (p. 16). "Instances

of aureoles about the head, bilocation, the ‘odour of sanctity,’ insensibility to fire, levitation, speaking in strange tongues, and prophecy are to be found in the lives of many saints: St. Francis d’Assisi, St. Theresa, St. Helena, St. Alphonso of Liguori, and St. Joseph of Copertino (1603–1663)” (p. 19). “Of him [St. Joseph] Görres says, ‘His ecstasies and ascensions were witnessed by . . . Pope Urban VIII.’ . . . The stories told us are scarcely ever lies and very rarely complete illusions. People exaggerate, alter, arrange their accounts, forget essential details, and add imaginary ones; but all these legends contain some fragment of truth. . . . We can scarcely hope to extract the truth imbedded therein” (p. 20). “The naïve imagination of the Christians of those days does not refer all these metapsychic powers to God and good angels: the devil also is capable of many marvels when he takes *possession* of some unlucky woman: he is nearly as powerful as God, and confers wonderful powers on his victim . . . knowledge of languages . . . of future events . . . the power of perceiving the thoughts of others . . . and those at a distance. . . . All these are real metapsychic phenomena; it is therefore credible that such things should have occurred now and again, alike to the saintly and the possessed, in all times” (p. 21).

With Mesmer, all was changed. “The Royal Society of Medicine, the Academy of Sciences, and the Faculty (of Paris) took the matter up and showed that Mesmer’s methods gave rise to a certain psycho-physiological state which might sometimes be efficacious in the curing of disease. The new doctrine obtained numerous adherents” (p. 22). “An effort of will or a fixed gaze has sufficed to produce magnetic phenomena, even when the subject was unaware” (p. 23). Of Hauff, “Kerner says, ‘One day I was conversing with her brother, when he said: “Hush! a spirit is crossing the room going toward my sister.” Then I saw a vague form . . . whispering to her’” (p. 23). “All who studied Federica Hauff [including] Strauss, the celebrated author of the *Leben Jesu* . . . were convinced not only of her good faith, but of the metapsychic phenomena, then called supernatural” (p. 24). “One Michael Weakman heard an unusual noise outside. He went out and saw nothing; but as the noises con-

tinued . . . he left Hydesville. His house was taken by John Fox and his two daughters Kate and Margaret, aged 12 and 14. One night on going to bed the two girls heard raps, noises, and discovered . . . that these showed intelligence. . . . Many gatherings, sometimes enthusiastic, sometimes hotly inimical, were held. . . . The Fox family were certainly not disinterested; public séances were given at which places were paid for as at a circus" (p. 25). "Margaret Fox, then become Mrs. Kane, avowed in 1888 that all her revelations . . . were impostures. . . . The other sister Kate, then Mrs. Joncken . . . made the same confession. . . . But in 1892 both retracted" (p. 26, *note*). "A curious chapter might be written on the pseudo-confessions of mediums" (p. 26, *note*). "It is probable that the denial is the lie," by this "They thought to regain notoriety" when money fell off (p. 27). "It is deplorable that . . . the Fox family should have given theatrical spiritist performances for payment," but it does not invalidate the facts (p. 27). "In Europe spiritualism spread very rapidly. . . . Scientific men, especially, refused to admit the actuality of the phenomena" (p. 27). "At that time, about 1854, the phenomena of unconscious muscular action . . . was unknown" (p. 28).

The spiritist theory was due mainly to Rivail, a doctor of medicine, celebrated under the name of Allan Kardec, and is thus expounded: "The soul does not die; after death it becomes a spirit and seeks to manifest through certain privileged beings (mediums), capable of receiving directions and impulses from spirits . . . as Pythagoras had previously taught" (p. 29). "To build a doctrine on the word of so-called spirits is a very grave error. . . . Spiritualism was defended in England by Robert Dale Owen and Alfred Russel Wallace" (p. 30). The time was ripe for the great pioneer of metapsychic science, Sir William Crookes, who declared: "I do not say that these things are probable: I say that they exist"; but no pains were taken to verify or refute this. "Men were content to ridicule them; and I avow with shame that I was among the wilfully blind. . . . Henceforward spiritualists will know that experiment is the path of progress, rather than religious or mystical speculation" (p. 31). "The efforts of those who study metapsychics should now be directed to

bringing this science out of the category of the occult " (p. 32). " When Crookes established the reality of phantoms, he said scarcely anything that had not already been stated by spiritualists " (p. 32). " The Society for Psychical Research was founded by . . . E. Gurney and F. W. H. Myers. A group of eminent persons drew together to make investigations in the despised region of occultism, in order to discover by rigorous scientific method the truths underlying these strange facts. . . . I then, with Dariex, founded the *Annales des Sciences Psychiques*. . . . This is now replaced by the *Revue Metapsychique* directed by Geley " (p. 33).

" There can be no psychical research without a medium. . . . Between 1885 and 1920 there were many powerful mediums: Slade, Eglinton, Stainton Moses, Eusapia, Mme. d'Esperance, Mrs. Thomson, Marthe Beraud, Stanisława Tomczyk, Miss Goligher, and Mrs. Leonard. . . . If there were no other medium in the world but Mrs. Piper that would be sufficient to establish scientifically the facts of cryptesthesia. . . . Eusapia Paladino has been studied hundreds of times by the leading scientific men of Europe; even if there were no other medium than Eusapia in the world, her manifestations would suffice to establish scientifically the reality of telekinesis and ectoplasmic forms. . . . Scientific men of the future should recognize with gratitude the debt they owe to them and to their predecessors, D. D. Home and Florence Cook " (pp. 33-4). Mrs. Piper and Eusapia have always complied "with scientific tests, accepting all control without taking offence " (p. 34).

" Spiritualism, according to the formula of Allan Kardec and others, is a theory leading to a religion; but this takes us very far beyond science. . . . theory must always be subordinate to the facts; it must never dominate them. . . . It is no longer admissible that a new medium should be developed by a small circle . . . rigorous and exhaustive inquiry, such as is carried out by the S.P.R., is indispensable for all subjective phenomena. Complete certitude is required, half certitudes will not do " (p. 35). " This term 'medium,' which signified an intermediary between this world of the living and the world of the dead, is execrable. . . . There is a great difference between powerful mediums such as Home, Eusapia, Stainton

Moses, and Florence Cook, who manifest surprising objective and energetic phenomena, and those who show only subjective phenomena" (p. 38). "To mention Home, Florence, Stanton Moses, Eusapia, Mme. d'Esperance, Eglinton, Linda Gazzera, Slade, Marthe Beraud, Miss Goligher, and Stanislawa Tomczyk is to name nearly all. . . . The number of those who give raps is very much larger. . . . Unfortunately physical mediums often misuse their powers . . . and give public séances for profit. The Fox sisters, the Davenport Brothers, Eglinton, and Slade all did this, and from thence to fraud is but a step that has often been taken, so that professional mediums of this class are always to be looked upon with suspicion and the most rigid precautions . . . taken" (p. 39).

"The first departure from the normal consists in slight, almost imperceptible muscular movements—sufficient, however, to enable an experienced person to recognize unconscious sensation and will in the subject under observation. . . . Fifty per cent. of normal persons . . . reveal their thoughts by slight muscular tremors of which they are unconscious. . . . The second degree consists in the creation of a new personality by hypnotism. . . . The third degree is a mediumistic state, *i.e.* a new personality is created by auto-suggestion. Hypnotism acts through hætero-suggestion, mediumship by auto-suggestion. There is very little difference between the personality of Marie Antoinette as assumed by Helen Smith of her own accord and this same personality as aroused by suggestion of a hypnotizer. . . . The fourth step is when the new personality shows cryptæsthesia and really seems to know things . . . that the secondary personality alone could be aware of, as in the case of Mrs. Piper incarnating Phinuit or George Pelham. The 'guide' of the medium . . . then seems to be a genuinely extraneous intelligence. . . . I need scarcely remark that the notion that an extraneous force is in play is only a hypothesis" (p. 41). "There is still nothing to prove that the secondary personalities may not be exclusively human and due to modalities of human intelligence. . . . But these personalities, though probably imaginary and arising from auto-suggestion, have astonishing cryptæsthetic powers. . . . Mrs. Leonard, Mme. Briffaut, Stella, and the Seeress of Prevost

are all mediums of this kind " (p. 42). " Powerful mediums attribute their powers to a 'guide' . . . in order to carry out successful experiments, it is necessary to act as though this guide were really existent and incarnated in the medium. This is a working hypothesis in the strictest sense, nearly always essential to the production of the phenomena " (p. 43). " Sensitives are always automatomists also, though the converse is not true. Hundreds of cases might be cited of automatic writing which are but moderately interesting examples of released subconsciousness " (p. 43).

" Mediums are more or less neuropaths, liable to headaches, insomnia, or dyspepsia; but this signifies very little. . . . Cryptæsthesia also admits of many gradations. A person who has been perfectly normal during the whole of a long life may one day see a veridical apparition or hear a premonitory voice. He cannot be called ' a sensitive,' though he has been such for a few minutes or seconds " (p. 44). " Even great sensitives like Mrs. Piper or Stainton Moses have no distinguishing physiological characteristics. These privileged persons who, according to spiritualist ideas, enter into communication with the dead, do not show any other physical or mental superiority " (p. 44). " It is curious and discouraging to find that their powers do not increase. They arise spontaneously, no one knows how or why. If the fancy takes them, so to speak, they simply disappear. . . . Dr. Segard told me that his young daughter of twelve showed remarkable telekinetic phenomena . . . for three days only, after which the whole power vanished. This was twenty-five years ago. A powerful medium is a very delicate machine, of whose secret springs we know nothing. . . . It does not seem to me that we can necessarily infer the intervention of an external intelligence " (p. 45). " Mediums should be claimed for science—severe, just, and generous science, instead of allowing their wonderful faculties to be prostituted by childish credulity " (p. 46).

" Laplace says somewhere that 'the rigour of proof must be proportioned to the gravity of the conclusions.' Now, to admit that an extra-terrene intelligence moves the brain of Helen Smith to inspire her with Sanscrit, or the brain of A. to dictate French verse, is an inference so contrary

to common sense and logic that I shall admit any hypothesis, short of mathematical or physical impossibility, rather than that of an extra-terrene mind" (p. 51). "There is a small number of subjective intellectual facts . . . which neither pantamnesia nor the subconscious elaboration of remembrances can account for. Nevertheless, even the facts inexplicable by pantamnesia do not necessarily imply the presence of an external intelligence" (p. 53). "The subconscious, perhaps even more than the conscious, is capable of prolonged and skilful elaboration of its materials. . . . Everything that the human intelligence can do, even when it is most profound and penetrating, is psychological. Everything of which such intelligence is incapable belongs to metapsychics" (p. 54). "The mathematical theory of probability does not apply unless the conditions can be most accurately stated, for the least experimental defect will very greatly change the figures obtained" (p. 56). "The experimenter should act as if the medium were persistently fraudulent; for if conscious good faith is the rule, unconscious bad faith is the rule also: every medium makes desperate efforts by an unwearied subconscious mind to find the answer required, and uses all possible means to discover it. Fraud is as rare in subjective phenomena as it is common in the objective" (p. 62). "The question whether there is telepathy (transmission of human thought) or lucidity (cognizance of an external fact) is specially applicable to the very frequent cases of monitions at the moment of death" (p. 68). "Distance also counts for nothing. There have been cases of lucidity at a distance of more than six hundred miles between agent and percipient" (p. 107).

"The visions alleged in the lives of saints are mostly connected with their times of crisis or ecstasy, whether the form these take is catalepsy, lethargy, or convulsions. The cases of demoniacs who speak in unknown tongues (?) and divine the thoughts of their interlocutors (?) would give us many instances; but the credulity of the witnesses deprives them of any scientific value" (p. 124). "The Rev. P. Lescœur . . . (quoted by Grasset, *loc. cit.*, 140) states that he knew a woman who, on looking into a glass of water, saw to her great surprise an apparition of the head of Christ, expressive of great pain. 'I drew back, with an exclamation of amazement;

but on looking again the *Ecce Homo* face appeared in profile, then grew less distinct and vanished. It had lasted about a minute ’’ (p. 202). “ These ideas and cognitions are in the realm of the subconscious ” (p. 206). “ Nearly always the discarnates show very moderate intelligence indeed, and give utterance to commonplaces ” (p. 209). “ A hand touched me, alleged by John King to be that of my father. As a preliminary sign of identity I asked for his first name; but this, so very easy to supply, was not given ” (p. 209). “ Helen Smith in six months was able to speak fluently in a tongue of her own invention. Flounoy having advanced some objection, she changed her Martian language and made it ultra-Martian. . . . Laura Edmunds, the daughter of Judge Edmunds, conversed with Evangelides in modern Greek, of which she knew nothing in 1859. She told him of the death of his son in Greece. This was correct, though he did not know it ” (p. 221).

Judge Edmunds was President of the Senate and judge of the Supreme Court of New York (p. 221). He records that Mrs. Young spoke in German, Spanish, and Italian, under control of German spirits, for over an hour; she was quite unlearned (p. 222). “ Mrs. X, in my presence, wrote long sentences in Greek, with some errors, which show mental vision but no real knowledge. After much search, I was able to discover the book from which she had got the passages. It is not to be found in Paris except in the National Library. It is a dictionary of modern Greek, not used in any school; στολησμούς was written στολισμόδς ” (p. 222). “ Six hundred and twenty-two letters with 6 per cent. of errors . . . long sentences from mental vision ” (p. 223).

Eglinton, in a séance in which Gladstone took part, gave “ answers by direct writing in Spanish, in French, and in Greek . . . but Eglinton’s sincerity is doubtful. Mrs. Thompson was able in hypno-spiritist trance to speak in Dutch to Dr. van Eeden.” To the canons of Nancy an answer was given in Latin by a young boy, to questions in a sealed envelope on the table. A girl in Palermo, 1849, spoke fluent French, and held a long conversation in English, a language of which she was ignorant (p. 225). “ None of these facts, whether of xenoglossia or of automatic writing by children and unlettered persons, carries sufficient weight of proof ” (p. 227). “ Four

horses were trained by Mr. Krall. . . . These were able to solve simple arithmetical problems and even some very complicated ones . . . add, subtract, and multiply, and also extract square roots." One gave "the fourth root of 456,776 and the cube root of 15,376. . . . By choosing cards with letters on them they could carry on conversations." "We must inquire whether there is trickery or illusion." Twenty-four German Professors deny this; but only two of them had seen the horses (p. 240). In the case of Mme. Telechoff, "five children and a dog perceive the apparition of a little boy, Andre, floating high in the room, the child having died in a house near by. In this case there certainly was a real phantom with real outlines like a living person, which might probably have impressed a photographic plate" (p. 247). "Mrs. Bettany sees an old woman . . . Mr. Bettany sees the same, and both recognize Mrs. X. Is it possible that there was no external phenomenon?" (p. 255).

"Recognition is variable; often the form seen is ill-defined, so that the percipient does not at first connect it with any particular person" (p. 256). "It often takes place between sleeping and waking" (Maury's *Borderland* "Hallucinations," p. 256). "Everything occurs as if the vision were of a living person in the material world. Sometimes the apparition speaks; sometimes a voice is heard. Sometimes . . . there is a tactile phenomenon so that the impression of reality is complete, all the senses contributing to the perception" (p. 256). "Some monitions are certainly objective, and are seen by several persons. It is then very difficult, almost impossible, not to admit some external phenomenon" (p. 257). "Col. Wynyard and Mr. Sherbrooke both saw Mr. Wynyard. Mr. Weld and his daughter both saw Philip Weld, who had just died, walking in the avenue. The mother and sisters of Col. Aylesbury heard his voice. Mr. and Mrs. L. both heard the voice of their son. . . . All the same . . . the existence of an exterior fact . . . cannot be admitted in all these cases of collective perception, for they differ" (p. 259). "Captain M. was wounded . . . and left for dead. The same night at the same hour, his daughter . . . woke up and told her mother: 'Mother, father is wounded but is not killed'" (p. 272). (This was the result of a dream, apparently.) Miss

Lichfield saw her betrothed standing behind her, and felt a kiss. "The figure then disappeared. . . . That day he had a fall from his horse, was insensible for some time, and ill afterwards" (p. 273). Mme. d'Esperance had a monition at a séance; "it is very complex, being accompanied by a materialization"; "Bozzano considers this case one of the best substantiated; but this seems an exaggerated view" (p. 274). Mrs. R. saw the head and shoulders of a man and cried out, "It is Captain W." This coincided with an accident in which Capt. W. was injured and for a long time insensible (p. 276). Richet repeats the story as to "Volterra," giving Count Gomanys as the chief actor (p. 277). He has some 40–50 pages of cases; that, six to eight to a page, would give the number he reports as over 300; but they are not convincing, and are so casual that one is not impressed. Mrs. Paget saw her brother shining with wet. She said, "Where have you come from?" He replied, "For the love of God, do not say that I am here." He had been almost drowned at Melbourne, and was taken out insensible, some ten hours before the vision (p. 273).

Mr. Searle saw in his rooms a figure of his wife, pale as death. At that same hour she had fainted. She had never fainted before. Mrs. Severn, wife of Walter Severn, felt a blow on the lip; at the same time her husband was struck on the mouth by part of a boat (p. 275). Amongst others, Richet gives one of Lord Brougham that is admitted to be worthless by Myers and Gurney (p. 290), and a number from Flammarion, that no one would credit. All this detracts very much from the value of the book—*e.g.* Mrs. Cox says: "I was not asleep, and saw my brother . . . quite clearly . . . later I heard his voice call me by name three times" (p. 294). Of course, it is a great difference whether he is trying to prove telepathy or a "real presence." Mrs. Cox's brother died the same day in China. His son, aged seven, also saw his father near his bed. Mrs. H. D. dreamt that a friend was playing chess wearing a thick black veil, which, being raised, showed a death's-head (p. 249); the friend died that night. Is a real "spiritual presence" possible, as Churchmen assert of the Eucharist? A few well-attested cases, told clearly, would weigh more than all this somewhat futile congeries of possible or probable "wonders."

Richet concludes: "We have now reached the end of this long list of facts. It is decisive, for all these monitions, apparitions, and powerful sensations cannot be explained by mental hallucination of the perfectly normal persons who relate them. It would also be equally inept to refer them to a long series of chance coincidences. It is therefore well established that at the moment of death some vibration takes place, moving something in nature, which occasionally gives information of the death to those who are sensitive. That is cryptesthesia, an unusual and supernormal faculty peculiar to sensitives. It generally takes an auditory or visual form, but most probably the vision itself is a hallucinatory symbol. A. dies and the notion of his death reaches B.'s subconsciousness. But in order that B. may understand, the creative power of subconscious imagination elaborates a phantom resembling A. more or less and surrounds the vision, which is really internal though seemingly external, with detail which may be symbolical or veridical, just as occurs in delirium and in dreams. We may provisionally suppose that death being a more moving event than the facts of daily life, it sets in motion a stronger vibration than the latter" (p. 325). "Let us simply say: A.'s death is a reality; B., by his cryptesthetic faculty, perceives that fact and represents it under the symbolical forms to which alone our intelligence is open" (p. 326).

Somewhere he says: "Dismiss tales of passing observers climbing trees and seeing fakirs cutting up a pumpkin when professing to dissect a child."

"The important fact is that suggestion does possess this power, and that by it worthy and honest persons can be brought to consent to things which are false in themselves and terrible in their consequences. There is no doubt that some of the crimes committed by women are due to hypnotic or even to simple suggestion" (De Dubor, *The Mysteries of Hypnosis*, p. 59). "Bernheim has attained the desired result after an interval of 63 days; Beaunis after 172 days; Liegeois at the end of a year" (p. 61). "Cases for which hypnotism would seem particularly adapted are those of aphronia (lack of discretion and practical judgment), want of malleability, and certain vices, such as kleptomania, moral perversity, and idleness" (p. 78). "When stubbornness is excessive it is one

Richel concludes: "We have now reached the end of this long list of facts. It is decisive, for all these monitions, apparitions, and powerful sensations cannot be explained by mental hallucination of the perfectly normal persons who relate them. It would also be equally inept to refer them to a long series of chance coincidences. It is therefore well established that at the moment of death some vibration takes place, moving something in nature, which occasionally gives information of the death to those who are sensitive. That is cryptesthesia, an unusual and supernormal faculty peculiar to sensitives. It generally takes an auditory or visual form, but most probably the vision itself is a hallucinatory symbol. A. dies and the notion of his death reaches B.'s subconsciousness. But in order that B. may understand, the creative power of subconscious imagination elaborates a phantom resembling A. more or less and surrounds the vision, which is really internal though seemingly external, with detail which may be symbolical or veridical, just as occurs in delirium and in dreams. We may provisionally suppose that death being a more moving event than the facts of daily life, it sets in motion a stronger vibration than the latter" (p. 325). "Let us simply say: A.'s death is a reality; B., by his cryptesthetic faculty, perceives that fact and represents it under the symbolical forms to which alone our intelligence is open" (p. 326).

Somewhere he says: "Dismiss tales of passing observers climbing trees and seeing fakirs cutting up a pumpkin when professing to dissect a child."

"The important fact is that suggestion does possess this power, and that by it worthy and honest persons can be brought to consent to things which are false in themselves and terrible in their consequences. There is no doubt that some of the crimes committed by women are due to hypnotic or even to simple suggestion" (De Dubor, *The Mysteries of Hypnosis*, p. 59). "Bernheim has attained the desired result after an interval of 63 days; Beaunis after 172 days; Liegeois at the end of a year" (p. 61). "Cases for which hypnotism would seem particularly adapted are those of aphronia (lack of discretion and practical judgment), want of malleability, and certain vices, such as kleptomania, moral perversity, and idleness" (p. 78). "When stubbornness is excessive it is one

of the most dangerous of mental follies" (p. 80). "If an artist has to act or sing beside a trembling or hesitating fellow-artist, fear will conquer him or her. A calm and self-possessed colleague will, on the contrary, communicate courage" (p. 83). This dread is want of faith or confidence; so somnambulists can do things of which they are incapable normally: this is the result of trust in the subconscious. A boxer or fencer cannot stay to reason; all must be done at once—at least in defence, and even in "attack," if it is to be successful. By practice, skill is made almost instinctive, and the belief that you have God on your side, the universe behind you, that you are doing right, prevents hesitation; and so "the right thing" is done in time, and justified to eternity. "It is the flying carpet," right out of the Arabian Nights, from which nobody ever tumbles; the angels, or something, bear you up; you are as stable as a pyramid, so long as you believe other people are the same way. In this faith resides a magic, that sees you through (B. B. Lindsay, *The Revolt of Youth*). "It is the falling back on all humanity, in place of an individual man."

The subjoined references are to, and the extracts from, *Thought Transference*, by Stacey Wilson, M.D.:—

"The following account of the Indian 'Rope trick,' given to the writer by a doctor who, when in India, had often seen it performed, shows how easy it must be for the Indian juggler to gain hypnotic influence over those around him, for suggestion of this type is clearly the explanation of such happenings. He said you will see the juggler take a rope and throw the end of it up into the air, and it then goes stiff and straight and the boy proceeds to climb up it; when he has got to the top he rests the centre of his chest upon it, and turns round as on a pivot. Then, at a word from the juggler, he comes down again, and the rope collapses. The basket trick is similarly explicable. The boy is put into the basket, and then a sword is run through it in all directions, and afterwards it is found to be empty and the boy comes running to the juggler from an adjacent street. Again, the juggler will make one side of a mango taste sour and unripe, and the other ripe and luscious, or the first few sips of a glass of water taste sweet, and the remainder too acid to swallow. And all this without

any evident attempt to gain hypnotic influence over those around him" (p. 40). "From what I have heard and read there is, I think, no doubt that under certain conditions hypnotic power can be exercised by thought transference when the hypnotizer is at a distance from the subject he is seeking to hypnotize" (p. 47). "The picture so dramatically and skilfully drawn in Browning's poem called 'Mesmerism' is not merely a figment of his imagination, but might have been drawn from real life." "To my mind there is no need for the intervention of any spirit influence. It is, I consider, simply and clearly explicable by what we know as to thought transference and memory-reading. If the account be thus explicable by laws which concern this world of ours and our own mental mechanism, I feel that we are not justified in seeking an explanation which involves the intervention of what are called spirit influences" (p. 55). "I find nothing in the true phenomena of spiritualism that is not explicable by what we know of the human brain and its activities, and that nothing of what I have heard and read of such phenomena requires for its explanation the intervention of any influence from the spirit world. . . . There is a very great probability of those present at a séance seeing and hearing just those things, and only those things, which the medium desires that they shall see and hear" (p. 57). "To try to develop, therefore, the faculty of receiving messages through the medium of thought-waves is to run the risk of undermining the basis of our sanity" (p. 45).

"We must recognize the possibility of the transference of spiritual thought between two friends, even though one of them has had his connection with the material body severed by death" (p. 68). "There appear to be many instances on record where the influence of some dead friend has been perceived definitely enough to call up a visual memory of that friend, and sometimes the memory may be vivid enough to constitute a definite vision of the well-known features or figure of the friend. . . . In the case of our Saviour, His spiritual presence with His disciples after His death did give them the certainty that He was with them, not only in spirit but also so far as His bodily presence was concerned" (p. 70). "It is possible that during the three years of His ministry the nerve-

energy available in His human brain would not suffice to attune more than a few men to His own pitch, and render them capable of carrying on His work after He had left them" (p. 105). "The spiritual element of our personality belongs to a higher plane of existence than the bodily mechanism, and can and does modify the activities of the latter in such a way as to give expression to itself in this material world" (p. 80). "A definite statement made with authority to someone who has faith in the words of the speaker will have much the same effect" (p. 87). "The key-note of all [Christ's] actions, all His words, His human life as a whole, and His death is to be found in a word of four letters, L O V E, God is love. He that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, for God is love" (p. 106).

"If the account in the Acts with regard to the apostles speaking to the people in foreign languages upon that memorable day of Pentecost could be taken as literally accurate, it would be quite believable considering the perfection of their spiritual attunement and of their consequent power of thought-contact with other men" (p. 110). "Many of the experiences which we speak of as religious spiritual experiences might result from hypnotism and thought transference alone" (p. 116). "They first went on board the ship, and spent a short time there in silent prayer: with the result that they felt certain that that was not the right ship for them to sail by. They therefore went on board an older and slower ship and felt quite satisfied that it would be right for them to go on that. This guidance proved right, for the slow ship arrived in time for the meeting, whereas the fast met contrary winds, and was delayed so much that it did not arrive in time" (p. 120). "During the voyage they also had Divine guidance, for when their ship had been several days at sea, the weather became very bad and no bearings could be taken. Then these Friends had the assurance given them that the ship was on the wrong course and would soon run on the rocks. They told the captain this, and he altered the course of the ship. When the weather cleared they found that on their former course they were heading straight for the Irish coast" (p. 120). [This reminds one of St. Paul's experiences; but there is no evidence that it was, in fact, not a "placebo" of the captain,

who like all shipmasters, was expert in calming fears and suggestions of passengers. It seems to me, to show a bias.—  
AUTHOR.]

“ [Coué] finds that in most cases the subject is sufficiently prepared by the emotional atmosphere of the collective sittings and by the preliminary suggestion exercised by the practitioner’s reputation” (Baudouin, *Suggestion and Auto-suggestion*, Allen & Unwin, 2nd ed. 1924, p. 215, note). “ Everyone knows the reputation of the clinique. To the simple-minded it is a place where Coué works miracles. For the first time in the history of mankind a genuinely scientific practitioner is the object of a collective faith analogous to that inspired in earlier days by certain mystics and charlatans: The public on which Coué acts by suggestion is a public on which suggestion has already been at work. . . . The newcomers sit among persons who have already attended numerous sittings, and who make no secret of their progress towards health. From sitting to sitting each patient can see how the others improve, can see how paralytics walk, how the deaf hear . . . and not until then do the new patients make trial for themselves” (p. 221). “ Liébault and Bernheim declared that they succeeded in conveying effective suggestions to at least 90 per cent. of their subjects. Vogt and Forel speak of successes with 97 per cent. Coué claims to have exceeded the latter. . . . About 98 per cent. of the population are susceptible” (p. 228). The Nancy School have given remarkable results in cases where ordinary psychotherapy had failed; several “ in which typical fibromata have completely disappeared” (p. 231). “ Most people, in fact, are greatly influenced by what is said and thought by those with whom they associate. The arguments of routinists and professional sceptics end by shaking their nascent confidence, above all when these are dinned into their ears day after day, or are presented in an elegant and logical form by a man who is cultivated though superficial” (p. 236).

According to De Dubor, “ The recent European War has familiarized us with the sad spectacle of innumerable men, whom poison gas and other horrible instruments of modern warfare had blinded. Dr. Gaston Durville, whilst medical officer in a military hospital, gave magnetic treatment to

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several war-blinded men, and had the great happiness of seeing his enterprise and skill crowned with success, and sight restored to many. . . . Lafontaine . . . who pursued his researches in the magnetic art during the second half of the last century, arrived at the conclusion that all cases of blindness caused by paralysis of the optic nerve were curable" (p. 107). The meaning of this is not quite clear, and the fact is open to question: but it is hard to set aside Prof. Richet's deliberate conclusions. If such things occur in these comparatively unimportant cases, there can be no wonder that Jesus appeared to His beloved disciples in the tragic circumstances of His death. There is no doubt that modern spiritualism does throw a very distinct light on the Gospel story—possession by devils, inspiration, speaking with tongues, the "Appearances," the "Ascension," all become intelligible, in a way not otherwise very evident. Sir William Crookes says: "There is scarcely a fact either in sacred or secular history which can be said to rest on better evidential foundation than this fact of levitation. I have seen Home on three occasions levitated completely from the floor to the ceiling. Moreover, I have received from other reliable eye-witnesses (Lord Dunraven, Lord Lindsay, and Col. Whynne) a clear and detailed account of similar levitations at which they were present. It is impossible to reject evidence like this unless we are prepared to discredit all human proof." The tale he tells is of Home going horizontally out of a first-floor window round to the next one, where he hovered while he opened this, and came in, floating. One cannot help recalling that Crookes in a letter to *The Times* stated that during a number of years he had made ten thousand analyses of London water, and had never found a pathogenic organism. An answer was published (in, I think, the *Journal of Sanitary Science*) that such a volume of work could not have been done by Crookes alone in the time named; that *B. typhosus* was the only one likely to occur, and finding this needs a long and laborious process; that though at first sight it seems very imposing, the test amounts only to taking half-a-thimbleful of water from the whole supply of each day, and one could not expect to find the microbe there; also, lastly, that the method used would not have discovered it, even if present.

Crookes states that "Katie's" pulse beat at a considerably lower rate than Miss Cook's, and that no sign of lung-weakness from which the medium was suffering was "perceptible in her double." Did he use a stethoscope, as well as kissing her and cutting off a lock of her hair? Really this tale is beyond the bounds of credibility. Joseph McCabe scouts the whole as a fraud, and says the alleged materialization did not take place in the Professor's house, and that two sisters were in league to deceive him. Their record is not immaculate, for they were exposed more than once.

Dr. F. H. van Eeden said at the Fourth International Congress of Psychology, Paris 1901, "Whilst studying the dreams and morbid ideas of the insane, I have had a very vivid impression that a malign, diabolical, or demoniacal influence was concerned with them, profiting by the physical weakness of a man to instil into him all sorts of terrible, sad, and absurd fancies" (quoted by J. G. Raupert, in *Modern Spiritism*, Kegan Paul, 1909, p. 17).

"True ecstasy I regard as the condition where the centre of consciousness changes from the supraliminal to the subliminal; and realizes the transcendental in place of the material" (Richet, p. 572). "It is hardly a paradox to say that the evidence for ecstasy is stronger than for any other religious belief. It is common to all religions; from the medicine-man of the savage up to St. Paul and St. John, with Buddha and Mahomet on the way, we find records that, morally and intellectually much different, still are in psychological essence the same: the shaman, the medicine-man, when he is not an impostor, enters as truly into the spiritual world as St. Peter or St. Paul" (p. 269). "We need not deny the transcendental ecstasy to any of the strong souls who have felt it; to Elijah, St. Paul, to Kant or to Swedenborg, to Dante, to St. Theresa or Joan of Arc, to Buddha, to Mahomet, to Virgil, to Tennyson, to Wordsworth. Through many ages, that insight and that memory have wrought their work in many ways. Religions and philosophies, as these have hitherto been known, are but balloon flights that have carried separate groups up to the mountain summit, whither science at last must make her road for all men clear" (p. 261). "The simplicity of our instinctive anthropomorphism is not the

simplicity of truth" (p. 265). "The prime need of man is to know more fully that he may obey more unhesitatingly the laws of the unseen world" (p. 273).

"Knowledge has been communicated by higher spirits either affecting individual minds, or, as is believed in the case of Christ, voluntarily incarnating themselves on earth for the purpose of teaching what they recollect of that spiritual world from which they came. In those ages it would have been useless to attempt a scientific basis for such teaching" (p. 265). "One may have listened to the echoing pomp of some Ecumenical Council thundering its damnations, *urbi et orbi*, from an infallible Chair, and yet one may find a more Christian sanctity in the fragmentary whisper of one true soul descending painfully from unimaginable brightness to bring strength and hope to kindred souls still prisoned in the flesh. The high possibilities that lie before us should be grasped once for all, so that the dignity of our quest may help to carry the inquirer through many disappointments, deceptions, delays. I will not say that there cannot be any such thing as occult wisdom, or dominion over the secrets of Nature, ascetically or magically acquired; but I will say that every claim of the kind that my colleagues or I have been able to examine has proved deserving of complete distrust. We have no confidence here, any more than elsewhere, in any methods except the candid, open, straightforward method that the spirit of modern science demands" (p. 277).

J. Godfrey Raupert, who appears to have great experience and faith in these apparitions, quotes Prof. Sir W. Barrett thus: "Granting the existence of a spiritual world, it is necessary to be on our guard against the invasion of our will by a lower order of intelligence and morality" (p. 120). He says that names are "never given straightforwardly and unhesitatingly" (p. 127); that Cicero is found to have misquoted Latin, and medical controls to have given wrong diagnoses (p. 130). "Yet these intelligences have access to knowledge which are wholly unknown to us," and use it to "furnish proof of identity" (p. 132).

"There is a general haziness about the messages where there is not positive error; it is extremely difficult to get definite and concise facts plainly put" (S. Moses, *Spirit Identity*,

p. 42). Prof. Perry says: "Their answers are, for the most part, evasive and trivial." Of Phinuit, Mrs. Piper's "control," Dr. Leaf writes (*Proc. S.P.R.*, VI, 560): "I do not see the least ground for believing that he is what he gives himself out to be, the spirit of a departed Marseilles physician. His ignorance of French is a positive ground, and one which he has never been able to explain." Dr. F. Richards affirms: "There is good reason for concluding that Phinuit is not a French doctor" (*Proc. S.P.R.*, VIII, 50). "There are lapses that cannot be explained" (Mrs. Sidgwick). "To my mind, this failure on the part of Moses is an obstacle to acceptance of the spiritualistic theory." "We have here a clear and proven case of spirit deception" (Newbold, *Proc. S.P.R.*, XXXIV. p. 142). According to Moses we meet with "vain figures strutting in borrowed plumes"; "Shakespeares who cannot spell, Bacons who cannot convey consecutive ideas." These impersonations have been allowed to continue their pranks for years, though every test of identity failed. "Occasionally, but rarely, the actual agency of a deceased person is indicated" (Sir O. Lodge). "If I was really holding intercourse with the deceased, he could never have made such errors as I found in my notes" (Dr. Van Eeden). "It is impossible to construct hypotheses, religious eschatologies, according to taste; and the passive medium will exhibit your machineries in full motion" (p. 193).

[Sir L. Farnell repeats Renan's remark that "God is said to have created man in His own image, and man has ever since been returning the compliment, by making God in his"; and now we have heaven also created by men to suit their own tastes. If you are an abstainer you have a paradise of teetotallers; if of the opposite persuasion then brandy and sodas, cigarettes and billiards are provided for you.—AUTHOR.] "They mix up fancy, fraud, and fact; so as to bewilder and perplex" (S. Moses). The religious views of the spirits in particular are the subject of most startling modifications. "Some spirits with a desire to please will say anything" (*ibid.*, p. 163). "Such motiveless lying bespeaks a deeply evil nature. I also believe that some or many of the lower phenomena are caused by beings who have not reached man's plane of intelligence" (p. 164).

There is scarcely an investigator of the truth who has not a story to tell of cunning and crafty deception, of deliberate falsehood and prevarication. "To resort to prevarication and falsehood to account for ignorance and failure is a moral defect" (Mrs. Sidgwick, *Proc. S.P.R.*, XXXVI. 162). "Phinuit's character is tricky, he has all sorts of ways of getting out of difficulties," says Dr. Hodgson. "A certain degree of moral perversity is a frequent characteristic of automaton expression" (Frank Podmore, p. 163). "The operating agents are mostly intelligences with a low aim and desires" (Dr. Du Pral, p. 176). "I have been able to count up over seventy mediums, most of whom abandoned their conjugal relations; others, living with their paramours, called 'affinities'; others in promiscuous adultery; and still others who exchanged partners" (Dr. Hatch, husband of a noted American trance-medium, p. 187). "Their pledges, the integrity of their oaths, are no more to be relied on than the shifting breezes" (p. 188).

"One of the most fascinating and seductive forms of subjective mental activity is exhibited in trance, or inspirational speaking" (Hudson, *The Law of Psychic Phenomena*, p. 330). "Millions have sat entranced by the eloquence of subjective speakers, and noted with profound admiration their accuracy of logical deduction" (p. 322). "It is an easy and pleasurable existence for the time being. . . . [The Medium] finds that there is no need of taking thought of what he is to say, for ideas, and words with which to clothe them, flow from him like a mountain torrent. . . . He believes . . . that he is inspired by some lofty spirit whose knowledge is unlimited and whose resources are unfailing" (pp. 330-1). "At length he becomes fitful, erratic, eccentric" (p. 331). "He assumes and believes that in the clearer light of the world of spirits many of the artificialities of mundane civilization are held in pitying contempt. . . . It all too frequently happens that one of the first 'artificial' institutions of society which becomes the object of private attack by the spiritual medium is the marriage relation" (p. 334). "It is well known to all men and women who are dissatisfied or unhappy in their marriage relations that they can find justification for illicit love by invoking the spirits of the dead through such mediums"

(p. 335). The spirits, writes Raupert, "teach one religion in America, another in England, another in France" (p. 198). Dr. W. Leaf says that "If Imperator and his assistants [Stainton Moses's controls] are really discarnate personalities, they are lying spirits . . . and it is upon their communications . . . that Modern Spiritualism has in large measure constructed itself" (p. 212).

"We are taught that there is no high, no low, no good, no bad; that murder is right, lying is right, adultery is right, slavery is right. That whatever is, is right (Dr. Potter, *Spiritism As It Is*, p. 301). Livy says of the "Mysteries," in 160 B.C.: "All criminal excesses find a place there—the great religious principle consists in regarding nothing as prohibited by morality. Men, as if inspired, prophesy, with violent gestures, of drunkenness, of fanaticism." A great trial followed, which resulted in numerous capital condemnations (Lenormant, "Bacchanalia," *Dict. Antiq. Romaine*, I, 500; Leuba, *Psychology of Mysticism*, p. 33).

Henry Frank says: "We must allow for the excitement, delusion, hallucination, and over-eagerness to accept what phenomena may be presented" (*Psychic Phenomena*, p. 395). And of Sir W. Crookes: "Some of his descriptions of the apparition seem to indicate almost a state of ecstatic admiration" for "Katie" (p. 79), a lock of whose hair he preserved. This removal of a part of a "spook," and the retention of it, was unique, I believe, till lately; but Prof. Richet records a similar experience. "A voice from behind the curtain said, 'Bring scissors to-morrow.' I brought the scissors next day. . . . As I was about to cut a lock high up, a hand behind the curtain lowered mine, so that I cut only about six inches from the end" (*Psychical Research*, p. 509).

The way these things repeat one another and do not produce anything fresh is astonishing. Why should not somebody fit glasses to a spirit? As Frank has pointed out: "If we are to admit that the Professor's reason was not shattered, we are perhaps compelled to admit that he saw these two forms as distinct and separate" (p. 197). "Because of the vast superstructure of fraudulent efforts upon what there may be of genuine in such manifestations, none can say what small moiety will ultimately remain as indisputable" (p. 454).

Yet he says of Crookes's photographs there happens to be perhaps but one such case in all the array of alleged genuine prints at least of sufficient importance to call for consideration in a scientific investigation of the problem we are discussing (p. 323). In the photograph of Dr. Geley, on a plate taken nine days after his death . . . the position is peculiar, and almost precludes faking. The other sitters include Stanley de Brathé, the translator of Prof. Richet's *Thirty Years of Psychical Research*. Richet also disparages spirit photography (*Psychical Research*, p. 484) : "As to doubles, effluvia, portraits of the deceased, of phantoms invisible to the sitters and perceptible only to the photographic plate, I do not think that anything decisive has yet been produced. What the eye does not see the plate rarely registers. The whole question of human effluvia, thought-forms (as Commander Darget has endeavoured to demonstrate them) must be studied anew from the beginning. Whatever Sir A. Conan Doyle may claim, it must be stated that, despite many attempts, nothing reliable has been proved" (p. 484). "The possibilities of elaborate fraud, difficult of detection, are greater here, than in any psychical phenomena of Psychism" (Bird, *My Psychical Experience*, 1924).

[There are many ways of faking "spooks"; they may be painted on the ground-glass screen in sulphate of quinine, or on the lens with collodion, or a small camera may be used inside the large one, worked from outside by a button. Any of these would frustrate Bird's precautions, but would not give a sharp image as good as that of Dr. Geley.—AUTHOR.]

Sir W. Crookes's photographs were "accidentally lost," forty or more of them. And where is the lock of hair that he says "he cut off," after having ascertained that it really grew from the scalp? There is in no museum specimen anything half so curious as this tress of hair from a "spirit" returned from the dead; yet he allowed it to be destroyed. Nothing I know of will equal it; unless the critics are right when they say that there was a record of the words of Christ in the very tongue He spoke, and the Church allowed it "to be lost." This, of course, is only inference; whereas the Spiritualists are constantly saying: "If one undoubted case of a deceased person communicating with the living can be established,

the question is ended." Yet, like the people in the Gospel, "though one rose from the dead," they did not believe. No case could possibly be more convincing if it is authentic, no witness could be more trustworthy than Sir W. Crookes. It is clear, then, that even "true believers" cannot credit his assertion; and indeed there is no warrant that this was a case in point, for "Katie" King is the revived daughter of the original old pirate "King." Crookes asserts only that she was the double of Florrie, whatever that may mean. Myers explains what a double is: "It is the same person under a different aspect." That is precisely what those who caught her out affirmed—that "they had hold of Florrie Cook; there was none else to be gotten." This is vouched for by Sir George Sitwell and Baron von Buch; Volckman had previously caught her at tricks. She was paid by Mr. Blackman not to take money at the door, but she did accept jewellery; she was, in fact, a duplicate, and not the innocent girl Sir W. Crookes conceived her to be. Even Serjeant Cox suspected her; she was pupil of Mr. Williams, husband of Mrs. Guppy, whose marvellous feats are discounted to-day even among spiritists. Yet, thirty years ago at Oxford a man of ability spoke of them as if they were miracles, and compared them with those of Christ. So quickly do apparently authenticated cases arise and vanish. In these matters it is my experience that makes me strongly sceptical—liar and cheat are the terms that would probably be used of her to-day; and it seems fairly agreed that professional mediums are not to be relied on in dark séances or "physical" manifestations.

Richet says: "Mrs. Williams was unmasked at a séance in Paris; there were found on her various things used to simulate phantoms, as in Eldred's case" (p. 456). "Completely criminal are such acts as those of Eldred or Mrs. Williams preparing paraphernalia for deliberate fraud, hidden in a chair or upon their person; this is radically different from the suspicious movements of an entranced medium" (p. 456). "There is a quasi-identity between the medium and the ectoplasm, so that when an attempt is made to seize the latter a limb of the medium may be grasped; though I make a definite and formal protest against this frequent defence of doubtful phenomena by spiritualists. More frequently the ectoplasm

is independent of the medium. . . . The case of Mme. d'Espérance (though she was open to suspicion) is on record to show that a medium may incur a long illness by reason of such an attempt" (p. 458).

Automatic writing and communications of that sort alone are now reckoned valid, apparently, to prove survival of the departed. "I prefer not to allude to the unpublished experiments which were told me at Warsaw or described to me by letter, by persons of good standing. They are so stupefying and hugely improbable that I unfortunately cannot bring myself to believe them" (Richet, *Psychical Research*, p. 542, *note*). They are, like Amerghino's discoveries of fossil men, too grand to be swallowed; Richet speaks of materializations as absurd, even when true (p. 544). "Two strong hands seized my two shoulders, and very bright lights came round a face. No trickery seems possible, but it must be remembered that we were dealing with a professional medium" (p. 545). "The facts narrated by Aksakoff did not convince me; even the putty cast of Eusapia's head did not seem to me certain, and I was sure that we had nothing really evidential in the way of moulds, when in 1921 we were able to study these phenomena with a Polish medium—Kluski—at the Metapsychic Institute. Geley and I took the precaution of introducing, unknown to any other person, a small quantity of cholesterin in the bath of melted paraffin wax placed before the medium during the séances. This substance is soluble in paraffin without discolouring it, but on adding sulphuric acid it takes a deep violet-red tint; so that we could be absolutely certain that any moulds obtained . . . could not have been prepared in advance but must have been produced during the séance itself. . . . During the séance the medium's hands were held firmly by Geley and myself on the right and on the left, so that he could not liberate either hand. A first mould was obtained of a child's hand, then a second of both hands, right and left; a third time of a child's foot. The creases in the skin and the veins were visible on the plaster casts made from the moulds. By reason of the narrowness at the wrist these moulds could not be obtained from living hands, for the whole hand would have to be withdrawn through the narrow opening at the wrist" (p. 543).

Stainton Moses quotes Dr. Collyer, *'Psychography* (W. H. Harrison, 1878), p. 138: "That many persons with partially developed powers have resorted to deception I am equally convinced. I have discovered on many occasions false representations, but these do not militate against the genuine phenomena." And from Mr. M. H. Harrison, Editor of the *Spiritualist*: "Observation . . . proved to me that the materialized hands common at séances were most frequently the duplicates of those of the medium. . . . I noticed that they [the messages] were nearly always in the handwriting of the medium" (p. 125). "'Mr. Simmons' said 'there was usually a strong resemblance'" (p. 125). "It is impossible to say of a given public Psychic, like Monk or Slade, that he does or does not know such a fact, or has or has not ever heard of it in his past life. I could only say that it was unlikely" (p. 70). "It is probable that Psychography could be obtained in any given language, provided a person were present who understood that language . . . on rare occasions a language is used with which no person present is familiar" (p. 79). "Professional Psychics, who, having an interest in producing them for money, may be supposed to be under some temptation to manufacture a counterfeit when the real article is not forthcoming" (p. 80). "Absolute blind faith . . . is necessary to the full development of will-power" (p. 139). "Blind faith is essential to the exercise of will-power. It is the will-power during an abnormal or exalted state of brain which produces all these varied phenomena" (p. 139). "Doubt your own capacity, and it ceases to exist. Conviction of power is the surest road to success" (p. 130).

"The sum of what I have stated may be resolved into the following propositions:

- (1) That there exists a Force which operates through a special type of human organization, and which is conveniently called Psychic Force.
- (2) That this Force is (in certain cases) demonstrably governed by Intelligence.
- (3) That this Intelligence is (in certain cases) probably not that of the person or persons through whom the Force is evolved.
- (4) That the Force, thus governed by an external Intelligence,

manifests its action in (among other methods) the writing of coherent sentences without the intervention of any of the usual methods of writing.

(5) That the evidence for the existence of this Force, thus governed by an external Intelligence, rests upon (*a*) the evidence of the observer's senses; (*b*) a language other than that known to the Psychic is frequently used; (*c*) the subject-matter of the writing is frequently beyond the knowledge of the Psychic; and (*d*) it is demonstrably impossible to produce the results by fraud" (p. 127). "As a matter of fact, no case is here recorded that took place in darkness; none where any such imposture as he refers to was possible; none where the critics can fairly say every reasonable precaution was not taken to ensure fair and straightforward acting. These special phenomena are produced not only in public, and for gain, but in private and without the presence of any person outside of the family circle" (p. 128).

These conditions resemble very nearly those detailed by Richet (*loc. cit.*), who would be quite ready to admit that the "intelligence was the secondary personality of the medium"; he remarks that "the precautions taken were wholly insufficient in those days." Stainton Moses, I believe, in spite of his apparent moderation, was fierce in his assertion of spirit action. It is clear that his results "are not accepted to-day as final"; yet if they were regarded as beyond question they would seem almost to settle the point at issue; at any rate, they were more convincing, as stated, than the "cross-question and crooked answer" method in vogue, where two and two have to be put together, and after a long interval, by chance, somebody can make something out of contradictory messages, in the manner of answers to magazine acrostics. "This is the magic secret of the kabalist, the grand truth enunciated in days long past by Jesus Christ: 'Thy faith has saved thee' . . . the sole secret of success, a will that knows no 'perhaps' and a faith whose confidence no temporary failure can shake" (p. 143). Such are the requisites of Spiritualism according to a great and original high-priest of the sect, a curious jumble of ideas which justify doubts. "If Moses was sane or sober in his views" he is strangely set aside by the modern adepts, who appear to ignore him altogether, or at least to

put little weight on his conclusions and beliefs. *Sic transit gloria mundi.* Now we have ghost stories, and haunted houses, and cock-and-bull tales from all the world which are used "to get the habits and methods of such beings." In this way it might be possible to get from fairy tales the habits of these also, and those of giants.

Professor Richet narrates that "at the house of Prof. E. of Christiania, in 1893, M. de Bergen arranged a series of séances with Mme. d'Espérance, in which . . . an extremely beautiful female form appeared calling herself Nepenthes. She showed herself in the light at the same time as the medium, who was sitting with other persons outside the cabinet, and materialized in the midst of the circle. She plunged her hand into liquid paraffin wax, leaving a mould of a rare beauty. The modeller who made the plaster cast could not believe his eyes, and spoke of sorcery, because he could not imagine how the hand could have been extricated from the paraffin wax. Professor Aksakoff published a memorandum as to Mme. d'Espérance, to which it would seem too much importance has been ascribed. Mr. Carrington has shown that if there was no fraud, fraud was quite possible. Professor Aksakoff very loyally gives the evidence of several persons present at this alleged dematerialization who did not accept it as genuine: for example, the engineer Schonelz. The honesty of Mme. d'Espérance may very well be admitted, by an unconscious backward motion of her legs she may have given rise to the notion or may have herself thought that her lower limbs were dematerialized for a time. A medium named Sambor . . . gave a series of séances from 1896 to 1902, which are recorded in the Russian Spiritist journal *Rebus*. Perovsky-Petrovo-Solovovo has raised some doubt even as to those at which he was present" (pp. 538-9). "One of the sitters intentionally released Sambor's hand that he was supposed to be holding . . . But this does not explain the phantom seen by all at Sambor's side, for the complicity seems to have been limited to the release of one hand. All the same, legitimate doubts may be cast upon all Sambor's mediumship, for there is no certainty of his probity nor that of the circle. It is scarcely worth while to mention the very old experiments by Dale Owen in New York in 1860, and, as the

phenomena were given by one of the Fox sisters, then Mrs. Underhill, they cannot be trusted. Still it is probable, as in so many cases with Leah Fox, there was an admixture of genuine phenomena " (p. 540).

Dr. Gray cut off a piece of the garment of the materialized form, which melted little by little in his hands (Erny). " This must be accepted as genuine unless Dr. Gray was a low imposter " (p. 540). [And so, presumably, must the vanishing money of fairy tales; there is no warrant that the whole was not a delusion.—AUTHOR.] " A New York banker, Mr. Livermore, had about a hundred séances at his own house with Leah Fox, and many times recognized his deceased wife, whom he ardently desired to see " (p. 540). " The phenomena recorded of Home, Florence Cook, Eusapia, and Miss Goligher . . . are unassailable. Those of Marthe-Eva, of Linda Gazzera, Mrs. Salmon, Eglinton, and Mme. Lacombe acquire full value from the others, and this value is considerable; nor do I see reason to dismiss entirely those of M. Corrales, Sambor, and perhaps those of Mme. d'Espérance " (p. 542). " Materializations, however perfect, cannot prove survival; the evidence that they sometimes seem to give is much less striking than that given by subjective metapsychics " (p. 490). " The case of George Pelham, though there was no materialization, is vastly more evidential for survival than all the materializations yet known. I do not even see how decisive proof could be given " (p. 542). " A kind of nebulous, gelatinous, substance exudes from the medium's body and gradually is organized into a living, moving form " (p. 491).

Sir W. Crookes says: " 'A little hand, very beautifully formed, rose from the table and gave me a flower. It appeared and disappeared three times, giving me every opportunity to convince myself that it was as real as my own; this took place in the light, in my own room, while I was holding the medium's hands and feet ' " (p. 492). " A hand has been repeatedly seen by myself and others playing the keys of an accordion, both of the medium's hands being visible at the same time and sometimes being held. . . . The hands and fingers do not always appear to me to be solid and lifelike; sometimes, indeed, they present more the appearance of a nebulous cloud partly condensed into the form of a hand. This is not

equally visible to all present. For instance, a flower or other small object is seen to move. . . . I have more than once seen . . . a luminous cloud appear to form about it . . . condense into shape and become a perfectly formed hand. At this stage the hand is visible to all present. . . . To the touch the hand sometimes appears icy cold and dead, at other times warm and lifelike. . . . I have retained one of these hands in my own firmly resolved not to let it escape . . . but it gradually seemed to resolve itself into vapour; and faded in that manner from my grasp" (*Crookes, Researches in the Phenomena of Spiritualism*, p. 92).

"Hitherto I have seen nothing to convince me of the 'spiritual' theory. In such an inquiry the intellect demands that the spiritual proof must be absolutely incapable of being explained away . . . that we cannot, dare not deny it. . . . I confess that the reasoning of some spiritualists would almost seem to justify Faraday's severe statement that many dogs have the power of coming to much more logical conclusions" (p. 48). "Even the admirable work of William Crookes (1872) brought no conviction; he, like Zollner, remained isolated. No one would believe what these two eminent men of science asserted: it was said that they had been deceived, illusionized . . . humbugged. The Society for Psychical Research, together with E. Gurney, Myers, H. Sidgwick, and Podmore, started with the axiom . . . that there are no material phenomena, that everything is subjective. But in the forty years from 1880 to 1920 ideas have evolved. . . . This scepticism is comprehensible when one reads the descriptions of the extraordinary séances given by some mediums" (*Richet*, pp. 445-6). We may take it, then, that there is a consensus of authorities against the spiritualistic view, that there is no sufficient evidence of the actions of the dead. Serjeant Cox says (*Crookes, Researches in Spiritualism*, p. 101): "We contend that there is as yet insufficient proof of any other directing agent than the Intelligence of the Medium, and no proof whatever of the agency of Spirits of the Dead."

"Simple rustics like Eusapia do not understand that simulation of a phenomenon is a serious crime; they do not recognize the enormity of the fraud. They say: 'People want phenomena; well, we'll give them what they want.' . . . Trance

turns them into automata that have but a very slight control over their muscular movements. When a medium is nearly or quite insensible, his eyes shut, sweating and making convulsive movements, unable to answer questions put to him, I do not think he ought to be reproached for anything he may do. He is not himself: he has not that poised and quiet consciousness which can decide between right and wrong" (Richet, p. 457). "It is also quite easy to understand that when exhausted by a long and fruitless séance, and surrounded by a number of sitters eager to see something, a medium whose consciousness is still partly in abeyance may give the push that he hopes will start the phenomena" (p. 458). "Although Boursnell and Buguet found many disciples, and although there may have been many frauds that have been accepted as genuine phenomena, it is consoling to know that fraud always fails in the long run; it cannot defeat prolonged and careful experiment" (p. 459).

"Photographs, impressions on blackened paper, on clay, or on paraffin wax, have no value in themselves; everything depends on the conditions. There are photographs so skilfully counterfeited that I should make no conclusions at all on any such shown to me unless the circumstances under which they were produced were given with such precise detail as to make all trickery impossible" (p. 460). "But for materializations which with some exceptions are only produced in the dark, it is necessary to be very exacting as to the conditions" (pp. 461-2). "It is quite obvious that no séances to which all and any persons are admitted on payment count for nothing" (p. 462). "Even if the circle is a limited one, and composed of sincere and honourable persons, it is possible that some of these persons may be childishly credulous. The medium can then do as he likes. . . . They are generally very ordinary men or women who have discovered in themselves strange capabilities which surprise them at first, and then are turned to a source of profit and made into a trade. The Fox sisters did this from the beginning of their surprising manifestations" (p. 463).

We have been offered all sorts of proofs: first, sealed letters were left which the writers promised to "reveal the contents of, after death." This ended in absolute fiasco; the

spirits knew nothing about their own writing. Then we were told that the same medium could write with both hands and speak at the same time, delivering three messages from different people simultaneously; that also did not materialize, as once hoped and asserted. "Cross Answers" and enigmas of one sort or another were also set up as infallible evidence of spiritual action; but years have passed and those which seemed at first fairly to bear out the pretence have turned out very disappointing and inconclusive. Most of those who bragged of the method and its success have "passed over," yet a convincing case has not come to hand. A tenth edition of Sir O. Lodge's book was published in 1926; but, so far as I can make out, it is merely a reprint of that of 1919, or even of 1909. Apparently the cross-communications have failed altogether to produce any conclusive results and are replaced by materializations and "spirit photographs," which Richet explains by "ectoplasm," and not by a spirit. An eminent man of science and physician, he accepts practically all the results, but wholly repudiates as unproved the spiritualistic account of it. Dr. Hodgson's theory, that the "communicators on the other side are also in a state of trance," and that only in this condition is it possible for a mind there to "communicate with one here, and so there is confusion on both sides," is an ingenious but purely imaginary view, invented *ex post facto* to explain away circumstances that did not fulfil expectations.

Joseph McCabe, though perhaps not a very impartial witness, has had considerable experience, and is quite explicit in his assertion that these trances are "a sham." "Séances are a tedious and most irritating way of convincing oneself that these people are all frauds"—*i.e.*, all professional mediums. "There is a vast amount of fraud in automatic writing, even in private," and "a great deal more delusion." People seem to think it "a joke" to mislead in such things for the "good of the souls of others"; they exaggerate their experiences, just as they do in other spiritual matters. "The spiritualist tells of flowers with the fresh dew on them, of fruit and living objects being carried through closed windows and even solid brick walls."

Sir W. Crookes naturally asks that an "additional weight (if it be only the one thousandth part of a grain) be deposited

on one pan of his balance when the case is locked. And the chemist asks for the thousandth of a grain of arsenic to be carried through the sides of a glass tube in which pure water is hermetically sealed" (*Researches in Spiritualism*, 1874, pp. 6, 62). Crookes quotes an eminent chemist as saying: "Either a new and most extraordinary natural force has been discovered, or some very eminent men specially trained in rigid physical investigation have been the victims of a most marvellous, unprecedented, and inexplicable physical delusion. I say unprecedented, because, although we have records of many popular delusions of similar kind and equal magnitude, and speculative delusions among the learned, I can cite no instance of skilful experimental experts being utterly, egregiously, and repeatedly deceived by the mechanical action of experimental test apparatus, carefully constructed and used by themselves" (p. 61).

We are, then, face to face with the alternative that, seemingly, spiritism is a hoax that shows how readily men are hoodwinked by evil spirits—a belief that finds some support in Scripture and in the teaching of the Church—or that it is based on genuine phenomena and is distinctly opposed to Christian tenets because it affords an explanation of the facts by which these are commonly thought to be proved. Indeed, in its advocates we find two classes: those who accept both and do not trouble as to how they may be reconciled—that is, the thoughtless, ordinary people who do not bother as to what they do not understand; and those who realize that the two are in fact incompatible. It may be contended that "these are isolated units, that the bulk of believers hold to both"; but they are the leaders, the Scribes of the movement who are most likely to know the truth and estimate correctly its logical bearing. The others "may be the Pharisees, who cling to every exploded faith even when it may be clearly shown that its basis is gone completely."

It is only fair, however, to say that Sir O. Lodge is inclined to this position, though in his last book he takes up a very unorthodox position. Conan Doyle is outspoken on the other side, and sceptical in the extreme; but when doctors disagree, who shall hold the scale? Doyle sets up as the St. Paul of a new religion, making apostolic journeys, with his

whole family and two attendants. "If we have once got a man's *thought* operating apart from his body, if my 'fixation of attention' on, say, the two of diamonds does so modify another's brain a few yards off that he seems to see the two of diamonds floating before him, there is no obvious halting place on his side till we come to 'possession' by a departed spirit; and on my side till we come to 'travelling clairvoyance,' with a corresponding visibility of my phantasm to other persons, in the scenes I spiritually visit" (*Lodge, The Survival of Man*, amended 9th edition, 1919, p. 133). The survival of spirits seems to be assumed in this book; but Richet holds that appearances do not imply any reality. In other words, that things may "appear" to us so real as to force belief of their presence.

This seems to me to go far to explain the "Resurrection" of Jesus by an appearance to Mary Magdalene. To quote Goguel (*Jesus the Nazarene*) (pp. 91-290): "If Paul believed in the resurrection it was not because of the prophecies; but because of the apparition he had seen." According to his own words, it was not from anything he had learnt from the others, but because of his "heavenly vision"; even to the teaching of Christ he was almost indifferent, he quotes it on only five subjects, and his own doctrine is quite other than that of the gospels—theological, rather than moral. "Many of these letters [the Epistles of Paul] have disappeared, and amongst those preserved to us several seem to have undergone various alterations" (p. 81). "One is forced to cultivate the mentality of antiquity in order to understand the conceptions in virtue of which the theology of primitive Christianity (and especially that of Paul) attempted to explain in the person and work of Jesus that which surpassed the common standard of humanity" (p. 97). "The point of view of Paul might be better styled 'monolatry' than 'monotheism'" (p. 111). "According to Romans He died (although He was not in person a sinner, but through solidarity with humanity accepted by Him) because God treated Him as though He were sin itself, and inflicted the chastisement which sinners deserve" (p. 127). "'Communion' with the son of God, the Lord, appears as an ideal held up to the faithful. He who is united with the Lord becomes a spirit with Him. . . . The explanation

of this union is furnished by the idea of the death of Christ in solidarity with humanity. ‘As one died for all, therefore, all died’” (p. 120). “The manifestations of Christ took place at a recent date, at a time which he considers the last in the world’s history” (p. 144). “The Epistle to the Philippians similarly affirms that salvation is not yet attained. It is at the second coming of the Lord that it shall be fully realized (Rom. viii, 18–25)” (p. 134). “We would say without hesitation it is the penalty of the association in Paul’s thought of two incongruous elements . . . Paul resolved the difficulty by dividing the mission of the Messiah into two parts and in reserving for the glorious return of Christ . . . everything it was possible to discover as accomplished in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus” (p. 135).

“The first Epistle of Peter shows how the theological interpretation of the Gospel history, already vaguely outlined in the preceding generation, tended to become substituted for the history itself” (p. 145). “There are, on the other hand, in the Apocalypse certain pictures which have a distinctly mythical character. The Messiah there appears completely stripped of all human features” (p. 149). The concept of sufferings and death of the Messiah that the Christians had such a need to discover in the Old Testament was by their own confession contained there only in so obscure a way that a special capacity was required to find it; *e.g.* in 4 Macc. vi. 29. “‘For their sake be satisfied with my punishment. Make of my blood a means of purification, and accept my life for their ransom’” (p. 159). “Doubtless Matthew has exaggerated (xxi. 8) in speaking of a great multitude who acclaimed Jesus. Mark has the Greek word which may signify ‘some’” (p. 167). In Mark xv. 24, the clothing of victims belonged to the executioners; this is nothing out of the way (p. 170). No mention of the nails in the hands is found before the fourth Gospel, nor in the feet before Justin (pp. 174–5). “The fourth evangelist did not claim to substitute his work for that of his predecessors; to a fairly large extent it would not be clearly intelligible without them” (p. 181). Luke’s “work thus shows an attempt to include narratives which originally were works of edification into the literary domain proper” (p. 181). “It was only at a relatively late period that the word ‘gospel’

was interpreted in the sense . . . a book which narrated the history of Jesus" (p. 184). "They expected the early return of Christ, whose task was to complete the work of redemption already begun, and all interest in organization was completely foreign to their minds. In so far as they had need of an authority, they found it in the Old Testament and in the persuasion that they had been inspired and guided by the Spirit" (p. 185).

"The chronology of the life of Jesus presents in later tradition a singular vacillation" (p. 187). "We have neither in the canonical tradition nor in that which is extra-canonical any precise indication concerning the times in which the facts of Gospel history took place" (p. 186). "It follows from the preceding analysis that the plan of Luke's work has no independent value of its own. It is a mere enlargement of that of Mark" (p. 199). "The primitive tradition has not been preserved in its integrity because a dogmatic construction has been substituted for the account of the real development of the story of Jesus" (p. 202). "The faith in the resurrection was in its origin an affirmation and a conviction of a religious nature, and it was not an experimental observation" (p. 227). "The abandonment of Jesus by His disciples can be interpreted in two ways." Gospel tradition makes an attempt to explain if not to excuse it, as a realization of prophecy (*Zech. xiii. 7*) (p. 229). "The priority of Mark's narrative compared with that of Matthew is beyond question. The apparition of Jesus to the women is under suspicion; Mark would not have suppressed it if he had found it in the source of his work. . . . In John's narrative (xx. 1-18) the relation between the empty tomb and the apparitions is closer still. Jesus appears to Mary Magdalene, and two disciples come to the tomb to investigate the women's assertion. One of them 'sees and believes'" (pp. 232-3). "The Jerusalemite tradition of Luke arises from downright juggling with the phrases in Mark on which the Galilean tradition rests" (p. 235). "A reminiscence of the myth concerning the death and resurrection of the god may have prepared the minds of men to conceive the idea of the resurrection of the Messiah" (p. 228). "The idea that a phantom cannot eat, and that an apparition which is taken for a spirit offers a decisive proof of his corporeal reality by sitting down

to a repast, appears to be widely disseminated in folk-lore" (p. 223, *note*).

"According to the oldest tradition, it was not before the Sunday morning that the disciples quitted Jerusalem; they desired, therefore, to know the issue of events in the drama" (p. 230, *note*). "It was in Galilee that the disciples had their first visions. . . . The time of the first apparition cannot be fixed with precision. . . . The intense feeling of a spiritual presence being easily transformed into the sense of a real presence. At first there must have been some indifference as regards the details of the apparition narratives, so exclusively were minds dominated by the sentiment of the presence of and the life of the Christ. It is this which explains that the narratives at an early date took forms of sufficiently varied character, and ended in the extreme diversity which we observe between the accounts known to us" (p. 240). "The Galilean tradition may have been obliterated when . . . it was possible to speak of an order given by Jesus . . . not to leave Jerusalem" (Acts i. 4, p. 236). It will, I think, come as a surprise to most that two of the chief passages in the Old Testament on which Christians rely are not in the Hebrew at all, but only in the Septuagint. "The words 'Until he send forth judgment unto victory,' words giving a clear Messianic stamp to the personage described, are not in either the original Hebrew, or the Greek of the Septuagint. Where did the Gospel writer get them? The rendering of the final words 'in him shall the Gentiles trust' which is in the Greek of the Septuagint, is imported from an undoubtedly Messianic passage in Isaiah xi." (M. Arnold, *Literature and Dogma*, p. 47).

The very same occurs with New Testament verses in support of doctrinal points: John v. 7 is definitely rejected in the Revised Version as spurious. Of Romans ix. 5 Canon Sandy says: "These words are a well-known subject of controversy; the title 'God' does not appear to be applied elsewhere to our Lord by St. Paul. In First Timothy iii. 16 the true reading should be, 'who was manifest'; not 'God manifest'; but many read in John i. 18 'God' for 'Son'; e.g., all the old fathers, Eusebius, Origen, Basilides, Tertullian, Clement, Ambrose, and others, 'deliberately,' says Tischendorf." The question of quotation in the New from the Old Testament, is

curious and complicated; that the Septuagint should be used in Matthew, which is said to have been written in Aramaic for Hebrews, that it should have been so in the Epistle to the Hebrews, and by St. Paul, is really astonishing. Luke makes Peter quote it, and Stephen and Philip, where Archdeacon Plumptre says, of viii. 37: "This is a striking illustration of the tendency to improve Scripture that showed itself at a very early period: it existed in the time of Irenæus, but is wanting in all the best MSS." The Jews were hopelessly set on cheating, even in Holy things. St. Paul had to take precautions against forgery, yet it seems impossible that anyone should then imitate his style with success.

Prophecy as practised in Judea and elsewhere is quite intelligible in the light of spiritist phenomena. From the account given of him, clearly Samuel was a "seer" or medium who would find lost things for a small fee—the remains of food in Saul's wallet appear to have been enough, or a quarter shekel (*7s. 9d.* in our money). Joseph was a "crystal-gazer" seemingly; Balaam may also have been one. Such things have been practised in the East for ages. "I heard several times, 'Go to Volterra'; I was dizzy with its repetition. M. Volterra implored me to follow him at once and see his son; his [the son's] aspect was hideous, he sometimes crawled on his belly like a serpent, with constant choreic spasm accompanied by hissings, howlings, barkings. Sometimes he fell on his knees; sometimes he talked and quarrelled with imaginary persons; crises were followed by periods of profound syncope. When I opened the door he darted at me furiously; but I stood my ground, and seized him by the arm, looking him fixedly in the face. In a few minutes his gaze fell; he trembled all over and fell to the ground with his eyes shut. I made mesmeric passes over him; and in half an hour he had fallen into somnambulic sleep: the cure lasted two and a half months, during which many interesting things were observed. Since its completion the patient has had no return of his malady" (Gurney, Myers, and Podmore, *Phantasms of the Living*, p. 120). The narrator was "M.O.H." in the Hellenic army, and the account is signed by five persons, including the patient, his father, and three Counts.

This reminds one of several similar instances in the Bible,

especially the case portrayed in Raphael's "Transfiguration." Indeed, the whole story told of that event recalls what is recounted of spirit séances. Many references in Scripture indicate a similar procedure, "speaking with tongues" and "trying the spirits," of which no intelligible explanation is given in modern commentaries, which are always misty on such points. Apparently the above-cited case was capable of "mind-cure." In his article on "Medicine" (*H.D.B.*), Prof. Macalister says those in Luke xiv. and xv. were not. "The mystical character of St. Paul's religious experience and teaching is not always sufficiently recognized. His Christian career began with a sudden conversion attended by visions and auditions. He was taken up into the 'third heaven' and heard 'unspeakable words which it is not lawful for man to utter'; and he spoke frequently with tongues (*glossolalia*). The Christian life was for him the life of Christ in man. . . . The ecstasy of Montanus is said to have been deliberately induced. . . . He regarded himself as a passive instrument, a lyre, upon which played the divine plectrum. The prophecies were usually delivered in great excitement and often in an 'unknown tongue'" (*Leuba, Religious Mysticism*, p. 50).

"Two features of this movement are of interest to us: the idea of a God communicating himself through the passive instrumentality of the prophet who became the mouthpiece of the Divinity, and the presence of ecstasy—that is, of an extraordinary rapturous condition involving obscuration or total disappearance of self-consciousness" (pp. 50-1). "These mystics, it may be said, are not the most worthy of admiration. They are rather extravagant instances, all or most of whom suffered from some form of nervous instability, if not hysteria" (p. 56). "A warning should be added regarding a trait common in different degrees to all our great mystics. Their writings are marred by an inexactness approaching at times deliberate falsehood. This defect is due . . . to a strong natural tendency to exaggeration" (p. 59). "We shall not insist here upon the warmth and intimacy of Suso's love-relation with the feminine *Ewige Weisheit*" (p. 61). "Her [Mme. Guyon's] return to divine favour is bound up in a very illuminating way with the birth of tender relations with a

certain Father la Combe. . . . Mme. Guyon now entered upon a period of feverish activity . . . preached moral perfection through passivity . . . healed bodies as well as souls. Her activity was attended by curious manifestations of automatisms and by the elaboration of strange doctrines" (pp. 80-2). "To that passionate woman the erection of an altar to her Heavenly Bridegroom at her very door was an inflammatory event" (p. 91). "For a considerable time at the beginning of this second period Mme. Guyon walked on clouds of glory" (p. 93). "At one magic stroke, the despised Cinderella became the bride of the King of Heaven" (p. 92). "Her dependence upon the Father appears conspicuously, some would say shockingly, in her pursuit of him" (p. 95). "The first part of the fourth period was marked by striking manifestations of various forms of dissociation; by automatisms, and high suggestibility, as well as by love-ecstasies. We find no clear evidence of important moral improvement" (p. 99).

[This is just what we see in "Spiritualism." There are all sorts of amazing things—materialization, automatic writing, presence of the spirits of the dead—but nothing worth hearing comes of it. An old fool is told he used to be called "Tommy" when a boy, and stupid deeds of stupid persons are set out in tedious detail, yet nothing new results, nothing valuable.

—AUTHOR.]

"The relations of certain classes of patients to their physicians and its practical results, especially when they hypnotize their patients, is in a surprising degree similar to the relation of the mystic with his God and to its results" (p. 120). "Dr. Ferez writes of a certain physician that though he does not consciously hypnotize, this physician exercises upon his patients considerable psychical influence" (p. 123). "Did not something similar happen to Mme. Guyon when she met Father la Combe; and in general to those who live in the divine Presence?" (p. 124). "Because their husbands have not known how to assume the rôle of directors of their minds" (p. 125). "St. Francis was attached to Santa Clara, Suzo to Elizabeth Staglin, Francois de Sales to Mme. de Chantal, Mme. Guyon to Father la Combe, etc. Moreover, their temperament favoured the appearance of auto-suggestive

phenomena, they acquired at times, in particular during the ecstasy, the concreteness of a bodily presence" (p. 143). "There takes place then between the soul and God such a sweet love transaction that it is impossible for me to describe what passes'" (*Life of St. Theresa*, p. 354). "This mixture of exquisite pain with incomparable delight is usual in mystical love-ecstasy. The pain, as much as the pleasure, indicates most probably . . . the participation of sex-organs tormented by an insufficient stimulation. Of Catherine of Genoa it is related that, when at prayer, 'she received suddenly such a love-wound in her heart that put her beside herself'" (pp. 144-5). "The obvious rôle played by persons of the male sex in the production of her love-trances makes the case of Mme. Guyon particularly useful; in her devotion, La Combe and Christ became one" (p. 146). "Mystics of the Middle Ages could compare their ecstasies, altogether spiritual, to the enjoyment and the embraces of human love" (p. 148). "When . . . she realized clearly that the Power revealed to her was not the divine, *personal* being she needed, her [Mlle. Ve's] extraordinary trances soon came to an end" (p. 149).

"St. Theresa" has: "'The voice of the Well-Beloved causes in the soul such transports that she is consumed' by desire'" (p. 150). "The production of an inordinate degree of sexual excitement is greatly favoured by the semi-trance condition during which it happens" (p. 151). "The great mystics have been in respect of love, as also in other respects, daring experimenters" (p. 152). "In its strenuous effort to curb the flesh and the pride of spirit, asceticism is in obvious opposition with the doctrine of passivity" (p. 155). "If the mystical trance stops at the 'complete sleep of the powers,' it is because, as the mystic grows somnolent and mental activity ceases, his idea of God fades out and he loses the stimulating and directing influence exerted by that idea" (p. 172). "Complete 'surrender to God' in a trance, and complete surrender of the selfish will in the affairs of daily life, are, as a matter of fact, very different things. . . . As to St. Theresa herself, the account she gives of her trances is far from agreeing entirely with her theory" (p. 173). "What St. Theresa has pictured under the name of Spiritual Marriage or Deification is therefore not an

additional and final stage . . . beyond what she names Ecstasy ; but her conception of the final condition of the purified soul. . . . The tendency to confuse the passivity of unconsciousness with the universalization of the individual will is facilitated by the fact that the mystic enters the trance with his mind fixed on God " (p. 175). " In this state, the soul may be drawn to ' content herself with thinking of God or of His presence in a confused and general manner ' " (p. 177). " Trances become mystical when they are regarded as divine possession or as due to a divine intervention " (p. 182).

In crystal gazing, automatic writing, and other spiritualistic actions, a tone of repose, of emptiness, is pressed upon observers ; it is when in a state of " day-dreaming," of somnolence, of disengagement, that the spirit speaks to the inner mind. This is quite in keeping with what we know of the subliminal, that it comes into action mostly when the conscious mind is in abeyance, more or less ; that you have premonitions and appearances just when you are half asleep ; that the warnings and suggestions of another world are sent to you from the realm of the unknown, the universe of the spiritual, of the sublime, the highest, chiefly. " There is a psychological condition prerequisite to all auto-suggestion. This is that the idea should have a notable intensity, an intensity which is mainly the outcome of attention. An idea upon which attention is peculiarly concentrated is an idea which tends to realize itself " (Baudouin, *Suggestion and Auto-suggestion*, 1924, p. 27). " In certain persons trances can be brought about practically at will. They are induced, auto-suggestively, according to the method of the Hindoo Yogan, of the Mohammedan Sufis, of certain so-called spirit mediums (Mrs. Piper, for instance) " (Leuba, p. 183). " A chance event, making her feel her loneliness, would stir up in Mlle. Ve passionate yearnings for divine companionship, and the coming of the Friend or of the great Experience would be hastened " (p. 186).

In the *Life of St. Theresa* we have: " ' I was as motionless as if death had stiffened my limbs; I had merely the strength to move one finger. . . . People hardly dared approach me; my whole body was sadly bruised, I could not stand the contact of any hand. . . . During nearly three years I

remained paralysed'" (p. 198). Mme. Guyon "during a severe illness marked by paryses, contractures, hyperæsthesias, etc., returned to 'the state of the child' . . . her yearning worked itself out into the mimicry of a child" (p. 199). Ecstasy in epileptic cases is "assigned to a purely physiological cause" (p. 206). "'Sometimes, when I am away on the hills or in the woods alone, God seems very near'" (p. 207, *note*). M. E. writes: "I asked myself if it were possible that Moses on Sinai could have had a more intimate communication with God. . . . I feel the impossibility of describing the thing . . . what I felt is this: God was present, though invisible; He fell under no one of my senses, yet my consciousness perceived Him" (p. 210).

"There is no evidence that the primary conscious facts in the experiences of 'M. E.' of St. Paul, and of Symonds differed in any essential way from those of the usual epileptic auræ. . . . But *they were differently interpreted*. 'M. E.' and St. Paul regarded their ecstasy as the work of God" (p. 213). "Ignorant as he was of modern science, a sharer in the beliefs current about him in divine and diabolical possession . . . how could St. Paul have interpreted the storm of feelings and emotions that suddenly assailed him otherwise than as he did?" (p. 211). In George Moore "this presence was felt with absolute certitude and stirred in him indescribable emotions, just as in Miss X, Mlle. Ve, and a host of other mystics" (p. 212). Mlle. Ve "felt a Power 'more personal, less elemental.' Why that impression? She provides the answer when she adds, 'I had an impression of divine *sympathy*'" (p. 233). "The hero in 'The Princess' is afflicted by weird seizures, Heaven knows what,

'On a sudden in the midst of men and day,  
And while I walked and talked as heretofore,  
I seemed to move among a world of ghosts,  
And feel myself the shadow of a dream.'

(Suppressed Poems of Alfred, Lord Tennyson.)

"Such dreamy mental states being the prelude or accompaniment of epilepsy" (Crichton Brown, Cavendish Lecture, p. 237, *note*).

"Long search and practice have made the Hindoos proficient far beyond our great poets in the production of mystical

trances" (p. 238). "Tennyson remarked that, in his artificially induced trances, time seemed no longer to exist, and several classical mystics mention levitation" (p. 255). Negroes find they can induce "the feeling of exaltation" by standing on their heads; this, no doubt, is due to congestion of the brain. In a series of experiments made on this subject the following are given: "under nitrous oxide gas an impression of levitation was clearly realized by two of the subjects, and another described something similar as a floating" (p. 254). "'Of twenty subjects who retained consciousness after they had completely relaxed, eight experienced the illusion of levitation'" (L. H. Horton, "The Illusion of Levitation," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, xiii, 1918-19, p. 50). "He ascribes the illusion (without sufficient reason it seems to us) mainly to vaso-motor dilatation." "The illusion often takes an elaborate form; the dying person thinks that he is being carried to heaven by angels; others . . . are being dragged out of their beds by demons and resist with all their remaining energy. . . . General lowering of the mental level is, in addition, required . . . the use of narcotic drugs and the religious method of producing trance reduce mental life to a condition resembling that of partial sleep. In dreams we suffer similar illusions" (p. 259 and *note*). "Truth is powerful in the measure in which it agrees with things loved, or disagrees with things hated. It may possess the power of habit: but the habit of being swayed by truth has itself become established in society because of a more or less clear perception of the relation of truth to the ultimate realization of desire . . . Love and criticism are in the main incompatible" (p. 265). "A solution is actually found acceptable to the entranced, but it is discovered by the fully awake mind to be woefully inadequate. . . . Of an adequate solution of a great problem, forgotten [remembered?] on awakening, no satisfactory evidence has come to our knowledge." "The abundance of details, the wealth of the vision, was merely an illusion. Degradation of the mental life simplifies and isolates the object of thought" (p. 276).

"Of the different categories of alleged proofs of the existence of a God-Providence this immediate experience of Him is probably the one which has so far suffered least from the

introduction of science into the sphere of religion. The many instances of divine Presence . . . have already shown that the experience means much more than the mere thought of the presence of God" (p. 281). "'The atmosphere seemed thicker than usual and felt charged with what might be called latent personality. Out of this more or less vitalized atmosphere I tried to form definite presences. . . . Finally, without any effort or force, I felt a Presence standing at the table'" (p 285).

"James R. Lowell writes: 'I knew not what. I spoke with the calmness and clearness of a prophet. I cannot tell you what this revelation was. . . . The air seemed to waver to and fro with the presence of Something.'" "St. Francis Xavier" says: "'This state of intuition lasted about twenty-four hours, and then, as if the veil had fallen again, I found myself as ignorant as before'" (p. 239 and *note*). "Hindoo mystics have long ago taught us that, in order to escape the delusion of the senses, to see into the real life of things, and to become one with the All, one needs only to repeat a mysterious syllable" (p. 238) (cp. Tennyson, and his own name). "As to the stupendous revelation, the poet never consigned it to paper. It was unutterable at the time, and we may assume that if ever he caught intelligible glimpses of it, they possessed no particular significance" (p. 240). "The day is past when these traits may be regarded as pointing to a dualism in the origin and in the nature of men's thoughts and actions, stamping some as altogether human and others as gifts from above" (p. 247).

"They are God's favourite children, or they stand to Him in a still closer relationship, that of the bride to the bridegroom; it is no longer they who think and act, it is God in them" (p. 296). "Automatic movements and hallucinations appear in the mystics also and are ascribed by them to the divine Presence" (p. 296). "They also make upon God or the Virgin a 'stormy' demand for love; they also wish to be lovers or mistresses. . . . Their sexual organism participates in the intercourse. That love, while it lasts, may cure body and soul is perhaps nowhere better demonstrated more convincingly than in . . . P. Janet's *Medications Psychologique*" (p. 297). "'As soon as I fall in love all my ailments

are cured' [forgotten?] "—" "I felt as if I were a demigod" " (p. 297) (*Héloïse*, pp. 205 and 168.) From end to end of the Protestant world these "inner experiences" constitute the only argument relied on for the belief in a God in affective and intellectual relation with man (p. 304). "These alleged truths are revealed not only to a few lofty religious souls; any and everybody may enjoy them. Nitrous oxide stimulates the mystical consciousness in an extraordinary degree. . . . However it may be produced, ecstasy is ecstasy, just as fever is fever" (Leuba, p. 309). "Experience no more justifies the mystic in placing credence in it than the absence of certain organic sensations authorizes the asylum patient to believe that the doctors have removed his viscera" (p. 310). "The thought of a 'higher power' is not an immediate datum of consciousness" (p. 310). The mystic is more sure that he is sure than of what he is sure. "The knowledge of God is not a revelation or an intuition; it is the product of intellectual activity. . . . The metaphysical effort to find God is provided with a much broader intuitive basis than that of mystical ecstasy alone" (pp. 312-13). "Its intuitive basis includes the 'given' in conscious experience generally" (pp. 312-13).

"The thought of 'God,' however understood, seems to us always an elaboration of the 'given' . . . to ascribe a cause to an intuitive, immediate, experience. The confusion of this assignment of a cause with an immediate intuitive experience reveals how deeply ingrained, how automatic is the habit of assigning causes; it begins to be formed at birth, and becomes mechanical. When the uncivilized human being hears God in the thunder, he is subject to the same illusion of immediacy as the Christian who feels God in an influx of moral energy when in ecstasy or ordinary prayer" (pp. 314-15). Bazeley, the Oxford evangelist, who was also a celebrated theological coach, said "that Butler's *Analogy* was only valid if the argument from causation is accepted. It assumes the position of the deists without proof" of any kind.

[Men will not resent your doubting their facts; but to question theories is to impugn their judgment and acumen, to slight their mental offspring, which are as dear to them as their own children.—AUTHOR.] Leuba resumes, quoting Professor Hocking, " "I shall always be more certain that

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God is than *what* he is . . . reality from the beginning is known as God. . . . The unity of my world which makes it from the beginning a whole, knowable in simplicity, is the unity of other Selfhood. . . . The other mind which in creating Nature is also creating me. . . . We have what must justify the animism of our ancestors—the inevitable animism of all mankind. Man knows well that he is not alone. . . . Primitive animism is in-so-far no mere theory, but a report of certain and intimate experience'" (p. 314). Reality, in law, is the opposite to personality; personal properties are not real (*v.* Arnold, *God and the Bible*, Rationalist Press Association edition, p. 48). "The early mystics owe their belief mainly to delightful impressions of limitless power and freedom, to altered self-feelings, to the impression that the soul is liberated from the body. . . . There need be no differences between religious and non-religious ecstacies other than those due to a different interpretation" (Leuba, p. 315). "But if the regular law-bound nature known to science should be called the 'Divine,' then the essential claim of mysticism would be given up. . . . These experiences reveal not the Christian God, but the lawful workings of our physiological organisms" (p. 316).

"On the brink of unconsciousness, whether it be the unconsciousness of sleep or of abnormal trance produced in any way whatever, consciousness is at its simplest; it is continuity without parts, and therefore, let us say, eternal and timeless" (p. 316). "We might have used the expression 'subconscious sources of energy.' But that would not have constituted an addition of real knowledge. . . . The great Christian mystics strove to establish the Kingdom of God on earth. . . . The Divine in them might be seen, if anywhere, in the unrelenting effort with which they endeavoured to realize in themselves and in others a lofty social ideal" (p. 317). "For the psychologist who remains within the province of science, religious mysticism is a revelation not of God, but of man" (p. 318). "The mystic acquires his religious convictions precisely as his non-mystical neighbour does—namely, through tradition and instruction, auto-suggestion, grown habitual, and reflective analysis" (Prof. G. A. Coe, *Hibbert Journal*, VI, 367). "Its sources are the same, and the superior certainty and

authority that it claims for itself are illusory." "Here is where the mystic's psychology falls short. He will not admit that his certainty of spiritual things is self-produced" (p. 372). "The religious method has produced no cure which cannot be paralleled by similar cures wrought without religion" (Report of the Committee on the "Ministry of Healing," appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury).

"Whereas in every other group the number of believers in immortality is greater than that in God, among the psychologists the reverse is true . . . the greater the ability of the psychologist *as a psychologist*, the more difficult it becomes for him to believe in the continuation of individual life after bodily death" (Leuba, *The Belief in God and Immortality*, p. 325). For instance, Prof. James writes: "The *prima facie* theory, which is that of spirit-control, is hard to reconcile with the extreme triviality of most of the communications. . . . I confess . . . that I was too disgusted with Phinuit's tiresome twaddle even to note it down. . . . I can now merely say that neither then nor at any other time was there to my mind the slightest inner verisimilitude in the personation" (*Proc. S.P.R.*, VI. 654 ff.). "Practically all his material rests on the evidence of native, Chinese, or Mongolian witnesses; all are fully convinced of the diabolical origin of the phenomena, and Dr. Nevius himself takes the same view; so we can hardly accept them" (Prof. Newbolt, *Proc. S.P.R.*, VI. 655). Richet is strong on the same side: "To admit all-powerful and omniscient beings is much the same as to admit our entire ignorance" (*loc. cit.*, p. 570). In *Plain Speaking*, the Rev. Dr. Stebbing quotes Dr. G. Dumas, giving a medical opinion on Joan of Arc: Her "dominance over her visions is a characteristic I have noticed in many of the higher mystics and in those who have attained to notoriety. This kind of subject, after having at first passively submitted to hysteria, afterwards uses it rather than submits to it, and finally by means of it attains in his ecstasy to that divine union after which he strives" (p. 102). "In what may be called Joan's subsequent history the limits of credulity were fairly passed by the imposture of an impersonation" (pp. 102-3). "The whole story of the Maid's Rehabilitation is pitiful" (*vide Anatole France, Life of Joan*, II. 353, 359) (p. 103). In the case of

La Salette, Mlle. de la Merliere was proved in the Court of Constance to have bought a dress and impersonated the Virgin; completely exposing the fraud. A higher Court confirmed the sentence on appeal, though the Archbishop Philibert affirmed the genuineness of the apparition and Pope Pius IX granted indulgences to all who visited the spot (p. 104).

"The subconscious is always on the alert, and grasps at the very slightest indications that may put it on the 'track'" (Richet, *Thirty Years of Psychical Research*, p. 196). "But that is no reason for introducing gods, angels, demons, or spirits after the fashion of savages who ascribe natural forces to a fantastic divinity rewarding or tormenting poor mortals. It is hardly rational to call in the spirits of the dead" (p. 204). "These ideas and cognitions are in the realm of the subconscious; the conscious self is hardly touched by them" (p. 206). "There are forces that our normal consciousness does not perceive, but that are occasionally perceived by our subconsciousness . . . they can at rare moments touch the subconscious elements of our mind" (p. 207). "The hypothesis that spiritualists advance almost as an article of faith, that a vanished human personality intervenes, that there is an 'incarnation' of a dead person whose intelligence animates the body of mediums . . . demands profound consideration" (p. 208). The second hypothesis "is that these three mediums had a subconscious intelligence acute enough to take on the rôles of Marie Antoinette, Phinuit and Dickens. I do not hesitate a moment in preferring" this to the "enormous absurdity that, despite the guillotine and the worms of the tomb, Marie Antoinette and Dickens should return to visit us and that their souls should intervene in our lives. . . . Nearly always the discarnates show very moderate intelligence indeed, and give utterance to commonplaces of a special kind with a 'spiritoid complexion,' to use the picturesque barbarism adopted by Flournoy and Lombroso. . . . The idea that Aristotle should return to us to tell us in French, English, or Italian that the future of humanity is bound up with the belief in spirits, will always fill me with strong repugnance to the hypothesis that Aristotle is speaking" (p. 209). "This cannot be fortuitous, but I absolutely refuse to believe that the soul of my mother had nothing to say to me but this

idiotic play on words" (p. 209). "It is easy to admit cryptæsthesia, even very far-reaching cryptæsthesia: this faculty of the mind is much simpler than survival. . . . The tendency of the human mind to group its remembrances and its notions . . . around a real or imaginary person is not hypothesis; it is a fact . . . I go so far as to claim . . . that subjective metaphysics will always be radically incapable of proving survival" (p. 212). "By some channel which we do not understand real facts are made known; but this does not prove that the big consciousness of Raymond Lodge has survived" (p. 215). "Cryptæsthesia is always partial, defective, symbolical, and so mixed with errors and puerilities that it is difficult to believe that the consciousness of a deceased person can be limited to such a degree" (p. 216). "Alas, no! Survival is not to be proved thus; and, despite the genius of its author, and his noble faith in the future life, this book [*Raymond*] has not supplied the decisive date" (p. 216). "Cryptæsthesia exists, even when no death is in question. It is therefore unnecessary to suppose survival of the dead" (p. 217). "Why do not mediums present everyday and obscure persons? . . . the incarnations are of fanciful personalities like 'Rector,' 'Imperator,' 'John King,' 'Phinuit,' 'Katie King,' or of notabilities" (p. 220). "It would be rash to deny survival, but a thousand times more rash to affirm it. This negation of survival in no way implies the negation of cryptæsthesia." "Even Aksakoff . . . says, 'Absolute proof of spirit-identity is impossible to obtain'" (p. 220 and note).

"If man were immortal, he could be perfectly sure of seeing the day when everything in which he had trusted would betray his trust; and, in short, of coming eventually to hopeless misery. He would break down at last, as every good fortune, every dynasty, and every civilization does. In place of this we have death" (C. Peirce, "The Doctrine of Chances," *The Popular Science Monthly*, March, 1878; and *Chance, Love, and Logic*). "In the last book of the New Testament its poor, distracted author represents that all the time Christ was talking about having come to save the world the secret design was to catch the entire human race, with the exception of a paltry 144,000, and souse them all in a brimstone lake, and

as the smoke of their torment went up for ever and ever, to turn and remark, ‘There is no curse any more.’ . . . I wish I could believe St. John did not write it; but it is his gospel which tells about the ‘resurrection unto condemnation’—that is, of men’s being resuscitated just for the sake of torturing them. At any rate, the Revelation is a very ancient composition.” And this feeling grew until about A.D. 330 Eusebius “could announce his intention of exaggerating everything that tended to the glory of the Church and of suppressing whatever might disgrace it . . . until before the end of the century the great library of Alexandria was destroyed by Theophilus; until Gregory, two centuries later, burnt the library of Rome, proclaiming that ‘Ignorance is the mother of devotion’ . . . until a sober description of the state of the Church would be a thing our not-too-nice newspapers would treat as ‘unfit for publication’ ” (Peirce, *Chance, Love, and Logic*, pp. 291–2).

“Of the fifty or hundred systems of philosophy that have been advanced at different times of the world’s history” the larger part have occurred to their authors by accident (p. 157). Anyone who wishes to form a competent opinion as to “fundamental problems should first of all make a complete survey of human knowledge, should take note of all the valuable ideas in each branch of science”; why it “has been successful and where it has failed” (p. 158). “Now, the only possible way of accounting for the laws of nature and for uniformity in general is to suppose them the results of evolution. This supposes them not to be absolute, not to be obeyed precisely” (p. 162). “And arbitrary heterogeneity is the feature of the universe the most manifest and characteristic” (p. 163). “The Lamarckian theory only explains the development of characters for which individuals strive. . . . But more broadly and philosophically conceived, Darwinian evolution is evolution by the operation of chance and the destruction of bad results, while Lamarckian evolution is evolution by the effect of habit and effort” (p. 164). “Intellectual power is nothing but facility in taking habits and in following them in cases essentially analogous to, but in non-essentials widely remote from, the normal cases” (p. 167). “General conceptions arise upon the formation of habits in the nerve-matter, which are molecular changes consequent upon its activity and

probably connected with its nutrition" (p. 168). "The metaphysical axioms are imitations of the geometrical axioms; and now that the latter have been thrown overboard, without doubt the former will be sent after them . . . we can have no reason to think that every phenomenon in all its minutest details is precisely determined by law. That there is an arbitrary element in the universe we see—namely, its variety. This variety must be attributed to spontaneity in some form" (p. 175). "In the beginning . . . there was a chaos of unpersonalized feeling, which, being without connection or regularity, would properly be without existence. This feeling, sporting here and there in pure arbitrariness, would have started the germ of a generalizing tendency. . . . Thus the tendency to habit would be started; and from this with the other principles of evolution all the regularities of the universe would be evolved. At any time, however, an element of pure chance survives, and will remain until the world becomes an absolutely perfect, rational, and symmetrical system, in which mind is at last crystallized in the infinitely distant future" (p. 177).

"At present, historical criticism has almost exploded the miracles, great and small; so that the doctrine of necessity has never been in so great vogue as now" (p. 181). "A probable inference can at most only suppose something to be most frequently, or otherwise approximately, true, but never that anything is precisely true without exception throughout the universe" (p. 183). "The principle of universal necessity cannot be defended as being a postulate of reasoning . . . the ordinary determinations of physical constants, such as appear from month to month in the journals, are about on a par with an upholsterer's measurements of carpets and curtains, the idea of mathematical exactitude being demonstrated in the laboratory will appear simply ridiculous" (p. 188). "Try to verify any law of Nature, and you will find that the more precise your observations, the more certain they will be to show irregular departures from the law" (p. 190). That which has been inconceivable to-day has often turned out indisputable on the morrow. Inability to conceive is only a stage through which every man must pass in regard to a number of beliefs (p. 192). "The adaptations of Nature,

beautiful and often marvellous as they verily are, are never found to be quite perfect; so that the argument is quite against the absolute exactitude of any natural belief, including that of the principle of causation" (p. 192). "By supposing the rigid exactitude of causation to yield, I care not how little, be it but a strictly infinitesimal amount, we gain room to insert mind into our scheme" (p. 198). "I point first to the phenomena of growth and developing complexity, which appear to be universal, and which, though it may possibly be an affair of mechanism perhaps, certainly presents all the appearance of increasing diversification" (p. 200). "Besides, variety is a fact which must be admitted; and the theory of chance merely consists in supposing this diversification does not antedate all time" (p. 201). "Finally, there is consciousness, a patent fact enough, but a very inconvenient one to the mechanical philosopher" (p. 201). "I believe I have thus subjected to fair examination all the important reasons for adhering to the theory of universal necessity, and have shown their nullity" (p. 201).

"Habit is that specialization of the law of mind whereby a general idea gains the power of exciting reactions." "By induction a habit becomes established" (p. 228). "The future is suggested by, or rather is influenced by the suggestions of the past" (p. 226). "Reference to the future is an essential element of personality. Were the ends of a person already explicit, there would be no room for development, for growth, for life; and consequently there would be no personality" (p. 234). "Matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind hide-bound with habits" (p. 235). "*Mens agitat molem.*"

"If there is a personal God, we must have a direct perception of that person, and indeed be in personal communication with him. Now, if that be the case . . . how is it possible that the existence of this being should ever have been doubted?" (p. 237). "There is a fair analogical inference that all protoplasm feels. It not only feels, but exercises all the functions of mind" (p. 253). "There is no reason why it should not be formed synthetically like any other chemical substance" (p. 252). "But all mind is directly or indirectly connected with all matter, and acts in a more or less regular way; so

that all mind more or less partakes of the nature of matter" (p. 263). "Great respect should be paid to the natural judgments of the sensible hearts. This is what sentimentalism precisely is; and I entreat the reader to consider whether to condemn it is not of all blasphemies the most degrading. Yet the nineteenth century has steadily condemned it, because it brought about the Reign of Terror" (p. 274).

"Our modern religious teachers maintain that they know a great deal about God. They define minutely and critically His various attributes; they enter into His motives, His feelings, and His opinions; they explain exactly what He has done and why He has done it. . . . In the teaching of the spirits there is not a word of all this" (Raupert, *Modern Spiritism*, p. 221). "There is no offended God to be reconciled, no mysterious sin-offering to be made; but a higher law to be discovered and to be obeyed, a truer knowledge of self and of the universe to be attained: adaptation to higher conditions and environments to be striven for" (pp. 232-3). "'The time,' said the spirits to Mr. Stainton Moses, 'is far nearer than you think, when the old faith, which has worn so long, and which man has patched so clumsily, will be replaced by a higher and nobler one'" (p. 235). "The entire conception of the shedding of blood and of the surrender of life as a means of reconciliation between God and man is a notion abhorrent to the spirit world" (p. 236). "'It rejects as false any notion of the Divine Being vindictively punishing a transgressor or requiring a vicarious sacrifice for sin'" (p. 237). "Christ came to die for and to save man in the same, though in a higher sense, that all regenerators of men have been their saviours and yielded up bodily existence in devotion to an overmastering idea" (p. 237). "According to the belief of the modern spiritist, then, *man is his own saviour* in the literal sense" (p. 238). "And what Jesus did and effected during His earthly life is, it is asserted, but a type of what can, in large measure, be effected by all those possessed of similar transcendental powers. . . . The difference between Him and them is one of degree, not of kind. Some of the miracles which He worked have, it is claimed, been worked by other highly developed mediums before and since His time. . . . And even His resurrection from the grave can be shown to be

on a line with those spirit-materializations which constantly occur in the presence of good sensitives" (p. 241). "'It is when we come to deal with the central figure in the Gospel story,' writes Mr. Stainton Moses, 'that the divergence . . . becomes most marked. The mysteriously incarnated God . . . who lived amongst men gives place to the man who lived nearest God'" (p. 242). "They are Christians in a new and quite modern acceptation of the term, and in most instances repudiate the very fundamental doctrines upon which the Christian system reposes" (p. 244).

"'We are all the sons of God, and there is in all men a spark of the Divine.' 'Each human soul imprisoned in a human body is an incarnation in the truest sense'" (p. 245). "'The appearance, at spirit séances, of 'the materialized' Christ has from time to time been recorded'" (p. 246). "As regards the existence and personality of Satan so clearly taught by Christ, the spirits counselled Mr. Stainton Moses 'to cease to be perplexed by thoughts of an imagined devil.' 'For the honest and truth-seeking soul,' they said, 'there is no devil nor prince of evil such as theology has feigned'" (p. 247). "'We know of no hell,' say the spirits, 'save that within the soul; a hell which is fed by the flame of unpurified lust and passion, which is kept alive by remorse . . . that springs unbidden from the results of past misdeeds'" (p. 249). "The Scriptural notion of retribution after death and of punishment for sin committed in the flesh is a misreading and misrepresentation of the words of Christ" (p. 252). "'Judgment,' too, 'is ceaseless, for the soul is ever fitting itself for its change'" (p. 250). "Of the resurrection of Christ a diversity of views are entertained among spiritists, unanimity of mind existing only in their repudiation of the historic doctrine" (p. 247). "Whatever else the spirit-creed may be, it is utterly and wholly incompatible with, and indeed manifestly antagonistic to, the teaching of Holy Scripture" (p. 253). "There is absolute agreement and unanimity on these points: (1) That Christianity cannot be regarded as a revelation of a unique and specific character. . . . (2) That Christ is not divine in the sense in which the Church throughout all ages has understood that term and has believed and taught Him to be divine" (p. 251). "'Spiritualism is an experimental science,' writes

Prof. Wallace, ‘and affords the only foundation for a true philosophy and a pure religion. It abolishes the term “supernatural” and “miracle” by an extension of the spheres of law and the realm of nature . . . and substitutes facts for opinions’” (pp. 250–1, *note*).

“As Mr. Stainton Moses puts it, ‘The abnormal conditions produced by the action of spirit in this world are merely the phenomenal manifestations attendant on the close of one dispensation, era, or epoch, and the ushering in of a new régime with wider spiritual knowledge and clearer insight into Truth.’ ‘Spiritualism, in fact, comes as a revolutionary element to an age that is ripe for it’” (*The Modern Spiritistic Movement*, p. 195). Stainton Moses was “the Prophet” of the movement; but his words seem not to be fulfilled: though Raupert writes that “it is beginning to undermine the religious belief and convictions of thousands of serious-minded but not very accurately informed persons” (Preface, v). For, as Stainton Moses says, “‘Man has disguised God’s truth so deeply and is so wedded to his inventions, that it is not easy to disabuse him’” (p. 196). “‘Destruction must necessarily precede the work of construction’” (p. 196).

Reason recoils from the inconsequence and futile nature of much of this doctrine; the whole is so confused, so full of contradictions, that I can find no firm foothold in the quick-sands. Experts themselves admit this, and freely give cases of irreconcilable messages and trivial rubbish solemnly delivered. To me, all that they seem to prove is that idiots are not unknown, but even frequent in the world to come. Certainly, the most one can say is that these tom-fool tricks may be played by pucks and imps, but surely not by rational and benevolent spirits. “That such spirits should be the consciousness of defunct human beings is, strictly speaking, possible; but I venture to say, with all the caution that should guard every negation, it is not at all probable. These dis-carnate souls are too fundamentally different from those of living men that they should be the same; and . . . how should the disintegrated body . . . be able to find the clothes that it wore when living?” (Richet, *Thirty Years’ Psychic Research*, p. 622). “It would cause one to lose confidence in his guardian angels if he were forced to believe that

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a short residence in the spirit-land could reduce the immortal mind to such a state of imbecility" (Hudson, *Psychic Phenomena*, p. 228). And few will deny that he has good reason. He continues: "Suggestion may be oral, and proceed from another; or it may be an auto-suggestion, arising from something suggested in a previous hypnotization, or from some forgotten circumstance. . . . The power is exhibited by the subjective personality of a spirit medium when it assumes the names and characters of any number of spirits of the dead whose names are suggested" (p. 269). In this work "it will be assumed that all statements made by respectable witnesses in regard to the occurrence of physical phenomena are true" (*loc. cit.*, p. 271).

"Mediums are always anxious to exhibit their phenomena when genuine, under test conditions. . . . The writer has never seen anything genuine in the line of materializations. There is here more room for fraud, and more fraud is perpetrated by materializing mediums than by any other" (p. 272). According to Richet: "A true account of materializations is specially difficult because of all experiments it is these that most lend themselves to fraud. Thinking that they have a spirit before them, credulous persons lose their presence of mind; they are inclined to accept everything, and to be indignant at precautions to avoid trickery (p. 464). . . . For my own part, having seen many materializations, I can declare that I have never felt the very slightest awe. My only preoccupation, and one that filled my whole being, was always not to be duped" (p. 464). "Every possible precaution must be taken; the experiment must be often repeated" (p. 465). Photographs, direct handwriting, apports, the production of musical sounds, and lights, cannot be held to be really established, fraud being easy (p. 469).

"Spiritists themselves . . . assert, as does Allan Kardec, on the authority, as he says, of 'the spirit of St. Louis,' that 'the spirits who produce these effects are always inferior spirits.' It is only the 'inferior spirits' who are capable of producing physical manifestations. Superior knowledge confers no advantage . . . the physical power displayed must have a physical basis. . . . Now, if its intellectual character leads us in the same direction, the evidence is still stronger in favour

of its purely human origin" (Hudson, *Law of Psychic Phenomena*, p. 274). "Some of them possess the most intense interest, not only on account of the wonderful psycho-physical power displayed, but because of their intellectual phases. Slate-writing, for instance, when performed by a first-class medium" (p. 275). A sitter may bring his own slates, he may place the pencil between them himself, and tie them together; and hold them as tightly as he can, in the broad daylight, while the writing goes on—and yet be hoaxed. Each of five letters received a reply that assumed that its writer was dead, whereas two were written to living persons. "The power which moved the pencil, being clearly not physical, must have been occult." "It emanated from the medium." "Suggestion also plays its subtle rôle in this class of phenomena, as in all others, and so relieves the medium of all imputation of dishonesty or insincerity in attributing it to the wrong source." "Everything goes along swimmingly as long as the medium knows what to reply, or can obtain information by means of his telepathic or clairvoyant powers. . . . The physical phenomena were produced to perfection and under the most perfect test-conditions . . . such as to preclude the possibility of fraud or legerdemain. . . . Yet there is no valid evidence, in any of the phenomena of so-called spiritism that the spirits of the dead have any part in their production" (*loc. cit.*, pp. 276, 281-4).

"All the promises of the Master still hold good. Moreover, every new development in psychic science adds strength to the arguments, and fresh proof of his wisdom" (p. 285). "The phenomena of so-called spirit-photography amply demonstrate the fact that visions can be created of such tangible character that they can be caught and fixed upon the photographic plate. In saying this I am not insensible of the fact that many frauds have been committed in this species of phenomena, as well as in all others attributed to spirits of the dead" (p. 288). "The image was not only perceptible to the sight, as much so as the real presence would have been, but in some instances it was even tangible" (Richet). "Spiritists believe, of course, that the real spirits of their friends are present, and are thus made visible to mortal eyes" (p. 291). "At the hour of death . . . the power is greatest" (p. 295). "As the

intellectual part of the performance of these alleged spirits is always on a par with that of other forms of spirit manifestations, subject to the same limitations and governed by the same laws, we must come to the same conclusion as to their origin—namely, that, whatever it may be, it is not due to spirits of the dead ” (p. 291). “ They may be called ‘ embodied thoughts,’ as man may be called the embodied thought of God ” (Hudson, *Law of Psychic Phenomena*, p. 294). Eliphas Levi says: “ ‘ The evokers of the Devil must before all things belong to a religion which believes in a Devil who is the rival of God. . . . He who affirms the Devil creates the Devil ’ ” (p. 292). Sir Leslie Stephen asks: “ What then is the doctrine that by a general consent is allowed, if not the doctrine of which Canon Farrar cannot speak without indignation ? ” (*Dreams and Realities*, p. 40). “ If anything can justify every cruelty it is this: if I took his representation of Christianity to be true, I should regard it as necessarily including a very large element of devil worship ” (p. 43). Augustine says, *Non est ullus medius ulli locus, ut possit esse nisi cum diabolo, qui non est cum Christo* (*De Peccat. merit.* I, 26). Owing mainly to the authority of St. Augustine, the mediæval Church held the doctrine of the damnation of infants dying unbaptized. “ I know nothing more calculated to make the whole soul revolt with loathing from every doctrine of religion than the evil complacency with which some cheerfully accept the belief.” “ Yet even this has survived to us from the Middle Ages.” “ Dare any one of you regard such teaching as other than blasphemy against the merciful God? “ I repudiate these crude and glaring travesties of the awful and holy will of God. . . . I impeach them, as a falsehood against Christ’s universal and absolute redemption.” “ If this be the result of accepting theories, better believe in no God at all ” (Leslie Stephen, *ut supra*). “ The hideous incubus of atrocious conceptions, of unimaginable horror and physical excruciation endlessly prolonged attached by . . . false theology to the doctrine of future retribution ” (Farrar, *Eternal Hope*, pp. 65–6, 72, 83–4).

“ I should like to begin by stating quite definitely that the doctrine of everlasting punishment—in its ordinary, traditional acceptation—presents us with a view of the character of God so clearly revolting to the modern conscience, and so incon-

sistent with the general teaching of our Lord Himself about the love of God, that we could not accept it in deference to any external authority whatever. I make this remark in order that I may not be accused of approaching the subject with a fixed determination neither to accept the doctrine of everlasting punishment, nor to question the view usually accepted by Christians as to the moral authority of their Master. If Jesus did indeed teach the doctrine of everlasting punishment, and meant by it what the words naturally and obviously suggest, modern Christians would have to recognize in such an unquestioning acceptance of a traditional Jewish view another of those limitations of His knowledge which in some matters Orthodoxy itself has been compelled to acknowledge" (*Rashdall, Conscience and Christ*, pp. 294-5). "It is fair to point out that these passages are all derived from the first Gospel [Matt. xviii. 8; xxv. 41, 46]; and, if there is a conclusion to which the general results of recent Gospel criticism point . . . it is that sayings in the first Gospel, unsupported by the other Synopsists, are very frequently coloured by the doctrinal beliefs or ecclesiastical arrangements of the Judæo-Christian Church at the end of the first century A.D. These passages may well be 'ecclesiastical additions' like the authority to bind and loose, the committal of the keys of the Kingdom to St. Peter, the command to bring quarrels to be settled by the Church, etc.; or at least they are in all probability very much modified by the unconscious influence of ecclesiastical tradition" (p. 298). "The truth of the matter seems to be that the thoughts of Jesus about the future of human souls did not generally travel far beyond the moment of the Kingdom's coming" (p. 305). "Christianity has already appropriated much spiritual truth which is not of Christian origin; what it has done in the past it will probably do in the future" (p. 277). "We have most of us come, I imagine, to recognize the historical fact that traditional Christian doctrine is the result of the Church's reflection about its Founder. It has expressed that sense in terms which were taken from the metaphysical dialect of the ancient Græco-Roman world" (p. 279). "If there is a certain result of criticism, it is that the introductions to our Lord's discourses and the joinings of His sayings are frequently literary devices of the compilers, and

cannot be implicitly relied upon as history" (p. 281, *note*). "In *The Teaching of Christ*, by the Rev. E. G. Selwyn, an attempt is made to deny that Jesus 'revealed God as "Father"' (p. 56)" (p. 21, *note*). "Mr. Selwyn further asserts that 'He no more teaches the Brotherhood of Man than the Fatherhood of God'" (p. 282, *note*).

"He might have taught the traditional view in the traditional words without seeing how inconsistent it was with His own conception of the loving Father who is always ready to forgive the penitent" (p. 295). "The question was, of course, one which had never been presented to Him in the technical language of philosophy" (p. 290).

This seems to be another case where men feign that the Almighty Son was ignorant of the common affairs of life; in fact, as in the words of the Magdalene, it means He was not omnipresent or omniscient. This seems to me playing with the subject and with us as rational beings; either he was or he was not (*vide* Hallam, on "the Eucharist"). Take this: "In the depth of His stern indignation against sin He may have used severe but vague prophetic language without expressly attempting to reconcile it with His other great conviction about the love of God" (Rashdall, *loc. cit.*, p. 302). As a description of one who was "Very God of Very God" is not this ludicrous and absurd, an attempt to deceive others and themselves? "Put hatred in the world and we may make it hell upon earth"; but has not the Bible done this all along, with the Church's interpretation of its meaning? Everyone has constantly to put things so as to be intelligible to those with whom one speaks, but every wise and conscientious teacher takes care that in so doing the truth is not distorted or denied. Working hypotheses, methods of putting things, are a necessity of imperfect knowledge; but to allege, as the Dean does, that Almighty Wisdom could not speak so as to be understood without misleading, can only be defended on the plea that the Devil is a *façon-de-parler* for evil. Canon Sanday said plainly that the life of Christ in the Gospels was clearly that of a man, and Dr. Rashdall exhibits it as such: "I do not believe that Jesus is the only man in whom the Word or Reason or Wisdom of God has dwelt" (p. 238).

We are now face to face with the obvious fact that various

parts of the Scriptures are of dubious value; that some of them are by unknown writers whose works show clearly that their thoughts were not correct in the eyes of God or man. We can see that "Mark" is an original Gospel from which "Matthew" and "Luke" are in great part derived. It is manifest that the setting of events in the two is different, that the occasion of discourses is not the same. It is confidently asserted on good grounds that there was a version of those in the first Gospel in Aramaic, the tongue Jesus used; that this was so little prized by the early Christians that they allowed it to be replaced by what is now said to represent the advanced views of later times and the "improved" style of a literary man. Both of these assumptions are admitted to be influenced by private views of what the teaching should have been if it had involved their own opinions in a satisfactory manner.

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[Although the foregoing excursus on the invalidity of Biblical credentials as a divine revelation, and on the attributes of the deity as portrayed in the Old and New Testaments, or in the casuistical or metaphysical constructions of theologians, may not seem to have a direct relevance to the cardinal subject of this chapter, it is subsumed in it, as an interpenetrating element of the supernormal which forms the basis of Spiritualist and Occultist psychology and practice, to the further critical examination of which we now return.—EDITOR.]

"The shade only talks about its personal predilections, and remains deaf to every question outside the limits it has prescribed for itself. . . . A ghost was never known to have more than one idea or purpose; it possesses no general intelligence" (Hudson, *The Law of Psychic Phenomena*, p. 297). "Most professional mediums eventually become physical wrecks. Many are overtaken by mental derangement, and some by moral degradation too loathsome to be described. . . . It is undeniable that the tendency of mediumship is to unhinge the mind, to destroy the mental balance, and often to produce the worst forms of insanity" (M. A. d'Assier, *Posthumous Humanity*).

This quite agrees with what Richet, Myers, Maxwell, and many other experts tell of "unconscious" fraud in all mediums, even Marthe, Florrie Cook, Mme. d'Espérance, Eusapia, and

Linda Gazzera. "The first time that I saw the surprising performances of Anna Roth, the 'Blumen medium,' I was dazzled; at a second sitting I was perplexed; at the third I was convinced that the thing was a fraud. I asked Anna Roth to allow a more complete control . . . she refused" (Richet, *Thirty Years' Psychical Research*, p. 429). "It cannot be affirmed that all the cases of direct writing presented by Slade and Eglinton were fraudulent, but Mr. Davey's experiment warrants great reserve in accepting any, and the tricks of American conjurers described in detail by Mr. David Abbott justify the utmost distrust of alleged slate writing" (p. 449). "Hence arises the absolute necessity that the medium be scrupulously searched, dressed only in garments provided, and never let out of sight from that moment" (p. 460). "The idea that the medium may be making efforts to deceive [must] never be lost sight of and should dominate the mind of observers" (p. 465). "Mr. Podmore . . . has tried, without adducing the semblance of proof, to maintain that Stainton Moses was a great neuropath, an hysterick, deceiving for the sake of deceiving, moved by a kind of half-morbid, half-unconscious knavery. These insinuations against the good faith and honesty of Stainton Moses will not hold" (p. 482). "The painful imperfection of the old spiritist photographs may be seen from the book published by Dr. Foveau de Courmelles. . . . Despite all my good-will I cannot consider most of those faces as authentic. Only very simple-minded persons could accept the photographs by Dr. Th. Haumann of Washington. Almost all the photographs which show doubles result either from photographic errors or from a very easy trick. Double exposure, easily done by the least skilful, gives a very good imitation of a phantom or a materialized face" (p. 483). Richet quotes Walter F. Prince as stating, "There is not yet completely satisfactory proof of spirit photography" (p. 484). This is curious, for in common séances a photograph is almost always relied upon to show the presence of spirits. Flammarion especially draws the difference between real and imaginary cases that the genuine will show on photographic plates, and not the false.

With Marthe (Eva), "experimental rigour was even pushed

to the point of giving her an emetic before a séance"; and examination *per rectum et vaginam* (p. 510), to make sure that nothing was concealed about her. This is the person on whom spiritualists now rely; does it not indicate something abnormal in all concerned in it? "The mental instability of mediums is, for the most part, such that their affirmations, whether positive or negative, have but small value. That the Fox sisters, after the enormous development of spiritualism that followed on their early demonstrations, should have tricked is possible or probable, not to say certain" (p. 26). "I believe, too, that Marthe Béraud once told a certain lawyer at Algiers that she had tricked at the Villa Carmen; later on she denied this, and her statements have no value either way" (p. 26, *note*).

This again is very curious, since it is just the Villa Carmen manifestations that are relied on for real appearances of "spooks." For it was there that Richet got the strange repetition of Crookes's marvellous experiment with "Katie King," cutting off a lock of hair from a phantom and getting a precipitate of calcium from its breath. It is hoped that he has preserved these even with extreme care; for carbonates come from food, and it would be interesting to see if these deposits are just the same as from normal beings. When assisting in physiology I was blamed for not having got the brain of a youth killed on the railway, as this would have been a rare chance of obtaining a specimen not wasted by disease; but what is that to getting part of a ghost? Could they not find something new?—for instance, the excreta of a "spook" would afford a good field for research; whether spookland has bacteria, for example, would be an important discovery; it might not then seem so desirable as a place of retreat from life to the beyond. And is the food real, as the formation of carbon dioxide would indicate, or is it just a fake, like the cigars and whiskies of Sir Oliver's son?

Matthew Arnold throws a light on the question: "Why they took so much care to get precipitates from the breath of ghosts?" He says the verb "to be" originally meant "to breathe"; spiritualists may think then that if they can show that spooks breathe they prove their reality—e.g. "Spirit, which they oppose to matter, means literally we know only

to the point of giving her an emetic before a séance"; and examination *per rectum et vaginam* (p. 510), to make sure that nothing was concealed about her. This is the person on whom spiritualists now rely; does it not indicate something abnormal in all concerned in it? "The mental instability of mediums is, for the most part, such that their affirmations, whether positive or negative, have but small value. That the Fox sisters, after the enormous development of spiritualism that followed on their early demonstrations, should have tricked is possible or probable, not to say certain" (p. 26). "I believe, too, that Marthe Béraud once told a certain lawyer at Algiers that she had tricked at the Villa Carmen; later on she denied this, and her statements have no value either way" (p. 26, *note*).

This again is very curious, since it is just the Villa Carmen manifestations that are relied on for real appearances of "spooks." For it was there that Richet got the strange repetition of Crookes's marvellous experiment with "Katie King," cutting off a lock of hair from a phantom and getting a precipitate of calcium from its breath. It is hoped that he has preserved these even with extreme care; for carbonates come from food, and it would be interesting to see if these deposits are just the same as from normal beings. When assisting in physiology I was blamed for not having got the brain of a youth killed on the railway, as this would have been a rare chance of obtaining a specimen not wasted by disease; but what is that to getting part of a ghost? Could they not find something new?—for instance, the excreta of a "spook" would afford a good field for research; whether spookland has bacteria, for example, would be an important discovery; it might not then seem so desirable as a place of retreat from life to the beyond. And is the food real, as the formation of carbon dioxide would indicate, or is it just a fake, like the cigars and whiskies of Sir Oliver's son?

Matthew Arnold throws a light on the question: "Why they took so much care to get precipitates from the breath of ghosts?" He says the verb "to be" originally meant "to breathe"; spiritualists may think then that if they can show that spooks breathe they prove their reality—*e.g.* "Spirit, which they oppose to matter, means literally we know only

breath; but people use it for a being which is impalpable to touch as breath is. Perhaps this may be right, but we want first to know what being is." "I admit that some so-called mediums of whom the public have heard much are arrant impostors, who have taken advantage of the demand for spiritualistic excitement to fill their purses with easily earned guineas; whilst others who have no pecuniary motive for imposture are tempted to cheat, it would seem solely by a desire for notoriety. I have met with several cases of imposture, some very ingenious; others so palpable that no person who has witnessed the genuine phenomena could be taken in by them" (*Crookes, Researches in the Phenomena of Spiritualism*, pp. 98, 99).

"Physical degeneracy keeps pace with his mental decline [in a medium], his whole nervous system is prostrated by excessive exercise of subjective power, and too frequently the end is acute mania or drivelling imbecility. . . . Those who have known him [a medium] before and are aware of the limits of his education are the most surprised of all, and no argument can convince them that he is not inspired by some almost superhuman intelligence from another world. They know nothing of the wonders of subjective mental power" (*Hudson, The Law of Psychic Phenomena*, p. 330). "He believes, and from his standpoint has every reason to believe, that he is inspired by some lofty spirit whose knowledge is unlimited and whose resources are unfailing" (p. 331). "But no well-informed spiritist of the better class will attempt to deny or weaken the force of the statement that a mephitic moral atmosphere surrounds the average spiritistic medium" (p. 333). "He generally regards himself as a reformer, having broken away from the orthodox creed and become the advocate of a new religion. Like most radical reformers, who find the world all wrong in one respect only, he immediately assumes that it is wrong in everything" (p. 334). "And I charge a large and growing class of professional mediums with being the leading propagandists of the doctrine of free love" (p. 335). To the young whose characters are not formed and to those whose notions of morality are loose the dangers are appalling. . . . The Western world is threatened with a revival of the arts of the magician, the conjurer, and the

wizard. "It may be . . . that the Eastern adepts know more of the practice of subjective arts than is dreamed of by spiritists. . . . They denounce as dangerous to health, morals, and sanity the practice of mediumship" (p. 336). "The Orientalists have the power to produce a greater variety of startling phenomena, and hence are in possession of greater facilities for deceiving themselves" (p. 337). [In the Western world, if all accounts are true, prodigies of equal magnitude are performed. Richet informs us of the alleged collection of a fragment of the "flesh" of a materialized spirit which was preserved in a bottle; but, unfortunately, there was something lacking in the preservative fluid, for the specimen speedily dematerialized.—AUTHOR.]

"The code of ethics found in the writings of the ancient Greek philosophers will compare favourably with anything found in the New Testament. It is not in this, therefore, that the internal evidence of the truth of the New Testament is to be found. . . . That he [Jesus] understood the principles which underlie his doctrines and constitute the secret of his power goes without saying; but his biographers did not understand them, or if they did they were as reticent as he was" (p. 340). "He stated the conditions of success and promised the world that whosoever complied with these conditions should be able to do even greater works than he had done. He formulated the doctrine of immortality, and stated the conditions of its attainment" (p. 342). "There are those, however, who now seem to fear that Jesus will be robbed of his glory and reduced to the common level of mankind, if it is shown that the conditions necessary to the success of the mental healer of to-day are the same as they were nineteen hundred years ago" (p. 341). "The condition which he declared to be essential not only in the patient, but in the healer, is embraced in the word faith. . . . When Jesus of Nazareth proclaimed its potency from the hilltops of Palestine he gave to mankind the key to health and to heaven, and earned the title of Saviour of the World" (p. 347). "His expression concerning their power to remove mountains doubtless had reference to the fact that ponderable bodies can be moved by subjective power" (p. 348). In the case of Jairus, "He desired to quiet the fears and stop the lamentations of the

friends and relatives, for the obvious reason that their hopeless wailing must operate as a strong adverse suggestion to the soul of the patient" (p. 353). "It is claimed by the Eastern adepts that as long as the vital organs of the body are perfect, it is always possible to compel the soul to return to its habitation. . . . There are many apparently well-authenticated instances of the performance of the feat, even in the Western hemisphere. The evidential value of the case is just as great, supposing it to have been a case of suspended animation. . . . Jesus could not have taken the course he did if he had not been in full possession of the knowledge of the laws pertaining to mental therapeutics" (p. 354). The case of the Shunamite's son is very like "insufflation," but none to-day place much faith on the miracles of Elijah and Elisha: they are pretty well acknowledged to be little beyond folk-lore of a highly imaginative people. Yet, when the same process is applied to the miracles of Jesus, just as the methods of criticism used with regard to the Old Testament are being turned on to the New Testament also, one cannot but feel that the so-called evidences of Christianity are vitally affected. It is a well-known belief among Spiritualists that appearances are more frequent at or about the time of death, especially if sudden, or of a nature to raise strong emotion.

In *Phantasms of the Living*, produced under the authority of the Society for Psychical Research, it is stated that "The instinct of scientific continuity which, even in shaping the solid continents is fain to substitute for deluge and cataclysm the tideway, and the ripple and the rain, will rebel against the hypothesis of a bygone age of inward miracles, a catastrophic interference with the intimate nature of man" (Preface p. liii). "The discoursers on things spiritual who have been most listened to in our own day—as Carlyle, Emerson, Mazzini, Renan, Tennyson, Matthew Arnold, Ruskin, etc.—have been to a very small extent dogmatic on the old lines" (p. liv). "Just as the fabric of religious orthodoxy used to be strained in order to admit the discoveries of geology or astronomy, so now also the obvious deductions of materialistic science are strained or overpassed in order to give sanction to feelings and aspirations which it is found impossible to ignore" (p. lv). "'Mad doctors' tend to

supplant theologians, and the lives of lunatics are found to have more lessons for us than the lives of saints" (pp. lv-lvi). The "prevalent temper is not so much *materialistic* as *agnostic*; and, although this renouncement of all knowledge of invisible things does in a sense leave visible things in sole possession of the field, yet the Agnostic is as far as anyone from being 'a hog from Epicurus' sty'" (p. lvi) "We have for the first time a firm foothold in this impalpable realm; we know that these unuttered messages do truly travel, that these emotions mix and spread; and though we refrain as yet from dwelling further on the corollaries of this far-reaching law, it is not because such speculations need any longer be baseless" (p. lvii.). "And here arises the pressing question, notoriously still undecided, difficult and complex beyond any anticipation, as to whether supernormal phenomena of this physical kind do in fact occur at all; or whether they are in all cases—as they undoubtedly have been in many cases—the product of mere fraud or delusion" (p. lix).

"The time, we hope, will come when enough of daylight shall shine upon our path to make possible a discriminating survey of the tracks" (p. lix). "Reviewing the evidence thus obtained, we were struck with the great predominance of alleged apparitions at or near the moment of death" (p. lxi). "Here would seem to be the fitting place to explain why we have given the title 'Phantasms of the Living' to a group of records most of which will present themselves to the ordinary reader as narratives of apparitions of the dead. . . . We find that more than half of them are narratives of appearances or other impressions coincident either with the death of the person seen or with some critical moment in his life-history" (p. lxiii) "We may fairly say, as we do say, that chance alone cannot explain this coincidence. . . . If I have a vision of a friend recently dead, and on whom my thoughts have been dwelling, we cannot be sure that this may not be a merely delusive hallucination, the mere offspring of my own brooding sorrow" (p. lxiv). "Testimony proves that phantasms (impressions, voices, or figures) of persons undergoing some crisis—especially death—are perceived by their friends and relatives with a frequency which mere chance cannot explain" (p. lxvi).

"All manner of false beliefs have in their day been able to muster a considerable amount of evidence in their support, much of which was certainly not consciously fraudulent. The form of superstition varies with the religious and educational conditions of the time" (Vol. I, p. 115). As to witchcraft, anyone will find "that the actual testimony on which the alleged facts were believed came exclusively from the un-educated classes. . . . The easy acceptance of this evidence by better-educated persons was due to ignorance which was at that time all but almost universal" (p. 116). "We know now that there is a condition capable often of being induced in uneducated and simple persons with extreme ease, in which any idea that is suggested may at once take sensory form and be projected as an actual hallucination" (p. 117). "B and C are together and B has a hallucination, it may be veridical and due to a telepathic impression—from the distant A, or it may be non-veridical and due to a spontaneous pathological disturbance of B's own brain; and this experience of B's is then communicated to C, whose brain follows suit and projects a kindred image" (Vol. II, p. 171). Already I have drawn attention to the ease with which educated persons may slip into believing that they have seen what they have only heard of, and, under excitement this is of course doubly likely. It is as easy for a mesmerist to persuade a group of good subjects that they see a particular phantasmal object as to persuade one of them.

Several hypotheses, all approximately difficult and doubtful, may be suggested (p. 157). "If A's phantom is witnessed by B and C together—and witnessed, as we are assuming throughout, without any intimation thereof from one to the other by look or word—then it might seem simplest to assume that a separate telepathic impression passed from A to B, and from A to C, and was externalized by each of the percipients. As a phantasm of his own shaping it has been shown . . . that the recorded cases will not always admit of this hypothesis. C is sometimes a stranger to A" (Vol. II, p. 279). The inference is then that it passed by suggestion, telepathic or subliminal. "There are so many records of collective 'hallucinations,' collected with such care and attested with such exactitude by persons of unquestioned good faith, that it is not

possible to reject them, any more than the non-collective hallucinations" (Richet, *loc. cit.*, p. 472). "The wild hypothesis of an astral body might be advanced. But what about the astral presentment of a garment, a hat, an eye-glass, or a walking-stick?" (p. 476).

The carnal-minded may be excused for thinking this to be the height of folly, but the initiated maintain that such sumptuary details are pre-requisite, since, save for them, identification of spirits is so difficult, if not impossible to ordinary mortals, that it is imperative that these should persist without change by time or fashion. Hence ghosts are of necessity always out of fashion; for any variation would mar their recognition—nay, even terminate their existence—by obscuring their identity.

It is the case of

"The man who shoots the hares,  
This is the coat he always wears;  
With a game-bag, powder-horn, and gun,  
He is out to see some fun."

A sort of sacrament, an outward and visible sign of the spirit within, lacking which they cannot endure in the eyes of incarnate human beings, or survive the light of day. No philosophy of clothes has ever paralleled this in extravagance. Even Thomas Carlyle, in his most bizarre imaginings of what might be attained by a suitable scheme of sartorial religion, never went so far when he urged "an immediate retreat from Houndsditch." By which undoubtedly he meant we should free ourselves from Jewish old clothes; that the Old Testament precepts, though well suited to the time when they were promulgated, were not agreeable to the thought that flourishes now; that Hebrew fashions and ideas, though right no doubt for their race and age, are not adapted for modern purposes. For if ever they can be forced into the usages of to-day, the attempt only raises the question of their divine origin or heavenly wisdom. In *Barnaby Rudge*, Dickens tells us that no ghost in his senses would come on a cold night without clothes, and the weight of Dickens on such a point is overwhelming. So we may feel more confident that there is still rhyme and reason among the departed, since they preserve their outward appearance and vesture unaltered, however much their mental and bodily characteristics may be changed by the passage of Acheron.

It is a consolation that though our dear ones may suffer "a sea change, strange and wonderful" in the waves of Lethe and become unrecognizable, their clothes may still ensure their identity; and, though to human eyes and hearts they are no longer known as themselves, still we may be assured that they are the speaking likenesses of their vesture. From this, however, arises a new fear that any migration from Houndsditch would be useless; that though we might get rid of the Jewish hucksters who keep them upright and in order, yet the garments, by a persistent power, would torment and haunt us, unchanged and unchangeable amid the ages. *Eheu fugaces, labuntur anni; at vestamenta irrita perire, nolunt: et nos mutamur in illis.* The physical still clings to the spiritual and will not be put aside or got rid of. The flesh struggles with the spirit, which is weighed down and encumbered by this heavy burden of mortal weakness, and cannot rise unfettered through the realms of air and light to the ethereal abodes of real things, freed from the bonds of earth.

"It will be remembered that many of the better-evidenced groups of supernormal phenomena seemed to cluster round the point of death." A subliminal self may sometimes perceive his own approaching death, and may transmit this knowledge to the empirical self, sometimes by aid of an hallucination. Now, we know that the subliminal self may sometimes communicate knowledge to other persons. There are various cases where the phantom of a person destined soon to die has been seen by a person at a distance; it often appears while he is asleep, or in a comatose condition (*Myers, Phantasms of the Living*, Vol. II, p. 270).

I would here draw attention to the fact that the records of the appearances of Jesus are not precise or consistent, and they are quite incompatible with the account given by St. Paul (Cor. i. 15). If the "more than 500 at once" was really a fact, it is incredible that subsequent writers should not have insisted upon this point; but St. Paul classes along with his visions all the other cases in a way that suggests that they were subjective rather than objective events: " $\omega\phi\theta\eta.$ " There is, however, a fair consensus that the first appearance was to Mary Magdalene, out of whom devils had been cast—that is, to an hysterical or epileptic woman who was not sure what she

saw, and who reported the absurd remark that after three days Christ had not come into contact with the Omnipresent God. This is clearly a reflection of the old superstition that the spirit hovered about the grave for three days; just as the "eating before them" is of a "meta-organism," such as Mr. Gurney derides as a popular fiction. But, of course, if Jesus was not able to "put his doctrine so as not to countenance the mistaken ideas and superstitions of his time," *teste* Dr. A. C. Headlam, we cannot expect his followers to avoid similar misrepresentations. Both Myers and Gurney were Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge, and came into contact with many eminent men of their time, so that their opinions are not to be lightly dismissed, especially as they had the support of the Master of the College.

It is quite certain that, as J. M. Robertson points out, the events of the Last Day have been greatly "dramatized." It is out of the question that three trials, including the journey to and from Herod and the crucifixion and death, should really have taken place between sun-down on Thursday and Friday, twenty-four hours or rather less. Death from crucifixion commonly took two to three days, and the suggestion is made that Jesus was not in truth dead, that Pilate was bribed to allow him to be taken down; which, from the account given, is by no means incredible. And the story of piercing his side was invented, *ex post facto*, like that of the guard at the tomb, to meet possible objections. The way it is spoken of in the Fourth Gospel bears this out. The fictions in the First Gospel as to the resurrection, which are still further developed in that of the Hebrews, make it quite possible; quiet bribing of Pilate by Joseph of Arimathæa is much more feasible than that of the guard by the Sanhedrin, which is not practical politics and is beyond credence. The whole chapter (xxviii) of Matthew is dubious—to say the least, open to question—and, with the spurious part interpolated in Mark, suspicious as being entirely different from the genuine portion of that Gospel. Even Luke does not vouch for it; he reduces the earthquake to a darkness and the remark of the centurion to something very ordinary: "This was a righteous man." Yet according to Mark this was the very officer who assured Pilate of the death. And, as Conybeare points out, the amount of spices mentioned

in John makes it absurd that the women should have brought more; just as the quantity of wine said to have been created at Cana is about a water-cart full. Now, if this is the case, we have exactly the conditions that would lead to telepathic appearances—namely, a man dying in very exciting circumstances.

As to spirit messages given through automatic writing: “It is . . . evident that we have here a phenomenon lending itself to deception; nothing is to be gained by ignoring this or denying that a good deal of alleged automatic writing is done consciously and deliberately and with fraudulent intent in the writer” (M. Bird, *My Psychic Adventure*, 1923, p. 15). “In spirit photography the possibility of elaborate fraud is greater than in any other of the physical phenomena of Psychism” (p. 29). “In view of the very definite suggestion that the mediumship of ‘Eva C.’ and ‘Willy Sch,’ to mention but two well-established cases, is accompanied by abnormal sex phenomena, I think that the resemblance of Frau Volhard’s stigmatization to actual flagellation is worth examination” (p. 138). “‘Eva C.’ is the Marthe Béraud of Prof. Richet; she changed her name after the exposure mentioned by him, which certainly looks as if there were something in it, more than he seems ready to admit. People do not assume false names without a cause. The most striking case given is that of the rings; but he did not see this, it was only told to him by Dr. Gradenwitz, in whom he does not appear to place complete reliance. When arrangements were made, as with Dr. Grunewald at Berlin and Baron Schenk-Notzing at Munich, to try the facts under strict scientific conditions, mediums refused constantly to act or even to sit. This is my own experience: I offered to repeat certain of Prof. Richet’s experiments with full precautions; but Mr. Podmore was unable to supply or suggest anyone suitable. It is, however, only fair to say that the Professor has adopted means more stringent than any I proposed and has had successes. Miss Besinet refused to sit before a committee, but she only acts in absolute darkness; although the heat made this very objectionable” (pp. 239, 241).

Bird proceeds: “In all my séances that gave scope for it there was observable the most amazing precision of movement

in the dark; objects fly about the room at high velocity, weaving their way among the arms of chandeliers with never a collision. Whatever the immediate physical agency that supports and moves them, whether actually the medium's arms or ectoplasmic extensions from the medium's anatomy or what not, these too travel noiselessly and with perfect precision, wherever they have to go" (p. 302). "Anything the controls may desire during the séance is either indicated or more likely carried out by seizure of the hands involved" (p. 247). "As to the rope-tying act, Mr. Mackenzie, principal of the British College of Psychical Science, in his investigation found that this business was actually accomplished by means of a trick" (p. 252). "When he discovered it he insisted rather that Black Cloud had been playing tricks on his own account, just to have a bit of sport with the investigators" (p. 253). "My left hand was located and picked up presumably by the medium's and carried into contact with her right, put neatly on top of it, and bound securely thereto, almost to the point of discomfort" (p. 253). "The slightest attempt to explore into interdicted spaces results, before one has come into contact with anything, in one's hand being seized and moved away. This seizure is made with the utmost precision, exactly as I might seize your hand in broad daylight" (p. 265). But here again he did not see or feel; he only heard by report of others, and one is very chary as to its exact truth; it appears exaggerated. Still, he heard a bass, a tenor, a soprano, and an alto voice accompanying the music, and, as he says, there was no notion of confederates, for the performance was carried out at Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's residence and at the Mackenzie's in London (p. 258).

Mr. Bird's report for the *Scientific American* is sceptical as to the factual value or interpretation of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's séance experiences, although he gives him full credit for providing him with facilities for investigation and devising precautions against fraud. Bird speaks of Powell, the Welsh medium, and Hope, the Crewe photographer, as being above suspicion, but hints at the possibility of deception in both cases, and sums up against them, though he says their effects excelled all that he was shown elsewhere. For example he writes of Hope: "Several plates were developed [by Hope], and one showed

an extra. This plate failed to show the secret mark. The investigators claimed to have actually observed the act of substitution. Hope and his defenders agree that the result shows substitution to have been effected." And again: "In prints from this negative the best extra looks like the coarsest sort of newspaper half-tone, the grain being its predominant feature. . . . If he is a fraud he has certainly substituted plates or plate-holders with other sitters, and this is one thing he certainly did not do with me." Apropos of Powell: "I want to be fair to the mediums, and I must be fair to the facts. My best judgment is that the thread was broken, probably in advance; and that the trick which I have outlined was probably performed." "The procedure actually adopted was highly artificial, elaborate, and indirect. It does not seem to me that it could ever occur to one, much less be employed by one who did not have something to conceal." "Not long before I sat with her, Frau Volhard had, without any apparent reason, abandoned the production of 'ectoplasm.'" "She would not sit in any clothes except her own, and would not submit to other than perfunctory search" (*Bird, My Psychic Adventures*, pp. 188, 193, 212, 214, 231).

The upshot is that one feels the matter is surrounded with fraud; but at the same time one cannot, in face of such men as Sir W. Crookes, Prof. Richet, Sir O. Lodge, Sidgwick (Master of Trinity College, Cambridge), dismiss it as beneath consideration. The facts—if they are facts—are very astounding, and one might also say incredible. Two members of the staff of the Edinburgh Royal Infirmary to whom I retailed some of the most remarkable things, gave their view that Richet is a very old man and has been mixed up with Flammarion. Yet this will not cover the adherence of a number of eminent people, nor is it applicable to others in bygone times, as long as thirty years back. Our answer then to Spiritualists, whether Christian or psychic, is that these things do not occur in our experience. They may feel them, and the evidences may be convincing to them; but the only way in which they appeal to us is by the effect on their lives. Are you different from those around you? Do you stand out as a shining example of the teaching from the spirit world? Do you show forth to men the results of the system of morality,

the working of the spirit? The only persons I knew who testified to the physical manifestations of Spiritualists, who lived in a house between two radio sets and complained of the noise they made, were given to spirits of a far different and more material kind. The only person I have come across who was much moved by Coué's views, and had been his disciple at Nancy and a strenuous advocate of his methods in this country, and wrote a book explaining them, ended his own life in a fit of despair.

The one scientific man who argued strongly for the action of a force not material, and professed to have proved it to be spiritual, just as his experiments had reached a stage when they were capable of demonstration before a competent jury, came to an end by his own hand. He had the ball at his feet and failed to kick it home. In similar cases the verdict is usually, "He did not dare to submit to trial," and judgment goes by default; and a similar finding would seem to be applicable here. A doctrine is known by its fruits, as Christ teaches; and in reference to Goguel I may suggest that Christianity is a sort of allegory, that we are all "sons of God," and that we should be Redeemers also, giving our lives for others, working for the good of the whole race. By this is meant no mere sentimental altruism, but simply doing one's best in the sphere to which one is called. One does the best for others when one does the best for oneself. That is best in a long run which earns the good opinion of one's fellows on mature consideration, not the mere passing applause of the mob or waning favour of women and thoughtless persons of either sex.

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Sixty years ago Mr. Nutt, sub-librarian of the Bodleian and later Vicar of Harrietsham, suggested to me that the account of the origin of man in Genesis was an allegory, that "the effect of the knowledge of good and evil was that Eden vanished." Man's necessity is God's opportunity; in conversion often nothing worthy of it is brought forth. According to Jonathan Edwards, "the work of God in creatures outweighs the Creation"; no such marked effect generally results, no unmistakable class-mark. There are spiritual grubs and Stigginses. According to Tony Weller, Stiggins was the "saint of St. Simon Without and St. Walker Within." In the

opinion of a former Oxford Professor of Hebrew: "We have perhaps no writing of the time of Moses, we are not beyond the realm of myth in that of David, or even in that of Elijah and Elisha." The Old Testament is not a true story of events, but an example of the use of fiction for teaching truth; it embodies the folklore and prejudices of Hebrews, and was written nobody can say by whom, and hardly when. Its interpretation is very much a question of the feelings of to-day. Views change, and we cannot, though willing, accept those of bygone times and alien races. When we see the same methods used as to the New Testament—namely, "it is a patchwork," put together nobody knows by whom or how; that even the Epistles of Paul have been tampered with and forged, which is plain from his own words as to "letters as if from us," one can but ask if the same sort of exegesis applies here? At the era of these works and long afterward the system of allegory was applied to many religious ideas and doctrines—*e.g.* in "Melchisedek being called" without father or mother, because none is mentioned, and priest of the Highest; just as Balaam is spoken of as "Prophet of the true God," though a very bad man.

The fact is that the history of the times is obscure and confused in the extreme and is in the same category as the Arthurian legend with us, or at least the quasi-legendary saga of Alfred. No one to-day maintains that "Holy Writ" is inspired; the quotation from "Enoch as fifth from Adam" in Jude, and endless incorrect citations, often from the Septuagint, especially in St. Paul's Epistles, which might, above all, set up such a claim, disposes for ever of the pretence that these books or their authors are infallible. At Tarsus, Paul's native city, there was a yearly sacrifice, originally of a man, but later of an animal, to take away the "sins of the people" —a sort of scapegoat; and it would have been miraculous if this had not affected his thoughts and his words. The great merit of Jesus is that he got rid of the notion of sacrifice in the whole world, but Paul brought it all back as an allegory. I cannot answer for Romanists or Ritualists, but I believe most sensible men are agreed that the pretence of priests making atonement for others is a fiction bred of the desire to dominate. We can see clear traces of development of doctrine in the

Synoptics; the genealogies are those of Joseph. Matthew says Jesus was resident at Bethlehem, Luke "at Nazareth," and that "they went to Bethlehem to be taxed . . . in the time of Cyrenius." John and Mark are silent on these points. Matthew says "in the time of Herod," ten years earlier, and adds a number of stories based on dubious interpretation, and also fictions to the tale of the Resurrection. Luke seems to tone these down, as he gets rid of the command "to go to Galilee" after the crucifixion. Canon Sanday attempts a reconciliation of the two versions that does not carry conviction. This method has been tried often, always with the same result that believers say the discrepancies have all been satisfactorily explained; but this is a mere *ipse dixit*.

Books that give genealogies of Joseph, to show that Jesus was "the son of David," at a time when this was considered important, and then assert that he was not the son of Joseph; and confuse Ναζωραῖος with Ναζαρηνός, it is too absurd to look on as above error or criticism. The *Encyclopædia Biblica*, Hastings's *Dictionary of the Bible*, and the authors of the *International Critical Commentary* treat the Gospels, etc., just as if they were written like other books by putting together facts and even rumours. Luke clearly takes this view, and it was only when the Reformers wanted something infallible to put into the place of the Infallible Church that they conceived this notion of an inspired book that was beyond all mistakes and above all question. To this it was replied, "that 'Revelation' was suited to man's apprehension; that you can only speak to anyone by common symbols; that it is useless to address deep thoughts to a savage." Let us apply this test to a special case. Suppose the story of the Creation had been put thus: "As a builder piles up a structure so were the foundations of the earth laid; line upon line and stone upon stone it was constructed. The water and the winds were the workmen; with the aid of fire they built up the solid ground and carried masses where they were needed. The cauldron of volcanoes poured out sheets and covered up and joined broken masses; lime was the mortar, and iron, glass, and marble filled up the cracks; and sea-shells and sand formed the cliffs. Even mountains were thrown up and planed down, and valleys carved out, and courses of streams."

I have written this in a few minutes, and everyone even with a superficial knowledge can see that it represents the truth. But answer will be made: A century ago such a cosmogony had not been formulated. Werner and Hutton were quarrelling over rival theories; Dean Buckland was explaining obscure things by reference to the flood; the fossils were said to be trials or jokes of the Almighty; early man of necessity looked on God as in the image of Himself; even in Roman times law was spoken of as "untouched with any sense of our weakness"; a king was open to sympathy and could make exceptions and deal with cases with human feeling. Experience of Tudor and Stuart sovereigns, French, German, and Russian rulers has shown that monarchy really leads to partiality and disregard of merit, and that Jewish monarchs and Christian Popes have not been morally superior. David's last words were quite unjust, and Solomon, in spite of heavenly wisdom, was only an Oriental despot who erected altars to the gods of his too-numerous wives and made Jerusalem a city of shrines, like Benares. We have to get rid of pretence in such matters: you cannot persuade others to believe what you yourself do not credit. It is only to bury your head in the sand to think that the working classes do not fully know the truth in these subjects, which have been spoken of too plainly to be in any way hushed up now. To autocratic rule succeeds the idea of saying "exactly what you should do by written law." It was against this attitude that Jesus protested: "The letter kills, the spirit maketh alive." It is by the sacred spirit—the spirit of Christ—that the world can be saved, the aim being to do to others as you would have them do to you. Jesus was divine because of his humanity; but the Church has been inhuman because of its divinity. At Rome Numa succeeds Romulus; at Constantinople Constantine superseded Christ. Thereafter it was a question of obeying the law; the kingdom of God had become that of the world, "of the world, worldly." "Conquerors, kings, and Kaisers are laden with crowns of gold; but Christ was despised, and rejected; and His crown was a crown of thorns. Therewith he ascended to heaven, and sits on the throne of God: And they who would follow Him thither, must tread by the road He trod" (*Ruth: A Poem*).

## CHAPTER VI

### THE PHILOSOPHY OF “AS IF”

The Moving Finger writes; and having writ,  
Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor Wit  
    Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,  
    Nor all thy Tears wash out a Word of it.

—*The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyám*, translated by Edward Fitzgerald.

THIS has all been developed into a formal doctrine of “As If” by Vaihinger; starting from Kant’s “Practical Reason,” as compared with “Pure Reason,” he has set himself to prove that in all things we use “working hypotheses” on the principle enunciated by Bacon—“that falsehood is like alloy in gold, which makes it easy to work though it debaseth it,” e.g. “The rational concepts (‘the soul as a substance’ and ‘personal God’ in particular) are, however, mere ideas without any objectivity, do not come within the range of empirical facts, and only serve as the ‘regulative principle’ . . . Kant himself gives in this connection as specific examples the ‘incorporeal unity of the soul and the existence of a Supreme Being’ ” (Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of “As If”*, Kegan Paul, p. 272). “The Virgin Birth, the idea of Atonement, and the idea of the Last Judgment. For Kant these ideas are a serviceable pedagogical expedient, ‘aesthetic machinery’ for the animation and furtherance of moral impulses, a sensuous poetic dress . . . for practical purposes” (p. 320). “Forberg clearly grasped . . . Kant’s As-if doctrine” (p. 321). “‘It is not a duty to believe that there exists a moral world-government or a God as a moral world-ruler; our duty is simply to act *as if* we believed it’ ” (p. 323). “‘Religion is therefore nothing but a belief in the success of the good cause, just as irreligion is nothing but despair of the good cause.’

“On the other hand, ‘theoretical belief (which then becomes superstition) and practical unbelief can very well exist together.’ Theoretical atheism is, as such, a mere question of speculation,

in that respect harmless and without danger" (p. 324). "Practical atheism is something quite different (for it the moral law is not so sacred as it would be if a God existed): such 'practical disbelief is mean egoism.' . . . If a man who 'regards such optimism as completely chimerical,' who is convinced that the world is 'full of stupidity, falsehood, and wickedness . . . neglects none of his duties' " and acts in a way that indicates the greatest consideration for the rights of others, "'this is true and genuine religion'" (p. 325). "'It is not the (theoretical) belief that the kingdom of God is coming which constitutes religion; but the endeavour to make it come, even if we believe that it never will come'" (p. 326). What is this but the Biblical precept put in the forefront of the English Prayer-book: "When a wicked man does that which is lawful and right, he shall save his soul alive?"

"This and this alone is religion' . . . a practical belief in the 'kingdom of God' . . . A good man does good although theoretically he does not believe in a moral world-order. . . . What is to Forberg merely an 'as if' is to Fichte a 'that' and a 'because.' . . . We should to-day return to the clear and definite Kant-Forberg religion of As-if, which . . . is yet not devoid of warmth and poetry, and represents in its radical form the highest point to which the human mind, or rather the human heart, is capable of raising itself" (pp. 326-7). "Lange's theory of metaphysics as a justified form of 'poetry' made a deep impression upon Nietzsche. . . . The intentional adherence to illusion, in spite of the realization of its nature, is a kind of 'lie in an extra-moral sense'" (pp. 341-2). "Nietzsche expressly invokes Kant: 'when Kant says: "Reason does not derive its laws from Nature"'" (p. 349, *note*). "'It is our laws and our conformity to laws that we read into the world of phenomena'" (pp. 348-9). "The belief in permanence, duration, the unconditioned, is not 'the belief that is most true, but the one that is most useful'" (p. 350). "'The question is to what extent is it advantageous to life'" (p. 354). "We no more harbour 'one soul' in our breasts than we do 'two'" (p. 355). "'What if God is a deceiver, in spite of Descartes?' 'Let us assume that there is something deceptive and fraudulent in the nature of things'" (p. 360). "The use

of the term 'Scepticism' as applied to the Philosophy of 'As if' has . . . been partly due to the doubt with which this philosophy regards metaphysical realities, particularly God and immortality" (Preface, p. xlvi). "I regard these conceptions as fictions of ethical value." "One would be well advised to remember how Kant had already pointed out that there are problems which mock us perpetually, but which we cannot get rid of. . . . We do not understand the world when we are pondering over its problems, but when we are doing the world's work. Here too the practical reigns supreme" (p. xiv).

"The strivings which probably exist in the most elementary physical processes develop in organic beings into impulses. In man, who has sprung from the animal (and to a certain extent in all the higher animals), these impulses have evolved into will and action" (pp. xlv-xlvi). "Thought is originally only a means in the struggle for existence," the "Will to Live"; and the means comes to preponderate over the end, "and is finally practised for its own sake as theoretical thought. . . . These . . . questions cannot be answered by looking forwards, but only by looking backwards, by showing how they arose" (p. xlvi). "Many thought-processes and thought-constructs appear to be consciously false assumptions which either contradict reality or are even contradictory in themselves. . . . This æsthetic and ethical world of 'As if,' the world of the unreal, becomes finally for us a world of values which, particularly in the form of religion, must be sharply distinguished in our mind from the world of becoming. What we usually term reality consists of our sensational contents which press forcibly upon us with greater or lesser irresistibility, and as 'given' can generally not be avoided. . . . By means of the sensational contents which we call our body we can exercise greater or lesser influence on the rich world of the other sensational contents. In this world we find on the one hand a very great number of relations of fitness, on the other hand much that is not fitting. . . . It is a satisfying fiction for many to regard the world as if a more perfect Higher Spirit had created or at least regulated it. But this implies the supplementary fiction of regarding a world of this sort as if the order created by the Higher Divine Spirit had been destroyed

by some hostile force" (pp. xlvi–xlvii). "Appearance, and consciously-false, plays an enormous part in science, in world-philosophies and in life" (p. xli). "Fiction which is found in a greater or lesser degree in all the sciences can best be expressed by this complex conjunction 'As if.' . . . I gave it the name of 'Positive Idealism' or 'Idealistic Positivism'" (p. xli). "Fictions . . . are hypotheses which are known to be false, but which are employed because of their utility" (p. xlvi).

In Prof. Upton's *Philosophy of Dr. Martineau* we read: "Dr. Martineau did not claim for Jesus exhaustive moral insight, but only that perfect fidelity to the ideal as he discerned it" (p. 63). Dr. Martineau adds: "That no higher human being can ever appear on earth we would by no means venture to affirm" (p. 63). "In Sir John Seely's brilliant volume on *Natural Religion* we are told that in the conception of Religion formed by the man of science . . . 'the word "God" is only a synonym for "Nature"'; that in the field of Nature 'he feels himself to stand in the presence of an infinite and eternal being,' nay a 'divine being'; so that 'he is as truly a theist as he who bends down in prayer'" (p. 163). "Comte, the founder of Positivism, seeing the great value for ethical purposes of the idea of a personality behind the phenomena of Nature to give them unity and to kindle warmth of interest in the universe, suggested that, though as a matter of fact there is no evidence of the existence of such a personality, nevertheless the *idea* of such a being might be cherished in the form of *poetry*." Martineau puts it that "'*Noumena* are unknown except as phenomena cognizable in our personality. . . . But none the less shall I rest and move with assured certainty upon them; and if you will not let me say "*I know them*," I will be content to say "*I trust them*," but the difference between "*trust*" in the one case and "*knowledge*" in the other marks no distinction of certainty'" (pp. 172–3).

"We must so explain the world of phenomena which the senses reveal, as not to violate the primitive intuitions of the mind. Those intuitions assure us of our personal causality; they assure us also of our moral freedom; and therefore, no inferences drawn from phenomenal sequences, whether in the physical or the psychical sphere, can avail to overrule

these ultimate pronouncements of our rational and moral nature. If, says Dr. Martineau, we cannot prove the truth of these institutions, as we can prove scientific laws, we nevertheless accept them as authenticated by the very constitution of our minds" (p. 171).

"At the opposite pole to this doctrine, which makes the perceptions of 'Reason' a part of the activity of God, lies the system of Kant and Fichte [which] represents God as an ideal formation—it may be, therefore, a fiction—from the activity of 'The Reason'" (p. 50). "It is a well-known fact that by repeating tales to themselves and to others people come to believe what they say, and are duped by their own falsehoods" (p. 46). "The subconscious . . . provides us with all kinds of excellent reasons for doing what it wishes us to do, when the only real reason is the presence in the subconscious of an image or a system of images which the conscious mind knows nothing of" (Baudouir, *Suggestion and Auto-suggestion*, p. 83).

It is evident from countless passages in his books that Martineau really believed that we do know God in his reality; but I confess that I feel great difficulty in understanding how we could possibly reach this knowledge if He were differentiated from our subjective selves in the same way as "other objects of thought." If He only revealed Himself to us as other noumena do, we might have a cognition of Him. My brother, a cleric, urged and insisted on the introduction of Kant's philosophy at Oxford because he thought it supported Christianity. Men whose native language is German, and who were the pupils of his successors, probably understand Kant's meaning very much better. It may be instructive, then, to give some passages from his works. His distinction between "Pure Reason" and "Practical Reason" based on the notion "As if," as is shown clearly in "the expression 'objective reality,' which is also applied to the idea of God and of immortality, is explained with all desirable clarity. This 'objective reality' has nothing whatever to do with an external existence theoretically demonstrable, or assumable; the 'objective reality' of the ideas consists in their inward existence in the human reason as practical, ethical norms, values, ideals, fictions." This passage is a classical one for

Kant's whole theory of ideas (p. 300). It is followed by Kant's celebrated and as yet little understood definition of religion, namely: "All religion consists in the fact that in respect of all our duties, we regard God (a mere idea) as the lawgiver to be universally reverenced." "The stress is on 'regard,' we regard the matter as if a God existed, and as if this God had prescribed our moral code. In this double fiction lies the essence of the religious manner of approach" (*The Philosophy of "As If,"* p. 300).

"The religion of Pure Reason consists in the fact that man takes his duties as seriously '*as if*' they had been imposed by some higher being. 'The coverings, under which the embryo first develops into the man, must be laid aside before he can be born into the light of day,' says Kant. 'The leading-strings of the sacred tradition, with all its appendages, statutes, and observances, that did good service in their time, become gradually less and less indispensable—indeed, act as a clog as man reaches adolescence.' So long as he (the human race) 'was a child, he had the wisdom of a child . . . but now that he is become a man, he must put away childish things.' As soon as the human being reaches the stage of thinking manhood he transforms the 'that' (*dass*) of the dogmas into the '*as if*' of the fictive standpoint" (p. 301) (cf. Temple, *Essays and Reviews*). Carlyle preached the doctrine of "Migration out of Houndsditch," and the discarding of Jewish old clothes; but this implies that we must get rid of the surroundings inherited from our mothers so as to be free men in the world of facts. It is reminiscent of the French quip, "That if Christianity did not exist, it ought to be invented." This implies that the truth of Christianity is of no importance; only believe and all things are possible, which is tantamount to the formula of Trine and Coué: "Rest on the unknown, and it will pull you through in spite of yourself."

It will be said, of course, this means that "we cannot get beyond our own ideas, our thoughts are limited by our understanding," which must be quite inadequate to represent such realities; that our notion of space, time, and other constants is symbolical only—a shadow of it. It really is so; we do merely grasp an indistinct and unreal phantom of the actual. Vaihinger clearly does not hold this view (*vide* p.

315) : “‘God is not a substance existing outside of me, but merely a moral relation within me’ . . . the ideal person who exercises the highest authority, God, is not a ‘substance different from man’ ” (p. 316). In contrast to the “technical-practical” view, which assumes an active God in Nature, Kant called this the “pragmatic-moral” view; *i.e.* the necessity I feel to act as if I were under this terrible, but salutary guidance, which is at the same time a guarantee recognizing all my duties as divine commands (*tanquam, non ceu*). Of freedom, Kant says: “This does not imply the ‘reality of freedom.’ ‘Freedom is here treated as a transcendental idea’—in other words, only as a heuristic fiction. . . . Our moral endeavour . . . ‘derives its principles from a higher source and determines our behaviour, *as if* our destiny extended infinitely far beyond our experience, and therefore far beyond this life.’ This fiction is naturally only possible on the basis of the assumption of a ‘non-corporeal soul,’ and this assumption in its turn is . . . for Kant himself, only a fiction” (pp. 274–5). “We are dealing here, he says, with a ‘mere idea,’ but ‘from a psychological Idea of this kind only advantage can be derived.’ Here again Kant quite clearly indicates the utility of the soul-fiction. . . . In the second section, he speaks specifically of ‘the transcendental ideal,’ *i.e.* of the idea of God as the ideal of *omnitudo realitatis*” (p. 275). “We are subject to ‘a natural illusion’ when we in this way ‘hypostasize’ and ‘personify’ the dependence of the empirical particular ‘upon the totality of all empirical reality’ ” (p. 276). “The concept of God, as well as that of the whole intelligible world has been created by our reason and must therefore” (p. 277), “‘as a mere idea, have its seat and its resolution in the nature of reason’ ” (p. 276). “‘You should philosophize about Nature *as if* there were a necessary first cause for everything that exists, simply in order to bring systematic unity into your knowledge’ ” (p. 277).

“‘The ideal of the Supreme Being is, according to this view, nothing else than a regulative principle of reason’ ” (p. 277). “It is, however, at the same time inevitable that we should, by means of a transcendental subsumption, represent to ourselves this formal principle as constitutive, and think of this unity as hypostatic.” “It is thus we get the fiction of a

substance, supposed to exist outside the realm of experienced objects, which then become mere *attributa*, or *modi*, of the substance. In the same way there arises the fiction of an absolute cause of which the world of experience is supposed to be the effect" (p. 165). I know, of course, that the human mind, developed for practical purposes, only knows things that are brought to it by the senses—that is, mostly appearances and hearsay. There are rays of light and vibrations of sound that never reach our brains because they are not perceived by sense; there may be things of which we learn nothing because the means of transmitting them to our minds is defective or wanting. "Reality" and "things in themselves" are beyond our ken; we are capable of grasping only what can pass by our usual channels of apprehension. If Kant and his followers meant no more than this commonplace of philosophy, they have been very careless and remiss in its expression. They say that we should act as if these things were facts, but make this very hard to do by undermining the foundations of knowledge and speaking in an ambiguous manner—e.g., "If we desire to retain the popular and quite justifiable view that Kant proved the necessity of the idea of God, we must say not the 'necessity of the idea of God,' but 'the necessity of the *idea* of God,' for we are dealing here with 'a mere Idea.' The emphasis is to be placed on the word 'idea,' not on the word 'God'" (p. 279, *note*). "We have no right to deduce the world-order from a Supreme Intelligence but only from the Idea of such an Intelligence," i.e., we are allowed to make use of these concepts as heuristic fictions" (p. 280). "'This rational entity is, of course, *a mere idea*, and is not simply and in itself to be accepted as anything real, but is only problematically assumed'" (p. 281).

"The assumption, fully justified as a fiction, [is] of an 'understanding possessing the faculty of perceiving its object without the aid of the senses.' Thus intuitive understanding or intellectual intuition is here characterized clearly as a mere 'methodological' fiction. In the same sentence Kant cites as further examples of such fictions the idea of a substance which 'without being impenetrable, should nevertheless be present in space'—in other words, the idea of the soul, and connected with it the idea of a supersensuous

'community of substances,' the idea of 'presence otherwise than in space,' the idea of 'duration otherwise than in time'; *i.e.*, the whole stock-in-trade of the old dogmatic philosophy'" (p. 283). "The 'system by which happiness is bound up with and proportional to morality'. . . . the 'system of morality which produces its own reward.' That too 'is only an Idea,' which in its turn is made possible only by a special fiction; the fiction, namely, that 'all acts of rational beings take place as if they had sprung from a Supreme Will. . . . We may not 'presume from the conception of a Supreme Being,' to deduce the laws of morality; this would be 'fanciful, or even presumptuous'" (p. 285). "Kant lets slip a very characteristic expression: the 'moral law,' he says, is also 'a mere idea'—a very remarkable saying. The whole moral law, merely an idea?" (p. 285, *note*). Most men, I think, will be inclined to call this cant; for cant consists essentially in professing what you do not believe. When some years ago the ministers of two contiguous parishes in Edinburgh avowed that they did not credit what they preached in their pulpits, surely things can be said to have come to a pretty pass.

The view here given of Kant's argument is altogether different from that taken up by Archbishop Temple in Bampton Lectures (Macmillan, 1884), that: "Holding that invariable sequence was a law of Nature known independently of experience and applicable to all phenomena in the minutest detail, he could not allow that any act of the human will lay outside the range of this law. Such an act being a phenomenon must, in his view, be subject to the law which the constitution of our minds imposed on all phenomena apparent to us. And yet . . . the Moral Law made us responsible for all our acts. . . . His mode of reconciling these two opposites amounted to this, that our action throughout life considered as a whole is free, but that each separate act considered by itself is bound to the preceding acts by the law of invariable sequence" (p. 74). "The man is free. His life represents his free choice. But his separate acts are what that free choice becomes when translated into a series of phenomena; and are bound each to the preceding by the law of invariable sequence. It is plain at once that this does not satisfy our consciousness. We are not conscious of freedom as regards our life as a whole:

we are conscious of freedom as regards our separate actions" (pp. 75-6).

Besides, if all our acts are "determined," it is difficult to see how the whole of life can be "self-determined," for the whole is but the sum of its parts, and there can be nothing beyond it. Unless, indeed, one admits that development means that something is added which was not there originally; the potentiality of it, no doubt, must have existed. In short, this almost implies that the reality did not; for the power to do a thing is obviously different from doing it. In electricity, or more obviously in dynamics, potential means the possibility of action, as when a body is supported and can produce effects by falling, but does not so long as the support is effective and prevents this action and its results. The one is active; the other is passive, and without any action at all. A bag of flour together with raisins, currants, suet, and other ingredients has the potentiality of a plum-pudding. A mere mixture with water might produce a paste resembling frumenty or firmenty. A compound is quite different in properties from the constituents. Mechanical mixing will give only a mixture, not a chemical compound.

Vaihinger's pragmatal philosophy and the equally paralogical doctrine of William James are reflected in, although not expressly endorsed or directly applied by Peirce in his *Chance, Love and Logic* from which accordingly it is necessary to quote somewhat freely. Peirce's philosophy is so abstract that it is difficult to understand, all the more so because his exposition is unsystematic. Consequently, even the most carefully-chosen passages apart from the context are apt to give a wrong perspective of the nature and scope of his speculative thought.

"Modern statistical mechanics and thermodynamics (theory of gases, entropy, etc.) suggest that the regularity in the universe is a matter of gradual growth . . . from a chaos of diversity to a maximum of uniformity or entropy" (Introduction by Morris R. Cohen, p. xii). "One way of accounting for it certainly would be to suppose that the world is ordered by a superior power" (p. 106). "Whatever further conclusions we may come to in regard to the order of the universe,

thus much may be regarded as solidly established, that the world is not a mere chance medley" (p. 109). "The world is not as orderly as it might be and, for instance, not so much so as a world of pure chance would be" (p. 112). At first sight this may seem not quite intelligible; but the Food Committee in their first report say: "We are impressed with the fact that the system has worked, and has ensured the nation a regular and uninterrupted supply of bread and meat. Concerted action is limited in its scope; the wider movements of supply and demand result from the judgments and preferences of millions of individual producers and consumers" (p. 130). So that unorganized efforts may effect regular and constant results, quite apart from any one guiding mind. "The relation of means to an end as embodied in the chase is such a fixed form of human thought that few are able to conceive of any natural product except as a work of design and as having a purpose" (Read, *Origin of Man*, p. 28; Cambridge University Press; 1925).

"Darwin says: 'Man not only uses inarticulate cries, gestures, and expressions, but has invented articulate language, if indeed the word *invented* can be applied to a process completed by innumerable steps, half-consciously made.'" That this is the true rationale of the evolutionary process adumbrated by Darwin is brought out clearly by the following extracts from the chapter on "The Origin of Languages" in *Plain Speaking*, by T. R. Stebbing, 1926. "Wherever the primary roots themselves may have come from, at any rate starting from them language has been formed by human beings, and not by them with any definite concert and plan, but in the haphazard style of ordinary intercourse" (p. 138). "Whatever we may think of language in the abstract . . . the various forms of it at present in the world have been shaped in the mental factories of mankind" (p. 138). Humboldt says: "'Man is only man through language, but to invent language he must already have been man'" . . . yet, "Language, properly speaking, was never invented, but slowly developed . . . neither was man, properly speaking, ever invented, but, like language, slowly developed, so that at one stage of the process there will have been a half-human creature with a half-articulate language; at another stage a savage, with few abstract ideas,

and few, if not fewer, words to express them" (p. 157). "For if the theory of evolution be true as applied to mankind, and men are descended, it matters little through how many generations, from animals which were dumb, as some human beings are even now, it will no longer be true that *no animal has ever spoken*" (p. 161). "Before many years are over the doctrine of the evolution of all organic life from lifeless inorganic material may come to be proclaimed by eloquent and orthodox theologians as agreeing with the express statement of the Book of Genesis, that 'The Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground'" (p. 155).

"Haeckel's supposition, whatever we may think of his phrase for expressing it, of an animal organism 'becoming' by natural process from inorganic matter is no more *atheistic* in itself than the *supposition* that lightnings flash among the clouds, and hail descends from the sky by natural process, although in the olden times it was Zeus that thundered, and Jehovah that rained down hailstones from Heaven" (p. 151).

"We have in Dr. Farrar a scholar and theologian of eminence strongly opposed to any hypotheses or conclusions which seem to favour an atheistic materialism; and yet at the same time one who stoutly maintains that language is a human invention" (p. 152). He says, "'All *but* the most prejudiced even of theologians ought to admit that if man *could* have invented language, we may safely conclude that he *did*'" (p. 148), and he "declares that 'some modern writers, essentially aggressive, and essentially retrogressive, doctors of that school which learns nothing and forgets nothing, and whom eighteen centuries have only pushed back behind the earliest Fathers in tolerance and liberality, can only see in the certainty of a language discovered by mankind a materialist deistic hypothesis'" (p. 152). "'Disbelieving,' on the scientific ground in the fixity of type, the Darwinian hypothesis, we should yet consider it disgraceful and humiliating to try to shake it by an *ad captandum* argument, or a claptrap platform appeal to the unfathomable ignorance and unlimited arrogance of a prejudiced assembly. We should blush to meet it with an anathema or a sneer, and in doing so we should be very far from the ludicrous and complacent assumption that we were on the side of the angels'" (Farrar, chapter on "Lang-

guage," p. 153). Yet "Dr. Farrar, no less than Professor Max Müller, appears to be strongly opposed to the theory of evolution" (p. 149) on the ground that "no animal has ever spoken"; so now they try to make us believe that evolution was the "plan" on which the Creator chose to make the Universe. But Natural Selection and the survival of the fittest does not mean any "determined or planned" scheme; it is an explanation of the facts of the world.

[As an illustration of the operation of this law, there is a colonial form of animal in which, while each of the polyps is a separate organism, the whole moves along like a snail or worm, so as to bring the colony into positions more favourable for its life. In all such forms the substratum must be nourished by the individual members of the complex, just as a tribe or nation lives by the life of its constituents. The growth of the individuals and the increasing independence of "persons," as against the congeries of corporate existence, is a subject that has been much discussed of late, especially in relation to the advancement of the Jewish race from the "favourite nation" to the status of separate "souls," which had each to give account of its own doings, in the flesh, apart from the inherited bias of its origin.—AUTHOR.] "From this time [Ezekiel] onward *prayer* superseded *sacrifice* as the essential feature of the Jewish religion, and the *individual* value of the human soul became more fully realized, as contrasted with the earlier predominance in the eyes of the Jews of the *nation* as Jehovah's first-born. Ezekiel thus inculcated a newer and more spiritual conception of religion and sketched the principles of the future theocracy. The future community should be a Church, God himself should dwell in their midst: 'The soul that sinneth it shall die . . . but if the wicked will turn from all his sins . . . he shall surely live; he shall not die'" Ezek. xviii. 20–21. 592–586 b.c. (Rev. J. M. Hardwich and Rev. H. Costley-White, *Old Testament History*, Part V, 1914; John Murray, pp. 106, 109–10).

According to Peirce "A world of chance is simply our actual world viewed from the standpoint of an animal at the very vanishing-point of intelligence. The actual world is almost a chance-medley to the mind of a polyp. The interest which

the uniformities of Nature have for an animal measures his place in the scale of intelligence" (p. 115). "The tendency to personify every thing, and to attribute human characters to it, may be said to be innate; but it is a tendency which is very soon overcome by civilized man in regard to the greater part of the objects about him. . . . It seems incontestable, therefore, that the mind of man is strongly adapted to the comprehension of the world" (p. 124), because the inner and outer have reacted for countless ages on one another and produced conformity.

Thus "the heavens" are the type of beauty because the eye has become so completely adapted to the light of the sky: the varying tints of this are our beau-ideal of the perfect in colour; but to colour-blind people they are "all alike," yet they see them as beautiful. Their want of appreciation of pigment is not so complete as is generally thought; they see red and green as light and shade, or yellow and blue; "red-green" is the common defect, and these see the sky in its proper colours. The yellow-blue variety see the plants and earth practically correctly; and they see the heavens like a steel engraving, with all its perfection of gradation and contrast of light and shade. The question is one of appreciation of minute differences in speed of vibration, and one does not suppose that this existed from the beginning. It has been gradually evolved, until it gives us our almost divine vision of the day-spring and of sunset at eve, the most charming, perhaps, of the pleasures of life—that which, in the words of the poet, recalls our minds "From the earth unto heaven."

In the same way our hearts have become accustomed to things which we look on as right, and resent that which we are unused to as unlawful and even sacrilegious. We are inclined to forget the everlasting precept of love when face to face with some practice which we regard as outrageous because it differs from what our fathers held. By degrees mankind is coming to see things in the same light, and to agree as to what is the truth. In this process science has had a profound effect in spite of the prejudices set up and strongly maintained by various religions. It has brought home to people of different climes and races that certain things are facts and others fiction.

Although, at first sight, there may not appear to be any logical or natural connection between Vaihinger's theorem of "As If" and the motivating factors in the origin and nature of Spiritualist belief and doctrine, also other psychological manifestations of the "Will to Believe," and its primary and secondary reactions, e.g. expectant attention, mind-healing, etc., there is actually such a causal link. This is aptly illustrated in the voluminous literature of Spiritualism, notably in a representative and authoritative work, *The Law of Psychic Phenomena*, by T. J. Hudson, which has passed through many editions. This must be our warranty for drawing largely upon its contents. All works on the subject, even Richet's, while they begin with hypnotism and telepathy, which no one would have difficulty in accepting at their own estimate, sooner or later get to "dreams and ghosts and haunted houses and spooks" that do not carry conviction to most minds.

Hudson writes: "Plato's idea of terrestrial man was that he is a 'trinity of soul, soul-body, and earth-body.' . . . The early Christian Fathers confidently proclaimed the same doctrine, as is shown in the writings of Clement, Origen, Tatian, and other early exponents of Christian doctrine. . . . It is the basis of their conception of God as a Trinity in his personality, modes of existence, and manifestations; a conception of which Schelling says: 'The philosophy of mythology proves that a trinity of divine potentialities is the root from which have grown the religious ideas of all nations of any importance that are known to us'" (pp. 27-8). "The 'subjective mind' is a distinct entity, possessing independent powers and functions, having a mental organization of its own, and being capable of sustaining an existence independently of the body. In other words, it is the soul" (p. 30).

In hypnotism, "if a subject is told that he is a dog, he will instantly accept the suggestion; and to the limit of physical possibility act the part suggested. If he is told that he is the President of the United States, he will act the part with wonderful fidelity to life. If he is told he is in the presence of angels, he will be profoundly moved to acts of devotion. If the presence of devils is suggested, his terror will be instant. . . . If told that he is in a high fever his pulse will become rapid. . . .

He may be raised to the highest degree of mental or physical exaltation . . . or be plunged . . . into the lethargic or cataleptic condition. . . . The subjective mind of an individual is as amenable to the control of his own objective mind as to the objective mind of another" (p. 31). "Through all the varying phases of hypnotic phenomena, auto-suggestion plays its subtle rôle. . . . The hypnotic subject is not the passive, unreasoning, and irresponsible automaton which hypnotists, ancient and modern, have believed him to be" (p. 32). "The subjective mind never classifies a series of known facts . . . but, given a general principle to start with, it will reason deductively from that down to all legitimate inferences" (p. 34). "A man had been told that he has been talking with a disembodied spirit of superior intelligence (Socrates); he believed that statement; he saw, or thought he saw, a spirit" (p. 36). "The spiritists present felt that they had scored a triumph. . . . At a subsequent séance he was introduced to a very learned and very philosophical pig, who spoke all the modern languages with which C. was acquainted, and appeared to know as much about spiritual philosophy as did the ancient Greek" (p. 37). "The subjective mind of the young man accepted the suggestion of the operator as an absolute verity" (p. 38). "It would, perhaps, be hazardous to say the memory of the subjective mind is perfect, but there is good ground for believing that such a proposition would be substantially true" (p. 40). "Psychologists of all shades of belief . . . have declared their conviction that 'the minutest details of acquired knowledge are recorded upon the tablets of the mind'" (p. 40).

"Diseases . . . particularly those of the brain or nervous system, and intense febrile excitement, are frequently causes of the total or partial suspension of the functions of the objective mind, and of exciting the subjective mind to intense activity" (p. 42). In a case quoted by Mr. Coleridge, speaking in unknown tongues is seen to be merely a feat of subjective memory (p. 45) (*vide* Sir W. Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, II, 212, I, 138, for Coleridge's case).

A servant girl repeated sentences of Hebrew and Greek that she had heard her master declaiming in the delirium of some illness—a true case of subliminal memory. "The subconscious memory forgets nothing" (Richet, *Thirty Years of Psychical Research*, p. 240).

Hudson continues: "Those philosophers who held that there appertain to every man a male and female element have dimly recognized the duality of man's mental organization" (p. 39). Yet "to believe in the reality of subjective visions is to give the subjective mind control of the dual mental organization; and to give the subjective mind such control is for Reason to abdicate her throne. . . . The result, in its mildest form of manifestation, is a mind filled with the grossest superstitions, a mind which, like the untutored mind of the savage, 'sees God in the clouds, and hears him in the wind.' Its ultimate form of manifestation is insanity" (p. 61). "Religious devotees . . . are often thrown into the hypnotic state, even to the degree of ecstasy, by gazing upon the crucifix, or upon pictures of the Holy Virgin or of the saints. . . . Hence the subjective hallucinations which often result from the long and earnest prayers of religious enthusiasts" (p. 94). "*The subjective mind never sleeps.* No matter how profound the lethargy, it is ever alert, and comprehends . . . everything that occurs" (p. 98). [This, I think, must be taken with a large pinch of salt.—AUTHOR.] "Since Braid's method of hypnotizing has been gradually adopted . . . clairvoyance and thought-transference have fallen into disrepute, and are now rarely produced" (p. 88). "Mesmerists who believe in the verity of the phenomenon are rarely able to produce it at the present day" (p. 107).

Finally, Hudson leans to the view that Christ really gained his results by suggestion: "The faith required for therapeutic purposes is purely subjective and is attainable upon the cessation of active opposition on the part of the objective mind" (p. 156). "Luckily the unconscious self is most anxious to please you; he is also most impressionable; and at every moment is influenced by you; so that if you say or even think 'I am ill,' he believes you, and then all things go wrong. Just as when you thought or even said 'I am quite well,' everything, thanks to him, goes on quite well inside you" (*Emile Coué, a Little Treatise*, by Hugh Macnaghten, Vice-Provost of Eton; Methuen, 1922). "Don't shut out the divine inflow; open yourself to it; in the degree that you open yourself it will course through your body; a force so vital that old obstructions that are dominating to-day will be driven out before it" "Thoughts are forces . . . .

of its kind; each comes back laden with the effect that corresponds to itself, and of which it is the cause" (Trine). "Any system of belief, if earnestly advocated, will find plenty of followers" (Hudson, p. 157). "The Great Healer never descended to falsehood even to the end that good might come; He always told his followers frankly that faith was essential; and his words are as true to-day as they were when He proclaimed to mankind that great secret of occult power" (p. 160).

This is very different from the Bishop of Gloucester's contention that Christ used "expressions of his own time and nation," though the result has been to mislead man ever since, until the Higher Criticism, backed by the compulsion of the Darwinian theory and science generally, found out late in the ages that He really did not mean what his words have all along been understood to imply, but that he was mistaken, and we have been misled; a very sorry substitute for a faultless guide.

Hudson goes on: "The obvious conclusion is that one theory is as good as another, provided always that the mode of operation under it does not depart, in any essential particular, from the standard, and that the operator has the requisite faith in his own theory and practice" (p. 163). "Theoretically, all the diseases which flesh is heir to are curable by mental processes. Practically, the range of its usefulness is comparatively limited" (p. 164). "The success of the mental healer depends largely upon his knowledge of his patient's habits of thought, his beliefs, his prejudices, and, above all, his mental environment" (p. 165). "'The whole system of magnetic medicine is only the medicine of the imagination; the imagination is put into such a condition by the hypnosis that it cannot escape from the suggestion'" (p. 168; quoting Professor Bernheim, *Suggestive Therapeutics*). "We get such unsatisfactory results, in the treatment of moral disorders, when we aim at the re-education of the will. What we have to work for is the education of the imagination" (Baudouin, p. 126, quoting Coué). "When the will and the imagination are at war, the imagination invariably gains the day . . . the imagination is in direct ratio to the square of the will" (p. 125). In some cases auto-suggestion based on effort will have the

desired result; but in many the result is negative; the reverse of what we desire (*Suggestion and Auto-suggestion*, p. 126). "There can be no doubt of the efficacy of the method, thousands of successful experiments having been made by the author and his colleagues" (Hudson, p. 169). "Christian scientists are constantly demonstrating the potency of purely telepathic suggestion by what they dominate 'absent treatment.' . . . That there is a power emanating from the operator who hypnotizes by means of mesmeric passes seems to be very well authenticated" (p. 170). "Telepathic suggestions by a genuine mesmerist are often far more efficacious than the oral suggestion of a hypnotist." Mesmerism "combines oral suggestion with mental suggestion, and employs in addition that mysterious psycho-physical force, or effluence, popularly known as animal magnetism."

"Patients who have been cured by hypnotism and mesmerism have suffered a relapse, and in some cases the relapse has been worse than the original sickness. . . . Christ was fully alive to this danger" (p. 174) from waning faith; wherefore He said, "Tell no man, go show yourself to the priest and return thanks unto God." "Christ enjoined upon His followers the simple scientific fact that faith on their part was a condition . . . of the benefits of His healing power, and he compelled them to believe by publicly demonstrating that power" (p. 202). The "subjective" mind exercises control over the functions and sensations of the body. The subjective mind is constantly amenable to control by suggestion of the objective mind (cf. Hudson, *ut supra*, p. 31). "The intelligence [of a 'spirit'] is always on a level with that of the medium through whom it manifests itself. That is, it never rises so far above that of the medium as to preclude the possibility of its having its origin in the medium's subjective mind" (p. 208). "It is well known that any one can as readily obtain a communication from an imaginary person as from a real one, from a living person as from the dead one, providing the medium does not happen to know the facts" (p. 209) (the present writer has had frequent and very affectionate communications from an imaginary dead sister). "Alleged communications from the greatest philosophers . . . amount to the merest twaddle when filtered through an ignorant medium" (p.

209). "Unfortunately . . . many professional mediums, despairing of success . . . will . . . resort to fraud." They can produce genuine phenomena and quiet conscience "by reflecting that it can do no harm to resort to legerdemain to simulate that which [is known] to have a genuine existence" (p. 211).

"There is no system of religious belief which is so thoroughly fortified by facts as that of spiritism when its phenomena are viewed from the standpoint of the investigator who is unacquainted with the latest scientific discoveries in the domain of experimental psychology" (p. 213). "It is also just as easy to obtain communications from a living person through a hypnotic subject as from a dead one, and from an imaginary person as from a real one, by merely making the proper suggestion. The same is true of any medium, for that matter" (p. 215). The "objective memory retains little, comparatively, of the incidents of life, while the subjective mind retains all" (p. 217). "The subjective mind of man appears to be fond of allegory as a means of conveying its thoughts or information above the threshold of consciousness. The history of mankind is full of illustrations of this fact" (p. 221). "His subjective mind will proceed to fill in the details in some way with marvellous acumen" (p. 223). "The subjective mind of man retains all that he has ever seen, heard, or read . . . no medium has ever yet been able to impart any information that is not known either to the medium or to some living person, with whom he is *en rapport*" (p. 229).

"If such ways of gaining knowledge are possible by telepathic means, there could be no possibility of proving the action of spirits of the dead" (Myers). But, as Lodge remarks: "No such power has ever been demonstrated; it is something quite different from the hesitating answers that thought-readers make under the influence of sympathy." Telepathy from the dead is just as probable as from the living of things they are not thinking about, or even do not consciously know. But this whole argument rests on the belief in the consciousness of the departed, of which there is no valid proof, and of their power to communicate with the living. It is admitted, or rather insisted upon, that this is at the best very feeble, so that a spirit cannot convey its name clearly or give any satis-

factory evidence of its identity; and the most that can be alleged is that "thought" persists and can be caught up by specially endowed persons, like a wireless message. "Experiments with Mme. Briffaut, Mrs. Leonard, and Mrs. Piper seem to give some support to the spiritualistic theory. . . . We may allow it a place, strictly provisionally, and on this delicate matter it is advisable to take the scientific ground here adopted. I consider cryptesthesia absolutely demonstrated, but I reject all hypotheses on the origin of these revelations and divinations, considering the proofs insufficient" (Richet, *Thirty Years' Experience in Psychical Research*, translated into English by Stanley de Brathé, pp. 255-6).

"Spirits whose character and habits in life are not generally known, or not known to the medium or to those surrounding him, invariably refuse to give proof of their identity" (Hudson, p. 231). "According to Alan Kardec, spirits refuse to answer puerile and impertinent questions" (p. 232). They do not appear to keep from asking them; if we may judge from the reports of Hyslop's and Hodgson's dealings with Mrs. Piper's familiars. If these are the best specimens that can be shown of spirit action, then there is good ground for saying "that if it shows anything about the next world, it proves that lunatics are not at all uncommon there,"—which can hardly be looked on as a satisfactory end to the enthusiastic work of so many eminent men of science, art, and literary ability, doing their best. "But they are not always reliable, for the reason that we are seldom able to distinguish a real premonition from that feeling arising from fear and anxiety regarding the welfare of those who are absent and very dear to us" (p. 245). "Doubtless many persons have been made insane by constantly hearing what they supposed to be spirit voices . . . when we say . . . 'He is talking to himself,' we are wiser than we think; for that is the fact . . . superstition causes him to ascribe it to spirits. . . . All men are insane who allow their subjective minds to obtain the ascendancy" (p. 249). "Vast systems of religion have been founded upon the supposed revelations of persons in a trance, and untold millions of the human race base their hopes of a life in a future world on the dreams of ecstasies" (p. 257). Of the disciples of Swedenborg, "each writer in succession amended the work of his

predecessors in those respects in which it seemed to him to be imperfect, and each one had authority from the spirit-world which sanctioned the amendment. . . . All believe that they obtain their authority for every statement of fact and every new idea direct from the spirits of the dead" (p. 259). I quote this not for any value in itself, but because it coincides exactly with the process that Canon Sanday ascribes to the writers of the Bible, especially in the earlier books of the Old and New Testaments alike, where "improvements" were introduced "for edification."

"We find, then, that human speculation had a great function to perform in so acting upon Old Testament dogma as to soften and widen it in the direction of the larger truths of the perfect revelation in Christ" (*H.D.B.*, p. 275).

"Zechariah introduces mediators to bridge the distance between men and Jahweh; who is conceived as reigning in the remote heaven and maintaining intercourse with the world through the medium of invisible messengers" (p. 275). In the book of Daniel "it will be observed, on the one hand what a curious deviation there is in some particulars from Old Testament doctrine; and on the other, how marked an approximation there is on some other points towards the New Testament position" (p. 275). "The providential shaking together of the nations which took place during the centuries immediately preceding the Christian era, enabled each to pour what contribution it could into the greater treasury of religious thought and sentiment" (p. 274). "There is a clear advance upon some Old Testament doctrines, notably with regard to that of immortality" (p. 276). A "necessary consequence of Judaism meeting Greek thought appears in nothing more clearly than in the way in which the Septuagint translators habitually tone down anthropomorphic expressions about God" (p. 279). "In certain psalms . . . and in Isaiah . . . we find the 'Word' personified and set forth as the agent and messenger of the Divine will. . . . The Word is essentially connected with the idea of mediation, and indeed the whole Jewish revelation is pervaded by the thought that God never manifests himself except through a medium" (p. 281).

"The whole subject is beset with much difficulty. This is

partly due to the variable meaning attached to the 'Wisdom' by Biblical writers. Sometimes it is conceived as a pure abstraction, sometimes as a simple personification of the Divine Intelligence, and sometimes as virtually a distinct person objective to God Himself. . . . The Logos is more than a simple personification of Wisdom, and yet is not altogether conceived as a distinct person. The conception is more than poetical, without, however, clearly passing beyond the poetical category" (p. 281). "Heraclitus, who was a pantheist, appears to have been the originator of the Greek doctrine of the *νοῦς* or *λόγος* . . . . The *νοῦς* holds together with the *κόσμος νοητός*; but, as regards its relation to God himself, Plato is clear only in saying that it is not identical with Him. . . . Still Plato does not go the length of representing the *νοῦς* as a distinct personality" (p. 282). "In the *Book of Wisdom* the Hebrew *Hokhma* is practically identified, however, not only with the Greek *νοῦς*, but also with the Holy Spirit and with the Logos" (p. 283). "Wisdom in the Apocrypha is intermediate between that of the Old Testament and the Logos of Philo, just as, in Philo again, we have the transition from the Apocryphal to the Johannine doctrine" (p. 283). "In support of the view that God's Word is here only another name for His Wisdom, we have the general doctrine, otherwise clearly expressed in our book, that God executes His will through His Word" (p. 283). "The designation of the Wisdom as word (*λόγος*) furnishes the transition to another notable development—that which we find in the teaching of Philo. According to this philosopher, the relation of the Wisdom to the Logos is that of the source to the stream; the Logos is just Wisdom come to expression" (p. 283). "The Logos is not in himself God; he is, however, an emanation from God, His firstborn son, and formed in His image. He is the manifested reflection of the Eternal—the shadow, as it were, cast by the light of God" (p. 283). "All empirical knowledge of God is referred to the Logos, who ranks indeed as a second, but also secondary, God" (p. 283). But "by no possible ingenuity can the Logos be consistently represented as at once the immanent Reason of God, and yet also as a distinct hypostasis mediating between the spiritual and the material, the Divine and the finite" (p. 286). "As 'the many-

named archangel ' he is the bearer of all revelation ; and in him as high priest God and the world are eternally reconciled " (p. 283).

" In one respect, however, the Targumists are at one with the Alexandrine theosophy . . . the Deity Himself remained in the background, and everything that can be known by us about God's essential Being is transferred to the Word. . . . It was in keeping with the spirit of the age that the Targumists should hail a doctrine which made for the purification of the conception of God, by excluding the ascription to God in His essential Being of all direct activity in the world or contact with man " (p. 284).

" For while on the one hand there was a disposition to surmise that the unity of the Godhead was not in all respects absolute, on the other hand it was recognized that the phenomena of the inner life of Deity were secrets undecipherable " (p. 284). " We must keep in mind the fact that when the Gospel was written the name Logos was a familiar one, alike in Jewish and in non-Jewish circles " (p. 284). " If we thus exclude the meaning *ratio* and confine it to *oratio*, we cannot put a satisfactory construction on the words *ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος*. . . . It is only as *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* that the term can denote His external existence *before* time. . . . Very noticeable in connection with St. John's solution of an enigma which had become more and more complicated as time went on is the contrast between the firm tread of Scripture and the hesitating vagaries of the unaided human intellect " (p. 285). " Nowhere are the cherubim endowed with independent personality. . . . We have further the conception of the Angel of the Lord, who is in some passages identified with Jahveh, and in others hypostatically distinguished from Him . . . and even the forces of Nature come to be personified as God's messengers " (p. 285). " Angels were multiplied until God was conceived as governing the world by hosts of these ' intermediary beings.' . . . In the later Jewish literature, accordingly, the angels are viewed as a well-organized host " (p. 286). " The Persian influence is seen in the pronounced angelology of the Book of Daniel " (p. 286). " The Jews began to follow the custom . . . of peopling the whole world with angels, and of giving to every man his own protecting spirit or demon " (p. 287).

"In a famous passage in the Book of Proverbs viii. 22, 30, Wisdom says of herself: 'The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way before his works of old. . . . I was by him as one brought up with him and I was daily his delight.' *The Book of Wisdom*, is a late work, but for that very reason more likely to be popular, and of which in the Epistle to the Hebrews we can see the influence, added: 'Wisdom is the breath of the power of God, and a pure influence flowing from the glory of the Almighty. She is the brightness of the everlasting light, the unspotted mirror of the power of God' (vii. 25-26)" (Arnold, *God and the Bible*, p. 209). "Saul suffered from a kind of melancholia, developing occasionally into dangerous mania. That disease was held by the Hebrews to be a visitation of evil spirits, implying the withdrawal of God's favour, is a familiar idea both in the Old and New Testaments. An evil spirit, as much as anything else in Nature, is created by and subject to God; there is, therefore, no difficulty in the phrase, 'an evil spirit from Jehovah' (on Sam. xvi. 14)" (Hardwich and Costley-White, *Old Testament History*, III, p. 57).

"'Man never knows how anthropomorphic he is,' says Goethe; and so man tends always to represent everything under his own figure; thus, God came to be a mere magnified and non-natural man, like the God of our popular religion" (p. 42). "When we personify 'the Eternal that makes for righteousness,' and call it 'the moral and intelligent Governor of the universe,' we presently find it not to be a person as man conceives of persons, nor moral as man conceives of moral, nor intelligent as man conceives of intelligent, nor a governor as man conceives of governors" (p. 29). So, "a second magnified and non-natural man has to be supposed, who pulls the contrary way to the first. So arise Satan and his angels" (Arnold, *Literature and Dogma*, p. 30).

"Mental disease was attributed to the malign influence of evil spirits, but in such cases the evil spirit is said to have proceeded from the Lord (I Sam. xvi. 14)." "There is no subsequent mention of Azazel in the Old Testament, although he reappears in the Book of Enoch as a leader of the (fallen) angels. . . . It is still a question . . . whether the Book of Job is pre-exilic, but the other Old Testament writings in which

the word Satan is used to denote this minister of God undoubtedly belong to the [late] Jewish period." "The spirit who misled the infatuated Ahab is Jehovah's messenger. . . . At the same time he has not yet become an actual demon" (v. 288). Satan "is not mentioned in the Apocrypha (Satan being most probably used in Sirach xxi. 27 merely in the general sense of adversary) or by Josephus" (p. 289). Josephus speaks of the discovery of exorcism by Solomon; "and says he saw one Eleazah releasing demoniacs in this fashion." *Wisdom* (ii. 23 f.) "is interesting as being the first clear allusion . . . to the narrative of the Fall as told in Genesis" (p. 289). "In Enoch xvi. 1 the demons are spoken of as the disembodied spirits of the . . . progeny of the fallen angels and the daughters of men, who will carry on their work of moral ruin upon the earth unpunished till the final judgment." "It is remarkable that Jesus added nothing to the doctrine of angels. He certainly used it as it existed for the advancement of His own purposes." "The popular belief in Satan and demons is nowhere assailed by our Lord. It may be that this did not lie to His hand as the herald of the heavenly kingdom. . . . The difficulty presses most in connection with the frequent cases of casting out demons recorded in the Synoptic Gospels. How are they to be explained? . . . If we accept the personality of the devil, must we also believe in his angels?" (p. 290) (*H.D.B.*, V. 288 *et seq.*).

In the Old Testament there appears "to be no distinction between *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή*; at all events there is no trichotomy." *Wisdom* "nowhere adopts Plato's doctrine of a tripartite nature in man" (p. 291). "In *Wisdom* the idea of a future life is much more prominent than in the earlier Old Testament canonical Books" (p. 291). "Christian doctrine gave final shape and precision to the Jewish anthropology, and threw a flood of light upon the obscurities of a period unrivalled for religious wavering and confusion" (p. 295). "The *Apocalyptic* presentation of the Messiah hope appears for the first time in the Book of Daniel, which seems to have formed the model of most of the subsequent literature bearing this name. The work dates from the Maccabean struggle against the tyrannical attempt of Antiochus Epiphanes . . . to suppress Judaism by force" (p. 297). "Subsequent *Apocalyptic* writers follow the Book

of Daniel in connecting the advent of the Messiah with the general development of human history, although they differ from it and from one another in their mode of mapping it out" (p. 297). "During the last century B.C. there occurred a radical change in Jewish eschatology. What lay at the root of this was the conviction that an external Messianic kingdom cannot be suitably manifested on the present earth. . . . The latter section of the Book of Enoch is the only work of this century which still places the Final Judgment at the inauguration of the Messianic kingdom. . . . As to the scope of the Judgment . . . it extends to all men and angels, righteous and wicked" (p. 303). "It would therefore appear from the above that the Apocryphal period witnessed very decided developments" (p. 304). "The first occurrence in the Old Testament of the idea of a resurrection is in Hos. vi. 2 ['On the third day he will raise us up'], where the hope expressed is clearly not individual, but national. . . . In the subsequent development of the doctrine the extent of the resurrection was variously conceived. . . . Different views were held also as to the nature of the resurrection itself" (p. 305). "At the beginning of the Christian era the limitation of the resurrection to the righteous was the accepted view of Judaism" (p. 306). "Many scholars, however, explain the eschatological development of the period on the theory of the contact of Judaism with foreign systems of thought" (p. 307). "Through the medium of earlier Jewish apocalyptic thought many Persian ideas found their way also into the Apocalypse, e.g. . . . the millennium, etc." (Rev. W. Fairweather, "The Development of Doctrine in the Apocryphal Period," *H.D.B.*).

"As soon as Jewish theologians systematically studied the Old Testament, they found a God-like Being set forth somewhat after the manner of New Testament writers and early Christians. He was the 'Wisdom' . . . the Heavenly Man of Daniel . . . and the Eternal One of Micah. All other middle beings are set aside by this supreme Mediator" (p. 308). In Christ, "the *non-potuit peccare* lay in His nature; otherwise through childhood and youth he could not have developed without some falls into sin. He was one with the Holy Ghost" (Rev. H. M. Scott, "The Trinity," p. 309). "We cannot believe that

its science must determine our view of nature; that its historic records can never be convicted of mistakes . . . that the imperfect morality which is found in some whom it commends as holy, or commissioned as teachers, must be explained by the discovery of mystic meanings; that every word it utters regarding man's duty, devotion, and destiny must be accepted as authoritative. . . . In the records of the Bible deeds are reported and approved in the name of God as done by men recognized as servants of God which our conscience must condemn" (Garvie, "Revelation," *H.D.B.*, p. 321). "Science, art, philosophy, culture of many kinds, is the Greek's contribution to the treasures of mankind. From the Roman the nations have learned law, order, government" (p. 324). Christ "knew all that it was necessary for Him to know, that, as Son, He might reveal the Father, and that, as Saviour, He might redeem mankind from sin and death, and restore it to truth, love, holiness, God. His was unerring moral insight and spiritual discernment . . . as regards the facts about nature and history, which men can discover for themselves by the exercise of their faculties of perception and reasoning, He probably knew what and as His age and people knew. All questions about God's character and purpose and man's duty and destiny He can answer with infallible authority. But questions about the authorship of a writing, or the date of an event, or the cause of a disease, it was not His mission to answer; and therefore regarding all such matters we are warranted in believing that He emptied Himself of all Divine omniscience" (p. 326).

The Church has persistently asserted the opposite, and the Roman branch of it would to-day maintain the same. As a matter of fact, it would be hard to get any ordinary man to admit this; people have been so surfeited with the idea of infallibility that they cannot understand a limited and conditioned position. Aristotle thought that a revelation was needed as to physical events, but that men could get at morals for themselves; this was probably due to want of knowledge and their narrow outlook. We find moral problems insoluble, yet Canon Sanday, in my hearing, once said publicly: "We hypothecate perfection nowhere." The Master of Balliol, Professor E. Caird, demurred, contending "that there must

be one first cause that united in itself all power and all wisdom, every virtue, and all goodness," and the meeting seemed to sympathize with him; but I urged Mill's overwhelming plea that the "facts of the Universe were inconsistent with an All-powerful and an All-loving and All-wise superintendence." Or, in the words of Cicero, "that it was clear that the 'governor of the world' is beneficent, but has too much on his hands to attend to details," which, indeed, is identical with the Jewish belief that the practical management of things was handed over to inferior powers. The Canon drew attention to this as the view taken by early Christians, who held that the "Creation is not the work of the supreme God," but of a "demiurge," who was authorized to carry it out. Atherley Jones, then M.P. for Carmarthen, at one time a London Police-Magistrate, who was present, spoke of this notion of devolution as "epoch-making." In *H.D.B.*, four stages of progressive development are exemplified. At first, Hastings issued it as an explanation of the Authorized Version, giving learned illustrations of the meaning of all the English words used, but apparently this was not found adequate, for a staff of Scottish theologians was enlisted to expound the ideas involved, of whom Bruce, Davidson, Kennedy, and Candlish are marked examples. To them were added some men of science of undoubted reputation, such as Conder, Conybeare, Drummond, Ewing, Farnell, Gray, Griffith, Harford, Hull, Kenyon, König, Macalister, Massie, Max Müller, Myers, Flinders Petrie, Pinches, Porter, Post, Ramsay, Sir J. S. Smith, Stock, Warren, and Sir Charles Wilson. The book then became the mouthpiece of certain English dogmatists—Driver, Sanday, Sayce, Cooke, Charles, Bartlett, Margoliouth, and others—who used it to propagate their own particular opinions. The result is just what an encyclopædia ought not to be: an inconvenient treatise, if only from the size of the volumes and the smallness of the print, on special points of doctrine from an *ex parte* position, in place of a general exposition of the subject in a way ordinary men could grasp and digest. These changes in the character and policy of the *Dictionary* conspired to impair its authority and value as an encyclopædia, and to turn it into a medium of sectional propaganda. Moreover, in lay-out and make-up it suffered

deterioration, especially in respect of increased unwieldiness and the smallness of the type.

The leading contributors to the *Dictionary* in its later phase press the rule of *terminus ad quem* in criticism in opposition to the principles and methods of criticism of Cheyne in the *Encyclopædia Biblica* and *a fortiori*, of Renan, and of Bauer and other members of the German School.

My feeling is that they could not rest there; that logically they had to go forward to the freedom of the Holy Land, or back into the darkness of Egypt; that the whole teaching of the Bible is directly contrary to scientific discovery, and could not by any gymnastics be reconciled at all with it; that the prophets were wrong when they promised the return of Israel from captivity and spoke of the destruction of Babylon and its survival only as "heaps and ruins."

Canon Sanday, in saying that "Revelation" was in error "only so far that it gave too early a date for the fall of Rome," was himself very far from the truth; but on this point Archdeacon and Canon Charles has cut the ground from under his feet by representing the Apocalypse as the work of an ignoramus who did not refrain from claptrap and even falsehood. The point will be dealt with later; but that this is not an over-statement is shown by the following extract: "The book makes use of apocalyptic materials from various, often probably from Jewish, sources, so that the question as to the place of a given section in the writer's plan, its meaning in his use of it, is to be kept distinct from the question of its original meaning and use." "The book [of Daniel] is made up of ten quite distinct pieces, largely independent of each other. . . . It is, however, the prevailing and probable view that the book, as we have it, comes from one author; that the enemy of God and His people is everywhere Antiochus, and the hope everywhere that of his speedy overthrow and the rulership of Israel over the nations" (*H.D.B.*, IV, 244-5, 247.) "To this were added, from Ezekiel, a final assault of the outstanding heathen upon Zion, in which they are gloriously and finally vanquished; from various prophecies, the expectation of the return of the ten tribes and the gathering of the dispersed Jews." "Throughout the entire book are found strongly marked grammatical irregularities, anacolutha and impossible

constructions and confusion of cases" (Prof. W. Bousset, *Encyclopædia Biblica*, I, 205). "It would be most unjust to call the chronicler a falsifier. He shows himself, on the contrary, as a man of great sincerity and moral earnestness" (I, 396). It would thus appear "that the value of Chronicles is not mainly that of an accurate record of past events, nevertheless its value is real and great. It is, however, the value more of a sermon than of a history" (*H.D.B.*, I, 396).

It is this habit of making sermons to edify that vitiates the standards of these Biblical higher critics. Anything that will go down seems good enough for the purpose, whether or not it is as near the facts as they can get. The practice of appealing to people's feelings from the pulpit ends in something very unpleasantly like absolute dishonesty. When men come to say openly that they do not credit that which they preach, surely the limit is reached; but Dr. A. C. Headlam seems to countenance casuistry when he says: "It was not Christ's business to set people right or teach such things." [Ergo, by logical implication, to confirm them in their ignorance, the effects of which in consequence lasted fifteen to eighteen centuries. "Besides, it may be true; you never know"—and never will, if you rely on such muddle-headed views.—AUTHOR.]

"It should not be forgotten that we are dealing with the reports of chroniclers whose minds were necessarily coloured by the prevailing beliefs of the age, psychic and cosmic; that the properly demoniac element is almost wholly absent from the Fourth Gospel. . . . St. Paul, however, shared the conceptions of his contemporaries respecting devils" (Art. "Demons," *H.D.B.*, I, 594). To Empedocles, in the fifth century B.C., "the gods were powerful and good, without appetite or passion; the demons . . . held a middle position between men and gods and were the ministers from the latter to the former. . . . Greek influence therefore stimulated the growth of Hebrew angelology and demonology. Intermediate personal agencies became interpolated between the absolute transcendent God and the phenomenal world" (I, 592). "Any disease, and especially epilepsy or insanity, was ascribed to demon possession." "Stoic theology subsequently adopted into its system this conception of an intermediate realm of demons in

order that polytheism, as a moral power, might be rehabilitated" (Prof. Whitehouse, *H.D.B.*, I, 592).

"Heraclitus affirms, much knowledge of things divine escapes us through want of faith." "Jehovah (or as he is also called, Elohim) converses familiarly with Balaam, gives him leave to go on a journey and is angry with him for going, sends his angel or messenger to stop him: and then twice meets Balaam, inspiring the mercenary and base-minded soothsayer with a finely phrased prophetic vision" (Stebbing, *Plain Speaking*, 96 *et seq.*). Again: "Is it reasonably credible, for instance, that divine providence would reveal . . . history to King Nebuchadnezzar, yet so unimpressively that the monarch forgot all about it; while Daniel, who had not dreamt it . . . knew it all in curiously minute detail?" (p. 104). "St. Paul declares that the prophets and Moses had foretold the suffering of Christ, 'and that he should be the first that should rise from the dead.' How could he be the first if Lazarus and several others had risen before him? . . . Spiritualists, I am told, believe that 'Jesus at the Resurrection materialized, and a materialization is not always a perfect likeness; hence difficulty of recognition. Again, at first the materialization was not very stable. Hence the "Touch me not." Later it became more so'" (p. 78). And the woman "grasped his feet." "Whether Jehovah of the Hebrews was likely to deliver an admonition to his high priest in the circuitous manner described in the Book of Samuel should excite some doubt in a reflective mind. . . . Nothing precludes me from suggesting that this 'historic fact' was merely a trick of ventriloquism" (p. 89). "A dove settled on the head of Jesus just after His baptism. It must be to many inexplicable that a person already from His birth divine, should need any new apotheosis. But that the divine majesty should at one and the same moment present itself in human guise and also in the form or the flutter of a . . . bird is a record surely stretching the credulity of modern minds to the breaking-point" (pp. 89-90). "In estimating the reality of this Protean God, it should be remarked that the 'heavens' had to be opened for Him to be seen and heard" (p. 100). "For this management of his life Christ's disciple needs no reliance on legendary miracles, on fantastic dreams, on conflicting reports of aerial sights and sounds" (p. 80).

" It must be admitted that none of the persons favoured with a renewal of ordinary human life make any subsequent mark in history. They leave no record of uncommon piety or uprightness, no memorials to show whether a second lease of life was fraught with peculiar blessing to themselves or fruitful in instruction to others " (p. 60). " The suggestion is made that persons supposed to have been restored from death to life had never really died." In the case of Lazarus, " the account is surrounded with difficulties " (p. 74).

Consider, again, the accounts given in the Bible of the sacrifices, assuming that we can place any reliance on assertions that 10,000 or more were slaughtered at one time, a massacre that would have made the Temple-area a horrid mixture of a shambles and a cesspool unbearable to think of. Although a movement had been rising against sacrifices ever since the time of the great prophets who attempted to bring in a more spiritual feeling into religion, Christ is not known to have uttered any distinct protest about it. He spoke of every little " tittle and jot of the law " being of eternal obligation and all efforts to divide the " moral " from the " ceremonial " precepts have been conspicuous for their want of logic and consistency. St. Paul indeed tried hard to get rid of what he recognized as the absurdity of Jewish superstitions ; but in the Catholic and even in the English Church the first object to be seen on entering a place of worship is a ridiculous table of forbidden degrees of marriage ; that between a man and his sister-in-law being based on a piece of flagrantly false exegesis ; and even when this had been removed by legislation, the absurd parallel between a wife and her brother-in-law, for which there is no scientific justification, was allowed to remain. A certain organized faction in the Church sets itself to maintain these antiquated commandments as the eternal rule of faith, and attempts to enforce them by a " system of excommunication " which the law courts have declared to be illegal and libellous. Similarly, all the Romish churches were placarded with a notice—a bare-faced lie—that marriage of a Catholic with a Protestant was illegal. If the word had been " forbidden " or " unrecognized," then it would simply have exposed the folly of those who tried to set up their authority against that of the recognized State legislature ; but the word illegal has only one meaning in commonsense, and that is

contrary to the law of the land which is passed by the common consent of the people of the country by the means that are acknowledged as the channels for such enactments.

"On this question of marriage reform, England is perhaps the most priest-ridden of all the existing States of Europe, and it is the clergy of her State Church that have proved the chief obstacle to reform. A section of them at present do not even recognize the validity of a decree of divorce on the sole ground of infidelity. It is intolerable that a section of the Church which draws its revenue from the State, and is subject to its jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters, should refuse to marry couples to whose union there is no legal impediment" (Lord Salvesen, address to Eugenics Society, London). Marriage with the aunt or niece of a deceased wife, or the uncle or nephew of a dead husband, is now legal by Act of Parliament. One of his clergy applied to the Bishop of Birmingham asking what he should do in such a case. The Bishop replied, in polite terms: "Don't make a fool of yourself, if you can help it." The Archbishop of Canterbury countered this with the *obiter dictum*: "If these people want to get married there are the Registry Offices; and if they need 'religious services' they can go to the dissenters." The Bishop's answer seems devilish clever; for whatever was done, he could retort, like a Greek oracle: "Well, you did make a fool of yourself." The Archbishop was not nearly so adroit, for he has led the Church, if it follows the advice, into a direct conflict with public views of what is sensible, which looks likely to end in disestablishment; but a way to wriggle out will probably be found, when it is a matter of loaves and fishes and the old buildings.

These myths or legends as to demons, resurrections of deities or human beings, possession, and defined forms of belief in the Supernatural, have their modern congeners and variants in the phenomena and paraphernalia of mediumship as described and interpreted by Hudson in his *Law of Psychic Phenomena*.

"If the medium is possessed of ideas of his own, and no outside suggestion is made, he will obtain information from the spirit world in exact accordance with his ideas." "The one noteworthy fact that is observable in all is that each one sees

and hears that which he expects to see or hear. . . . Whatever may be the belief or the philosophy of the ecstatic, confirmation of that belief will be found in his vision of, or his communications from the other world." "*Invenit et pariter, dogmata quisque sua.*" "When that idea was in vogue it frequently happened that persons who easily entered the subjective condition found themselves possessed of one or more devils. . . . Devils have generally gone out of fashion, and their place is taken by bad spirits of dead men. . . . The subjective mind of the person obsessed is dominated by the suggestion that it is a bad spirit, or the devil, as the case may be . . . it will personate the spirit or devil with the same extraordinary acumen that it would personate any other character suggested. . . . The fact that the trouble is susceptible of cure by hypnotic suggestion points clearly to its mental origin." "When a person is suddenly healed by mental processes, it becomes a matter of the first importance that he should not talk on the subject in public, or to persons who are sceptical" (*loc. cit.*, 260).

"Taken as a whole the narrative of the raising of Jairus's daughter from the dead conveys the best lesson in mental therapeutics which has ever been given to mankind. . . . It is noteworthy . . . that Jesus was in the habit of healing by what is known at this day as 'absent treatment'" (*i.e.* at a distance) (p. 356). "He it was who first divined the very essence of that science, and proclaimed it to the world, in the one word *faith*" (p. 363). "His biographers did not always relate the details of the transactions recorded; but it must be remembered that they wrote at a later day, and may not have been in possession of all the details" (pp. 362-3). "His wondrous works were performed within the domain of the same natural laws which limit the power of all mankind. He was a man, and merely a man, in his physical life and manifestations" (p. 364). "No man ever before possessed the subjective powers that he did. . . . His subjective mind was always under the perfect control of his reason" (p. 366).

To interpret the Temptation as a symbolical vision appearing to Christ after his forty days in the wilderness is to find in it one of the most important lessons ever conveyed to humanity. "To suppose that he could be tempted by such

a devil as has been pictured by some would be to degrade him below the level of common humanity" (p. 367). "He refused to allow his subjective mind to usurp control" (p. 368). "Reason triumphed over the natural, instinctive suggestions of his human nature. . . . He taught a lesson to humanity by illustrating the normal relations between the objective and subjective faculties, between reason and instinct. . . . If he placed himself above the laws of the land, he would have been proscribed. If he transcended or violated the laws of nature his example would have been lost to common humanity" (p. 371). The demand for "signs and wonders" in that day is obvious "*that they might believe.*" "It would avail the world little to simply know the truth of his physical history, if by that means he could not demonstrate the truth of his spiritual doctrines and philosophy" (p. 376). "The conclusions arrived at by . . . modern science are identical with the doctrines that he proclaimed" (p. 379). "It is simply impossible . . . that he taught that all consequences of a life of sin could be avoided by belief" (p. 384).

"Moses did not teach the Israelites any doctrine of the future world, and very vague mention is made of it in the later books of the Old Testament. Jesus found this doctrine already in existence, and in enforcing his moral precepts and in his parables he employed the symbols which the people understood, neither denying nor affirming their literal verity" (p. 385). "His code of ethics was sublime and godlike in its purity and simplicity, but it was not new" (p. 387). "He used the current coin of expression to convey to mankind the broad idea that the soul that is 'saved' to immortal life through 'belief' will then be punished, or rewarded, according to the deeds done in the body. It would, obviously, have been useless and confusing to his hearers had he attempted to employ any new symbols. . . . His mission as a moral teacher was secondary in importance. . . . The only thing wholly new was the doctrine of faith" (p. 388). "The Pythagoreans held that the soul is eternal—that is, uncreated and indestructible; that no real entity is either made or destroyed. The Eleatics held practically the same doctrine. The Ionics taught that the soul was re-absorbed into the Divine reason. . . . When Jesus appeared on the earth he found the philosophy of the soul in a

very chaotic state. . . . He simplified the doctrine of immortality into a system so plain that 'the wayfaring man, though a fool, need not err.' . . . For scientific truth is always simple and free from complication" (p. 391). "His descriptions therefore of the places of future rewards and punishments were necessarily limited to material conceptions. He could effectively employ no other symbolism than that with which his hearers were familiar, and which they could appreciate. . . . It was no part of his mission to reconstruct the accepted geography of the world of spirits" (p. 393). "We must reject all material conceptions of both heaven and hell. . . . Punishment must be a moral one. . . . Every violation of moral and spiritual law will be followed by its appropriate penalty" (p. 394). "No one can be said to know anything about the truth of any proposition that has not underlying it a substratum of demonstrable fact. The theory of Reincarnation has no such basis" (p. 395). "Spiritual death is the inevitable result of spiritual unbelief" (p. 394).



## PART II



# CHAPTER I

## THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

### SECTION I.—STUDY AND SURVEY OF RELIGION

[In this chapter the author, in pursuance of his ground-plan, draws chiefly upon the *Religion of the Semites*, by Professor W. Robertson Smith, 1st and 2nd editions.—EDITOR.]

IN dealing with the development of theology I have taken facts or the statement of them from various authors, mostly in their own words. The explanation given by them often appears to be mere guesswork, or, at least, elaborate inference frequently biased by the view of the subject held. The evidence is fragmentary, disconnected, and like that in a law-court liable to different interpretations in opposing interests; for which purpose examples are routed up from all over the world, and put together with dubious cogency. In the field of historical study and survey of religion the late Professor Robertson Smith was alike capable and conscientious, but he missed the logical implications of the results of his researches, failing altogether to realize their subversive reactions upon Christian theology.

Canon Ottley, who argues on similar lines, is of the same opinion, but this dialectic is really a two-edged weapon of very uncertain effect. If vicarious sacrifice based on a pious fraud has been a universal element in religious practice, it is open to doubt whether any such system is not the outcome of pre-existing ideas. I have neither the time nor the skill to seek evidence at first hand, but, while the next best thing is to judge of the purport and value of a writer's doctrines by representative quotations from his works, one may, nevertheless, unintentionally misrepresent him, especially when the passages chosen tend apparently to traverse or even to flatly contradict the author's argument.

For instance, Professor Robertson Smith is concerned to

prove that sacrifice by fire is not the original rite, but a "sacred meal in which a god and his worshippers had communion." He may be right; but his proof labours uphill against many difficulties, and is subject to some suspicion. Still, in the main Sir J. G. Frazer, who dedicates to Smith his great book, agrees with him on this subject. He writes: "From being little more than an ingenious hypothesis the totem sacrament has become, at least in my opinion, a well-authenticated fact" (*Golden Bough*, Preface). The prepossessions of these two writers are so different that what both accept may be taken as on the whole worthy of credence.

Frazer, however, does not attach to the totem sacrament the same importance as Smith, who appears to think that a primitive communion of a fictitious god with his worshippers in a sacrificial meal adds significance to the Christian ceremony. On the other hand Frazer holds that such a natural descent is an explanation of its origin. My own leaning is toward the latter inference, and therefore I have forborne to cite his words to any great extent as those of an *ex parte* witness. There is much more in this matter than Canon Ottley seems to think. The position of all these authors of the school which springs, in the main, from Wellhausen, and Robertson Smith in this country, is that the earlier part of the Old Testament is something like a gigantic fraud, written with a pretence of knowledge, but without any real grasp of the truth: beginning with an account of the Creation which is purely poetical, and which does not profess to be an accurate record of events, and going on with a history of mankind which is palpably incorrect, and narrow and one-sided in its views. When we come to the story of the Patriarchs and their wanderings, and study the history and evolution of Israel and its religion, we find that Abraham left Mesopotamia because of a "vague feeling that its worship was not right." He had learnt that human sacrifice was not acceptable, but nevertheless apparently shared in the common usages of the Canaanites and participated in their superstitions. His offspring was a clan of these tribes; and its visit to Egypt and return thence are mysterious proceedings during which the worship of Jahweh is somehow adopted. To account for this transition, a graphic description is given of a sort of duel at Sinai between Moses

and a thunderstorm, in the course of which he is represented as asking questions, and professing that the thunderclaps were an answer to them, and a warrant of his "divine legation" and prophetic authority. What are usually spoken of as his writings are really a collection of precepts, traditions, and legends from various sources, put together at the time of the exile by a set of priests who added to them an account of a tabernacle and Temple worship which, as a fact, had never been a reality. They feigned a history of their order and nation on lines that are fictitious, pretending a rapid conquest of Palestine, whereas the more authentic records of the race show that this annexation was a very gradual and imperfect process.

For the foregoing reasons the Books of Joshua, Chronicles, and the historical parts of the Law must to a great extent be condemned as unreliable, and even intentionally misleading. Indeed, there has been an attempt to magnify the office of the priests and to enhance the glory of their race. This is borne out by a study of the documents if made with an open mind and with eyes that can see.

I cannot, however, expect anyone to accept this judgment on my word alone; and, even if I gave an outline of the views of these writers, I feel I should be open to the imputation of having put the matter in a false light and perverted their meaning. Therefore it is essential to give *ipsissima verba*, and even then I shall not escape the charge of twisting them to my purpose. The real issue is that what these authors say is true, or that they have conspired together to misstate the case—an alternative that is too absurd to call for comment. Men in every part of the world, holding the highest positions, are agreed as to the facts. What deductions are to be drawn from them is a matter upon which there is wide diversity of opinion. Approximate consensus may ultimately be attained, but it is plain that no more reliance could be placed on the word of a Jew then than now. The faculty of imagination appears to have been always supreme in the race. Their emotional nature caused them to see things as they thought they should be, not as they really were. Most of the writers cited seem to think they can find a solid bottom in the quicksand, and by a sort of patent reinforced-concrete obtain safe

foundations in a quaking morass. To me the higher criticism appears to be building castles in the air to defend an impossible position. It recognizes that the Bible as it stands cannot in its entirety be the word of God, and it attempts to get rid of or to explain away those parts of it which it finds untenable from scientific, historical, or moral objections.

“ We can follow, stage by stage, the rise of the belief in the sole Godhead of Jehovah from the days when He was regarded as a tribal Deity, limited in His influence to the country of the Hebrew tribes, one among the gods of Palestine, up to the time when the law-giver could formulate the crowning article of the Jewish creed, ‘ Jehovah is our God, Jehovah is one,’ and the prophet could announce the sovereign truth, ‘ I am Jehovah, and there is none else; beside Me there is no Godhead at all’ (Deut. vi. 4; Is. xlvi. 5) (p. 4) ” (Canon G. A. Cooke, *The Progress of Revelation*, pp. 4 *et seq.*).

“ In the story of Abram we are in the region not of history but of national legend . . . the Abram of the Book of Genesis is the idealized ancestor of the race, a personification of all that was most typical of the national character and religion ” (p. 6). “ Tradition took the shape of a promise and a covenant pledged by God in the faraway days of Abram . . . it belongs to the sphere of legend ” (pp. 6-7). “ The case is different . . . when we come to Moses. We have not left the region of legend, but we tread the borderland of history. . . . So far as we can tell, no word of Moses, not a line of his writing, has come down to us: yet . . . we are driven to demand some such figure as the Moses of tradition—a man, that is, with a genius for religion and a capacity for leadership ” (p. 7). “ Moses grasped a new truth—the truth that Jehovah, the God of Moses’ countrymen, was no mere God of fire or tempest or mountain, but a Being essentially of moral character ” (p. 8). We shall see later what “ moral ” then meant. In place of this fictitious history and feigned religion, we are now told of totem clans which in a sacrificial feast of the totem-god hoped to obtain communion through flesh and blood. In other words, the Hebrews are brought into line with the rest of the Semites and with primitive people in general. This is a step in the right direction towards naturalism and development.

" In the fourth ritual of ' the Way of the Gods '—that is, Shinto—it is explained that the Spirits of the Storm took the Japanese to be their people, and the people of Japan took the Spirits of the Storm to be gods of theirs. In pursuance of that covenant, the spirits on their part undertook to be Gods of the Winds, and to ripen and bless the harvest, while the people on their part undertook to found a temple to their new gods; and that is why the people are now worshipping them. It was, according to the account given in the fourth ritual, the gods themselves who dictated the conditions on which they were willing to take the Japanese to be their people and fixed the terms of the covenant. So too in the account given in the sixth chapter of Exodus it was Jehovah himself who dictated to Moses the terms of the covenant which he was willing to make with the children of Israel: ' I will take you to me for a people, and I will be to you a God.' In Japan it was to the Emperor, as high priest, that the terms of the covenant were dictated, in consequence of which the temple was built and the worship instituted " (Jevons, *The Idea of God in Early Religion*, pp. 92-3). It seems to me that Jevons abandons the sacrosanct fable that the Jews were the exclusively Chosen People of God, and that Moses had a divine commission as their leader, so that we are driven back on the alternative that the Jewish religion resembles all other religious systems in having a political basis and factor. According to this author, the account given of the beginnings of religion in the Old Testament is very faulty; it starts with individual worship, and only by degrees gets to communal rites, whereas the evolution of religion has been in the reverse direction, from communal to individual faiths.

This is parallel to the development of self-consciousness, of individuality, and of morality. " So far as I can see, there can be only one sequel to the great mass of material bearing on ancient Palestine; only one sequel to the tendencies of studies in anthropology, archaeology, history, and the comparative study of religions; and the converging lines warn us to refrain from insisting upon the Old Testament as an accurate or trustworthy record of the development of Jewish history and religion " (Dr. Stanley A. Cooke, *Expositor*, March 1912, p. 256). " The name [Jacob] existed long before the traditional

date of Jacob, and the Egyptian phonetic equivalent of Jacob-el (cf. Isra-el and Ishma-el) appears to be the name of a district of central Palestine (or possibly east of Jordan) about 1500 B.C. But the stories in their present form are very much later" (*Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Jacob," 13th ed., p. 113).

"The story of the settlement of the national and tribal ancestors in Palestine is interrupted by an account of the southward movement of Jacob (or Israel) and his sons into a district under the immediate influence of the kings of Egypt. . . . The story of the 'Exodus' is that of the religious birth of 'Israel' joined by covenant with the national God Yahweh, whose aid in time of peril and need proved his supremacy" (*ibid.*, "Jews," p. 374).

"In the light of contemporary monuments, archæological evidence, the progress of scientific knowledge, and the recognized methods of modern historical criticism, the representation of the origin of mankind and of the history of the Jews in the Old Testament can no longer be implicitly accepted. Written by an Oriental people and clothed in an Oriental dress, the Old Testament does not contain objective records, but subjective history written and incorporated for specific purposes" (Do., p. 372). "The value of the book of Joshua is primarily religious. . . . As an historical record its value must depend upon a careful criticism of its contents in the light of biblical history and external information. Its description of the conquest of Canaan comes from an age when the event was a shadow of the past. It is an ideal view of the manner in which a divinely appointed leader guided a united people into the promised land of their ancestors and, after a few brief wars of extermination, died, leaving the people in quiet possession of their new inheritance. On the other hand, the earlier inhabitants were not finally subjugated until Solomon's reign (I Kings ix. 20). . . . There are traces of other conflicting traditions representing independent tribal efforts which were not successful, and the Israelites are even said to live in the midst of Canaanites, intermarrying with them, and adopting their cult (Judges i-iii, 6). . . . The book of Joshua has ascribed to one man conquests which are not confirmed by subsequent history. . . . The prominence of Joshua as military and religious leader, and especially his connection with

Shechem and Shiloh have suggested that he was a hero of the Joseph tribes of central Palestine" (Do., p. 519, *sub voce* Joshua).

"As regards the historicity of this elaborate sanctuary [the tabernacle] modern historical criticism has pronounced a negative judgment. The verdict is based not so much on the many difficulties presented by the narrative itself, or suggested by the unexpected wealth of material and artistic skill, as on the impossibility of reconciling the picture of the tabernacle with its worship, which is found in the middle books of the Pentateuch, with the religious history of Israel as reflected in the older historical books. There is absolutely no place for the tabernacle of the Priest's Code in the history of the worship of the Hebrews before the Exile. It cannot be reconciled with the account of the historical 'tent of meeting' (A. V. 'tabernacle of the congregation') of the oldest Pentateuch sources in any particular except the common designation, and in the later history of the ark, whether at Shiloh or at Jerusalem, the older records of Samuel and Kings are silent as to the tabernacle. The sections of the Pentateuch devoted to the tabernacle and its worship, therefore, are not to be treated as history, but as the expression of a religious ideal. Building on the traditions of the simple Mosaic 'tent of meeting' (Ex. xxxiii. 7 ff. and elsewhere), and believing that the temple of Solomon was its replica on a large scale and in more solid materials, the priestly idealists followed the example of Ezekiel, and elaborated an ideal sanctuary to serve as the model for the worship of the theocratic community of the future" ("Tabernacle" *H.D.B.*, IV; with which may be compared the corresponding articles in Cheyne and Black's *Encyclopædia Biblica*, by Benzinger, and in the *Jewish Encyclopædia*, by König).

"We now proceed to test the value of this tradition. The avowed intention of P, it is admitted on all hands, is to construct 'a movable and ambulatory temple' for the desert marches. Could anything be more absurd than to begin by constructing enormous logs of wood, each with a cubic content—on the usual computation of 1 cubit of thickness—of about 50 cubic feet; each weighing according to a recent calculation (Brown, *The Tabernacle*, 1889, p. 275) close upon

one ton, and out of all proportion to the weight they would have to bear? And this quite apart from the open question of the possibility of obtaining beams of such dimensions from the acacia tree of Arabia. No use is here made of the argument from Numbers vii. 8, compared with iii. 36, four waggons, each drawn by a pair of oxen, for the transport of the ‘boards,’ bases, pillars, etc.; as these passages are probably from a different hand from Ex. 26” (p. 659 and *note*). “After what has been said in our opening section—with which the article ‘Ark’ must be compared—as to the nature, location, and ultimate disappearance of the Mosaic tent of meeting, it is almost superfluous to inquire into the historical reality of the costly and elaborate sanctuary, which according to P, Moses erected in the wilderness of Sinai” (Kennedy, article “*Tabernacle*,” *H.D.B.*, IV, p. 666).

“The attitude of modern Old Testament scholarship to the priestly legislation, as now formulated in the Pentateuch, and in particular to those sections of it which deal with the sanctuary and its worship, is patent on every page of this Dictionary, and is opposed to the historicity of P’s tabernacle. . . . There is absolutely no place for it in the picture which their writings disclose of the early religion of the Hebrews. . . . In no genuine passage of the history of that long period is there so much as a hint of the Tabernacle with its array of ministering priests and Levites. Only the Chronicler (1 Chron. xvi. 6–39; xxi. 29, etc.), Psalm-writers, editors, and authors of marginal glosses writing at a time when P’s conception of Israel’s past had displaced every other, find the tabernacle of the priestly writers in the older sources, or supply it where they think it ought to have been (cf. 2 Chron. i. 3 f. with I Kings iii. 2 ff.)” (Kennedy, article “*Tabernacle*,” *H.D.B.*, IV, p. 666).

“A Christian apologist can afford to admit that the elaborate description of the tabernacle is to be regarded as a product of religious idealism, working upon a historical basis” (Canon Ottley, *Aspects of the Old Testament*, p. 226).

In other words, it is another case of “history seen by priestly eyes”; to which the echo faintly answers, “lies.” The fact is that the Ark of the Covenant is as much a fiction as the story of Moses; the beginning and the end of this ancient worthy are both alike imaginary. His nativity bears a curious resem-

blance to that of Osiris, and his death on a mountain top is parallel to the finale of many famous lawgivers and pundits of the East: the same miraculous and god-directed career is a commonplace in the lives of Oriental saints and old-world rulers (*vide* Buckle, *Civilization in Europe*). The straight lines laid down by these sacerdotalists needed the sanction of a divine author to enforce their observance; they commended themselves to the people of their time because they were in harmony with existing prejudices and superstitions; hence they had little difficulty in establishing their claim to supernatural authority, or in securing the belief of their contemporaries. Whether they can secure equal credence now depends on our acquiescence in their teaching.

As at Rome, so in the destruction of Jerusalem, the records of the Hebrews were to a great extent lost; they appear to have been put together again by priests in post-exilic times: anyone can see that the accounts given are not the original archives, but meagre recollections, perhaps mainly from memory; long reigns of kings are dismissed in a few sentences, important events in a few words. Prof. Naville of Geneva, who is strongly opposed to the higher criticism, and jeers at its redactors as "just men of straw," mere mental fictions of whose objective existence there is no shred of real evidence, asserts that square-written Hebrew was not in use before the Exile, and that the earlier part of the Bible as we have it is a popular version of an ancient Aramaic original, which he believes was inscribed in cuneiform characters on clay tablets like the Assyrian records, that being practically the only method of writing then possible. We may leave them to fight out this question for themselves: the result is very much the same either way—namely, that the ultimate authorities are unknown scribes of the post-exilic age.

The facts collected by Robertson Smith in his *Religion of the Semites*, from which the following extracts are taken, are so mixed up and blended with his opinions as to the Hebrews that I have not ventured to depart from his own words; but this very confusion is caused by, and is evidence of, the fact that he thought the two were intimately associated and interdependent: whether with such views it is possible to maintain that there was any essential difference between them, especi-

ally after the data which have come to light since his time, is a point hard to decide, and beyond my scope.

"In the long years of the Babylonian exile the Israelites who remained true to the faith of Jehovah had learned to draw nigh to their God without the aid of sacrifice and offering, and, when they returned to Canaan, they did not return to the old type of religion. They built an altar, indeed, and restored its ritual on the lines of old tradition, as far as these could be reconciled with the teaching of the prophets and the Deuteronomic law—especially with the principle that there was but one sanctuary at which sacrifice could be acceptably offered. But this principle was itself entirely destructive of the old importance of sacrifice, as the stated means of converse between God and man. In the old time every town had its altar, and a visit to the local sanctuary was the easy and obvious way of consecrating every important act of life. No such interweaving of sacrificial service with everyday religion was possible under the new law, nor was anything of the kind attempted. The worship of the second temple was an antiquarian resuscitation of forms which had lost their original significance" (*Religion of the Semites*, pp. 198–9; 1894).

"According to the Levitical ritual . . . the animal victim was presented at the altar and devoted by the imposition of hands, but the greater part of the flesh was returned to the worshipper, to be eaten by him under special rules. . . . The central significance of the rite lies in the act of communion between God and man, when the worshipper is admitted to eat of the same holy flesh of which a part is laid upon the altar, as 'the food of the deity'" (pp. 221–2). "In old Israel all slaughter was sacrifice" (p. 223). "A religious feast necessarily implies a victim slain" (p. 224). "Everyone who reads the Old Testament with attention is struck with the fact that the origin and *rationale* of sacrifice are nowhere fully explained; that sacrifice is an essential part of religion is taken for granted. . . . When we go back to the most ancient religious conceptions and usages of the Hebrews, we shall find them to be the common property of a group of kindred peoples" (p. 3).

"The natural basis of Israel's worship was very nearly akin to that of the neighbouring cults" (p. 4). "But though

modern historians and ethnographers have borrowed a name from the book of Genesis, it must be understood that they do not define the Semitic group as co-extensive with the list of nations that are there reckoned to the children of Shem" (p. 5). "The Semitic tongues are so closely related to one another that their affinity is recognized even by the untrained observer" (p. 9). "Their nearest kinship seems to be with the languages of North Africa. . . . The period during which the original and common Semitic speech existed apart, and developed its peculiar characters at a distance from languages of other stocks, must have been very long in comparison with the subsequent period during which the separate branches of the Semitic stock, such as Hebrew, Aramaic, and Arabic, were isolated from one another and developed into separate dialects" (p. 9). "The relation between the gods of antiquity and their worshippers was expressed in the language of human relationship, and this language was not taken in a figurative sense, but with strict literality" (p. 29). "If a God was spoken of as father and his worshippers as his offspring, the meaning was that the worshippers were literally of his stock . . . accordingly the organization of the state included provision for consulting his will . . . in all weighty matters" (p. 31). "This account of the position of religion in the social system held good, I believe, for all parts and races of the ancient world, in the earlier stages of their history. . . . In every region of the world, as soon as we find a nation or tribe emerging from prehistoric darkness into the light of authentic history, we find also that its religion conforms to the general type" (p. 31). "Aryans and Semites began on lines which are so much alike as to be almost indistinguishable" (p. 33).

"The first steps of social and religious development took place in small communities, which at the dawn of history exhibited a political system based on the principle of kinship, and were mutually held together by the tie of blood" (p. 33). "Local communities of men of different clans, who lived together on a footing of amity . . . were the origin of the antique state. . . . The several clans which united to form a state often came . . . to suppose themselves to be only branches of one great ancestral brotherhood" (p. 34). "The only organ-

ization for common action was that the leading men of the clans consulted together in time of need" (p. 34). "In time of war an individual leader is indispensable; in a time of prolonged danger the temporary authority of an approved captain easily passes into the lifelong leadership . . . which again tends to become hereditary, as in the case of the house of David, simply because the king's house naturally becomes greater and richer than other houses" (pp. 34-5). "The independent evolution of Semitic society was arrested at an early stage. . . . It is not therefore surprising that from the eighth century onwards the history of Semitic religion runs a very different course from that which we observe on the other side of the Mediterranean" (pp. 35-6).

Tribal gods present peculiar features. "In battle each god fights for his own people, and to his aid success is ascribed. . . . Observe how literal and realistic was the conception of the part taken by the deity in the wars of his worshippers" (pp. 36-7). "The most illustrious example of a tribal deity was Jahv or Jehovah of Israel, and it was instructive to trace the steps by which, in the course of Jewish history, a national religion was transformed into a universal religion, or at least into the *milieu* in which a universal religion became possible. The transformation was due, as everyone knew in a general way, to the teaching of the Prophets, and that teaching was connected in the closest way with the course of the national history. Thinking of Jehovah as absolute righteousness, Amos could no longer regard him as a merely national god whose prestige depended upon his worshippers, and who was bound to take sides with his own people. On the ground of nationality alone he declared the children of Israel were no more to Jehovah than the children of the Ethiopians; if he brought up Israel out of Egypt, he had brought the Philistines also from Caphtor and the Syrians from Kir." "Judaism after the Exile, with its ideal of ceremonial holiness and its punctilious legalism, could not but appear to us as a step backward from the spiritual ideal of the prophets; but it was not inconsistent with a spirit of genuine piety in the best representatives of the nation. In this respect Judaism had from the first a rigidly national and exclusive character, but the religion was no longer linked with the idea of a national State in

Palestine. The large-hearted inclusiveness of the second Isaiah gave place to a passionate sense of difference from all the rest of the world, and apocalyptic visions. The book of Daniel, which dated from the year when Antiochus had set up 'the abomination of desolation' in the holy place, was the earliest example of this pseudonymous apocalyptic literature, which was put into the mouth of some well-known personage in the distant past, such as Enoch, Noah, Solomon, David, Baruch, Ezra. The writers had ceased to hope for deliverance through any natural evolution of events or through any human agency. The triumph of righteousness could only come, in their view, through the direct intervention of God or of some supernatural being under His authority, and such intervention would mean the close of human history" (Pringle Pattison, Gifford Lectures, 1923, Fourth Lecture).

"Fusion between two communities tended to bring about a religious fusion also. . . . One Baal hardly differed from another, except in being connected with a different kindred, or a different place" (p. 39). "The tribal deities themselves were conceived as closely akin to the sacred species of domestic animals, and their images were often in the likeness of steers or heifers" (*Religion of the Semites*, p. 39, note). "As father the god belongs to the family or clan, as king he belongs to the state. . . . The antique conception of kinship is participation in one blood which passes from parent to child and circulates in the veins of every member of the family" (p. 41). "But in heathen religions the fatherhood of the gods is physical fatherhood. . . . That the same conception was familiar to the older Semites appears from the Bible" (p. 42). "Men of different kindred, united by political bonds instead of bonds of blood, could not be all thought of as children of the god. He was no longer their father, but their king" (p. 45). "Kinship continued down to the time of Mohammed to be the one sacred bond of social unity" (p. 46). "The duties of blood were the only duties of absolute and indefeasible sanctity" (p. 47). "The primitive connection of religion with kindred is attested by the existence of priesthoods confined to men of one clan or family" (p. 48). "The conception of the tribal god as father introduces into religion the idea of divine authority. . . . Thus in the sphere of religion the god as father

stands by the majority of the tribe in enforcing tribal law against refractory members" (pp. 60-1).

"On the whole, men live on very easy terms with their tribal god, and his paternal authority is neither strict nor exacting" (p. 61). "The gods of the heathen were not . . . absolutely just . . . the divine sovereignty was conceived as a kingship precisely similar to human kingship. . . . The authority of the prince was moral rather than physical" (p. 63). "The ideas which underlay the conception of divine sovereignty date from an age when the human kingship was still in a rudimentary state. . . . The sovereign was in no way held responsible for the constant maintenance of law and order in all parts of his realm. . . . This remissness was [not] felt to be a defect in the divine character. . . . It was not expected that he should always be busy righting human affairs" (pp. 63-4). "In the eighth century B.C. the national religion of the northern Semites had already passed its prime. . . . Except when the nation was in danger it called for no self-denial" (p. 65). "The God who could deal with such evils was the God of the prophets, no mere Oriental king raised to a throne in heaven" (p. 66). "The kingship of Jehovah is often set forth as the glory of Israel, but never in such terms as to suggest that the idea of divine kingship was peculiar to the Hebrews. On the contrary, other nations are 'the kingdoms of the false Gods' (Is. x. 10). . . . There was no difficulty in looking on the human king as the viceroy of the divine sovereign" (pp. 66-7). "Mohammed became a judge, law-giver, and captain, not of his own initiative," but in his quality of prophet, like Moses. "The wild tribesmen had lost the feeling of kinship with their tribal gods" (pp. 70-1). "In such a society the king is a guiding and moderating force rather than an imperial power" (p. 72). "The struggle between king and nobles . . . ended differently in the East and in the West. . . . This diversity of political fortune is reflected in the diversity of religious development . . . in the East the national god tended to acquire a really monarchic sway" (pp. 73-4). But "neither system . . . can fairly be said to have come near to monotheism" (p. 75).

It was purely local. "The man who was far from his old home was also far from his own god." Strangers or sojourners,

the *gerim* formed a distinct class; and “we know from Ezekiel xliv. that much of the service of the first temple was done by uncircumcized foreigners” (p. 77). “Hereditary priesthoods of Arabian sanctuaries were often in the hands of families that did not belong to the tribe of the worshippers, but apparently were descended from older inhabitants” (p. 79). “The progress of heathenism towards universalism, as it is displayed in these usages, seemed only to widen the gulf between the deity and man, to destroy the naïve trustfulness of the old religion without substituting a better way for man to be at one with his god” (pp. 80-1). “The ancients prayed to their gods for rain and fruitful seasons, for children, for health and long life, for the multiplication of their flocks and herds, and for many other things . . . the help of the gods was sought in all matters, without distinction, that were objects of desire and could not certainly be attained by the worshipper’s unaided efforts . . . help in all these matters was sought by the worshipper from whatever god he had a right to appeal to” (p. 82). “The really vital question is not what a god has power to do, but whether I can get him to do it for me” (p. 83). “All acts of ancient worship have a material embodiment. . . . They must be performed at certain places and at certain times” (p. 84). “The gods themselves are not exempt from the general limitations of physical existence” (p. 85). The “predominant conception of the gods is anthropomorphic” (p. 86). “There was no more difficulty in ascribing living powers and personality to a stone, tree, or animal, than to a being of human or superhuman build” (p. 87). “Many stones and rocks in Arabia were believed to be transformed men, but especially women” (p. 88, *note*). “Fantastic monsters, half human, half bestial, which began with the oldest Chaldean engraved cylinders, gave Phœnicia its cherubim, griffins, and sphinxes. . . . Of course, most of these things can be explained away as allegories, and are so explained to this day by persons who shut their eyes” (p. 89). “The gods proper were not sharply marked off, *as regards their nature*, from the lower orders of demoniac beings” (p. 90). “The gods have what may be called physical relations and affinities, not only to man, but to all kinds of natural objects” (p. 89, 1889 ed.).

The primitive conception of holiness, to which the modern variations of the idea must be traced back, belong to a habit of thought with which we have lost touch. "Holiness, as a religious term, did not originate within the sphere of the revealed religion of Israel. It is one of those primitive concepts which have been taken up and purified by revelation, but which may retain some traces of their origin in a lower stage of belief. . . . One such survival is probably to be found in the conception of holiness as a quality transmissible by contact, and constituting in certain circumstances a danger to be scrupulously avoided (See Ezk. xliv. 19, xlvi. 20; Ex. xxix. 37, xxx. 29; Lev. vi. 27, etc.; cf. Hag. 12 f.). . . . This institution has come to be denoted by the name taboo, and the instances just cited seem to indicate a close analogy between taboo and the primitive associations of the word 'holiness' in Semitic religion. This would account for the remarkable points of contact between the laws of holiness and those of uncleanness, the two notions being in their origin practically identical" (J. Skinner, D.D., *H.D.B.*, II, p. 395). "Unfortunately, our knowledge of the peoples related to Israel belongs to a period long after the Exodus, being derived from the Bible or inscriptions. . . . It is usually assumed that these small peoples, such as Edom and Moab . . . were henotheistic, *i.e.* worshippers of one god to the exclusion of all others. The assumption seems without foundation. . . . A monolatrous Shemitic people is not discoverable in the historic period. . . . The religious development of Israel is virtually a development in the idea of God. . . . Our convictions in regard to this point will be formed rather from our contemplation of the results eventually achieved. . . . The revolution of Jehu put its seal on the life-work of Elijah; it gave national expression to his demand: 'If Jehovah be God, follow him'" (*ibid.*, pp. 200-1). "To the mass the struggle probably appeared an external one between two names, two deities. . . . Though Baal as another from Jehovah was set aside, Baal had incorporated himself in Jehovah. . . . The prophets now broke with the people as a whole, as they believed Jehovah had broken with it and determined to destroy it." "Jehovah was God alone; He was righteous . . . yet He took no pains to assert Himself against the world" (v. 202).

"So, too, Israel was His people; they possessed the truth; His cause and theirs was one; because the eternal truth was in their hearts they were righteous as against the world, but all appeals to His tribunal were vain. . . . And in like manner the individual pined away solitary and deserted. . . . More daring spirits like Job rose in rebellion: the throne of the world was not vacant, it was filled by an immorality; the human conscience rose, and, proclaiming itself greater than He, deposed Him from His seat. . . . From Hosea downwards writers are in the habit of stigmatizing the corrupt worship of Jehovah at the high places as Baal worship" (Rev. A. B. Davidson, *H.D.B.*, II, p. 202).

"The activity, power, and dominion of the gods were conceived as bounded by certain local limits" (p. 91). "The land of a god corresponds with the land of his worshippers" (W. R. Smith, p. 91). "Nimrod is a god." "Og, king of Bashan, is a mythical figure, presumably an old god of the region" (p. 91, *note*). "A god cannot be worshipped outside of his own land (cp. I Sam. xxvi. 19; Hos. ix. 4)" (p. 92). "Foreign countries are unclean (Amos vii. 17; Josh. xxii. 19)" (p. 92).

This "is usually expressed by the title Baal," "the possessor" of some place (p. 92). "Gods are never conceived of as ubiquitous and can act only where they or their ministers are present" (p. 94). Mountains "are constantly conceived as the dwelling-places of deities" (p. 94). Land naturally moist is called "the field of the house of Baal." He waters, he "quicken[s]" it (p. 95). "Semitic antiquity . . . regards the primeval store of water as divided into two distinct bodies, one above the sky, whence rain comes, the other in the great deep, which feeds springs and lakes" (p. 97, cp. Gen. i. 2, vii. 11, xlix. 25; Deut. xxxiii. 13, etc.). "The godhead . . . gathers the clouds round him in his earthly sanctuary and then moves forth in storm and tempest to pour their waters on the thirsty land" (p. 100).

The Ba'alim were certainly regarded as fertilizing the corn crops, and must therefore have been viewed as givers of rain (p. 100). "Ultimately, as we see from Hosea, all agricultural produce was regarded as the gift of the Ba'alim. . . . Property in water is older and more important than property in land. . . . If a man digs a well he has a preferential right to water his

camels at it. . . . To the same circle of ideas belongs the conception of the Garden of Eden planted by God, and watered not by rain, but by rivers" (p. 104 and *note*). "All irrigated lands are dependent on him for the water that makes them fertile, and pay him first-fruits or tithes. . . . The idea that the Ba'alim were the authors of all fertility can only have taken shape among communities whose agriculture was essentially dependent on irrigation" (p. 105). "Villages must have existed, each with its worship of the local Baal. . . . In the oldest poetry of the Hebrews, when Jehovah rides over His land in the thunderstorm, His starting-point is not heaven but Mount Sinai; a natural conception, for in mountainous regions storms gather round the highest summits. . . . The cosmology of Gen. i. is confined to post-exilic writings (for II Kings vii. 2-19 is not to the point)" (p. 106 and *note*). Firstlings as well as first-fruits were offered at the shrines of the Ba'alim: "the fundamental type of Arabian sacrifice does not take the form of a tribute to the god, but is simply an act of communion with him" (p. 111).

"Where the god had a house or temple we recognize the work of men who were no longer nomads" (p. 112). "Agricultural habits teach men to look on this home as a garden of God, cultivated and fertilized by the hand of deity" (p. 113). "In later times celestial gods predominate, as we see from the prevalence of sacrifice by fire" (p. 114). "In later times the home or sanctuary of a god was a temple, or, as the Semites call it, a 'house' or 'palace.' . . . The gods haunted certain spots. . . . Thus in the earlier parts of the Old Testament a theophany is always taken to be a good reason for sacrificing on the spot (Gen. xii. 7, xxii. 14, xxviii. 18 ff.; Ex. xvii. 15; Jud. vi. 20, xiii. 19)" (p. 115). "God is not equally near at all places and all times . . . there are fixed places where the deity has appeared in the past and may be expected to appear again. . . . Bethel continued to be regarded as a sanctuary of the first class down to the captivity. . . . Mamre was a notable sanctuary down to Christian times" (p. 116). "By a prophet like Isaiah the residence of Jehovah in Zion is almost wholly dematerialized . . . but He is not to be found except in the places where 'He has set a memorial of His name'" (p. 117). "And long after the establishment of the Hebrews

in Canaan, poets and prophets describe Jehovah, when He comes to help His people, as marching from Sinai in thunder-cloud and storm (Deut. xxxiii. 2; Jud. v. 4 *sqq.*; Hab. iii. 3)" (p. 118).

"We find it hard to think of a visible manifestation of the godhead as an actual occurrence, but all primitive peoples believe in frequent theophanies. . . . Any natural object or occurrence which appeals strongly to the imagination, or excites sentiments of awe and reverence, is readily taken for a manifestation of divine or demoniac life" (p. 119). Nature is full of living beings of superhuman kind; the Jinn or demons "frequent savage and deserted places far from the wonted tread of man" (p. 120). "For, though there is no essential physical distinction between demons and gods, there is the fundamental moral difference that the *jinn* are strangers, and so, by the law of the desert, enemies" (p. 121). "Within the region frequented by a community of men, the god of the community was supreme; every phenomenon that seemed supernatural was . . . regarded as a token of his personal presence . . . among the ancient Hebrews" (p. 123).

"The origin of totemism is as much a problem as the origin of local gods" (p. 125). The "conception of the communities of the *jinn* is precisely identical with the savage conception of the animal creation. Each kind of animal is regarded as an organized kindred, held together by ties of blood and the practice of blood revenge. . . . A madman is possessed by the *jinn* . . . the soul of a beast being held to pass into a man" (pp. 127-8). "Every strange sound is readily taken to be the murmuring of the *jinn*, and every strange sight to be a demoniac apparition" (p. 130). "Vague talk about an instinctive sense of the presence of the deity in the manifestations of natural life does not carry us a whit nearer the comprehension of these beliefs" (p. 132). "While the most marked attributes of the *jinn* are plainly derived from animals, it is to be remembered that the savage imagination which ascribes supernatural powers to all parts of animate nature, extends the sphere of animation in a very liberal fashion. Totems are not seldom taken from trees, which appear to do everything for their adherents that a totem animal could do. . . . That trees are animate and have perceptions, passions, and a reasonable soul

was argued even by the early Greek philosophers" (p. 132). "Wherever the spontaneous life of nature was manifested in an emphatic way, the ancient Semite saw something supernatural. . . . The stars move because they are alive" (p. 134). "Mephitic vapours rising from fissures in the earth are taken to be potent spiritual influences" (p. 135). "The demoniac character of the serpent in the Garden of Eden is unmistakable; the serpent is not a mere temporary disguise of Satan, otherwise its punishment would be meaningless" (p. 442). "Syriac legends . . . are full of beasts with demoniac powers" (Excursus, p. 443). "There is no record of a stage in human society in which each community of men did not claim kindred and alliance with some group or species of the living powers of nature" (p. 137).

"It may be asked why there are not direct and convincing evidences of Semitic totemism. . . . The general answer to this difficulty is that totems, or friendly demoniac beings, rapidly develop into gods when men rise above pure savagery" (p. 443, *additional note*). "At the stage which even the rudest Semitic peoples had reached when they first become known to us, it would be absurd to expect to find examples of totemism pure and simple" (p. 444). "The conclusion that the Semites did pass through the totem stage can be avoided only by supposing them to be an exception to the universal rule" (p. 137). "If this is so, we can hardly avoid the conclusion that some of the Semitic gods are of totem origin" (p. 138) (*e.g.* "The Lion of Judah"). [It is only fair to say that Sir James Frazer does not hold the view that totems were universal (*vide Preface in 2nd Edition of Golden Bough*, p. xxv of Vol. I).—*AUTHOR.*] "We may expect to find traces of vague plurality in the conception of the godhead as associated with special spots. . . . I am inclined to think that this is the idea which underlies the Hebrew use of the plural . . . if the *Elohim* of a place originally meant all its sacred denizens, viewed collectively . . . the transition to the use of the plural in a singular sense would follow naturally" (*Religion of the Semites*, p. 445). "Finally, the animal god, who as a demoniac being, has many human attributes, is transformed into an anthropomorphic god" (p. 444).

"The sons of God who contract marriages with the daughters

of men are out of place in the religion of the Old Testament, and the legend must have been taken over from a lower form of faith" (p. 446). "The distinction between what is *holy* and what is *common* is one of the most important things in ancient religion" (p. 140). "The holiness of the gods is an expression to which it is hardly possible to attach a definite sense apart from the holiness of their physical surroundings. . . . Holy persons, things, and times, as they are conceived in antiquity, all presuppose the existence of holy places" (p. 141). "The oldest example of an Arabian sacred region is Mount Horeb. At the theophany (Exodus xix) the whole mountain is fenced off" (p. 136) (cp. Wundt's *Folk Psychology*). "A thing is called taboo when it may not be touched or when it must be avoided for some reason, whether because of its peculiar sanctity or contrariwise because its harmful influence renders it 'impure,' defiling everyone who comes in contact with it" (p. 193).

"Man himself is the primary object of taboo—not every individual, but the privileged ones, the superiors, the priest, the chieftain. . . . From the individual person, the taboo was further extended to localities, houses, and lands" (p. 195). "Sickness or even death is believed to follow a transgression of such a taboo regulation" (pp. 195-6). In the Levitical Priests' code of Israel, "the refined casuistry of the priests prescribed even to details what the Israelite might eat and what was taboo for him. For the Israelite, however, this taboo was not associated with the sacred, but with the unclean. The original taboo on the eating of the flesh of an animal related, in the totemic period, to the sacred animal. This is the taboo in its original form" (p. 199). "In the Priests' code, the sacred object has become entirely transmuted into an unclean object, supposed to contaminate all who eat of it. . . . We cannot avoid the impression, accordingly, that the unclean animals held to be taboo by the Priests' code are the same as those which this same people regarded as sacred soul and totem animals at an earlier stage of culture. . . . In this category belongs also the prohibition of consuming the blood of animals in the eating of their flesh. This likewise is the survival of a very common belief . . . that with the blood of an animal one might appropriate its spirit power"

(p. 200). "There are only *three* means by which an individual may free himself from the effects of a violation of taboo. . . . Just as water removes physical uncleanness, so also does it wash away soul or demoniac impurity—not symbolically, for primitive man has no symbols in our sense of the word—but magically. . . . Beside water, fire also is employed" (p. 201).

"The third form of purification finally consists in a magical transference of the impurity from man to other objects or to other beings, as, for example, from a man to an animal" (p. 202). "Israelite legend affords a striking example of such lustration in the goat which, laden with the sins of Israel, is driven by Aaron into the wilderness. He takes the goat, lays both his hands on its head, and whispers the sins of Israel into its ear. The goat is then driven into the wilderness, where it is to bury the sins in a distant place. An analogous New Testament story, moreover, is related in St. Matthew's Gospel" (p. 203). "The swine, however, plunged into an adjacent sea, and thus the demons perished with them" (p. 203).

"In Hebrew this root is mainly applied to such consecration as implies absolute separation from human use and association, *i.e.* the total destruction of an accursed thing, or in more modern times excommunication" (p. 150, *note*). "Every place and thing which has natural associations with the god is regarded, if I may borrow a metaphor from electricity, as charged with divine energy and ready at any moment to discharge itself to the destruction of the man who presumes to approach it unduly" (p. 151). "It is convenient to have a distinct name for this primitive institution, to mark it off from the later developments of the idea of holiness in advanced religions, and for this purpose the Polynesian term *taboo* has been selected" (p. 152). "Holy and unclean things have this in common, that in both cases certain restrictions lie on men's use of and contact with them, and that the breach of these restrictions involves supernatural dangers. . . . The acts that cause uncleanness are exactly the same which among savage nations place a man under taboo" (Excursus, p. 446). "Take the rules about the uncleanness produced by the carcases of vermin in Lev. xi. 32 *seq.* . . . if the defilement affect an (unglazed) earthen pot, it is supposed to sink into the pores, and cannot be washed out. . . . Rules like these have nothing

in common with the spirit of Hebrew religion; they can only be remains of a primitive superstition. . . . So too in the law for cleansing the leper (*Lev. xiv. 4 seq.*) the impurity is transferred to a bird, which flies away with it; compare also the ritual of the scapegoat" (p. 447).

"The Semitic taboo is exactly like the savage one; it has nothing to do with respect for the gods, but springs from mere terror of supernatural influences" (p. 448). "The punishment of the impious act is not a divine judgment, in our sense of that word, but flows directly from the malignant influences resident in the forbidden thing, which, so to speak, avenges itself on the offender. . . . The irrationality of laws of uncleanness from the standpoint of spiritual religion or even of the higher heathenism, is so manifest that they must necessarily be looked on as having survived from an earlier form of faith and of society. And this being so, I do not see how any historical student can refuse to class them with savage taboos. . . . The idea of property does not suffice to explain the facts of the case. A man's property consists of things to which he has an exclusive right . . . the notion that certain things are taboo to a god or a chief means only that he, as the stronger person . . . and so very dangerous to offend, will not allow anyone else to meddle with them. . . . The rules of Semitic holiness show clear marks of their origin in a system of taboo . . . there remain many traces of the view that holiness is contagious, just as uncleanness is. . . . Of the contagiousness of holiness there are many traces exactly similar to taboo" (pp. 449-50). "It is impossible to separate the Semitic doctrine of holiness and uncleanness from the system of taboo" (p. 452). Shoes were put off on going into a holy place, not for fear that this might be in any way defiled, but lest they should become holy and therefore taboo (cp. p. 434). Best clothes were also holy clothes, reserved for festal purposes; "best clothes meant clothes that were taboo for the purposes of ordinary life" (p. 453). "Among the Syrians, swine's flesh was taboo, but it was an open question whether this was because the animal was holy or because it was unclean. . . . The most startling agreement in point of detail with savage *taboos* leaves no reasonable doubt as to the origin and ultimate relations of the idea of holiness" (p. 153).

"The worshippers of Attis abstained from eating the flesh of swine. This appears to indicate that the pig was regarded as an embodiment of Attis" (J. G. Frazer, *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, Vol. II, p. 22). "Certainly the pig ranked as a sacred animal among the Syrians. At the great religious metropolis of Hierapolis on the Euphrates pigs were neither sacrificed, nor eaten. . . . Some people said this was because the pigs were unclean; others said it was because the pigs were sacred. This difference of opinion points to a hazy state of religious thought in which the ideas of sanctity and uncleanness are not yet sharply distinguished, both being blent in a sort of vaporous solution to which we give the name of taboo." It may be that "the pig was slain on solemn occasions as a representative of the god and consumed sacramentally by the worshippers [of Attis]. Indeed, the sacramental killing and eating of an animal implies that the animal is sacred, and that, as a general rule, it is spared. The attitude of the Jews to the pig was as ambiguous as that of the heathen Syrians towards the same animal. The Greeks could not decide whether the Jews worshipped swine or abominated them" (p. 23). "Robertson Smith conjectured that the wild boars annually sacrificed in Cyprus on 2nd April . . . represented Adonis himself" (*Religion of the Semites*, pp. 290 sq., 411; Frazer, p. 23, note). "We are confirmed in this opinion [that the Jews worshipped rather than abhorred the pig] by observing that down to the time of Isaiah some of the Jews used to meet secretly in gardens to eat the flesh of swine and mice as a religious rite: Is. lxv. 3, lxvi. 3, 17" (p. 24). "Once a year the Egyptians sacrificed pigs to the moon and to Osiris, and not only sacrificed them, but ate of their flesh, though on any other day of the year they would neither sacrifice them nor taste of their flesh." "In the Island of Wetar (between New Guinea and Celebes) people believe themselves to be variously descended from wild pigs, serpents, crocodiles, turtles, dogs, and eels; a man may not eat an animal of the kind from which he is descended" (p. 25).

"According to the latter writers [Miss A. C. Fletcher and F. la Flesche] any breach of a clan taboo among the Omahas was supposed to be punished either by the breaking out of sores or white spots on the body of the offender or by his hair

turning white" (p. 25, *note*). "The Bush negroes of Surinam, who practise totemism, believe that if they ate the *capiai* (an animal like a pig) it would give them leprosy. . . . The Wagogo of German East Africa imagine that the sin of eating the totemic animal is visited not on the sinner himself but on his innocent kinsfolk. Thus when they see a child with a scald head, they say at once that his father has been eating his totem" (p. 26). Certain examples "support the view that the pig must have been sacred in Egypt, since the effect of drinking its milk was believed to be leprosy. Such fancies may perhaps have been sometimes suggested by the observation that the eating of semi-putrid flesh, to which some savages are addicted, is apt to be followed by eruptions on the skin. . . . It seems not impossible that the abhorrence which the Hebrews entertained of leprosy, and the pains which they took to seclude lepers from the community may have been based on religious as well as on purely sanitary grounds. . . . Certainly we read in the Old Testament of cases of leprosy which the historian regarded as the direct consequence of sin (2 Kings v. 27; 2 Chron. xxvi. 16-21). Again, the rule that, after touching a pig, a man had to wash himself and his clothes, also favours the view of the sanctity of the pig. For it is a common belief that the effect of contact with a sacred object must be removed, by washing or otherwise, before a man is free to mingle with his fellows. Thus Jews wash their hands after reading the sacred scriptures. Before coming forth from the tabernacle after the sin-offering, the high priest had to wash himself and put off the garments which he had worn in the holy place (Lev. xvi. 23 *sq.*)" (p. 27).

"If a Chadwar of the Central Provinces who has the pig for his totem should even see a pig killed by somebody else, he will throw away the household crockery and clean the house as if on the death of a member of his family. . . . In short, primitive man believes that what is sacred is dangerous; it is pervaded by a sort of electrical sanctity which communicates a shock to, even if it does not kill, whatever comes in contact with it" (p. 28). "'To look upon it [a goat] would be to render the man for the time impure, as well as to cause him undefined uneasiness' (J. Mackenzie, *loc. cit.*). The Elk clan, among the Omaha Indians, believe that even to touch the

male elk would be followed by an eruption of boils and white spots on the body. . . . Thus the primitive mind seems to conceive of holiness as a sort of dangerous virus, which a prudent man will shun as far as possible, and of which, if he should chance to be infected by it, he will carefully disinfect himself by some form of ceremonial purification" (p. 29). "According to Eudoxius II, when the Nile had subsided, herds of swine were turned loose over the fields to tread the seed down into the moist earth (Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* xviii. 168). But when a being is thus the object of mixed and implicitly contradictory feelings [of both respect and abomination] he may be said to occupy a position of unstable equilibrium. In course of time one of the contradictory feelings is likely to prevail over the other, and according as the feeling which finally predominates is that of reverence or abhorrence, the being who is the object of it will rise into a god or sink into a devil." In Egypt the "pig came to be looked on as an embodiment of Set or Typhon, the Egyptian devil and enemy of Osiris" (p. 30).

"When an animal is thus killed as a solemn sacrifice once and once only in the year, it generally or always means that the animal is divine, that he is spared and respected the rest of the year as a god and slain, when he is slain, also in the character of a god" (p. 31). "This important principle was first recognised by Prof. W. Robertson Smith (See his article, 'Sacrifice,' *Encyclopædia Brit.*, Ninth Edition, Vol. XXI, p. 137 sq.; compare his *Religion of the Semites*, pp. 373, 410 sq.)" (p. 31 note). "At a later age, when Osiris became anthropomorphic and his original relation to the pig had been forgotten, the animal was at first distinguished from him, and afterwards opposed as an enemy to him by mythologists" (p. 31). In Palestine "in a single night a party of wild boars will uproot a whole field, and destroy the husbandman's hopes for the year. The places they love to frequent are the reedy marshes and thickets by rivers and lakes, and they swarm in the thickets all along the banks of the Jordan from Jericho to the Lake of Gennesaret. From these fastnesses, where neither dog nor man can dislodge them, they make nightly forays upon the corn-fields and root-crops of the villagers. . . . So in British Central Africa sentinels are posted day and night in huts raised on platforms to protect

the maize-fields from the inroads of baboons and of wild pigs, which are still more destructive than the baboons, for they grub up the plants as well as devour the grain" (p. 32). "Among the Kai of German New Guinea people who are engaged in the labour of the fields will on no account eat pork. The reason is that pigs, both wild and tame, are the most dangerous foes of the crops; therefore it seems clear to the mind of the Kai that if a field labourer were to eat pork, the flesh of the dead pig in his stomach would attract the living pigs into the field. Perhaps this superstition, based on the principle of sympathetic magic, may explain the aversion to pork which was entertained by some of the agricultural peoples of the Eastern Mediterranean in antiquity" (p. 33).

"The whole mountain of Horeb was sacred ground, and so probably was Mount Hermon, for its name means 'holy'" (*Religion of the Semites*, p. 155). "All taboos are inspired by awe of the supernatural . . . every sanctuary was protected by rigid taboos" (pp. 154-5). "In Exodus xxiv. 4, the altar is built outside the limits of Sinai, and the people are not allowed to approach the mountain" (p. 157, *note*). "The 'jealousy' of the deity . . . was never lost sight of in Semitic worship. . . . The personal dignity of the god, like that of a great chief, asserts itself mainly in punctilious insistence on a complicated etiquette" (pp. 157-8). "All such restrictions are ultimately of the nature of taboos" (p. 159). "Even where the whole land already belongs to a friendly deity, precautions are necessary when man lays his hand for the first time on any of the good things of nature" (p. 159, *note*). "The vegetation of the sanctuary is conceived as actually instinct with a particle of divine life" (p. 160). "In the beginning the beasts and the birds of the sanctuary, as well as its vegetation, were conceived as holy because they partook of the pervasive divine life. . . . Holiness, like taboo, is conceived as infectious, propagating itself by physical contact . . . even in Hebrew ritual common things brought in contact with things very sacred are themselves 'sanctified,' so that they can be no longer used for common purposes" (pp. 160-1). "Holiness acquired by contact is not so indelible as inborn sanctity" (p. 161). "The ultimate sanction of these rules lay in the . . . jealousy of the personal

god, who resents all undue violation of his environment" (p. 162).

"Among the Hebrews such taboos were created by means of a curse (Judg. xvii. 2), and by the same means a king can give validity to the most unreasonable decrees (1 Sam. xiv. 24 seq.)" (p. 163). "Achan's breach of a taboo involves the host (Josh. vi. 18, to vii. 11 seq.)" (p. 162). "The Israelites, on their first entry into Canaan, placed a number of the chief heads of public morality under the protection of a solemn taboo by a great act of public cursing" (p. 164). "All manifestations of life at or about a holy place readily assume a divine character . . . the sacred fountain and the sacred tree are likely to hold the first place in acts of worship . . . the deity as the giver of life is specially connected with quickening waters and vegetative growth" (p. 167). "Each town or village had as a rule its own well, and its own high place or little temple. . . . In I Kings i. 9 and 38 the fountains of Enrogel, where Adonijah held his sacrificial feast, and of Gihon, where Solomon was crowned, are plainly the original sanctuaries of Jerusalem" (p. 172 and note). "Among the ancients blood is generally conceived as the principle or vehicle of life, and so the account often given of sacred waters is that the blood of the deity flows in them. 'Smooth Adonis from his native rock, ran purple to the sea, supposed with blood of Thammuz yearly wounded' (*Paradise Lost*)" (p. 173).

"This is only another form of the idea expressed in the first class of legend, where a god dies—that is, ceases to exist in human form—but his life passes into the waters where he is buried" (p. 174). "That an impure person dare not approach sacred waters is a general principle. . . . An ordeal at a sacred spring based on this principle might be worked in several ways" (pp. 179–80). "Among the Hebrews this ordeal by drinking holy water is preserved . . . in the case of a woman suspected of infidelity (Numb. v. 11 sq.)" (p. 180). "The oldest Hebrew tradition refers the origin of the Torah to the divine sentences taught by Moses . . . beside the holy fountain which in Gen. xiv. 7, is called 'the fountain of judgment.' The principle underlying the administration of justice at the sanctuary is that cases too hard for man are referred to the decision of God. Among the Hebrews in Canaan this was

ordinarily done by an appeal to the sacred lot, but the survival of even one case of ordeal by holy water leaves no doubt as to the sense of the ‘fountain of judgment’ (*En-Mishpat*) or ‘waters of controversy’ (*Moribah*)” (p. 181). “When Ezekiel describes the sacred waters that issue from the New Jerusalem as giving life wherever they come, and the leaves of the trees on their banks as supplying medicine, his imagery is in full touch with common Semitic ideas (*Ezek. xlvi. 9, 12*)” (p. 184). “The fountain is treated as a living thing, those properties of its waters which we call natural are regarded as manifestations of a divine life, and the source itself is honoured as a divine being, I had almost said a divine animal” (p. 184).

“Altars were habitually set up ‘under green trees,’ and, what is more, the altar was incomplete unless an *asherā* stood beside it” (p. 187). “That the sacred tree should degenerate first into a mere Maypole, and then into a rude wooden idol, is in accordance with analogies found elsewhere, e.g. in Greece” (p. 188, *note*). “It follows that the ‘prophets of the *asherā*’ [who sat at the Queen’s table] in I Kings (xviii. 19) are very misty personages, and that the mention of them implies a confusion between Astarte and the Ashera, which no Israelite in Elijah’s time, or indeed so long as the northern kingdom stood, could have fallen into” (p. 189, *note*). “The life-blood of the god was conceived as diffused through the sacred waters . . . it was an easy extension of this idea to suppose that the tree which overshadowed the sacred fountain . . . was itself instinct with a particle of divine life. . . . All the members of one kin were conceived as having a common life embodied in the common blood which flowed through their veins. Similarly one and the same divine life might be shared by a number of objects, if all of them were nourished from a common vital source” (p. 190).

“Elements of water, tree, and animal worship could all be combined in the ritual of a single anthropomorphic deity. . . . Self-sown wood can flourish only where there is underground water” (p. 190). “Religion and agricultural arts spread together and the one carried the other with it” (pp. 192–3). “Jehovah, ‘who dwells in the bush’ (*Deut. xxxiii. 16*) in the arid desert of Sinai, was the God of the Hebrews while they were still nomads ignorant of agriculture; and

indeed the original seat of a conception like the burning bush, which must have its physical basis in electrical phenomena, must probably be sought in the clear dry air of the desert or of lofty mountains" (p. 194). "The same phenomenon, according to Africanus and Eustathius, was seen at the terebinth of Mamre" (p. 193). "The apparition of Jehovah in the burning bush belongs to the same circle of ideas as His apparition in the thunders and lightnings of Sinai" (p. 194).

"The famous holy tree near Shechem, called . . . the 'tree of the revealer' in Gen. xii. 6, must have been the seat of a Canaanite tree oracle" (p. 196). This is where Abraham received the promise (A.V. "the Plain of Moonaim"). "That the artificial sacred tree or ashera was used in divination would follow from I Kings xviii. 19" (p. 194; cp. Hosea iv. 12). "The oldest Phoenician temples were natural or artificial grottoes. . . . Religious practice is always conservative, and rock-hewn temples would naturally be used after men had ceased to live like troglodytes in caves and holes of the earth" (p. 197).

"In other parts of the world, *e.g.* in Greece, there are many examples of caves associated with the worship of chthonic deities . . . the ordinary usages of Semitic religion have many points of contact with the chthonic rites of the Greeks" (p. 198). "The adytum, or dark inner chamber, found in many temples both among the Semites and in Greece, was almost certainly in its origin a cave. . . . Where it does exist it is a place of oracle, as the Holy of Holies was at Jerusalem" (p. 200). "Whether fire is used or not is a detail . . . the offering consists of food, 'the bread of God' as it is called in the Hebrew ritual (Lev. xxi. 8, 17, etc., cf. Lev. iii. 11). . . . In Arabia . . . the blood is the essence of the offering: no part of the flesh falls as a rule to the god, but the whole is distributed among the men who assist at the sacrifice. . . . Whatever else was done in connection with a sacrifice, the primitive rite of sprinkling or dashing the blood against the altar, or allowing it to flow down on the ground at its base, was hardly ever omitted" (pp. 200-2). "The original altar among the northern Semites, as well as among the Arabs, was a great stone or cairn at which the blood of the victim was shed. . . . That a single stone sufficed appears from I Sam.

xiv. 32 *sqq.*" (p. 202). "Monolithic pillars or cairns of stone are frequently mentioned in the more ancient parts of the Old Testament as standing at sanctuaries, generally in connection with a sacred legend about the occasion on which they were set up by some famous patriarch or hero. . . . At Shechem, Josh. xxiv. 26; Bethel, Gen. xxviii. 18 *sqq.*; Gilead (Rameth-Gilead), Gen. xxxi, 45 *sqq.*; Gilgal, Josh. iv. 5; Mizpah, I Sam. vii. 12; Gibeon, II Sam. xx. 8; Enrogel, I Kings i. 9" (p. 203 and *note*). "Jacob's pillar is more than a mere landmark, for it is anointed, just as idols were in antiquity, and the pillar itself, not the spot on which it stood, is called 'the house of God,' as if the deity were conceived actually to dwell in the stone" (pp. 204-5). "Ultimately it becomes a statue or anthropomorphic idol of stone, just as the sacred tree or post was ultimately developed into an image of wood" (p. 204). "Here, therefore, the sacred stone is altar and idol in one" (p. 205). "How such a conception first obtained currency is a matter for which no direct evidence is available, and which if settled at all can be settled only by inference and conjecture" (p. 205). "Sacred stones are found in all parts of the world . . . and among the Semites the sacred pillar is universal" (p. 209). "Solomon set up two brazen pillars before his temple at Jerusalem (I Kings vii. 15, 21). As he named them 'The stablisher' and 'in him is strength,' they were doubtless symbols of Jehovah" (p. 208, *note*). Two great pillars "stood in the Propylæa of the temple of Hierapolis. . . . Such twin pillars are very common at Semitic temples; even the temple at Jerusalem had them and they are shown on coins representing the temple at Paphos" (Excursus, p. 457).

"At Gilgal, there were twelve sacred pillars . . . (Josh. iv. 20). These stones are probably identical with the stone idols (A.V. 'quarries') of Judges iii, 19, 26. . . . At Sinai twelve pillars were erected at the covenant sacrifice (Ex. xxiv. 4)" (p. 211 and *note*). "If the god was already conceived as present in the stone, it was a natural exercise of the artistic faculty to put something on the stone to indicate the fact; and this something, if the god was anthropomorphically conceived, might either be a human figure, or merely an indication of important parts of the human figure (*vide note on*

Phallic symbols). . . . The stone or stone-heap was a convenient mark of the proper place of sacrifice, and at the same time, if the deity consented to be present at it, provided the means for carrying out the ritual of the sacrificial blood" (p. 212). "Unfortunately the only system of Semitic sacrifice of which we possess a full account is that of the second temple at Jerusalem. The detailed ritual laws of the Pentateuch belong to the post-exilic document commonly called the Priestly Code. . . . To the Priestly Code belong the book of Leviticus, together with the cognate parts of the adjacent books. Exodus xxv–xxxii., xxxv–xl; and Numb. i–x., xv–xix., xxv–xxxvi. (with some inconsiderable exceptions); and though the ritual of Jerusalem as described in the Book of Leviticus is undoubtedly based on very ancient tradition, going back to a time when there was no substantial difference, in point of form, between Hebrew sacrifices and those of the surrounding nations, the system as we have it dates from a time when sacrifice was no longer the sum and substance of worship" (p. 215 and *note*).

"The use of sacrifice as an atonement for sin is also recognized in the old literature, especially in the case of the burnt offering, but there is little or no trace of a special kind of offering appropriated for this purpose before the time of Ezekiel. . . . With regard to Hebrew sacrifices that can be clearly made out from pre-exilic literature . . . the distinction between sacrifices in which the consecrated gift is wholly made over to the god, to be consumed on the altar or otherwise disposed of in his service, and those at which the god and his worshippers partake together in the consecrated thing. To the latter class belong the *Zebahim*, or ordinary animal sacrifices in which a victim is slain, its blood poured out at the altar, and the fat of the intestines with certain other pieces burned, while the greater part of the flesh is left to the offerer to form the material of a sacrificial banquet" (p. 217). "The division of sacrifices into animal and vegetable offerings involves the principle that sacrifices . . . are drawn from edible substances, and indeed from such substances as form the ordinary staple of human food . . . sacred animals, whose flesh was ordinarily forbidden to men, being offered and eaten sacramentally on very solemn occasions" (p. 218).

"Among the Hebrews no sacrificial meal was provided for the worshippers unless a victim was sacrificed; if the oblation was purely cereal it was wholly consumed either on the altar or by the priests . . . *i.e.* by the representatives of the deity" (p. 223). "Whereas when an animal is sacrificed, the sacrificer and the deity feast together. . . . All sacrifices laid upon the altar were taken by the ancients as being literally the food of the gods. . . . In the higher forms of heathenism the crass materialism of this conception was modified, in the case of fire-offerings, by the doctrine that man's food must be etherialized or sublimated into fragrant smoke before the gods partake of it" (p. 224). "In all religions in which the gods have been developed out of totems, the ritual act of laying food before the deity is perfectly intelligible" (p. 212).

"The leading idea in the animal sacrifices of the Semites, as we shall see by and by, was not that of a gift made over to the god, but of an act of communion, in which the god and his worshippers unite by partaking together of the flesh and blood of a sacred victim" (p. 226). "The actual eating is done by the guests of the deity, but the god himself may still be supposed to partake of food in a subtle and supersensuous way. . . . Its typical form is the libation of blood, the subtle vehicle of the life of the sacrifice" (p. 229). "The libation of wine is in some sense an imitation of and a surrogate for the primitive blood offering" (p. 231). "The idea that the gods drink, but do not eat, seems to mark the feeling that they must be thought of as having a less solid material nature than men" (p. 235). "The distressful times that preceded the end of Hebrew independence drove men to seek exceptional religious means to conciliate the favour of a deity who seemed to have turned his back on his people. . . . When each local community had its own high place, it was the rule that every animal slain for food should be presented at the altar, and every meal at which flesh was served had the character of a sacrificial feast" (p. 238). "Among the Hebrews, as among many other agricultural peoples, the offering of first-fruits was connected with the idea that it is not lawful or safe to eat of the new fruit until the god has received his due (Lev. xxiii. 14). . . . In old Israel all slaughter was sacrifice . . . but cereal food had no such sacred associations" (p. 241).

"Originally perhaps offerings of first-fruits were supposed to be necessary for the subsistence of the divinities who, without them, must have died of hunger; but in after times they seem to be looked on rather in the light of a tribute or mark of homage rendered by man to the gods" (*Frazer, Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, II, p. 109). "As a native put it, 'Devil he eat first; all man he eat behind.' All the inhabitants of the village adjourned to the sea shore . . . to perform the sacrifices" (p. 126). "The worship paid to the god consisted in repeating prayers before the stone, and laying beside it a portion of the food prepared by the people for their own use. This they did at their daily meals, at festivals, and whenever they specially wished to propitiate the deity. The first fruits of the season were always offered to him. Every family of distinction had one of these stones which was considered rather in the light of a family altar than an idol" (p. 128). "We have seen that the Athenians and other Greek peoples offered the first-fruits of the wheat and barley harvests to Demeter and Persephone at Eleusis. The Trœzenians sacrificed the first-fruits to Poseidon, whom they worshipped as the guardian deity of their city. In Attica, the first-fruits of the vintage were presented to Icarius and Erigone. The Romans sacrificed the first ears of corn to Ceres" (p. 133).

"Domestic meals, which among the Semites had no religious character . . . at Rome were consecrated by a portion being offered to the household gods" (*Religion of the Semites*, p. 242 note). "The idea of the sacrificial meal as an act of communion is older than sacrifice in the sense of tribute. . . . All sacrifices are free-will offerings, and except in some rare forms of piacular oblation—particularly human sacrifice . . . the object of the sacrifice is to provide the material for an act of sacrificial communion with the god" (p. 245). "Even in the later rituals there was a clear distinction between cereal oblations which were simply payments to the god, and animal sacrifices, which were used to furnish a feast for the god and his worshippers together" (p. 458, Note E).

"The agricultural tribute of first-fruits and tithes is a charge on the produce of the land, paid to the gods as Ba'alim or landlords" (p. 459). "The system of taxation described in I Sam. viii. can hardly have been in full force till the time of

Solomon at the earliest, and its details seem to indicate that, in fiscal as in other matters, the developed Hebrew kingship took a lesson from its neighbours of Phoenicia, and possibly of Egypt" (p. 460). "That the sacrifice was in no sense a payment to the god, but simply an act of communion of the worshippers with one another and their god, is in accord with the relations that actually subsisted between chiefs and their tribesmen" (Appendix, p. 461). "In its origin, the *Zébah* was not the private offering of an individual householder but the sacrifice of a clan, and so the sacrificial meal had pre-eminently the character of a public feast" (p. 252). "The organization of the feast was in the hands of the ruling classes, who received the tithes and spent them on the service in a way that gave the lion's share of the good things to themselves" (p. 253; cp. I Corinthians xi). "It is clear from the Old Testament that the ritual observances at a Hebrew and at a Canaanite sanctuary were so similar that to the mass of the people Jehovah worship and Baal worship were not separated by any well marked line" (p. 254). "The same kind of worship ruled in ancient Greece and Italy, and seems to be the universal type of the local cults of the small agricultural communities out of which all the nations of ancient civilization grew. . . . The divine father or king claims the same kind of respect and service as a human father or king, and practical religion is simply a branch of social duty" (p. 255). "It must be remembered that all antique morality is an affair of social custom and customary law, and that in the more primitive forms of ancient life the force of custom is so strong that there is hardly any middle course. . . . A man may offend his god . . . but in such a case he knows, or can learn from a competent priestly authority, exactly what he ought to do to set matters right. . . . Men are satisfied with their gods, and they feel that the gods are satisfied with them" (p. 256). "The more developed nations of antiquity, in proportion as they emerged from national childhood, began to find the old religious forms inadequate" (p. 257). "The nations of Palestine in the seventh century B.C. afford an excellent illustration of the development of a gloomier type of worship under the pressure of accumulated political disasters. . . . It was not the business of the gods of heathenism to watch, by a series of special

providences, over the welfare of every individual" (p. 258). "The benefits which were expected from the gods were of a public character" (p. 259). "The sacrificial feast was not only an expression of gladness, but a means of driving away care. . . . A current Arabic saying . . . reckons the eating of flesh as one of the three delights of life" (p. 261 and *note*). [Therefore they thought the gods, being spiritually minded, also delighted in it.—AUTHOR.]

"In the great atoning ceremonies which became common in later times, a swift revulsion of feeling followed, and the gloomy part of the service was presently succeeded by a burst of hilarious revelry" (p. 262). "The good things desired of the gods were the blessings of earthly life, not spiritual but carnal things" (p. 263). "The gods watched over a man's civil life . . . but they were not sure helpers in every private need, and above all they would not help him in matters that were against the interests of the community as a whole" (p. 264).

"By admitting a man to his table the god admits him to his friendship; but this favour is extended to no man in his private capacity" (p. 265). "When the community is at one with itself and at one with its god, it may, for anything religion has to say, do exactly what it pleases towards all who are outside it" (p. 266). "Devotion to the common weal was, as everyone knows, the mainspring of ancient morality" (p. 267). "The advance towards ethical universalism, which was made with feeble and uncertain steps, was never sufficient to make up for the decline of the old heroic virtues that were fostered by the narrower type of national faith" (p. 268). "In the most primitive society there is only one kind of fellowship which is absolute and inviolable. To the primitive man, all other men fall under two classes, those to whom his life is sacred and those to whom it is not sacred" (p. 272). "In the earliest Semitic communities a man was of his mother's clan; in later times he belonged to the clan of his father" (p. 273). "Members of one kindred looked on themselves as one living whole, a single animated mass of blood, flesh, and bones, of which no member could be touched without all the members suffering" (p. 274). [There was no international morality.—AUTHOR.]

"To us all this seems mere metaphor . . . but in early thought there is no sharp line between the metaphorical and the literal" (p. 274). "An institution like the sacrificial meal, which occurs with the same general features all over the world, and is found amongst the most primitive peoples, must, in the nature of things, date from the earliest stage of social organization" (p. 276). "The principle that the god claims his share in every slaughter has its origin in the religion of kinship, and dates from a time when the tribal god was himself a member of the tribal stock" (p. 282). "Among primitive peoples there are no binding precepts of conduct except those that rest on the principle of kinship" (p. 287). "The kinship of the gods with their worshippers is a fundamental doctrine of Semitic religion" (p. 288). "Kinship between the gods and certain kinds of animals . . . are deep-seated principles of Semitic religion" (p. 289). "Respect and reverence is paid to domestic animals among many pastoral peoples in various parts of the globe. They are regarded on the one hand as the friends and kinsmen of men, and on the other hand as sacred beings of a nature akin to the gods" (p. 296). "Every Egyptian had, according to the nome he lived in, his own particular kind of forbidden flesh, venerating a particular species of sacred animal, exactly as totemic savages still do" (p. 301).

"The Hebrew records in the Book of Genesis, though they are undoubtedly based on ancient popular lore, have been recast . . . and purged of such elements as were manifestly inconsistent with Old Testament monotheism" (p. 306). "Just as in the Greek fable of the Golden Age, man in his pristine state of innocence lived at peace with all the animals (*Isaiah xi. 6 seq.*), eating the spontaneous fruits of the earth; but after the Fall he was sentenced to earn his own bread by agricultural toil. At the same time his war with hurtful creatures (the serpent) began, and domestic animals began to be slain sacrificially, and their skins used for clothing. . . . The original Hebrew tradition is that of the Jahvistic story, which agrees with Greek legend in connecting the sacrifice of domestic animals with a fall from the state of pristine innocence" (p. 307). "The Greek legend in the *Works and Days* agrees with the Jahvistic Story also in ascribing the Fall to the

fault of a woman" (p. 307, *note*). "There are other features in the story of the Garden of Eden, especially the tree of life, which prove that the original basis of the narrative is derived from the common stock of Northern Semitic folk-lore" (p. 308). "And when Asclepiades states that every victim was originally regarded as a surrogate for a human sacrifice, he is confirmed in a remarkable way by the Elohistic account of the origin of burnt sacrifice in Gen. xxii, where a ram is accepted in lieu of Isaac" (p. 309). "By the later law (Lev. xxvii. 27), the ass that is not redeemed is to be sold for the benefit of the sanctuary, and even in the older law all the firstborn of men must be redeemed" (p. 463).

"The annual stag sacrifice at Laodicea . . . was regarded as a substitute for a more ancient sacrifice of a maiden. . . . Here, therefore, we have one of the many legends of the death of a deity which are grafted on a rite of annual human sacrifice, or on the annual sacrifice of a sacred animal. . . . The stag whose death has such significance, is a theanthropic victim" (*Excursus*, pp. 466-7). "The old clan name of Hamor ('he-ass') . . . in Shechem, seems to confirm the view that the ass was sacred with some of the Semites" (p. 468). "The quail-sacrifice of the Phœnicians is said by Eudoxus (ap. *Athen.* ix, 47) to commemorate the resurrection of Hercules. . . . This was an annual festival at Tyre (February to March). . . . An annual sacrifice of this sort, connected with a myth of the death of the god, can hardly be other than the mystical sacrifice of a sacred animal" (p. 469). "All this goes to show that the animal sacrifices of the Phœnicians were regarded as quasi-human. . . . The sacrificial kinds were also viewed as kindred to the gods" (p. 310). "In the most ancient times all sacrificial animals had a sacrosanct character" (p. 312). "A sacrosanct victim, and the solemn mystery of its death is justified by the consideration that only in this way can the sacred cement be procured which creates or keeps alive a living bond between the worshippers and their god. This cement is nothing else than the actual life of the sacred and kindred animal which is conceived as residing in its flesh, but especially in its blood, and so, in the sacred meal, is actually distributed among all the participants each of whom incorporates a particle of it with his own individual

life. The motion that, by eating the flesh, or particularly by drinking the blood, of another living being, a man absorbs its nature or life into his own, is one which appears among primitive peoples in many forms" (p. 313).

"Of the stag or gazelle as a Phoenician sacrifice we have further evidence . . . in the legend of the god Usous, who first taught men to clothe themselves in the skins of beasts . . . and to pour out their blood sacrificially before sacred stones. This god was worshipped . . . with libations of the blood of a deer . . . in the district of Lebanon, presented by worshippers clad in deer skins (*Euseb. Pr. Ev.* I, 10, 10). The wearing of the skin of the victim is characteristic of mystical and piacular rites. . . . Most scholars, from Scaliger downwards, have compared Usous with Esau; but it has not been observed that the scene of Isaac's blessing, where his son must first approach him with the savoury flesh of a gazelle, has all the air of a sacrificial scene. Moreover, Jacob, who substitutes kids for gazelles, wears their skin upon his arms and neck. The goat, which here appears as a substitute for the game offered by the huntsman, Esau, was one of the chief Hebrew piacula, if not the chief of all" (*Excursus*, p. 467). [It is possible that, as the sacrifice of Cain and Abel represents a change from vegetable to animal offerings, so this scene between another pair of brothers typifies that from wild to domestic animals. It is to be noted that in both the elder brother is superseded, i.e. "an old order passed away."—*AUTHOR.*]

"In ancient Arabic literature there are many references to the blood covenant, but instead of human blood that of a victim slain at the sanctuary is employed" (p. 314; cp. Ex. xxix. 4; Gen. xv. 8 *seq.*; Jer. xxxiv. 18). "He who has drunk a clansman's blood is no longer a stranger but a brother, and included in the mystic circle of those who have a share in the life blood that is common to all the clan" (p. 315). "The Hebrews, indeed, who had risen above the conception that the relation between Jehovah and Israel was that of natural kinship, thought of the national religion as constituted by a formal covenant-sacrifice at Mount Sinai" (p. 318). "Jehovah as the national God was, from the time of Moses downward, no mere natural clan-god, but the god of a

confederation. . . . The worship of Jehovah throughout all the tribes of Israel and Judah is probably older than the genealogical system that derives all the Hebrews from one natural parent" (p. 319, *note*). "Physical unity of life, regarded as an actual participation in one common mass of flesh and blood, is obviously subject to modification by every accident that affects the physical system, and especially by anything that concerns the nourishment of the body and the blood. On this ground alone it might well seem reasonable to reinforce the sacred life from time to time by a physical process" (p. 319).

"The idea of sacrificial communion includes within it the rudimentary conception of a piacular ceremony" (p. 320). "In the ritual of the Semites and other nations . . . we find many cases in which the worshipper sheds his own blood at the altar . . . the effusion of blood without taking away life is a substitute for human sacrifice" (p. 321). But, "there is an extensive class of rites prevalent among savage and barbarous peoples in which blood-shedding forms part . . . the blood of the man is shed at the altar, or applied to the image of the god, and has exactly the same efficacy as in the forms of blood-covenant that have been already discussed" (p. 322), "e.g. in the Spartan worship of Artemis Orthia" and in that of Bellona (*Tibullus, Lib. 1; El. 6, vv. 45 seq.*, p. 322 *note*). "In early societies a man is destined by his birth to become a member of a particular political and social circle, which is at the same time a distinct religious community. But in many cases this destination has to be confirmed by a formal act of admission to the community" (p. 327). "As in the cruel flagellation of Spartan Ephebi at the altar of Artemis Orthia" (p. 328).

"The sacrifice of one's own blood was mainly associated among the Aramaeans with deprecation or supplication to an angry god" (p. 337). "The godward side of the ritual is summed up in the shedding of the victim's blood, so that it flows over the sacred symbol, or gathers in a pit. . . . A pit to receive the blood existed also at Jerusalem under the altar of burnt-offering (p. 339). "The sprinkling of the blood continued to be regarded as the principal point of the ritual down to the last days of Jewish ritual; for on it the atoning

efficacy of the sacrifice depended" (p. 341). "No feast is complete in which the god has not his share" (p. 346). "Forms of consecration and atonement in which the blood of the victim is applied to the worshipper, or the blood of the worshipper conveyed to the symbol of godhead, occur in all stages of heathen religion, not only among the Semites, but among the Greeks and other races" (p. 348).

"In the Hebrew ritual both of the holocaust and of the sin-offering the victim is slain at the altar 'before Jehovah'" (p. 349); "hewing Agag in pieces before the Lord" at the sanctuary by Samuel [I Sam. xv. 33.—AUTHOR]. "The law expressly recognizes that the flesh and blood of the sin offering is a sanctifying medium of extraordinary potency . . . even the vessel in which the flesh is sodden must be broken or scoured to remove the infection of its sanctity" (p. 349). "Both the ministrant priest and the man who disposed of the body had to bathe and wash their clothes exactly as in the Greek ritual (Lev. xvi. 24, 28; Numb. xix. 7-10)" p. 351. "Everywhere the old national deities had shown themselves powerless"; new "cults appear to have begun among the Northern Semites, or in parts of Asia Minor. . . . The leading feature that distinguishes them from the old public cults . . . is that they were not based on the principle of nationality, but sought recruits from men of every race who were willing to accept initiation through the mystic sacraments" (p. 358). "They carried on a missionary propaganda in all parts of the Roman Empire. . . . A full discussion of mystical sacrifices cannot be confined to the Semitic field" (p. 359).

"A point which is strongly insisted upon in all ancient sacrifices is that the victim should be perfect and without fault"; though "animal life would probably be deemed purer and more perfect than that of man." Yet, "it had begun to be recognized that human life, or rather the life of a tribesman, was a thing of unique sanctity" (p. 361). "The favourite victims of the Saracens were young and beautiful captives, but, if these were not to be had, they contented themselves with a white and faultless camel" (p. 362). "All over the world we find cases of human sacrifice in which an alien is substituted for a tribesman . . . the substitution was felt to be a fraud on the deity . . . it is considered

necessary to make believe" (p. 363). "The plan of substituting an offering . . . was largely applied throughout antiquity, and belongs to the general system of make believe. . . . The thing was really a fraud, but one to which the gods were polite enough to shut their eyes" (p. 364). "The human victim was burned after the blood had been poured out as a libation . . . at the altar the victim took the place of a man" (pp. 364-5). "This doctrine appears all over the ancient world in connection with atoning sacrifices . . . among the Hebrews (Gen. xxii. 13; cf. Lev. xv. 11) . . . among the Phœnicians, among the Egyptians . . . among the Greeks, the Romans, and many other nations" (pp. 365-6). "In those sacrifices in which the victim most fully retained its original theanthropic character, and was therefore most efficacious as a vehicle of atonement, the primitive idea of atonement by communion in the sacred flesh and blood was most completely disguised" (pp. 367-8). "Sacrifices of a certain class were no longer eaten. . . . Whether the custom of actually eating the flesh survived in historical times in any case of human sacrifice is more than doubtful. . . . The custom of drinking the blood, or at least of sprinkling it on the worshippers, may have been kept up longer" (p. 368).

"All myths of the death of gods seem to be derived from sacrifices of theanthropic victims" (p. 370, *note*). "In the more advanced rituals the use of fire corresponds with the conception of the gods as subtle beings, moving in the air, whose proper nourishment is the fragrant smoke" (p. 371). "At Tarsus there was an annual feast at which a very fair pyre was erected, and the local Heracles or Baal burned on it in effigy. This annual commemoration of the death of the god in fire must have had its origin in an older rite, in which the victim was not a mere effigy but a theanthropic sacrifice, *i.e.* an actual man or sacred animal, whose life, according to the antique conception now familiar to us, was an embodiment of the divine human life." "For the burning of the Tyrian Heracles (cf. *Clem. Recog.* x. 24)" (p. 373 and *note*). "We have therefore a series of examples all pointing to human sacrifice beneath and outside the city" (p. 374). "When the burning came to be the essence of the rite, the spot . . . might naturally become itself a sanctuary" (p. 375). "The

burning was originally no integral part of the ceremony" (p. 377).

"The sacred elements, after they cease to be eaten, are still used in various forms as a means of communicating the divine life and life-giving or protective virtue to the worshippers" (p. 382). "On this view, the anointing of kings, and the use of unguents on visiting the sanctuary, are at once intelligible" (p. 384). "The use of unguents by witches . . . belongs to the same region of superstition, and to the most primitive form of the superstition which turns on the kinship of men with animals" (p. 384, *note*). "In the first instance, therefore, everything must be eaten up, and eaten while it is still alive—fresh and raw" (p. 385). "Not every man is holy enough to partake of the most sacred sacraments without danger. What is safe for a consecrated chief or priest is not safe for the mass of the people. . . . The blood and the fat are medicines too powerful to be taken internally, but they may be sprinkled or daubed on the worshippers, while the sacrificial meal is confined to the parts of the flesh in which the sacred life is less intensely present. . . . The gradual concentration of the holiness of the victim in its fat and blood tends to make the rest of the flesh appear less and less holy till ultimately it becomes almost a common thing. It was human sacrifice that first gave rise to the use of fire as a safe means of disposing of the bodies of the holiest victims" (p. 386).

"There is a variety of evidence that fire was applied to sacrifices, or to parts of sacrifices, as an alternative to their consumption by the worshippers, before the altar became a hearth. . . . Originally all sacrifices were eaten up by the worshippers" (p. 387). "The transformation of the altar into the hearth on which the sacrificial flesh was consumed, marks the final establishment of a new view of holiness based on the doctrine of property" (p. 391). "Even in Israel, before the Exile, the dominant idea in the ritual was that the material oblation afforded a physical satisfaction to the god, and that copious offerings were an infallible means of keeping him in good humour" (p. 393). "Only in the holocaust the god kept everything to himself, while in ordinary sacrifices he invited the worshipper to dine with him. . . . In the case of human sacrifices the gift-theory led to results which were

not only absurd, but revolting, since it does not follow that because a man's firstborn son is dearer to himself than all his wealth, the life of that son is the most valuable gift that he can offer to his god; and revolting, when it came to be supposed that the sacrifice of children as fire-offerings was a gift of food to a deity who delighted in human flesh" (p. 394). "The idea that every offence against the deity can be appraised, and made good by a payment of a certain value, was not inconsistent with the principles of ancient law. . . . In point of fact, all ancient religions had sacrificial ceremonies of this more powerful kind, in which the notion of pleasing the god by a gift either found no expression at all, or evidently did not exhaust the significance of the ritual; and these are the sacrifices to which the distinctive name of *piacula* is properly applied" (p. 397). "But every man was free to put his own meaning on what was done" (p. 399). "Even in the palmy days of Hellenic civilization we find evidence of a deeply-rooted belief in the potency of human sacrifice to ensure victory in war" (p. 402, *note*).

"Among the Hebrews the sacrifice of Isaac takes place on a mountain (Gen. xxii. 2), and so does the burnt-sacrifice of Gideon. The annual mourning on the mountains at Mizpah in Gilead must have been connected with a sacrifice on the mountains, which, like that of Laodicea, was thought to represent an ancient human sacrifice (Judg. xi. 40)" (p. 490, *special note*).

"In the Old Testament, war and warriors are often spoken of as consecrated, a phrase which seems to be connected, not merely with the use of sacred ceremonies at the opening of a campaign, but with the idea that war is a holy function, and the camp a holy place (Deut xxiii. 10-15)" (p. 455). "The sacrifice made for warriors on their return from a foray was not an ordinary feast, but an antique rite of communion, in which the victim was a sacred animal, or might even be an actual man, and is, in its oldest meaning, simply a re-tying of the sacred links of common life, which may have grown weak through absence from the tribal seat" (p. 491; *v. Frazer*). "Thus an Indian on the march, when he feels weary, never fails to ascribe his weariness to the evil spirit; and if he has no diviner at hand, he wounds himself in the knees, the

shoulders, and on the arms in order to let out the evil with the blood" (Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, Part VI, *The Scapegoat*, p. 12). "Unable clearly to distinguish the immaterial from the material, the abstract from the concrete, he is assailed by vague terrors, he feels himself exposed to some ill-defined danger on the scene of any great crime or misfortune. The place to him seems haunted ground" (p. 13). "The word *baraka*, which in North Africa describes the powerful and in general beneficent, yet dangerous, influence which emanates from holy persons and things, is no doubt identical with the Hebrew word *b'rakhah* (ברכה) 'blessing.' The importance which the ancient Hebrews ascribed to the blessing or the curse of a holy man is familiar to us from many passages of the Old Testament. See, for example, Genesis xxvii, xlvi. 8 *sqq.*; Deut. xxvii. 11 *sqq.*; xxviii. 1 *sqq.*" (p. 23). "Amongst the Caffres . . . sometimes a few drops of blood from the sick man are allowed to fall on the head of the goat, which is turned out into an uninhabited part of the veldt. The sickness is supposed to be transferred to the animal, and to become lost in the desert" (p. 31). "But similar attempts to shift the burden of disease, misfortune, and sin from one's self to another person, or to an animal or thing, have been common also among the civilized nations of Europe, both in ancient and modern times" (p. 47), e.g. it was common in India to put some of the skin of a person in a fever under a small heap of earth on the street in hope that someone would catch the disease and it would leave the patient.

"Jephthah looses his vow on his return from smiting the Ammonites by the sacrifice of his own daughter" (*Religion of the Semites*, p. 492). "The opening of a campaign appears also in Africa as one of the rare occasions that justify the slaughter of a victim from the tribal herds" (p. 403, *note*). "Sacrifices of exceptional form in which the victim was treated as a human being . . . would continue to be offered on occasions" (p. 404). "Rites of exceptional form, which later ages generally connected with ideas of sin and atonement, were merely the modern representatives of primitive sacraments . . . but are often nothing more than survivals of ancient annual sacrifices of communion in the body and blood of a sacred animal" (pp. 404-5). "And mean nothing more

than that the mystic unity of life in the religious community is liable to wear out, and must be revived and strengthened from time to time" (p. 406).

"The annual piacular sacrifice was very often an actual human victim" (1st edition, p. 390). "In some parts of Australia children are not born except at one period of the year; the annual changes of nature have impressed themselves on the life of man to a degree hardly conceivable to us" (p. 406, *note*). "The prophet Ezekiel, whose sketch of a legislation for Israel, on its restoration from captivity, is older than the law of Leviticus, does indeed provide for two annual atoning ceremonies, in the first and in the seventh month. . . . In Lev. xvi. the sprinkling of the blood on the great Day of Atonement 'cleanses the altar and makes it holy'" (p. 408). "The altar-idol on its part, as well as the worshippers on theirs, is periodically re-consecrated by the sprinkling of holy (*i.e.* kindred) blood, in order that the life bond between the god it represents and his kindred worshippers may be kept fresh. This is the ultimate meaning of the yearly sprinkling with a tribesman's blood, which, as Theophrastus tells us, was demanded by so many altars of antiquity, and also of the yearly sprinkling where the victim was not a man, but a sacrosanct or theanthropic animal" (p. 409). "Among the Semites the most current view of annual piacula seems to have been that they commemorate a divine tragedy—the death of some god or goddess. . . . Originally the death of the god was nothing else than the death of the theanthropic victim" (p. 410). "The substitution of an effigy for a human sacrifice, or for a victim representing a god, is very common." "Thus the Romans substituted puppets of rushes or wool for human offerings in the Argea and the worship of Mania. In Mexico, again, human victims were habitually regarded as incarnations of the deity" (pp. 410-11 and *note*). "Porphyry recounts a number of cases of human sacrifice in former times, and their commutation into animal or symbolical sacrifices: appealing to historical authority for the statement that it was not until the time of Hadrian that all survival of such rites throughout the Empire was practically abolished. . . . Then he points to the swarm of evils brought in by those who introduced costly sacrifices. To think that the gods delight in this kind

of expenditure must have a specially bad influence on the minds of youth, teaching them to neglect conduct; whereas to think that they have regard above all to the disposition must tend to make them pious and just" (*T. Whittaker, The Neoplatonists*, Cambridge University Press, 1918, p. 117).

"The annual mourning for Tammuz or Adonis, which supplies the closest parallel in point of form to the fasting and humiliation on the Hebrew Day of Atonement, is the scenic commemoration of a divine tragedy in which the worshippers take part with appropriate wailing and lamentation" (*Religion of the Semites*, p. 411). "Without any thought corresponding to the Christian idea that the death of the God-man is a death for the sins of the people. . . . The god had once been killed and rose again; the explanation offered is derived from the physical decay and regeneration of nature. The Canaanite Adonis or Tammuz was a form of the local Baal" (p. 392). "What the Greeks took for a proper name is perhaps no more than a title, *Adon*, "lord," applicable to various deities" (p. 411, note). "If the reference in Zach. xii. 10-11 to the mourning of Hadad-rimmon is really, as seems most probable, an allusion to some form of the lamentation for Adonis, it seems that the piercing of him who is mourned must . . . refer to a symbolical representation of the death of the god" (p. 392 note). [In that case the suggestion of J. M. Robertson, "that the death of Christ represents a human sacrifice like that at Tyre," is far from incredible. See also Frazer, *Golden Bough*, 1st ed.—AUTHOR.]

"Among the Hebrews the spring piaculum of the Passover, which in its origin belongs to the pre-agricultural stage of Semitic society, was connected in the Pentateuchal system with the opening of the corn harvest, and in like manner the gerat Day of Atonement precedes the vintage feast" (*Religion of the Semites*, p. 414). "In the brighter days of Semitic heathenism, the annual celebration of the god's death hardly suggested any serious thought that was not presently drowned in an outburst of mirth saluting the resurrection of the Baal on the following morning; and in more distressful times, when the gloomier aspects of religion were those most in sympathy with the prevailing hopelessness of a decadent nation, such times as those in which Ezekiel found the women

of Jerusalem mourning for Tammuz, the idea that the gods themselves were not exempt from the universal law of death, and had ordered this truth to be commemorated in their temples by bloody, or even human sacrifices, could only favour the belief that religion was as cruel as the relentless march of adverse fate, and that man's life was ruled by powers that were not to be touched by love or pity but, if they could be moved at all, would only be satisfied by the sacrifice of man's happiness and the surrender of his dearest treasures. . . . The same sanctuaries which in prosperous times resounded with licentious mirth and carnal gaiety, were filled in time of distress with the cowardly lamentations of worshippers, who to save their own lives were ready to give up everything they held dear, even to the sacrifice of a firstborn or only child. . . . The stated occurrence of gloomy rites at fixed seasons, and without any direct relation to human conduct, gave the whole ceremony a mechanical character" (p. 415).

"The Passover is a rite of the most primeval antiquity" (p. 416), "and in the local cults, annual mournings, like the lamentation for Jephthah's daughter, which undoubtedly was connected with an annual sacrifice, like that which at Laodicea commemorated the mythical death of the virgin goddess, had been yearly repeated from very ancient times. Yet, only after the exile, and then only by a sort of afterthought . . . do we find the annual piaculum of the Day of Atonement interpreted as a general atonement for the sins of Israel during the past year. . . . The conception of piacular rites as a satisfaction for sin appears to have arisen after the original sense of the theanthropic sacrifice of a kindred animal was forgotten, and mainly in connection with the view that the life of the victim was the equivalent of the life of a human member of the religious community" (pp. 415-16).

"Among the Jews, at the second temple, the Levites often acted as slaughterers; but before the captivity the temple slaughterers were uncircumcised foreigners (*Ezek. xliv. 6 seq.; O. T. in Jewish Church*, 2nd ed., p. 260 *seq.*)" (p. 417, *note*). "Coincidences between the ritual of sacrifice and of execution are not accidental; in each case they had their origin in the scruple against shedding kindred blood; and, when the old ideas of the kinship of man and beast became unintelligible,

they helped to establish the view that the victim whose life was treated as equivalent to that of a man was a sacrifice to justice" (pp. 418-19). "The obscure form of execution 'before the Lord,' mentioned in II Sam. xxi. 9 (and also Num. xxv. 4) is of the same sort. . . . Note that this religious execution takes place at the season of the Paschal piaculum" (p. 418, *note*). "When a tribesman is executed for an impious offence, he dies on behalf of the community, to restore normal relations between them and their god; so that the analogy with sacrifice is very close in purpose as well as in form" (p. 421). "Christian theologians, looking on the sacrifices of the Old Testament as a type of the sacrifice on the cross, and interpreting the latter as a satisfaction to divine justice, have undoubtedly over-estimated the ethical lessons embodied in the Jewish sacrificial system" (p. 424). "Primarily, purification means the application to the person of some medium which removes a taboo" (p. 425). "But the most powerful cleansing media are necessarily derived from the body and blood of sacrosanct victims" (p. 426). For "without shedding of blood there is no remission of sin (Heb. ix. 22)" (p. 427). "The death of the god is originally nothing else than the death of the theanthropic victim" (p. 430). "And primarily, as we know, the theanthropic victim was equally akin to the god and to the sacrificers" (p. 431). "When the worshippers gash their own flesh in rites of supplication, this is not an appeal to the divine compassion, but a purely physical means of establishing a blood-bond with the god" (p. 434). "We also find a widespread idea . . . that the altar (which is only a modern form of the sacred stone) requires to be consecrated with blood, and periodically re-consecrated in the same way (Ezek. xlivi. 18 seq.; xlv. 18 seq.; Lev. viii. 15; xvi. 33). . . . Man does not begin by persuading his god to dwell in the stone, but by a theurgic process he actually brings divine life to the stone . . . and when the sacred stone is on the way to become an idol, and primarily an animal idol, it is peculiarly appropriate to dress it in the skin of the divine victim" (p. 436). "In piacular and cathartic rites the skin of the sacrifice is used in a way quite similar to the use of the blood, but dramatically more expressive of the identification of the worshipper's life with that of the victim . . . the skin

of the sacrifice is the oldest form of a sacred garment . . . a ‘robe of righteousness,’ which is found both in the Old Testament and in the New, and still supplies one of the commonest theological metaphors” (p. 438).

“The various aspects in which atoning rites presented themselves to ancient worshippers have supplied a variety of religious images which passed into Christianity, and still have currency. Redemption, substitution, purification, atoning blood, the garment of righteousness, are all terms which in some sense go back to antique ritual. . . . The attempt to find in them anything as precise and definite as the notions attached to the same words by Christian theologians is altogether illegitimate. The one point that comes out clear and strong is that the fundamental idea of ancient sacrifice is sacramental communion, and that all atoning rites are ultimately to be regarded as owing their efficacy to a communication of divine life to the worshippers . . . or confirmation of a living bond between them and their god. In primitive ritual this conception is grasped in a merely physical and mechanical shape, as indeed, in primitive life, all spiritual and ethical ideas are still wrapped up in the husk of material embodiment” (p. 439).

“A ritual system must always remain materialistic, even if its materialism is disguised under the cloak of mysticism” (p. 440). [In Mexico, the skins of human beings slaughtered in sacrifice were worn as piacular garments: the records of that country were so wholly destroyed by the Spaniards, who looked on its religion as a blasphemous imitation of Christian doctrine, and its rites as “Satan’s copies of Catholic truth,” that the facts are not easy to get at.—AUTHOR.]

The following extracts to which page references are given are taken from *Lectures and Essays* by Professor Robertson Smith—namely, the lectures on *Animal Worship*, *Prophecy* and *Studies of the Old Testament*.

“It is a favourite speculation that the Hebrews or the Semites in general have a natural capacity for spiritual religion. They are either represented as constitutionally monotheistic, or at least we are told that their worship had in it from the first, and apart from revelation, a lofty character from which spiritual ideas were easily developed. That was not the opinion

of the prophets, who always deal with their nation as one peculiarly inaccessible to spiritual truths" (Robertson Smith, *Lectures and Essays: Animal Worship*, p. 482). "In the time of David the kinship of animal stocks was still acknowledged between Israel and the surrounding nations" (p. 481). "The same names which appear as totem tribes in Arabia reach through Edom, Midian, and Moab into the land of Canaan" (p. 475). "The prophets occupy this position. A great proportion of their convictions has continued to work on the subsequent development of thought, and accordingly they are greater men than the heathen seers who contributed very little to religious thought that has lived." "The individual human soul is of as little account as a single wave in the sea. It is not therefore necessary that a personal religious reality should present itself to the individual soul. It is only necessary that the soul be swept on in the right course of development by a supreme religious conviction" (*Two Lectures on Prophecy*, p. 364). "God receives the prophet into personal confidence with Himself, dealing with him, and with the people through him, on the analogy of human intercourse" (*loc. cit.*, p. 362). "The old theology treated of God, His attributes, His manifestation, His dealings with man. The new school treats of religion. Its theology is a discussion of men's beliefs about God" (p. 363). "It is important to note that the characteristic freedom with which the Hebrew scribes made additions to the texts they copied continued to so late a date that in the historical books the Massoretic text contains quite large interpolations, which were wanting in the copies that lay before the Greek translators" (*Studies of the Old Testament*, p. 376).

"'The origin of prophecy,' answers Kuenen, 'falls in the days of Samuel.' Before his time the 'seers' of Israel were little different from vulgar sooth-sayers. The prophetic ecstasy was associated, not with Jahvism, but with Canaanite nature-worship, to which indeed, in the period of the Judges, the Hebrews had no formed aversion" (*On the Question of Prophecy*, p. 194). "The critical study of prophecy has by no means borne out the view that, in points of detail . . . the prophets are fully at one" (p. 174). "God was differently conceived of by all the different Biblical writers; and there are

indisputable proofs of a great change in some very important factors, if we trace the development of this conception from the earliest to the latest of these writers. Jesus' 'Father in Heaven' is far from being the precise facsimile of the Yahveh of the earliest Old Testament scriptures. And how differently is the God to whom Jesus looked as Father, and whose son Jesus was in a very special and unique way, conceived of by the different Christian sects and creeds, and teachers of historic Christianity" (G. Trumbull Ladd, LL.D., *What Should I Believe?*, 1915, p. 256). Morality is so obviously a matter of imagination, of sentiment; of convictions that come to us we know not whence and offer to conduct us we cannot just see whether, as to make the prominence of its faith an affair of universal experience. "Nahum is a worse prophet than Zephaniah, with less conscience and less insight, he is a greater poet. . . . It is a great pity the text is so corrupt. If the original lay before us, and that full knowledge of the times which the excavation of ancient Assyria may still yield to us, we might judge Nahum to be an even greater poet than we do . . . thoroughly Oriental in its sense of God's methods and resources of destruction; very Jewish, and very natural to that age of Jewish history, in the bursting of its long pent hopes of revenge. We of the West might express these hopes differently. We should not attribute so much personal passion to the Avenger" (The Rev. Sir G. A. Smith, *The Book of the Twelve Prophets*, Vol. II, pp. 91-2). "I am convinced that what is required chiefly just now by the devout student of the Bible is the opportunity to judge for himself how far Old Testament criticism is an adult science; with what amount of reasonableness it has been prosecuted; and how gradually its conclusions have been reached, how jealously they have been contested" (Preface, Vol. II, p. vii).

"In the criticism of the Old Testament the results of excavation showed that the account of the conquest of Palestine by the Israelites as described in the Book of Joshua could not be taken as sober history since the archæological evidence failed to represent that dislocation of conditions which would have ensued had there been any sweeping successful invasion. This evidence was unambiguous, yet Biblical scholars had previously shown from the internal historical criticism of the

Old Testament that the account of the conquest was an exaggeration and that the settlement of the Israelites could only have been a slow process. More was achieved by the archæological data than by the careful and critical argumentation based upon the ancient records themselves" (Stanley A. Cooke, *Study of Religions*, pp. 51-2). "The 'criticism' of the Bible is the careful investigation of its contents, conducted on the same lines as the criticism of other sources. Taking its rise in very simple beginnings, this criticism has, in spite of continuous opposition, reached a stage which marks an entirely new era in the history of Christianity. Furthered rather by religious individuals than by the shrewd, though thoroughly unmethodical efforts of rationalists and atheists of all sorts, it is placing the Bible in a new light. No longer the sole authoritative source or centre of all knowledge, no longer the Book with which almost all thought was woven, the Bible may be regarded, for purposes of criticism, as the outcome of certain unique vicissitudes in the history of ancient Palestine. . . . But while this treatment connects the Book with the history of conditions in a far-off land and at a distant age, the Bible, the fruit of *ancient* experiences, will ultimately reappear, not as a record of the history of mankind from the creation of Adam in or about the year 4004 B.C., but as part of that more profound evolution of man and thought which concerns all mankind" (*loc. cit.*, pp. 57-8).

"The Old Testament represents in many respects a connecting link between ordinary Christian religious ideas and those found among rudimentary peoples removed from our ways of thinking, and often difficult to grasp. The criticism of the Old Testament is especially important because it involves the study of vicissitudes which sever the old Oriental empires and their religions from a new era which leads on to Christianity and modern culture" (p. 61, note). "One may take the history of David. Every one understands that it would be possible to construct a biography from the books of Samuel and Chronicles. But from the critical point of view this would confuse *actual events* of David's time with *representations* of David's history drawn up many centuries later and representing later conditions" (p. 63). "So, too, in the early chapters of Genesis, is one reading *objective* antediluvian

history, or what was *supposed* to have happened in that period?" (p. 63, *note*). "Robertson Smith from first to last was able in all sincerity to reconcile his own views with dogmatic Protestantism. Not so his opponents, who saw in another light the effect his views tended to produce" (p. 68). "Our intellectual difficulties are in a very large measure due to the fact that we have inherited a pre-Copernican system of thought which is incompatible with that which has been and is still being demanded by the progress of knowledge" (p. 38). "No longer does all Nature seem hide-bound, created once and for all; the dynamic point of view sees movement, and in attempting to shape the future is more definitely creative" (p. 53). "Psychology, in fact, strikes at some of our treasured prejudices. It links man with the lower orders—the psychologist cannot make an absolute severance between man and the animals" (p. 47). "It is particularly interesting to observe how quickly Darwinism revolutionized many branches of research" (p. 51). "It also marked the inauguration of the modern stage of Old Testament criticism" (p. 50).

"We are wont to speak of *esprit de corps*. No one can produce this 'corporate spirit,' but all will agree that it is extremely effective and that without it there would be no coherence in social life" (p. 79). "If we look back upon the history of thought, it is obvious that there was once a time when the amount of divergence must have been exceedingly small. The factors that make for variation of ideas were wanting, and, as we repeatedly see in primitive or rudimentary societies, a certain oneness of all thought is characteristic of the lower levels. Starting as we must with groups and not with isolated individuals, we can conceive a stage in development when the contents of minds were quantitatively very small and closely interrelated. Even in the Middle Ages the amount of variation is relatively insignificant" (p. 85). "The ideal attitude is that which recognizes the incompleteness of our own outlook, and can have a sympathy for one which, whatever we may think of it, may contribute to a greater fullness in the future. . . . Knowledge grows when there is room for differences, and not when men, banded together to attack or to resist attack, must have a larger measure of agreement among themselves" (p. 93). "Our own standpoint or position

usually seems eminently reasonable, whereas that of our opponent often seems rationally or intellectually inferior" (p. 105). "We are necessarily obliged to form estimates from the standpoint to which we happen to belong, but this does not exclude the recognition that there must be a standpoint less imperfect than that we have at the present stage of our experience and knowledge. . . . This is an intuition that has recurred independently in various forms; for example, an old Babylonian record of the seventh century B.C., and perhaps much older, asserts, 'What seems good to one, to a god may be displeasing; what is spurned by oneself, may find favour with a god'" (pp. 110-11). "Nature cherishes the average, for those too much above or below the average seem to fall outside her care" (pp. 112-13).

"No one can foresee the precise outcome of progressive movement in life and thought" (p. 120). "The path of thought is strewn with broken theories" (p. 121). "Never could it be said that religion has been without its crude, gross, unlovely, or absurd features, or that religious people have always been beneficial to the environment" (p. 141). "The line of evolution is influenced by our own personal development; and consequently it usually culminates in a way that—curiously enough—usually coincides with our ideals" (p. 148). "Certain habits and ways of thinking or of looking at things have grown up with us. The greater part of the work is done for us; we are unconscious of any process" (p. 152). "A very considerable amount of selection was done by us when we were so young that we can hardly conceive ourselves having any definite plan or purpose or even having ability to select" (p. 153). "When one studies the lower orders of organic life, one is frequently struck with extremely purposive and significant behaviour, which, as we can see, is a preparation for vicissitudes which have not yet entered into their experience. They, like the young child, are so thoroughly adapted to their normal environment, and they seem to grow so appropriately in consciousness as their conditions evolve, that it is difficult to find satisfactory terms for describing the behaviour" (p. 154). "The cult of the peasant is characterized by a vivid immediacy between his environment and the local being who is felt to be more distinctly interested in the

environment than the more powerful though undoubtedly somewhat remote Deity who rules the world" (p. 169). "Local spirits, gods, or godlings which we find scattered over any considerable area may seem minor and subordinate beings, but it is necessary to determine whether they may not be considered as powerful in their little circle of influence as a single national god is in an area which recognizes him alone. In this way, the area that seems to be polytheistic may really consist of a number of henotheistic systems" (p. 195).

"Henotheism explicitly recognizes one deity superior to other deities" (p. 195, *note*). "The adherents of any religion may feel that they have gained the highest conception of His [God's] nature, but, as they would be the first to admit, this has been only in the course of their own development from childhood onwards, and of the development of the religious and non-religious thought of their environment" (p. 197). "When we give a child words so that he may express his ideas, either the vocabulary 'creates' the ideas—out of nothing—or his consciousness was such that it only needed a form of expressing some of its contents. . . . We all have ideas which we feel, ideas which struggle to express themselves, and wait for someone to help us to formulate them. If this is so, we must assuredly extend the process to the development of the child" (p. 238). "The man who thoroughly believes in himself and is in touch with the thought of the environment always commands a certain measure of respect, and when we have to deal with individuals who claimed or were attributed a supernatural authority, we can understand how difficult it often was for the environment to judge aright" (p. 240).

"Some may believe that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch, and that the account of the Exodus of the Israelites is thoroughly historical; whereas those, on the other hand, who hold the critical position, will have views which are distinctly destructive, and opposed to the trustworthiness of the sources" (p. 244). "Some have seen in the intricate problems of Old Testament research of to-day a chaos which blinds them to the solid progress that has been made. But this attitude is not found in Biblical study alone. Any pessimism of to-day ought to be corrected by a recollection of the steps trodden in the past" (p. 247). "When the Old Testament critic has

observed contradictions, difficulties, and the like, it has sometimes been suggested that the data are really illusory after all, they had not been observed in the past by other inquirers. The reply is, that they were there waiting to be observed, as surely as rocks, stones, and fossils had to wait centuries before the study we call Geology came into being" (p. 281). "The rise of the old monarchies of Israel and Judah may be associated with a period of weakness in the surrounding powers; there were vast movements" (p. 288). "In the Old Testament the account of Samuel's childhood is an example of a later tradition which grew up round a famous figure" (p. 292). "Whereas our forefathers had a perspective based upon the early chapters of Genesis, so that history could be traced back to the sons of Noah, and earlier to Adam, modern knowledge is slowly replacing this by a profounder perspective of the history of man" (p. 342). "It is premature to apply ideas of intellect, ethics, and morality to insects and animals, but from a psychological point of view the differences between them and us are of degree not of kind" (p. 412). "The study of religions is the study of an ascent of thought" (p. 427). "As far back as we have good documentary evidence—that is, for four to five thousand years ago—we find man at a wonderfully high level of thought, whereas at the present day there are savages so low in the scale that between them and us there appears to be a gulf that cannot be bridged. The ancient evidence comes from Babylonia and Egypt, lands which are historically linked with our own culture and civilization. If it were necessary to trace back the steps and demonstrate the links, one would notice our indebtedness to Rome and Greece, and the lands of the Bible, and the influence exerted by Babylonia, Egypt, Asia Minor, and the *Ægean Islands*" (p. 34). "The lowest and most rudimentary cults have essential points of resemblance with the highest religions" (p. 35). "There seems little reason to suppose that the normal savage child is intellectually much inferior to the young child of civilized white parents. The difference appears as each grows and comes under the influence of the mentality of the social group in which it finds itself, and it is this relationship between the individual and the environment that is all important for the study of religion" (p. 35). "It is very questionable

whether the savage can be said to differ psychologically from the civilized man" (p. 47). "Psychology, in fact, strikes at some of our treasured prejudices. It links man with the lower orders; the psychologist cannot make an absolute severance between man and the animals" (p. 47).

## SECTION II.—SACRIFICE

The extraordinary changes in the individual should make it easy to believe in change in species. Such change is the story of evolution.

—J. Y. SIMPSON, *Spiritual Interpretation of Nature*, p. 78.

By slow degrees man wins the truths that set him free at once from the torment of mental fears and the tyranny of natural forces.

—*Loc. cit.*, p. 115.

[A third of the author's text in this section was made up of a series of quotations from *Varieties of Religious Experience*, by the late Professor William James, which have had to be deleted, as his son, the copyright holder, has refused permission for reproduction, on the ground that the extracts fail to give a fair representation of the thesis propounded in his father's work. This extensive excision, which has also entailed the extrusion of sundry intercalated short quotations, and incidental comments by the author, has left a gap which it is difficult to bridge over, but, as far as possible, the editorial *liaison* preserves the continuity of the argument.—EDITOR.]

The following references are to, and the extracts from *Plain Speaking*, by the Rev. T. R. Stebbing, Fisher Unwin, Ltd., pp. 53–83.

"One born and bred, baptized and confirmed, ordained both deacon and priest in the Church of England, now late in life challenges the Logic of its Articles, the validity of its creeds, the divine right of its oracles" (p. 53). "When Superstition has been slain, Religion stands forth, no longer trammelled by vain armour not of proof, no longer distorted by ghastly imageries, and misrepresented under form and features not its own, but in unclouded majesty and grace" (p. 58). "Among so-called miracles none are more impressive than those of recalling the dead to life. . . . In five of the cases it is quite reasonable to suppose that instead of a miracle there was only a misunderstanding. This would apply to the child of the Zidonian woman restored by Elijah, to the

Shunamite's son revived by Elisha, to the daughter of Jairus, of whom Jesus Himself said, 'The maid is not dead, but sleepeth' (St. Matt. ix. 24)" (p. 59). Elijah "consumed a hundred and two soldiers by fire from heaven; and by prayer prevailed with the same heaven against his own country, so that it rained not on the earth" by the space of three years and six months (St. James v. 17). "This inhuman outrage is in fact cited by St. James to prove that 'the effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much'" (p. 60). Elisha "was not only capable of instigating political treason, but out of personal vindictiveness is said to have cursed a flock of 'little children' so that 'there came forth two she bears out of the wood and tare forty and two children of them'" (p. 61). "In the siege of Samaria women were reduced by the pinch of famine to the dreadful expedient of eating their own offspring, without Elisha's interposition" (p. 63). "But, by his expounding, this is the voice of Jehovah: 'Ye shall smite every fenced city and every choice city and shall fell every good tree and stop all wells of water, and mar every good piece of land with stones'" (p. 63). [Surely this is precisely what we charged against Germans in the Great War; and it is the method of all who take their morals from the Old Testament.—AUTHOR.]

As to the Flood, "It would be astounding that grown men and women should believe in such a course of action as the writer in Genesis directly or implicitly assigns to the Creator. It is enough, they argue, that the inspired writer says so and so. But how can they tell that he is inspired, when his statements are so unworthy . . . of divine wisdom?" (p. 65). Noah "must have had a crowd of descendants, from prattling innocents through successive generations to men like himself many hundreds of years old" (p. 66). "But there is no evidence of a universal flood, and disastrous floods still occur. Therefore it is a vain pretence in Genesis that the natural phenomenon of the rainbow was appointed by God as the token of a covenant between Himself and mankind that a universal deluge should not occur again" (p. 67). "Because the King of Egypt was obstinate, 'the Lord smote all the firstborn in the land of Egypt, from the firstborn of Pharaoh . . . unto the firstborn of the captive' (Exod. xli. 29).

"The whole history was invested, for pious reasons, by someone after the event to which it refers, with the air of prophecy. Even in the New Testament we find some of this ruthlessness attendant upon supposed miraculous agency" (p. 70). "It needs but small acquaintance with the history of Christianity for the reader to be aware that from age to age pious frauds . . . have been copiously practised. The long record is flooded with what a modern writer has stigmatized as 'the grossest deceits, called miracles'" (p. 73). "In regard to confidential conversations which in the Pentateuch God is stated to have held face to face with such representative persons as Adam, Noah, Abraham, and Moses . . . it will perhaps be admitted that when in other religions similar claims are advanced we simply regard them as impostures" (p. 67). "Yet this is believed of Moses on the authority of the Pentateuch, a work of obviously miscellaneous authorship, handed down to us from an age of credulity, and rife with now exposed fables and improbable fiction, such as the change of Lot's wife into a pillar of salt, a parallel to the heathen tale of Niobe metamorphosed into a rock" (p. 68). "Just as in the pagan tale Orpheus lost his loved Eurydice, so Lot's wife forfeited her redemption by the same fatal curiosity. The remnant of the family take refuge in Zoar. But Lot did not trust the angelic assurance that he would there be safe. Then follows the pitiful story of a drunken father and deceitful daughters. . . . In profane history we should probably impute the narrative to the malice of a prejudiced biographer, and wonder why such a family could have been supposed worthy of exceptional preservation" (p. 71).

"The suggestion is made that persons supposed to have been restored from death to life had never really died. The raising of Lazarus was not among those considered" (p. 74). "The unpleasing suspicion arises of a pious fraud" (p. 75). "Consider once more the raising or rising of Jesus himself from the dead" (p. 76).

"In miracles one may reasonably expect some sense of proportion between the means adopted and the object attained. . . . How could it be necessary for the angel of the Lord, with an awe-inspiring countenance like lightning, to descend from heaven—that is, from the sky—for the purpose of rolling back the

stone and giving the women a message which they were presently to receive from Jesus himself? For this dread angel outside the tomb we have in St. Mark a young man, also in white raiment, sitting inside the tomb. According to St. Luke, after the women had inspected the empty tomb, ‘ behold, two men stood by them in shining garments.’ According to St. John, Mary Magdalene, looking into the sepulchre, saw ‘ two angels in white sitting the one at the head, and the other at the feet, where the body of Jesus had lain.’ These and other inconsistencies in the narratives of the Resurrection have long exercised the ingenuity of the so-called harmonists” (pp. 77–8). “Varying stability, which permits at one time the possession of flesh and bones, at another the power of rising unaided into the air, may suit our post-mortem capacity. But that the Creator of the Universe, the Brightness of the Glory of God, should indulge in such eccentricities are two ideas which I cannot with any reverence combine. Fit them, if you will, to the ingenuity of a human conjurer or any imagined or imaginable conditions of posthumous humanity, but beware, I beseech you, of attributing futilities to the Majesty of God” (pp. 78–9). “Some of our clergy have given up reciting that venerable document [the Athanasian Creed].”

“Who would suppose that the Jewish Law was binding in all its primitive strictness at the age when Christ appeared? Who would not say that length of time had destroyed the obligation of a projected system, that had as yet never been realized? Consider the impossible nature (so to say) of some of its injunctions. An infidel historian somewhere asks, scoffingly, whether ‘the ruinous law which required all the males of the chosen people to go up to Jerusalem three times a year, was ever observed in its strictness.’ The same may be asked concerning the observance of the Sabbatical year; to which but a faint allusion, if that, is made in the books of Scripture subsequent to the Pentateuch. A principle, to remain the same through successive generations, must often appear to change its dress. It changes with them in order to remain the same. In a higher world it is not so, but here below to live is to change and to be perfect is to have changed often” (J. H. Newman, *Development of Christian Doctrine*, 1845, p. 21). When such men speak such words, it is too

late to set up the Old Testament as a barrier against the advance of scientific knowledge. If in its own province it was only provisional, and liable to alteration with the shifting need of the ages, it cannot consistently be argued that in other things it is unquestionable and final. Bishop Gore, in his *Can We Then Believe?*, perpetuates the old jejune defence, "It is not the function of the Bible to teach us science, physical, historical, or critical," and yet admits that he cannot understand anyone who dares to face the facts of the universe really believing that God is wholly good, until he has come to believe that God's real character is to be found in Jesus Christ. The following passages show clearly that many of the foremost thinkers of to-day are aware of the impossibility of maintaining the Jewish Law as the outcome of the mind of God.

Sir George Adam Smith writes: "As we would expect from a people of highland warriors and cragsmen, whose God was their battle Lord, we have whole-hearted songs of challenge, and of triumph. 'For by Thee I have run through a troop, and by my God have I leaped over a wall. For who is God save the Lord? Or who is a rock save our God? He teacheth my hands to war, so that a bow of steel is broken by mine arms.' Psalm xviii. 29, 31, 34; cp. Ps. cxlvii. 10, ' . . . he taketh not pleasure in the legs of a man'" (A.V.). "If the cancelling of contracts and the reversion of property in the year of Jubilee had been carried out, Society must have been utterly disorganized" (*Canon Sanday, The Life of Christ in Recent Research*, p. 13, quoting Kautzsch, *H.D.B.*, Vol. V, pp. 718 seq.). "In order to be able to approach God and present Israel's offerings to Him without danger, the priests have to guard carefully against all defilement. In particular, they are not to incur defilement from any dead body, except in unavoidable cases" (p. 719). "The idea of the sacral communion still continues to find expression in the employment of blood, as the most important part of all sacrificial transactions: and, indeed, the blood is brought always the nearer to God, in proportion to the importance and holiness of the sacrifice." "Even the idea of the offering of food still plays a part" (p. 720). "The natural soil out of which the prophetic gift was developed seems to have been the tendency to ecstatic religious excitement which is characteristic of the Semitic tempera-

ment. Prophetism was in fact an institution which Israel originally shared with its heathen neighbours. The gods of Phœnicia had their prophets: the prophets of Baal we know—fanatical devotees who with wild dancing and music endeavoured to attract the attention or win the favour of their god by cutting themselves with lancets and knives *till the blood gushed out upon them*. In some respects akin to these Canaanitish Nebiim seem to have been the bands of prophets described in the first book of Samuel in connection with the early career of Saul, enthusiasts who have been compared, not perhaps inaccurately, to the dervishes of the East, displaying in a kind of ecstatic behaviour the effects of special religious exultation. Cp. I Sam. x. 5–13; xix. 23–24” (Ottley, Bampton Lectures, p. 271).

“The name ‘prophet’ used to be a title of honour: but now ‘prophet’ is equivalent to *Ekstatischer*, one who is liable to trance or ecstasy, and that is only a symbol for boundless credulity” (Sanday, *Life of Christ in Recent Research*, p. 168). The Christians of the early centuries had no doubt about the matter: they do not hesitate to describe the God of Israel as an inferior deity or dæmon: and they ascribe the old Testament to demonic agencies. St. Paul had already struck deadly blows against the significance and authority of this. According to Harnack: “Different stages are to be traced in the anti-Semitism (anti-Judaism) of the early Gentile Christians. . . . The fourth stage is characterized by the so-called Epistle of Barnabas, the author of which rejects, together with the Jewish nation, the whole cultus and all the legal ordinances of the Old Testament as a diabolical misrepresentation of the truth, and accordingly admits the Old Testament which he claims exclusively for Christianity, only under an allegorical interpretation. The fifth and last stage is given in Marcion and the Gnostics. Here, together with the Jewish nation and Judaism, the whole of the Old Testament is thrown overboard, either as a book of the devil or of the demiurge: either as a complicated work composed of utterly different elements, or as a book full of absurd myths and lying inventions. All these standpoints have their roots in Paulinism, and their champions sought to establish them by appealing to the teaching of St. Paul (Acts of the Apostles, Chap. xxv).”

The Gnostics and other early heretical sects altered and rejected or interpreted the Scriptures in a way which makes it clear that there was no fixed view of its infallible origin. Even those who accepted it by allegory and like methods, showed that they had no faith in its literal sense being the word of God, or containing the truth. A mystical meaning was feigned as underlying its plain statements; and anyone was free to put on them his own views. "Above all, the idea of a subordinate God and semi-divine beings began to be familiar. . . . Origen himself, in many points bordered on polytheism . . . the Logos and other beings entitled to worship were suffered calmly to spring up side by side with God . . . a monotheism which did not exclude polytheism" (Harnack, *History of Dogma*, Vol. III, p. 135).

In this context I think it is better to let the theologians speak for themselves. By what may be called a curious coincidence, three out of five Oxford Canons have written in nearly identical terms on this matter. They are professors of this subject, appointed by the Government to represent the Church of England; two of them, as "Bampton lecturers" before the University, have expressed their views unequivocally. So far from there being any reaction against this attitude, the Theological Faculty of the University appointed one of them professor without any contest, after delivering the lectures. Subsequent appointments have been in the same direction. Another became occupier of the Regius chair of Hebrew, perhaps the very high-water mark in this direction. His predecessor was "ring-leader" in the rationalizing movement; consequently if any objection could be brought against this unanimity of view, it would be that by his specialist knowledge he created "an Oxford school." He followed Pusey, in a long tenure of the office, backed up by Bishops Wordsworth and King, and Canons Bright and Liddon, and supported by Newman and Keble, during which period he had really organized an "Oxford Movement," which profoundly affected not only the University, but the whole country, and even the world at large. Doubtless he was a leader, but *primus inter pares*, not autocratic and authoritative like the High-church potentates, who to the blandest possible manners joined an absolutely rigid adherence to their system, to deny which was damnation.

He spoke as a man conscious of the liability of all to mistake and wrong judgment; not as the representative of an infallible church, or other heaven-sent body. That such a method of "Come, let us reason together," should have influenced his contemporaries, especially when linked with wide and deep knowledge, an openness of mind, and an activity in seeking and sharing with others the best fruits of research equalled in few, is neither a matter for wonder nor for reproach. The judge on the bench, a leader in the councils of State or Church, justly resort to such motives; they appeal to a jury of their fellow-men, and put before them arguments which touch their common feeling for right and the truth. That truth should prevail in this way against authority and prejudice, crystallized by a duration of ages, tells rather in favour of its own strength than against credit in its genuine nature. Where a chord is found to vibrate in the hearts of many men qualified to estimate its value rightly, there must be something of the deep harmony which lies at the basis of things. Canon Sanday had never sat at the feet of Dr. Driver as a learner: he was no Hebraist, and his reputation was that of the greatest theologian of his day. I have therefore put him at the end like a judge to sum up the whole. The jury will be the readers: it will be for them to declare "proven" or "not proven," to condemn or to acquit, as seems right after hearing witnesses and experts on either side. The case is not specially addressed to them. In the ordinary affairs of life it is wiser to take the verdict of average men than to submit the decision to specialists. Oxford has been called "the home of lost causes": time alone can show whether this also is an *enfant perdu*.

These neologists are the official exponents of a very conservative system, and they appear to have thrown up the brief. A recent Bishop of Oxford was required to give up his position as principal of Pusey House, because of opinions expressed in *Lux Mundi*, and elsewhere, which alarmed the old school: but he himself was soon at variance even with Canon Sanday, for the "bench" is apt to be more conservative than the professoriate. Yet I fear it may be demurred, "After all, you have proved nothing but what is already admitted." Nevertheless, what is conceded by experts is very different from what is accepted by the rank and file of the Church.

These scribes appear to have put the stories together very much in the same way as other writers, and they did not use any very enlightened judgment or acute insight in their work. If it is a fact that there was actually a record of the sayings of Christ in the very language He used, and these men have let it be lost, no further discussion is needed ; but, apart from such unpardonable remissness, they are accused by authors of no mean reputation of having preferred style and elegance to accuracy and precision. On this slender foundation of hearsay evidence and carelessly arranged material the Church has erected a top-heavy pile of theology, culminating in the Athanasian Creed—which ends : “ This is the Catholic Faith, which except a man keep whole and undefiled he cannot be saved ” ; and of which the Thirty-nine Articles, the formal exposition of official English religion, say : “ The three creeds ought to be thoroughly received and believed, for they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture.”

Yet Canon Sanday declares : “ I repeat it, not as an individual but as a member of the Church. I do not feel that I am responsible for it : what I am responsible for is the desire to enter into the mind of the Church. I tacitly correct the defects of expression, because I believe that the Church would correct them if it could, but it cannot. For the Creed as it stands the Church is responsible, and not I. The use of the Creeds in public worship is one thing, and their use as a standard of opinion is another ” (*Christologies : Ancient and Modern*, p. 236). If this is the attitude towards the creeds, the foundations and pivots of dogma, is it requisite to argue the question of the rest ? As Harnack says, the fact is that “ the Church made the basis, on which she erected the whole ”, and this was done at a time when faith was at a very low ebb, by means which amounted almost to terrorism and certainly embraced bribery and political corruption. The Patriarchs of Alexandria came to the councils with a large following of fanatical monks, who assaulted and even murdered any who disagreed with them, or raised an outspoken and honest protest against all this knavery. The methods used were more akin to those in vogue at the French Revolution, when any who were condemned by the Assemblies ran a poor chance of escaping with

their lives from the hands of the mob outside. *Tantaene animis celestibus irae?*

May we not rather attribute such manners to the machinations of evil spirits, to the unruly wills of men and their self-seeking and worldly ambitions and rivalries, than to the inspiration and guidance of Heaven; especially when we know that the whole was dominated by a question of the relative precedence of the Sees of Alexandria and Constantinople, and their respective but not very respectable Patriarchs?

Further, what right had any Council of the third, or fourth, or subsequent centuries to lay down that, "This is the Catholic Faith, which except a man keep whole and undefiled he cannot be saved"? Nothing is said here of women and children; but St. Bonaventura, who is called "The Seraphic Doctor" of the Church, declared "that babies, not seven inches long, are crawling about on the floor of Hell," because they were not baptized. What could possibly show more completely how these bigots had set aside the doctrine of Christ, and the common instincts of humanity, by their clergy-made dogmas and man-voted creeds? To-day there is but one view by all historians as to the behaviour of the Egyptian Patriarchs—namely, that they were buried in worse than Egyptian darkness; that ambition and jealousy of the new Capital of the Empire were their ruling motives. Harnack and Kingsley re-echo Milman and Gibbon in downright denunciation of their method and their aims, and of the means by which these were carried out.

This tradition of mendacious bigotry and ruthlessness was transmitted by the Christian Church to the corrupted civilization of the Dark Age, and even tainted Renaissance thought, life, and morals. According to Machiavelli, "When a prince is at the head of his army and has at his back a multitude of followers, he should make little of being called cruel: such a character will be useful to him in keeping his troops in subjection. . . . A prudent prince cannot and ought not to keep his word, except when he can do so without injury to himself, or when the circumstances under which the contracted engagement arose still exist. . . . The Pope Alexander VI played his whole life a game of deception, and notwithstanding his faithless conduct, his artifices always proved successful:

oaths and protestations cost him nothing; never did a prince so often break his word, or pay less regard to his engagements" (*The Prince*, Chaps. viii and xxiii). It was precisely this kind of perfidy that we imputed to the Germans during the Great War. It had actually been authoritatively proclaimed by Germany that any undertaking holds only as long as it can be enforced on one of the contracting parties by the other. I think it is Roscoe who tells us that "Alexander (Borgia) excelled the Popes who came before and after him, only in the fact that he did not add hypocrisy to his other vices."

"Bloodshed, licence, and dire treachery mark the annals of the Church whose weapon was the Inquisition, and whose triumphs were the St. Bartholemew massacre and the fires of Smithfield" (Mrs. St. John, *The Court of Anna Carafa*, p. 83). "Paul IV, had he not been execrable as a priest, would be glorious as a patriot: one idea inspired his policy, the emancipation of Italy" (pp. 89, 96).

And where should we look for such survivals more than in Egypt, a land in which gross materialistic superstition was rampant and handed on by a swarm of ascetics and anchorites, who had been bred up in practices of submission and a belief in lying prodigies and animal gods? "In Egypt . . . all classes took part in it. . . . 'Bishop rose against Bishop,' says Eusebius, 'district against district, only to be compared to the Symplegades dashed against each other on a stormy day.' So violent were the discussions that they were parodied in the Pagan theatres. . . . The common name by which the Arians and their system were designated was the maniacs" (Stanley, *Lectures on the History of the Eastern Church*, Murray, 1883, p. 80). "Ask a man 'How many oboli?' and he answers by dogmatizing on generated and ungenerated being. Inquire the price of bread and you are told 'The Son is subordinate to the Father'" (p. 81). "Cyril carried his measures by placing himself at the head of bands of ferocious ruffians, and by canonizing the assassin" (p. 237). No graver charge rests on the memory of Athanasius than that of being a powerful magician. "His invectives against the Arians prove how far even an heroic soul can be betrayed by party spirit. . . . Amongst his favourite epithets for them are: 'Devils, Anti-priests, maniacs, Jews, polytheists, atheists, dogs, wolves,

lions, hares, chameleons, hydras, eels, cuttle fish, gnats, beetles, leeches' (See these epithets collected in a note to Athanasius's *Historical Treatises*, Newman's edition)" (p. 236 and note).

Religion, in truth, is what binds men together; the common view of what is good; the opinion of the majority against that of the individual. Not, indeed, each passing fancy or ephemeral decision, but what has grown up from long practice and profound thought, what has gone through the struggle for existence and survived as fittest. If the Catholic Church, instead of claiming infallibility—which as a fact has never really been credited—had said men were to obey the rules arrived at by common consent, it would have only asserted what all of us, more or less, have to submit to, the soldier to his commander, the civilian to decisions of Parliament.

By perpetrating and perpetuating the above error, it became a question if any change were possible. If what was decreed was right, nothing but change in the conditions could make it wrong. Was the accession of a new Pope or the assembly of a new Council enough to demand, or even to allow of alteration? The point is like that of "Inspiration" of Scripture, which no Church has ventured to define: from the first, it was manifest that some passages could not be relied on, and some not even countenanced.

In the subsequent history of Christian theology one dogmatic imbroglio followed another in quick succession, each exhibiting, with characteristic exacerbation, some sinister feature of *odium theologicum*. As in the primitive Church of the many heresies, the disputations that always aroused most rancour turned upon apparently infinitesimal points of doctrine, as in the notorious *Filioque*, and *homoousian* and *homoiousian* logomachies. Moral conduct in "Christendom" tended increasingly to become ceremonial, so that mechanical ritualistic practices ranked as substitutes for personal well-doing, and indemnified the true son of the Church for the most abandoned life, and even for criminality. So-called saintliness was compatible with the worst excesses of inhumanity, and clerical casuistry exalted the worse into the better case, and granted absolution and the fullest licence to the bloodiest tyrants. Within the

pale of Rome a mockery of liberty was permitted to the schoolmen, who might amuse themselves with metaphysical contortions, provided that due regard was had to the sophism that what is true in philosophy is false in theology and *vice versa*. The new spirit of the Renaissance and the truculent sectarian strifes bred by the Reformation opened the way for that destructive criticism of the Bible, of theological dogmas and systems, and of ecclesiastical institutions, which led up to the still more devastating onset of modern science on religious tradition and belief in Revelation, miracle, prayer, the soul, and immortality, and completed the overthrow of the whole fabric of Supernaturalism, fetishes which are now worshipped only by our new masters, the proletariat, who have still to be educated and weaned from their idols.

Experimental psychology, although still in its infancy, is shedding new and revealing light on the structure and functions of what, in lieu of a better name, must still be called the mind. The traditional notions about intellect, will, and the emotions, which classified them as faculties, are being discarded. It is now generally recognized that mental operations must be surveyed from a wider base and in terms of mind-body and body-mind. This generalization applies *a fortiori* to the study of conation, or the urge to and power of action, which can be developed and disciplined by means of auto-suggestion, a process which, however, may have harmful as well as salutary consequences, since it plays a dominant part in the illusions of religious belief.

This then explains the efficacy of ecclesiastical formulas, and rites. M. Coué even suggests that a string with knots on it, like a rosary, at each of which you repeat his formula, is of great value, in making the process wholly automatic; and removing all doubt, or action of the will: once the method has been learnt, well known mental and physical laws make the task easier the longer the patient keeps it up (Duckworth, p. 148). Dumont has stated this law in the clearest way: "A lock works better after being used some time; at the outset, more force was required to overcome certain roughnesses in the mechanism" (*Revue Philosophique*, IV, 334).

Just as we may say of a dog that it inherits what one might call "dogity," and this form covers all the many sorts of dog, though they are supposed not to come from a single stock, and all monkeys get from their ancestors a quality of "monkeyity," so men have from their forefathers the gift of humanity. This term embraces all the physical, mental, and moral characteristics that "human" nature implies; the constitution of body and of brain, which makes possible the memory of bygone events and allows us to ponder on them, and meditate whether some other course of action would not be better and more worthy of us as men and members of a civilized community. It is the growth of this common feeling of humanity that is the basis of progress, the foundation of morals. In the end morality is "what is expected of you," what one in your position of wealth and education might justly be looked upon to do in the circumstances. No one is supposed to act in a way against his bringing up, at variance with the principles and precepts under which he has been trained; but in time these rise from the common raising of the feelings of the age and nation. Each is child of the past, of the ages gone; and each hands on the legacy he has received from them, as in the torch race described by Plato. Thus, by degrees the whole level of the race is raised, every generation starting more or less where those before had ended, and building on the basis laid by its predecessors. And so, not by mere self-sacrifice, but "on stepping-stones of our dead selves, we rise to higher things."

These hereditary and environmental factors have a kind of "hypnotic" effect; if all men were agreed upon anything it would be impossible to assert or at least to maintain the contrary. All men and all animals feel the sunshine to be warm and pleasant, for their organism is so completely adapted to it that all think alike. We use the word "heaven" for the perfection of beauty, because our eyes are so wholly suited to its light that we can imagine nothing more perfect than the sky. Each mind is a receiver, each a transmitter; and so men are influenced chiefly by those around them. By mass action the feelings and thoughts of our immediate neighbours and acquaintances mould our mentality and consolidate morals and conduct, and only by great strength of will can we contradict

their opinions. There is an environment of facts by which the individual is forced into certain lines of action ; and there is an atmosphere of thought in which one is bred from which one cannot escape. One is the child of the ages, the child of one's time and race ; and so can no more shed one's mind than a tiger its coat. This is precisely what the Bible teaches in the "Wisdom" Books, and even in the New Testament, in the form of "predestination," visiting on the children the sins of the parents. People have been ready to attribute sin to others, while they see extenuating facts in their own deeds. In this regard all are swayed alike by their prejudice, and act according to the maxims in which they were brought up. As Maudsley puts it, "There is a destiny made for man by his ancestors, and none can escape the tyranny of his organization"; or, in Tennyson's sardonic phrase, "the tiger and the ape" are still elemental in man.

On this issue Darwin is in direct contradiction to the accepted theory of morals and of personal responsibility. Perhaps if only these views had ruled mankind there might now be more humanity in the world ; but we should have less divinity, and possibly that would not have been much of a loss ; kindness at least might have played a greater part in history with advantage to men and morals. This consideration may not be quite clear to many. I have often said : " You cannot move a single muscle of your body," and have been jeered at : my retort was : " You know nothing about the muscles ; many of them have several actions, and even experts do not understand how the relative strength and delicacy of their action are regulated, and a nice mess you would make if you tried to do it." A chief Lord of the Admiralty may direct the movements of the whole Navy from his office. Such movements can be commanded, but how they are brought about is not your business. The procedure has been arrived at by centuries of practice and experience, by " trial and error," with many failures, and final success. The process is crystallized and preserved in the subconscious mind, as an inheritance of the race, just as each one to-day by perseverance acquires skill and retains the power of doing things. Try to touch a point, say a pimple, on your back with the aid of two looking-glasses ; you will find it difficult, for your finger moves the reverse way from what you meant ; shut your

eyes, and it will find the spot at once. There is something that achieves the end better than you can. To vary Matthew Arnold's saying, "Something, not ourselves, that makes for rightness," but rightness and righteousness are near akin.

## CHAPTER II

### WUNDT'S "FOLK PSYCHOLOGY"

[Except where specifically indicated, nearly all the subject-matter of this chapter consists of references to, and extracts from, Professor Wundt's *Folk Psychology*, English translation by Professor E. L. Schaub; London, Allen and Unwin.—EDITOR.]

"PEOPLES frequently trace their origin to an original pair of ancestors. From a single marriage union is derived the single tribe, and then, through a further expansion of this idea, the whole of mankind. The legend of an original ancestral pair, however, is not to be found beyond the limits of the monogamous family. Thus, it is apparently a projection of monogamous marriage into the past" (p. 12). "The thought of an original family thus represents simply a projection of the present-day family into an inaccessible past. Clearly, therefore, it is to be regarded as only an hypothesis, or, rather, a fiction. Without the support which it received from the Biblical legend, it could scarcely have maintained itself almost down to the present, as it did in the patriarchal theory of the original state of man to which it gave rise" (p. 13). "Our information concerning primitive man, therefore, must be derived from ethnology. We must not seek him *under* the earth, but *on* the earth" (p. 17).

"Emin Pasha, together with his companion Stuhlmann, had the good fortune to be able to observe the pygmies of the Congo more closely even than had been possible for Schweinfurth. In the Negritos of the Philippines a similar dwarf people was discovered. . . . According to their own belief and that of the neighbouring Malays, [they] are the original inhabitants of their forests. Besides these, there are the inland tribes of the Malay Peninsula, the Semangs and Senoi, and, finally, the Veddahs of Ceylon" (p. 19). "If we read a description of the characteristics, habits, and customs of the Negritos of the

Philippines and then pass on to the Malaccans, to the Semangs and Senoi, or, further, to the Veddahs of Ceylon, we constantly meet with almost the same phenomena, there being but slight differences, depending on the specific character of the natural environment" (p. 20).

"Contrary to what archæological excavations would suggest concerning the earliest age of peoples, primitive culture, in respect to implements and weapons, depended only to a small extent on the working of stone. We might better speak of this period as an age of wood. Wood is not only decidedly easier to manipulate than stone, but it is always more easily obtainable in shapes suitable for constructive purposes" (p. 26). "The concept 'primitive' is never valid, as applied to man, except in a *relative* sense. Of an absolutely primitive man we know nothing at all. Moreover, the knowledge of such a being could hardly render explicable his further development, since he would really belong to the animal level and therefore to the prehuman stage of existence" (p. 32). "Because of the natural relations of the sexes it was supposed that man lived in a state of marriage from the very beginning. Furthermore, the monogamous marriage of the present was projected back into an indefinite past, where it found final termination in the idea of a primal pair of ancestors. . . . But in 1861, a Swiss jurist and antiquarian, J. Bachofen, published a remarkable work on 'Mother-right.'" "In this book Bachofen attempted to prove the falsity of the doctrine—previously almost uncontested—that monogamy was the original form of marriage, and to refute the view, regarded as equally self-evident, that within this marriage union man held the supremacy—in brief, the patriarchal theory" (p. 34).

"The theory of the Swiss jurist, which was based essentially on philologic-antiquarian arguments, gradually fell into the background, until, in the seventies of the nineteenth century, it suddenly seemed to find important corroboration and a new basis from an entirely different quarter. . . . Ethnology revealed the fact that this system of kinship is still very prevalent in Australia. Indeed, it is so prevalent that even to-day about three-fifths of the tribes trace descent through the mother. . . . This system, though generally restricted to narrower bounds than in Australia, is likewise to be found in America, Melanesia,

Polynesia, and in several parts of the Old World, especially among the peoples of northern Siberia and among the Dravidian tribes in the southern part of Hindustan" (pp. 36-7).

"One woman may have several husbands. The two forms of polygamy may conveniently be called *polygyny* and *polyandry*, and these terms should always be distinguished" (p. 42). "Polygyny flourishes particularly wherever the general conceptions of property and of authority, and, connected with the latter, that of the supremacy of man within the family, have attained undue importance. Under the co-operation of these motives, the wife becomes the absolute property of the husband, and may therefore, wherever polygyny prevails among barbaric peoples, be given away or exchanged" (p. 43). "How, then, is so-called group-marriage related to these two forms? It is obviously nothing but a combination of polyandry and polygyny" (p. 44). "Among Australian tribes, for example . . . there is a common form of group marriage, in which a man possesses either one or several chief wives, together with secondary wives; the latter are the chief wives of other men, whereas his own chief wife is in turn the secondary wife of those men or of others. . . . One agency that is particularly apt to bring about such a form of marriage, transitional between monogamy and polygamy, is war. We know from the Iliad that in barbaric times woman was the booty of the conqueror, and became his slave or secondary wife" (p. 45).

"The most primitive stage of culture . . . lacks the conditions for either maternal or paternal descent, inasmuch as it possesses neither clearly defined clans nor any personal property worth mention" (p. 47). "Meanwhile, primitive man, in so far as we may speak of him in the relative sense already indicated, has really been discovered. . . . They include, in addition to several tribes of Hindustan (as yet insufficiently studied), particularly the Semangs and Senoi of the interior of the Malay Peninsula, the Veddahs of Ceylon, the Negritos of the Philippines and Central Africa, and, finally, to some extent, also the Bushmen" (p. 48). "Only, temporarily, on . . . the hunting of large animals, which requires a considerable measure of strength, or when new hunting grounds are being sought, is a leader appointed from among the older men. His leadership, however, ceases with the completion of the undertaking" (p. 51).

"There are no permanent chiefs, any more than there are clans or tribal organizations. . . . Whenever the social organization of primitive man has remained uninfluenced by peoples of a higher culture, it consists in a firmly established monogamy of the form of *single marriage*, a mode of existence that was probably carried over from a prehuman stage resembling that of the present day anthropoids" (pp. 51-2). "A horde we might say is a human herd . . . but it is precisely a *human* herd. Between the members of a horde, therefore, there exists a relation that is lacking in the animal herd, in flocks of migratory birds, for example, or in herds of sheep and cattle. This relation is established and preserved through a community of language. . . . Without a community of life, and we may add, without the mental interaction of individuals, language would be impossible. Language, however, in turn strengthened this community life, and elevated it above the status of the animal herd. . . . For that which differentiates the horde from the herd is the *language* of primitive man together with the activity most closely bound up with language—namely, *thinking*" (pp. 52-3).

"There here transpired what always occurs when the well-known principle of the struggle for existence is applied to the field of mental phenomena. . . . The language of the weaker race, which was probably very meagre, succumbed to a language that was more highly developed" (p. 55). "In all probability the intercourse which necessarily took place . . . between the older inhabitants and the newer peoples led to a competition of languages in which the poorer and less developed language of primitive man inevitably succumbed" (p. 57). In the case of gesture language, "it is not sounds, but expressive movements, imitative and pantomimic, that form the means by which man communicates his thoughts to man" (p. 58). "Studies have been made of the gestures of the North American Indian tribes, and similar, though less complete, observations have been reported concerning the Australians" (p. 59).

"The ideas of the Indian are not in all respects like those of the civilized European or those of the Australian. Nevertheless, the gestures that refer to the specific concrete objects are frequently so similar that many of the signs employed by the

gesture-language of the deaf-mutes of Europe may be found among the Dakota Indians. . . . This mode of communication is not the result of intellectual reflections or conscious purposes, but of emotion and the involuntary expressive movements that accompany emotion. . . . Whenever ideas strongly tinged with feeling enter into the course of emotions, the direct mimetic expressions of the face are supplemented by movements of the arms and hands" (pp. 59-60). "What is lacking is only that the emotionally coloured idea be not a mere expression of one's own emotion, but that it evokes the same emotion and, through this, the same idea, in the minds of others. . . . By virtue of this ideational content, movements expressive of emotions come to be expressions of ideas; the communication of an individual's experiences to others results in an exchange of thought—that is, in language. . . . Hence it is that deaf-mutes, though of different nationalities, can make themselves understood without difficulty, even upon meeting for the first time" (p. 61). "There is a second and important class of gestures, which, for the sake of brevity, we may call graphic" (p. 62). "The most important characteristic of gesture-language, as well as the most distinctive feature of an original language, is the fact that there is no trace of abstract concepts, there being merely perceptual representations. . . . Yet some of these representations . . . have acquired a symbolical meaning. . . . On the whole, however, such symbolical signs are rare if the natural gesture-language has not been artificially reconstructed" (p. 63). "If, then, gesture-language affords us certain psychological conclusions regarding the nature of a primitive language, it is of particular interest, from this point of view, to compare its characteristics with the corresponding traits of the most primitive spoken languages" (p. 65).

"Every spoken language is the outcome of recondite processes, whose beginnings are no longer traceable. And yet the Sudan languages, particularly, have preserved characteristics that show much more intimate connections between sound and meaning than our cultural languages possess. . . . While our words 'large' and 'small,' 'here' and 'there,' show no correspondence between the character of the sound and the meaning, the case is entirely different with the equivalent expressions in the Ewe language. In this language large and

small objects are designated by the same word. In the one case, however, the word is uttered in a deep tone, while in the other a high tone is used" (p. 66). "Word-formations, however, and the position of the words within the sentence, mirror the forms of thought itself; whenever the thought undergoes vital changes, the latter inevitably find expression in the grammatical categories of the language" (p. 67).

"Investigation of the grammatical forms of primitive language is of particular importance for the psychology of primitive man. . . . Such a language is composed of detached monosyllabic words, each of which has a meaning, yet none of which falls under any particular grammatical category" (p. 68). "Every simple monosyllabic word combines with others, and from this combination there result in part modifications in meaning, and, in part, sentences. Language, thus, does not develop by sprouting and growing, but by agglomeration and agglutination. . . . This agreement with gesture-language is brought home to us most strikingly if we consider the words which the primitive spoken languages employ for newly formed ideas" (p. 69). "Primitive language is absolutely at one with gesture language" (p. 71).

"Just as primitive language has no specific means for expressing a verb, so also are change and action overshadowed in primitive thought by the concrete image. The thinking itself therefore may be called *concrete*. Primitive man sees the image with its separate parts, and, as he sees it, so he reproduces it in his language. It is for this very reason that he is unfamiliar with differences of grammatical categories and abstract concepts" (pp. 72-3). "Thus, the thinking of primitive man is almost exclusively associative. Of the more perfect form of combining concepts, the apperceptive, which unites the thoughts into a systematic whole, there are as yet only traces" (p. 73). "The world of imagination, projected from man's own emotional life into external phenomena, is what we mean by *mythological thinking*" (p. 74). "In entering upon a consideration of the development of primitive myths, we are at once confronted by the old question. . . . Where and when did religion originate? . . . In certain cases, even primitive man supplements the sensuous world in which he lives and whose impressions he has not so much as

elaborated into abstract concepts, with supersensuous elements, though he himself, of course, is unaware of their supersensuous character. . . . The question, however, as to how religion arose acquires its great importance through its connection with the two further questions as to whether or not religion is a necessary constituent of human consciousness and whether it is an original possession or is the result of certain preconditions of mythological thought" (p. 75).

"Primitive man cannot think of death except as the sudden departure from the dying person of that which originally brought life. . . . We also find the conception of a *corporeal soul*, meaning by this the belief that the body is the vehicle of life, and that, so long as it has not itself disappeared, it continues to harbour the life within itself. . . . No certain traces are as yet to be found of belief in a breath or shadow-like soul" (p. 82). "The next group of ideas, those arising from the impression made by sickness, particularly by such sickness as attack men suddenly, are also restricted to the conception of a corporeal soul. . . . The dead person, therefore, continues to remain the seat of demoniacal powers. . . . Indeed, the attack of sickness is in itself sufficient to arouse fear of a demon" (p. 83). "Obviously they are creations of the imagination due to fear and terror" (p. 84). (*Timor primus fecit deos.*)

"Soul is throughout a great part of the Bible simply the equivalent of 'life' embodied in living creatures. . . . 'A living soul' in Genesis and other records is simply an 'animated being'; and the word is applied equally to the lower animals and to man." The following words are used: " *nephesh*, 'that which breathes,' the breathing substance or being =  $\psi\chi\eta$ , *anima*. . . . The life of the *nephesh* resides in the blood" —animal life. In "Job xxx. 15, 'soul' means 'nobility.' [Note:—It is 'honour' in R.V.] In the New Testament  $\psi\chi\kappa\sigma$  has acquired a meaning almost equivalent to 'carnal' or 'sensual.'  $\ddot{\alpha}\psi\chi\alpha$  (I Cor. xiv. 7) means 'lifeless'" (Prof. J. Laidlaw, *H.D.B.*, Vol. IV, p. 608).

"The violation of custom is regarded as dangerous, and as matter requiring, wherever possible, the employment of protective magic" (Wundt, *Folk Psychology*, p. 89). "Those ceremonies particularly that are in any way complicated are

passed down from generation to generation. . . . The meaning of the ceremonies has for the most part long been lost to the participants themselves, and was probably unknown even to their ancestors. . . . The performers firmly believe that the acts will secure that which is desired. . . . The conditions here are really not essentially different from those that still prevail everywhere in the cult ceremonies of civilized peoples" (p. 90). "Only that which arouses emotion and calls forth particularly fear and terror comes to be an object of magical and demoniacal belief" (p. 92). "The idea of a corporeal soul, present in the corpse yet also capable of abandoning it and of becoming a dangerous demon, is a creation of the emotion of fear. The demons who possess the sick man and cause his death, or who depart from him in convalescence, are products of emotion. . . . Thus, then, we utterly confuse primitive thinking with our own scientific standpoint when we explain it by the need for the interpretation of phenomena. Causality, in our sense of the word, does not exist for primitive man. If we would speak of causality at all on his level of experience, we may say only that he is governed by the causality of magic" (p. 93) (*i.e.*, misunderstood relations of things and effects).

"It is easy to understand how especially the complicated decorations on the combs of the Malaccan tribes may, through the familiar processes of psychical assimilation, come to be regarded as living beings, in the form either of animals or of plants, and how these forms in turn may come to be interpreted as sickness-demons. . . . A woman of the Senoi or the Semangs carries about on her head the demoniacal representation of all known diseases. For, according to an ancient law of magic, the demon himself has a twofold rôle: he both causes the sickness and protects against it" (p. 105). "The painting of the Bushmen, however, is obviously neither magical nor decorative in character. Originally these pictures seem to have been drawn in caves; at any rate, it is here that many of them have been found. We have already indicated the importance of this primitive dwelling for the beginnings of a memorial art" (p. 106).

"The most outstanding characteristic of primitive man is contentment" (p. 110). "The tribes that have remained relatively primitive to this day have led a peaceful existence

since immemorial times" (p. 111). [Just as animals and plants at the bottom of the sea or on isolated islands, or high lands, have retained their pristine features unchanged by the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest.—AUTHOR.] "It is characteristic of primitive culture that it has failed to advance since immemorial times, and this accounts for the uniformity prevalent in widely separated regions of the earth. This, however, does not at all imply that, within the narrow sphere that constitutes his world, the intelligence of primitive man is inferior to that of cultural man. . . . Inventions were not snatched from the blue, but they were influenced by all sorts of empirical elements . . . the assembling and combining of these elements in the production of a weapon best suited to the conditions of primitive life is a marvellous achievement, scarcely inferior, from an intellectual point of view, to the invention of modern firearms" (p. 112).

"This of course, does not deny that there may have been a time, and, indeed, doubtless, was one, when man occupied a lower intellectual plane and approximated more nearly to the animal state which preceded that of human beings" (p. 113). "The rather negative morality of primitive man also had its origin in his limited wants, in the lack of any incentives to such action as we would call immoral. Such a positive situation, however, is no doubt afforded by the strict monogamy, which probably originated in the prehuman natural state and was thenceforth maintained" (p. 114). "According to the Veddahs, even marriage between brother and sister was originally not prohibited" (p. 118). [Abraham was married to his sister.—AUTHOR.]

Prof. Wundt makes the second stage of man's development coincide with the Totemic Age: "The totem animal was regarded, for the most part, as having not merely given its name to a group of tribal members, but as having actually been its forefather. . . . Thus ancestor cult also began with the cult of animals, not with that of human ancestors. . . . The totem members were forbidden to eat the flesh of the totem animal, or were allowed to do so only under specific conditions. . . . Not irreconcilable with this is the fact that on certain occasions the eating of the totem flesh constituted a sort of ceremony" (p. 117). "This likewise implies that the totem

animal was held sacred. . . . The most important social aspect of this totemic tribal organization, however, consists in the fact that it involved certain norms of custom regulating the intercourse of the separate groups with one another" (pp. 117-18).

"Of the further phenomena that gradually come to the foreground during the totemic age, one of the most important is the growing influence of dominant individual personalities.

. . . A permanent leadership on the part of single individuals or of several who share the power. . . . Chieftainship gives rise to political organization; the latter culminates in the State. . . . With the firmer union of tribal members there comes also *tribal welfare*" (p. 119).

"Strife between tribes and peoples—that is, warfare—begins with culture in general . . . Tribal ownership of the land becomes more firmly established. . . . The land is cultivated by means of agricultural implements. . . . The care and breeding of animals is also undertaken" (p. 120).

"The passing of the sacred animal into the useful animal also signalizes the end of the totemic era and the beginning of the age of heroes and gods. . . . Man is primitive so long as he is essentially limited in his immediate means of support to that which nature directly offers him or to the labour of his own hands" (p. 121). "The beginning of the totemic period marks a great change. New forces now come into play, such as are not to be found among the universal motives that have controlled the life of man from its very beginning . . . we may distinguish *three great cultural stages*, of which the third, again, falls into two markedly different divisions" (p. 123).

"The Australian native was regarded, up to very recent times, as the typical primitive man. . . . But there is *one* important difference. . . . His weapons are markedly different from those of primitive man" (p. 124). "Weapons which are designed for use at close range—the long spear, the club, and, what is most indicative of battle, the shield. . . . The second great stage [of culture] offers a radically different picture. . . . In Australia, we find a primitive culture alongside of a highly developed tribal organization: in the Malayo-Polynesian region there is a fairly well developed culture, but a tribal organization which is partly in a state of dissolution and partly in transition" (p. 125).

"The Negritos and Papuans of various parts of Melanesia possess a culture bordering on the primitive . . . since they possess characteristics of pre-totemic society" (p. 126). "Far superior to the Papuan race is the Micronesian population, which, as regards its racial traits, is intermediate between the Melanesians and the Polynesians. . . . One of the most striking discoveries of modern ethnology is the finding of distinct traces of Papuan-Negritic culture in regions, such as the west coast of Africa, which are remote from the original home of the culture. . . . Obviously there were Papuan migrations, probably in repeated trains, from New Guinea across the Torres Strait to Northern Australia. . . . Above the level of the Negrito and Papuan peoples who, in their numerous fusions, themselves form several strata, we finally have the Malayo-Polynesian population" (p. 127).

"The Malay type, however, particularly on the physical side, points to Eastern Asia. The resemblance to the Mongolians as regards eyes, skull, and colour of skin is unmistakable. . . . Starting as we may suppose in Central Asia, that great cradle of the human race, they spread to the coasts, particularly to Indo-China, and then to the large islands . . . and over the entire region of Oceania. . . . Connected with this is a further important factor—one which exercised a destructive influence upon the original totemism, only a few factors of which have survived among these tribes. The boatman alone on the broad seas . . . turns his gaze involuntarily to the world of stars which serve as his guide. Thus, particularly in Polynesia, there sprang up a celestial mythology" (pp. 128-9). "The conditions differ in the southern and, to some extent also, in the western portion of the great American continent. Closely related as the various tribes are, the old hypothesis that they migrated from Asia across Behring Strait is untenable. Moreover in spite of their physical relationship and, in part also, of their linguistic similarities, their culture shows important differences" (p. 134). "All over America, from the Esquimos in the north far down to the south, a very important part of the equipment of the dancers is the mask. This mask reproduces either animal features or some fantastic form intermediate between man and animal" (p. 135).

" ' There were and still are hundreds of masks in use, every one of which represents a spirit who occurs in their legends. . . . The dance is accompanied by a song which celebrates in boastful words the power of the gods and the mighty deeds represented in the performance ' " (Frazer, *The Scapegoat*, p. 378). " ' On inquiring the origin of these ceremonies, I was informed that they did not originate with Indians, but were revelations of the guardian spirits who made known what they wished to be performed ' " (p. 376). " ' The intention of these exhibitions is to confirm the faith of the young people and the women in the ancient traditions as to the intercourse of the gods with men ' " (p. 377). " Similar masquerades are in vogue among the neighbours of these Indians, the Esquimaux of Behring Strait " (p. 379). " ' Masks may also represent totemic animals, and the wearers during the festivals are believed actually to become the creature represented ' " (p. 380).

" Vegetation festivals, especially those of North and Central America, exhibit many cult forms in which ideas that belong to a celestial mythology combine with the worship of animals and of ancestors. The conceptions of ancestors and of gods thus play over into one another, and these god-ancestors are believed to have their seat in the clouds and in the heavens above " (*Folk Psychology*, p. 136). " Even more than other peoples, the Africans show the effects of great and far-reaching external influences. Hamitic and Semitic tribes entered the country from the north at an early time: even from the distant south of Asia, probably from Sumatra and its neighbouring islands, great waves of immigration, crossing Madagascar in the distant past, swept on towards the west even to the Gold Coast, introducing elements of Papuan-Negritic culture into Africa. . . . That the Hamites pressed on in very early times, into southern Africa, is proved by the Hottentot tribe, whose language exhibits Hamitic characteristics, and the colour of whose skin, furthermore, is lighter than that of the negro proper or that of the Bantu. . . . There can be scarcely any doubt that the African cattle originally came from Asia " (pp. 136-7).

" It is only when the animal is used to draw the plough that it becomes in all respects a useful animal . . . finally, as an

animal of slaughter, it takes the place of the gradually disappearing wild animal of the chase. Coincident with this development, totemic ideas and customs disappear . . . it is, at most, isolated survivals that remain among the Hamitic population of the north" (p. 138). "No region so much as Africa has become the centre of a despotic form of government. It is this factor, together with the potent influence of ideas of personal property associated with it, that has contributed, on the one hand, to the origin of polygyny, and, on the other, to the rise of slavery. . . . To a far greater extent than in Africa, totemic culture has almost entirely disappeared throughout the entire *Asiatic* world. . . . Surviving effects of totemic culture, however, are everywhere apparent, no less in the sacred animals of the Babylonians, Egyptians, Hindoos, Greeks, and the Germanic peoples, than in the significance attached by the Romans to the flight of birds and to the examination of entrails, and in the Israelitic law which forbids the eating of the flesh of certain animals" (pp. 138-9).

"Totemic exogamy clearly represents the earliest form of marriage restriction found in custom or law" (p. 145). "The aversion to marriage with relatives has left its impress on our own present-day legislation, not so much, indeed, in the positive form of exogamy, as in the negative form which forbids endogamy within certain limits" (p. 151). "Great social transformations, of which one of the greatest is unquestionably the transition from the primitive horde to totemic tribal organization, are never affected by the ordinances of individuals, but develop of themselves through a necessity immanent in the cultural conditions. Their effects are never foreseen. . . . Moreover, as regards the question of the injurious effects resulting from the marriage of relatives, authorities even to-day disagree as to where the danger begins and how great it really is" (p. 152). "Ancient exogamous restrictions are still operative in the prohibitions which the statutes of all cultural peoples place on the marriage of relatives" (p. 156). "Sometimes the man buys the woman from her parents, as we know from the Biblical example of Jacob and from numerous ethnological parallels, or he enters into service in order to secure her, he labours for a time in the house of her parents" (p. 158). "Following upon the rise of exogamy, polygamy also regularly

appears. These two practices give to the marriage and family relations of totemic society an essentially different character from that which they possess under primitive conditions" (p. 167). "Maternal descent is in direct harmony with the natural feeling that the children who are born of the mother, and whose early care rests with her alone, should also belong to her. In this sense, mother-right represents the earliest of all conceptions of property" (p. 173).

"Because of its tribal struggles, whose increasing importance is externally reflected in the character of the weapon, it is precisely the totemic era that tends to loosen the natural family ties of the preceding primitive age, and, as a result, to allot the child to the mother" (p. 173). "The child, in these cases, inherits the totem of the mother as well as that of the father; or the son, though continuing to inherit the totem of the mother, nevertheless passes over into the clan of the father. These are intermediate phenomena, preparatory to the general transition from maternal to paternal descent. . . . Just as the wife becomes the property of the man, so also does the child" (p. 174). "A peculiar form of totemic belief is generally known as conception totemism. It supposes either that the totem ancestor co-operates with the father in the begetting of the child or that the father has no connection with procreation, the child being the direct offspring of the mother and the totem-ancestor" (p. 176). "The totem ancestor may appear to the woman in sleep or in a waking vision" (p. 181). "Either during the day, or, especially during the night and in sleep, the spirit of the ancestor passes into her. . . . The germ of the child is thought to pass over into the body of the mother independently of any act of the father, or, at most, the participation of the latter is held to be merely secondary and not essential" (p. 180). "Among the Aranda, the husband is ignored and it is believed that conception is mediated only by the totem ancestor" (p. 181). "It is also significant that in the case of sex totemism nocturnal animals predominate. . . . This fact is indicative of a dream origin" (p. 182).

"The totem that is conceived as an animal ancestor may give way to other fanciful ancestral ideas or may intercross with them: various forms of such phenomena are to be found, particularly in Australia. In this region, such ancestors,

which doubtless are for the most part regarded as anthropomorphic, are sometimes called Mura-Mura, or also Alcheringa. They are apparently imagined as mighty human beings, possessed of magic power" (p. 176). "Closely connected with these original ancestors there is a third sort of totems or of totemic objects which we may briefly designate as inanimate" (p. 177). "It is particularly stones and pieces of wood that are held to be the abode of these totemic spirits and that are represented by legend as having at one time been entrusted to the custody of the forefathers" (p. 177).

"The rule that the last married bride must leap over the fire in which the straw man is burned on Shrove Tuesday, is probably intended to make her fruitful." In the fire festivals, "the power of blessing women with offspring is a special attribute of the tree spirits" (Frazer, *Balder the Beautiful*, Vol. II, p. 22). He cites many cases of things supposed to make women fertile, but as it is not clear that these were considered effective without fecundation, perhaps they are not just to the point. Many people without scientific knowledge believed such parthenogenesis possible, even in quite recent times, and, for obvious reasons, it was looked on with favour.

"The two forms of totemism are closely analogous to the Roman Catholic worship of saints. The saints also are regarded partly as guardians of communities and partly as personal protectors" (*Folk Psychology*, p. 178). "The patron saints of individuals did not antecede those of the Church itself. . . . It is cult associations and their common cult objects that are first in origin" (p. 179). "The origin of totems in the sense of cult-groups is at least as old as tribal organization" (p. 180). "The earliest totem objects . . . are without doubt *animals*. In America, as in Australia, there are practically no totems except animals; in other places also it is the animal that plays the principal rôle in totemic mythology" (p. 183). "In part, the animal continues to remain predominant even after the age of actual totemism has passed. Nevertheless, *plant totemism* has found its way into certain regions. Here also the facts are most clearly traceable in Australia, our most important source of information regarding the history of the development of totemic ideas. . . . It is probably only with the appearance of plant totems that those cult ceremonies arose which are

celebrated, not, as the festivals of tribal totemism originally were, mainly at the adolescence of youths, but primarily for the sake of effecting a *multiplication of the totems*" (pp. 183-4).

"When, in times of a long drought, processions pass over the fields and supplicate Heaven for rain, as occurs even to-day in some regions, we certainly have an analogous phenomenon. The only difference is that the Australian tribes invoke their totems instead of Heaven. . . . In connection with the Australian ceremonials designed to multiply the food plants and game animals, we come upon still a *third* kind of totem objects . . . we may briefly call them *inanimate totems*. . . . They differ from animate totems in that the latter are in themselves endowed with magical properties, whereas the former are always held to derive these powers from living magicians, from the anthropomorphic or zoomorphic ancestors of antiquity. . . . Thus, totemism passes over, on the one hand, into ancestor-worship, and, on the other, into fetishism" (pp. 185-6).

"The totemic age marks an important turning-point in the history of soul conceptions . . . two sets of ideas come to be developed. On the one hand, the soul is believed to depart with the blood. In the place of the entire body, therefore, the blood comes to be the chief vehicle of the soul. Blood-magic, which by itself constitutes an extensive chapter in the history of magic beliefs, and which is prevalent in all periods of culture, has its source in this conception" (p. 191). "The idea of the sudden departure of the soul is then transferred from the one who is killed to the dying person in general. With the exhalation of his last breath, his soul is thought to depart from him" (pp. 191-2). "Folk belief, even down to the present, holds that the soul of the dying person issues in his last breath, and that it possesses the form of an animal" (p. 193).

"It is only when the notion of a soul, from being a quasi-scientific hypothesis, becomes a theological dogma that its unity and indivisibility are insisted upon as essential. The savage, unshackled by dogma, is free to explain the facts of life by the assumption of as many souls as he thinks necessary" (Frazer, *Balder the Beautiful*, Vol. II, p. 221). "Unable to conceive of life abstractly as 'a permanent possibility of sensation' or a 'continuous adjustment of internal arrangements to external relations,' the savage thinks of it as a concrete material thing of

a definite bulk, capable of being seen and handled, kept in a box or jar, and liable to be bruised, fractured, or smashed in pieces. . . . When a man is ill or dies, the fact is explained by saying that the material object called his life or soul, whether it be in his body or out of it, has either sustained injury or been destroyed" (*loc. cit.*, p. 95).

"The most important change in the history of the development of soul belief falls within the totemic period. This change consists in the distinction between a soul that is bound to the body, and which, because of this permanent attachment, we will briefly call the *corporeal soul*, and a soul which may leave the body and continue its existence independently of it. . . . We will call this soul *psyche*, the breath or shadow soul" (Wundt, *Folk Psychology*, p. 205). "The shadow soul is a variety of breath-soul. The two readily pass over into each other. . . . This idea of a breath-soul readily leads to the belief that the psyche, after its separation from the body, appears in the dream image, again temporarily assuming, in shadowy form, the outlines of its original body" (pp. 205-6).

"The savage, it is said, fails to distinguish the visions of sleep from the realities of waking life, and accordingly when he has dreamed of his dead friends he necessarily concludes that they have not wholly perished, but that their spirits continue to exist in some place and some form" (Frazer, *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, Vol. II, p. 260). "The theory of dreams appears to be hardly enough by itself to account for the widespread belief in the immortality of men and animals, [yet] dreams have probably done much to confirm that belief" (p. 261). "We have seen that many savages look forward to a joyful resurrection of men and beasts, if only a proper care is taken of their skeletons; the same old bones, they imagine, will do duty over again in the next life" (p. 263).

"The Ainu 'are firmly convinced that the spirits of birds and animals killed in hunting or offered in sacrifice come and live again upon the earth clothed with a body; and they believe, further, that they appear here for the special benefit of men, particularly Ainu hunters'" (Rev. J. Batchelor, *Ainu*, p. 479). The Aino, Mr. Batchelor tells us, "'confessedly slays and eats the beast that another may come in its place and be treated in like manner.' . . . Thus, among the benefits

which the Aino anticipates from the slaughter of the worshipful animals not the least substantial is that of gorging himself on their flesh and blood, both on the present and on many a similar occasion hereafter; and that pleasing prospect again is derived from his firm faith in the spiritual immortality and bodily resurrection of the dead animals" (p. 201). "The explanation of life by the theory of an indwelling and practically immortal soul is one which the savage does not confine to human beings, but extends to the animal creation in general. In so doing, he is more liberal and perhaps more logical than the civilized man who commonly denies to animals that privilege of immortality. . . . The savage is not so proud. . . . 'To the Indian, all objects, animate and inanimate, seem exactly of the same nature except they differ in the accident of bodily form. Every object in the whole world is a being, consisting of a body and spirit, and differs from every other object in no respect except that of bodily form, and in the greater or less degree of brute power and brute cunning' (im Thurm, *Among the Indians of Guiana*, p. 350)" (p. 204).

"In the primal genesis period they seem to be completely undifferentiated, and we find all creatures alike living and working together in harmony and mutual helpfulness until man, by his aggressiveness and disregard for the rights of the others, provokes their hostility" (pp. 204-5). "'Although they consider themselves superior to all other animals and are very proud of that superiority; although they believe that the beasts of the forest, the birds of the air, and the fishes of the waters, were created by the Almighty Being for the use of man; yet it seems as if they ascribe the difference between themselves and the brute kind, and the dominion which they have over them, more to their superior bodily strength and dexterity than to their immortal souls. . . . Hence in their languages those inflections of their nouns which we call *genders* are not, as with us, descriptive of the *masculine* and *feminine* species, but of the *animate* and *inanimate* kinds' (The Rev. John Heckewelder)" (pp. 205-6). "In the opinion of the Gilyak, 'the form and size of an animal are merely a sort of appearance. Every animal is in point of fact a real being like man, nay a Gilyak such as himself, but endowed with reason and strength which often surpass those of mere men' (L. Sternberg)" (p. 206).

They seem for a long time not to have understood the action of seed generally. "This refusal of the savage to recognize in death a final cessation of the vital process, this unquestioning faith in the unbroken continuity of all life, is a fact that has not received the attention which it seems to merit from inquirers into the constitution of the human mind." The line between the known and unknown "to most men is a hazy borderland where perception and conception melt indissolubly into one" (pp. vi-vii of the Preface). "If we could strictly interrogate the phantoms which the human mind has conjured up out of the depths of its bottomless ignorance and enshrined as deities in the dim light of temples, we should find that the majority of them have been nothing but the ghosts of dead men" (p. ix).

"Certain particular organs of the body are held to be vehicles of the soul; among these are the heart, the respiratory organs, and the diaphragm, the latter probably in connection with the immediately adjacent kidneys, which these primitive soul ideas usually represent as an important centre of soul powers. . . . The Egyptians, however, also developed the idea of a purely spiritual soul. The latter was held to exist apart from the body in a realm of the dead, from which it was supposed occasionally to return to the mummy" (Wundt, *op. cit.*, p. 207). In this connection, attention may be drawn to the prominence given in the Bible to the kidneys and the fat round them; the Jews do not, indeed, appear to have had any marked "soul-beliefs" before the period of the exile; even in the time of Christ these were a matter of opinion and debate, and certainly they can be found in the Apocrypha much more plainly than in the Old Testament. But there is a double fallacy here, for renderings in favour of views have been deliberately forced upon texts which would hardly bear them fairly, while interpretations that told in other directions were unconsciously set aside, perhaps because their importance, or even their possibility, was not realized. We will not venture on this dubious area; the work of many students with keen minds and open eyes will be needed before an ordinary man can tread the path that tracks the effect of ancient folklore on holy writ. The balance required for such work is hardly yet developed, or the temper which would receive its results

with tolerance. Frazer has done much to pave the way; but a fair estimate can scarcely be expected in points of controversy where the facts at issue are not only contested, but strenuously denied on either side.

"Strange as it may seem to us, one motive which induced a savage warrior to eat the flesh or drink the blood of a foe whom he has slain appears to be a wish to form an indissoluble covenant of friendship and brotherhood with his victim. For it is a widespread belief among savages that by transfusing a little of their blood into each other's bodies two men become kinsmen and allies" (*Frazer, The Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, p. 154). "Even without absorbing any part of a man's bodily substance it is sometimes thought possible to acquire his moral virtues through simple contact with his bones" (p. 153). "While the human heart is thus commonly eaten for the sake of imbuing the eater with the qualities of its original owner, it is not . . . the only part of the body which is consumed for this purpose" (p. 151). "As soon as the slayer has tasted the blood of the slain, he becomes a blood-brother of his victim, whose ghost accordingly will do him no harm" (p. 155). "The evidence . . . adduced suggests that the intention of forming a blood-covenant with the dead may have been a common motive for . . . cannibalism" (p. 156) (cp. *Frazer, The Scapegoat*).

"It is now easy to understand why a savage should desire to partake of the flesh of an animal or man whom he regards as divine. By eating the body of the god he shares in the god's attributes and powers. And when the god is a corn-god, the corn is his proper body; when he is a vine-god, the juice of the grape is his blood; and so by eating the bread and drinking the wine the worshipper partakes of the body and blood of his god" (*Frazer, loc. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 167). In Greek mythology, "when the gods fled to Egypt to escape the fury of Typhon, Dionysus was turned into a goat. Hence when his worshippers rent in pieces a live goat and devoured it raw, they must have believed that they were eating the body and blood of the god" (*op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 18). "The custom of killing a god in animal form . . . belongs to a very early stage of human culture, and is apt in later times to be misunderstood. The advance of thought tends to strip the old animal and plant

gods of their bestial and vegetable husk, and to leave their human attributes . . . as the final and sole residuum. In other words, animal and plant gods tend to become purely anthropomorphic" (Vol. I, p. 22).

"In concluding the so-called blood-brotherhood, the exchange of blood according to prevalent belief mediated the establishment of an actual blood relationship. In accordance with a custom which probably sprang up independently in many different parts of the earth, each of the two parties to the compact, upon entering this brotherhood, took a drop of blood from a small self-inflicted wound and transferred it to the corresponding wound of the other. . . . The idea that a soul exists in the blood, however, has also a converse aspect. This consists in the fear of shedding blood, since the wounded person would thus be robbed of his soul. The belief then arises that one who consumes the blood of a sacrificed person or animal also gains his soul powers. . . . To drink the blood of the slain enemy, to consume his heart—these are impulses in which the passion to annihilate the foe and the desire to appropriate his soul powers intensify each other" (Wundt, pp. 208-9). "In the course of religious development, human sacrifice gave way to animal sacrifice, and cult anthropophagy was displaced by the eating of the flesh of the sacrificial animal. . . . Nevertheless, there were phenomena which clearly indicated the influence of the fear of the blood, and this militated against the appropriation of the blood soul" (p. 210).

"Among the Israelites, as among many other Semitic tribes, the blood of the animals was poured out at the sacrificial altar. That which was denied man was fitly given to the gods, to whom the life of the animal was offered in its blood. . . . The Bible also offers remarkable testimony in connection with the history of the belief that soul powers were resident in the kidneys and their appended organs. . . . The sacrificial laws of the Israelites, therefore, state that, in addition to the blood, the kidneys with their surrounding fat are the burnt offering which is most acceptable to God" (pp. 210-11). "The earliest form of the belief, that in a *breath soul*, proves to be also the most permanent" (p. 212). Thus, all "Classical" names for the soul mean "breath," e.g.

spiritus, anima (*περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν*) οἶον ἡ ψυχὴ, ἡ ἡμέτερα, ἀὴρ οὐσία, συγκράτει ἡμᾶς (Plutarch; quoted by Prof. F. D. Maurice, *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 95). “Totemic man drinks the blood of those who are slain in battle, in order to appropriate their power” (Wundt, p. 215). “As the blood is drunk to appropriate the soul of the deceased, so [also] do the relatives crowd in to partake of the liquid products of decomposition. On the other hand, the first worm to leave the corpse is held to be the bearer of the soul. Thus, corporeal soul and psyche are here closely fused” (p. 216).

“Further, we have found a widespread custom of eating the god sacramentally, either in the shape of the man or animal who represents the god, or in the shape of bread made in human or animal form. The reasons for thus partaking of the body of the god are from the primitive standpoint simple enough” (Frazer, *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, Vol. II, p. 138). Several old men of the North American Indians “recommend and say that formerly their greatest chieftains observed a constant rule in their diet, and seldom ate of any animal of a gross quality or heavy motion of body, fancying it conveyed a dullness through the whole system” (p. 139). “In Norway, Sweden, and Jutland down to the nineteenth century the flesh of a white snake was thought to confer supernatural wisdom on the eater” (p. 146). “The people of Darfur, in Central Africa, think that the liver is the seat of the soul, and that a man may enlarge his soul by eating the liver of an animal” (p. 147). “Just as the savage thinks that he can swallow the moral and other virtues in the shape of food, so he fondly imagines that he can inoculate himself with them” (p. 158). “Among some Caffre tribes the powdered charcoal with which the warriors are thus inoculated in various parts of their bodies is procured by burning the flesh of a live ox with a certain kind of wood or roots to which magic virtue is attributed” (pp. 159–60). Also among some of the Caffre tribes the priest “makes incisions in various parts of the bodies of each inmate of the kraal, and rubs a portion of the powdered charcoal into the cuts; the rest of the powder he mixes with sour milk, and gives them to all to drink” (p. 161). Among the Zulus “when a bullock is struck by lightning, the wizard takes its flesh and puts it in

a sherd and eats it while it is hot, mixed with medicine; and thus he eats the heaven by eating the flesh, which came from the beast, which was struck by the lightning, which came down from the heaven" (p. 161). It would appear also among some of the Caffre tribes "that all persons in a village which has been struck by lightning are supposed to be infected with a dangerous virus, which they might communicate to their neighbours" (pp. 161-2). "The Arabs of Eastern Africa believe that an unguent of lion's fat "inspires a man with boldness, and makes the wild beasts flee in terror before him" (p. 164). "Doubtless the intention alike of the eating and of the anointing [of the kangaroo among the Central Australian tribes] is to impart to the man the qualities of his totem animal, and thus to enable him to perform the ceremonies for the multiplication of the breed" (p. 165). A "refined mode of cultivating the moral virtues [fumigation] is or used to be practised by the Caffres of South Africa. Thus in former times as soon as a baby was born, some dirt was scraped from the forearm and other parts of the father's body and mixed with special medicines. The mixture was then made to smoulder and the baby was fumigated or 'washed' in the smoke. This ceremony was deemed of great importance, being the established way of communicating to the child a portion of the ancestral spirit (*itongo*) through the physical medium of the father's dirt, to which the spirit naturally adheres" (p. 166). "Other ingredients which have a most beneficial effect are the powdered whiskers of a leopard, the claws of a lion, and the skin of a salamander" (p. 167).

"When we call corn Ceres and wine Bacchus," says Cicero, "we use a common figure of speech; but do you imagine that anybody is so insane as to believe that the thing he feeds upon is a god?" In writing thus the Roman philosopher little foresaw that in Rome itself, and in the countries which have derived their creed from her, the belief which he here stigmatizes as insane was destined to persist for thousands of years" (p. 167). Among the Aino, a bear was killed. "The blood, caught in cups, was eagerly swallowed by the men. None of the women or children appeared to drink the blood, though custom did not forbid them to do so" (p. 187). With the Gilyaks, "as soon as the carcases had been cut up, the skins

with the head attached to them were set up in a wooden cage in such a way as to make it appear that the animal had entered the cage" (p. 193). "The solemn participation in his [the bear's] flesh and blood, and particularly the Aino custom of sharing the contents of the cup which had been consecrated by being set before the dead beast, are strongly suggestive of a sacrament" (p. 198).

"While the fine flower of the religious consciousness in myth, ritual, and art is fleeting and evanescent, its simpler forms are comparatively stable and permanent, being rooted deep in those principles of common minds which bid fair to outlive all the splendid but transient creations of genius" (p. 335). "The Aztec ritual, which prescribed the slaughter, the roasting alive, and the flaying of men and women in order that the gods might remain for ever young and strong, conforms to the general theory of deicide. . . . On that theory death is a portal through which gods and men alike must pass to escape the decrepitude of age and to attain the vigour of eternal youth. The conception may be said to culminate in the Brahmanical doctrine that in the daily sacrifice the body of the Creator is broken anew for the salvation of the world" (Frazer, *The Scapegoat*, Preface, p. vi.).

To some extent this view corresponds to the facts of Nature; it is not the individual but the race which is renewed by death. The sacrifice of many may be necessary for the salvation of the whole. The martyrdom of man is the ladder by which he, like all other creatures, rises to higher levels; it is the culmination of evolution by the survival of those best suited to the conditions. Thus the criticism of Montaigne's maxim that you should follow the customs and ethics of your own time and race, and that of Carneades and Empiricus that "the probable is the rule of life," is faulty. No man's decision on such points is trustworthy, for he is judge in his own cause and needs to be set right by the common opinion; yet, "*Securus judicat orbis terrarum*," in this way man advances in civilization and virtue. To quote Abraham Lincoln's now almost proverbial philosophy, "You can fool some of the people some of the time, but not all the people all the time." A sort of survival of the fittest in thought, a natural selection of the best precepts, takes place by degrees, and humanity grows as

man's mind improves. As Boëthius says, a bad man, as far as he is bad, is not a man; he has fallen from the rank of human excellence to that of an animal, from the standard of advanced persons and nations to that of inferior creatures and savage tribes; he has made himself an outlaw. He is greatly to be pitied, for the loss is his—he has fallen from his high estate and is injured, like anyone else who has lost an estate of value; and though society must protect itself against such mistaken members, this should be done in a reasonable way, and not by vindictive or truculent punishments. Methods which enable or allow them to come to the knowledge of the truth are to be advocated by wise men and adopted by prudent states.

"Manxmen burn beasts when they are dead as well as when they are alive; and their reasons for burning the dead animals may help us to understand their reasons for burning the living animals" (Frazer, *Balder the Beautiful*, Vol. I, p. 307). "'There can be no doubt but that a belief prevailed until a very recent period, amongst the small farmers in the districts remote from towns in Cornwall, that a living sacrifice appeased the wrath of God' (Hunt, *Romances and Drolls of the West of England*, 1st series, p. 237)" (p. 301). "'The idea of appeasing the wrath of a ferocious deity by burning an animal alive is probably no more than a theological gloss put on an old heathen rite; it would hardly occur to the simple mind of an English bumpkin'" (p. 302). "'If you want to know to whom you are indebted for the loss of the beast, you have simply to burn its carcase in the open air and watch who comes first to the spot or who first passes by'" (p. 307; quoting Sir John Rhys). "'For the cure of the murrain in cattle, one of the herd is still sacrificed for the good of the whole. This is done by burying it alive. I am assured that within the last ten years such a barbarism occurred in the county of Moray'" (Sir Arthur Mitchell, A.M., M.D., *On Various Superstitions in the North-West Highlands and Islands of Scotland*; Edinburgh, 1862; p. 12) (p. 326).

"The Kamilaroi tribe of New South Wales sometimes deposited their dead on the forks of trees, and lighting fires underneath caught the fat as it dropped; for they hoped with the droppings to acquire the strength and courage of the deceased. The Wollaroi, another tribe of New South Wales, used to place

the dead on a stage, and the mourners sat under it and rubbed their bodies with the juices of putrefaction which exuded from the rotten body, believing that this made them strong." Among the negroes of Southern Guinea "anyone who applies the precious dripping to his forehead is supposed to absorb thereby the intelligence of the dead" (Frazer, *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, Vol. II, pp. 162-3).

At funerals "in Australia the ceremony is completed by cutting a piece of flesh from the corpse, which is dried, cut up and distributed among the relatives and friends of the deceased; some suck their portion, 'to get strength and courage' . . . this case puts it beyond question that the object is to make an enduring covenant with the dead" (Robertson, *Religion of the Semites*, p. 323). "Even in modern times the use of human blood in covenants is not unknown to the Semites" (p. 315). "But the most notable application of the idea is in the rite of blood brotherhood, examples of which are found all over the world" (p. 314). Among the Hebrews, "the application of the living blood to the worshipper is retained in certain special cases—at the consecration of priests and the purification of the leper—where it is proper to express in the strongest way the establishment of a special bond between the god and his servant" (p. 344). "Forms of consecration and atonement in which the blood of the victim is applied to the worshipper, or the blood of the worshipper conveyed to the symbol of godhead, occur in all stages of heathen religion, not only among the Semites but among the Greeks and other races" (p. 348).

"Purification from a taboo violation, however, was attained primarily by two means—water and fire. The latter of these means was employed even in very primitive times. Now, the corpse above all else was regarded as taboo; contact with it was thought to bring contamination and to demand the rites of lustration. The one who touched a corpse was likewise held to be taboo and as a result he himself might not be touched before having undergone lustration" (Wundt, *Folk Psychology*, p. 219). "Purification from all earthly dross is mediated, according to the ideas of India by fire. . . . The soul, or psyche, departs in the smoke which ascends from the body as this is burned. The body remains below in the ashes, while the soul soars aloft to heaven in the smoke. . . . The

customs of the Semitic peoples were different. They adopted the idea . . . that celestial migration of the soul would occur only after its sojourn under the earth, following upon its resurrection, which it was thought would take place only at the end of time. It was in this form, as is well known, that Christianity took over into its resurrection belief the ideas developed by Judaism" (*loc. cit.*, p. 220).

"Saul's body was burned (I Sam. xxxi. 12) possibly to save it from the risk of exhumation by the Philistines, but perhaps rather with a religious intention, and almost as an act of worship, since his bones were buried under the sacred tamarisk at Jabesh. In Amos vi. 10 the victims of a plague are burned, which is to be understood by comparing Lev. xx. 14, xxi. 9; Amos ii. 1, and remembering that plague was a special mark of divine wrath (II Sam. xxiv), so that its victims might well be regarded as intensely taboo" (*Religion of the Semites*, p. 372). "The importance attached by various nations to these vital parts of the body is very ancient. . . . All sacrificial flesh is charged with an awful virtue, and all *sacra* are dangerous to the unclean or to those who are not duly prepared: but these are so holy and so awful that they are not eaten at all, but dealt with in special ways, and in particular are used as powerful charms. . . . The Hebrews pour out the blood at the altar, but the Greeks use it for lustration. . . . The ashes of sacrifice are used, like the blood, for lustrations of various kinds, as we see in the case of the red heifer among the Hebrews and in agricultural religions such ashes are very commonly used to give fertility to the land" (pp. 381-2). [See Numbers xix, for the red heifer.]

"The healing power of sacred water is closely connected with its purifying and consecrating power, for the primary conception of uncleanness is that of a dangerous infection. Washings and purifications play a great part in Semitic ritual, and were performed with living water, which was as such sacred in some degree" (p. 184). "The problem of disposing of the sacred carcase was in fact analogous to that which occurs whenever a kinsman dies. Here, too, the point is to find a way of dealing with the body consistent with the respect due to the dead, a respect which does not rest on sentimental grounds, but on the belief that the corpse is taboo, a source

of very dangerous supernatural influences of an infectious kind. In later times this infectiousness is expressed as uncleanness" (pp. 369-70). "So much indeed does this view of the matter predominate that among the Hebrews all purifications are ordinarily reckoned as purification from uncleanness: thus the man who has burned the red heifer or carried its ashes becomes ceremonially unclean, though in reality the thing that he has been in contact with was not impure but most holy; and similarly the handling of the Scriptures, according to the Rabbins, defiles the hands, *i.e.* entails a ceremonial washing" (p. 426).

"The universal characteristic of the fetish . . . is the fact that it is supposed to harbour a soul-like, demoniacal being. . . . Among the Sudan negroes fetishes generally consist of artificially fashioned wooden objects, not infrequently bearing a grimacing likeness of a human face. As regards the possession of magical powers, however, they do not differ from the so-called charingas of the Australians. . . . Fetishism may be said to be disseminated over the entire earth. It is a direct offshoot of the belief in a corporeal soul" (Wundt, p. 221). "The fetish, as it were, was a precursor within the totemic age of the divine image of later times" (p. 223). "Because its activity resembled that of human beings, it was generally given anthropomorphic features, though occasionally it was patterned after animals. . . . So long as the god remains a demoniacal power without clearly defined personal traits, the divine image retains the indeterminate character of the fetish image. Even among the Greeks the earliest divine images were but wooden posts that bore suggestions of a human face" (p. 224).

"Fetishism . . . is not, as Plutarch imagined, a late corruption of a pure and primitive theism. . . . On the contrary, fetishism is early and theism is late in the history of mankind" (Frazer, *The Golden Bough: Adonis, Attis, and Osiris*, Vol. II, p. 43.)

"Not a trace of ancestor-worship is to be found among really primitive men. We have clear proof of this in their manner of disposing of the dead. So far as possible, the dead are left lying where they happen to be, and no cult of any kind is connected with them. Totemism, moreover, gives

evidence of the fact that the cult of animal ancestors long antecedent that of human ancestors. . . . A purely *a priori* psychology of religion still entertained the supposition, rooted in Biblical tradition, of an original state of pure monotheism" (Wundt, p. 230). "The tribal totem is an animal species. The Australian, whose totem, let us say, is the kangaroo, regards all kangaroos which he meets as sacred animals; he may not kill them, nor, above all, eat of their flesh" (p. 231). "He believes that it is always near at hand. The unseen animal which thus accompanies him is therefore sometimes also called his 'bush-soul'; it is hidden somewhere in the bushes as a sort of animal double. . . . Totem-poles we have already described. The head of the animal whose representation has become the coat of arms here surmounts a series of faces of human ancestors" (p. 232).

"This external soul, or bush soul, as Miss Kingsley calls it, may be almost any animal, for example, a leopard, a fish, or a tortoise. . . . Unless he is gifted with second sight, a man cannot see his own bush soul" (Frazer, *Balder the Beautiful*, Vol. II, p. 204).

"In the belief of earlier ages, this human ancestor was preceded by an animal ancestor to whom the reverence which is now paid to the human ancestor was at one time given. According to a belief prevalent particularly among the negro peoples, the ordinary man perishes with death; the chieftain, however, or a feared medicine man, continues to live at least until all memory of him has vanished" (Wundt, p. 233). "Ancestor-worship itself is at the turning point of the transition to the new era. In origin, it belongs to totemic culture; in its later development it is one of the most significant indications of the dissolution of totemism, preparing the way for a new age in which it continues to hold an important place" (p. 235). "The main feature of the funeral ceremonies comes to be a sacrifice to the dead. Not only are the usual articles of utility placed in the grave—such, for example, as a man's weapons—but animals are slaughtered and buried with the corpse. . . . Slaves and women must also follow the deceased chieftain into the grave" (p. 238). "In both cases, these usages are clearly connected with the increased importance attached to the psyche, for they first appear with the spread of the belief

in a survival after death and in soul migration. . . . As soon as god-ideas begin to emerge, the sacrifice is brought, in the first instance, to these higher beings. . . . The slaughtered animals are no longer placed in the grave along with the deceased, but their blood is poured out upon it; of their flesh, moreover, only a part is thrown upon the grave as the portion of the dead, while the rest is consumed by the mourners. . . . The gods under whose protection the deceased is placed receive a portion of the sacrifice. When this occurs, the offering, which had been devoted to the deceased, becomes sacrifice proper" (p. 239). "In this early sacrifice to the dead the attempt to exercise a magical influence upon the deity—later, as we shall see, the essential feature of the sacrificial idea—is still in the background. . . . The gift, however, was now a gift to the deity. This was the final stage in the development of sacrifice, and represents the basis of the ordinary rationalistic interpretation" (p. 240).

"Amongst many savage tribes, especially such as are known to practise totemism, it is customary for lads at puberty to undergo certain initiatory rites, of which one of the commonest is a pretence of killing the lad and bringing him to life again" (Frazer, *Balder the Beautiful*, Vol. II, p. 225). "In the so-called *initiation ceremonies*, for a considerable period these youths have been prepared for the festival by the older men. They have been subjected to a strict asceticism for weeks beforehand; meanwhile they have also been trained in the use of weapons, and instructed in certain matters of which the young are kept in ignorance" (Wundt, p. 241). "Moreover, they must give evidence of fortitude by fearlessly leaping over the fire. . . . We may be allowed to regard also the first test . . . as having originally been a means of magical purification" (pp. 242-3). "The simulation of death and resurrection or of a new birth at initiation appears to have lingered on, or at least to have left traces of itself, among peoples who have advanced far beyond the stage of savagery. Thus, after his investiture with the sacred thread—the symbol of his order—a Brahman is called 'twice born'" (Frazer, *Balder the Beautiful*, Vol. II, p. 276). Jumping over a bonfire is a regular practice among boys in Scotland; where the "Beltane" fires recall the fires to Baal in the Bible. "If there is one general conclusion which

seems to emerge from the mass of particulars, I venture to think that it is the essential similarity in the working of the less-developed human mind among all races, which corresponds to the essential similarity in their bodily frame revealed by comparative anatomy" (*Frazer, Balder the Beautiful*, Vol. I, p. vi).

The multitudinous folk-festivals and rituals which still exist in carnival, bonfires, Mayday ceremonies, and the like all over Europe are echoes of the grim realities of savage superstition.

"The peasant remains a pagan and savage at heart; his civilization is merely a thin veneer" (Quoted in *The Times'* critique of *The Golden Bough*, Jan. 29, 1914, from Preface to *Balder the Beautiful* (First Edition), Vol. I, p. viii).

"There can be no doubt," writes Robert Chambers, "that this leaping through the fire is one of the most ancient of all known superstitions, and is identical with that followed by Manassah." Whalton in Northumberland, and Tarbolton in Ayrshire, are probably the only places in Great Britain now where these midsummer usages are observed. But this is questioned seriously to-day. "The essentially pagan character of the Easter fire festival appears plainly both from the mode in which it is celebrated by the peasants and from the superstitious beliefs which they associate with it" (*Balder the Beautiful*, Vol. I, p. 140). "In the central Highlands of Scotland bonfires, known as the Beltane fires, were formerly kindled with great ceremony on the first of May, and the traces of human sacrifices at them were particularly clear and unequivocal. The custom of lighting the bonfires lasted in various places far into the eighteenth century" (p. 146). A writer states that on St. John's Eve, in Ireland in 1782, "'at the house where I was entertained, it was told me that we should see at midnight the most singular sight in Ireland, which was the lighting of fires in honour of the sun. . . . The people danced round the fires, and at the close went through these fires, and made their sons and daughters, together with their cattle, pass through the fire; and the whole was conducted with religious solemnity' (*The Gentleman's Magazine*, Vol. LXV, 1795, pp. 124 sq.)" (p. 202). "On Sunday night bonfires were observed throughout nearly every county in the province of Leinster. In Kilkenny, fires blazed on every hillside at intervals of about a

mile. There were very many in the Queen's County, also in Kildare and Wexford" (p. 203). "'At Stoole, near Downpatrick, there is a ceremony commencing at twelve o'clock at night on Midsummer Eve' (Thistleton Dyer, *British Popular Customs*, pp. 322 sq., quoting the *Hibernian Magazine*, July, 1817)" (pp. 205-6). "Of human sacrifices offered on these occasions the most unequivocal traces . . . are those which, about a hundred years ago, still lingered at the Beltane fires" (*Balder the Beautiful*, Vol. II, p. 31).

"Vegetation cults date back to the very beginning of the totemic period. . . . Our interpretation of vegetation cults is supported particularly by the conditions prevailing in the original home of totemism, Australia. These cults here occur chiefly in the northern districts, into which there were early Melanesian immigrations. . . . These vegetation festivals, therefore, are also totem festivals" (Wundt, pp. 243-4), and "were finally superseded by *true cults of the soil*. The latter presuppose the preparation of the soil by the efforts of man" (p. 245), "occur more regularly, and at definite seasons of the year. . . . Typical of the transition are the vegetation festivals of the natives of Central America. . . . Hoe-culture, to which the American Indian has attained, has taught him the dependence of the growth of plants upon the act of sowing. . . . However primitive may be the hoe-culture which the individual carries on about his hut, it is not concerned exclusively with the immediate present, as is the mere gathering of food, but it aims to satisfy a future need. True, even in this case, the beginnings may be traced back to the preceding age. . . . Perhaps all human action concerned with the distant future was at first magical in aim" (p. 246).

"It is conditioned also by a second factor—namely, *community labour*" (p. 147). "Initiation into manhood early came to be of common concern because of the community life of age-associates and of the need for military training created by tribal warfare; the same is true, though at a later stage . . . of the tilling of the soil. . . . Natural conditions are common to all, all are obliged to select the same time both for the sowing and later for the harvest. . . . The more closely the members of the mark live together, however, the more do they share in common labour. . . . Since, moreover, the activity of sowing

and the subsequent growth of the crop preserve the magical character acquired in an earlier period, the work itself comes to be a cult activity" (p. 247). "When the plough, which is drawn by an animal, comes into use, the individuals are again separated. . . . The plough trains to reflection and brooding; the hoe stirs violent emotions. . . . With the invention of the plough, agriculture finally becomes the exclusive concern of man" (p. 248). [This is a mere surmise.—AUTHOR.]

"That which brings the men and women together and converts the labour into a cult act is primarily the dance. . . . When the cult members give themselves up to ecstatic and orgiastic dances, therefore, they believe that they are magically influencing the sprouting and growth of the seeds. . . . In this ecstasy of the cult, man feels himself one with external nature" (p. 249). "In the festival-celebrations of early cultural peoples there is still another important difference between the earliest vegetation cults and their later recrudescences. The former are connected particularly with *sowing*, the latter primarily with the *harvest*. . . . Vegetation festivals are intermediate between demon cults and celestial cults. In respect to origin, they belong to the former; in the degree in which more adequate conceptions of nature are attained they give rise to the latter" (p. 250). It is reasonable to suppose "they gradually incorporate other cults" (p. 251).

A good deal of this is perhaps questionable, but the manners of savage men are curious and hard to find out. Possibly Germans know more of this than more civilized races. "Among the Kayans of the Mahakam river in Central Borneo the sowing of the rice is immediately preceded by a performance of masked men, which is intended to attract the soul or rather the souls of the rice and so to make sure that the harvest will be a good one. The performers represent spirits; for, believing that spirits are mightier than men, the Kayans imagine they can acquire and exert superhuman power by imitating the form and action of spirits" (Frazer, *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, Vol. I, p. 186). A ritual dance "was actually performed in the rites of Demeter and Persephone by masked men or women, who personated the goddesses in their character of beasts" (Vol. II, p. 339). "The exact date at which the Proerosia or Festival before Ploughing took place

is somewhat uncertain" (Vol. I, p. 51). "The thought of the seed buried in the earth in order to spring up to new and higher life readily suggested a comparison with human destiny, and strengthened the hope that for man too the grave may be but the beginning of a better and happier existance in some brighter world unknown . . . the ancients regarded initiation in the Eleusinian mysteries as a key to unlock the gates of Paradise" (Vol. I, pp. 90-1).

"Sick persons drag themselves painfully to the festival or are brought to it by their relatives, in search of healing" (Wundt, p. 252). "Just as we ourselves occasionally experience relief from the flow of perspiration, so also may the one who has passed through the ceremony of the sweat-lodge feel himself reborn, as it were. . . . The custom thus acquires the significance of a sanctification ceremony, similar to baptism or the bath of the Brahman. . . . Sacrifice itself, as has already been mentioned, probably originated as sacrifice to the dead. Its further development occurs primarily in connection with the higher forms of vegetation cults" (pp. 252-3). "The magical sacrifice connected with vegetation festivals and their associated cults more and more ceases to be regarded as purely magical in nature and comes to be an offering to the deity whose favour is thereby sought. . . . The priests serve as magic priests and magic doctors, and it is they who preserve the traditions of the general cult ceremonies. . . . This represents the typical figure of the *medicine-man*. He is to be found even in primitive culture. . . . Associated with him is a restricted group of those cult members who are most familiar with the secrets of the cult, and are his immediate assistants in the festal ceremonies. It is these individuals that compose the *secret societies*. . . . Presumably they derive from the more primitive institution of men's clubs, within which the male members of a clan are united into age groups. . . . As tribal organization developed, and particularly as family bonds became firmer, age associations were dissolved" (p. 254). "Secrecy caused every such association to be organized into various ranks, graded according to the extent with which the individuals were familiar with the secret doctrines. . . . As early as the associations of medicine-men among the Africans and the American Indians; later it is to be found in connection

with the Eleusinian and Orphic mysteries; it is represented also by the Christian and Buddhistic orders. . . . Even the Greek phratries underwent a change of purpose analogous to that which occurred in the transition from the age group to the secret society" (p. 255). "The men's group belongs exclusively to the totemic age. . . . In addition to the tribal festival in which they co-operate, these societies also maintain their special cults. It is particularly in these latter cults that ancient totemic survivals are in evidence" (p. 256).

"When a man was about to be initiated into a secret society called Olala, his friends drew their knives and pretended to kill him. In reality they let him slip away, while they cut off the head of a dummy. . . . For a whole year the novice remained absent. . . . In these ceremonies the essence of the rite appears to be the killing of the novice in his character of a man and his restoration to life in the form of the animal which is thence forward to be, if not his guardian spirit, at least linked to him in a peculiarly intimate relation. It is to be remembered that the Indians of Guatemala, whose life was bound up with an animal, were supposed to have the power of appearing in the shape of the particular creature with which they were thus sympathetically united" (Frazer, *Balder the Beautiful*, Vol. II, pp. 271-2). "Father Trilles . . . ascertained that among the Fans of the Gaboon every wizard is believed at initiation to unite his life with that of some particular wild animal by a rite of blood-brotherhood; he draws blood from the ear of the animal and from his own arm, and inoculates the animal with his own blood, and himself with the blood of the beast" (*loc. cit.*, p. 201).

"Even Australia possesses cave drawings which perhaps have some sort of cult significance" (Wundt, pp. 256-7). "Polynesia is the chief centre of *artistic tattooing*. . . . As soon as clothing appears, the decoration of the body itself gives way to that of dress. . . . On particular occasions custom may continue to demand entire nakedness . . . painting necessitated by the festivals takes the place of tattooing. . . . Tattooing is now practised almost exclusively by criminals and prostitutes" (p. 257). "These tattoo patterns contain many significant elements of a celestial mythology. . . . They become, as we would to-day express it, more and more

conventionalized, since only the simplest outlines of the objects are retained. . . . Even though the art of making pottery is not to be found in primitive culture proper, it nevertheless dates back to a very early age. . . . Totemic cult . . . furnished the motives for the decoration . . . implements, weapons, women's combs, and even the body itself were marked with simple and regular linear drawings . . . apperceived as the outlines of animal or plant forms" (pp. 258-9). "Thus arose representations of natural objects framed in by geometrical ornamentations. . . . By tattooing, man originally guarded his own person with protective magic; in ceramics, this magic was brought into connection with man's utensils. . . . The animals represented were at first primarily *totem animals*. . . . It is only in *one* respect that the ceramics, particularly of the American Indians, copy man—the vessel as a whole represents a head or a skull" (p. 260). "No portrayal of activities in which human beings participate, is to be found in the totemic age. . . . As there is no sculpture so also is there, strictly speaking, no *architecture*. . . . There are no temples. . . . In Melanesia, Polynesia, and other regions, the erection of dwelling places on the sea shore or on the shores of large rivers led to the *pole-hut*" (p. 261). "The sole impetus to architecture is furnished by the immediate needs of practical life" (p. 262). "Common labour gives rise to common songs. . . . such *work-songs* are to be found throughout the entire totemic era" (p. 267).

"A myth is never so graphic and precise in its details as when it is, so to speak, the book of the words which are spoken and acted by the performers of the sacred rite" (Frazer, *Balder the Beautiful*, Vol. I, p. 105). "Performed as magical ceremonies for the sake of producing these natural effects which they describe in figurative language" (p. 105). "We must always remember that we are treading enchanted ground, and must beware of taking for solid realities the cloudy shapes that cross our path or hover and gibber at us through the gloom. We can never completely replace ourselves at the standpoint of primitive man, see things with his eyes and feel our hearts beat with the emotions that stirred his" (*loc. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 302).

"The totemic age, particularly, has produced a great

variety of forms of narrative. Predominant among these is the *märchen-myth*, a narrative which resembles the fairy tale" (Wundt, p. 270). "The celestial *märchen* affords a direct record of the impression made by celestial phenomena on the consciousness of an age whose ideas were as yet circumscribed by the environment" (p. 275). "Animals and men were supposed to inhabit the clouds and the heavenly bodies. . . . Three themes in particular are dominant in the most primitive celestial tales; the ascension of man into the heavens; his descent from heaven, and the devourment of the great heavenly bodies. . . . A familiar example of *märchen* of devourment is the Biblical legend of Jonah . . . though it is probably based on much older tales. Many of the tales of devourment, which are common to all parts of the world, centre about a hero" (pp. 276-7). "The hero of the *märchen* then gradually passes over into the hero of the saga and of the epic" (p. 280). "A hero is any powerful individuality whatsoever, and the general characteristic of this new age, therefore, is the predominance of the *individual personality*. . . . The gods of this age are likewise patterned entirely after powerful human personalities. They are anthropomorphic in every respect—human beings of a higher order, whose qualities, though found only among men, are magnified to infinitude. . . . The god is created after the image of the hero, and not as traditional mythology still believes, the hero after the image of the god. It would, indeed, be a strange procedure for man first to create the ideal conception of his god and only subsequently to transform this into human outlines, and thus produce the hero" (p. 282). "The conception of an anthropomorphic god, therefore, results from a fusion of hero with demon" (p. 283). "Just because of the contrast between personal god and impersonal demon, this epoch may be designated as that of the *origin of religion*, in the narrower and proper sense of the word" (p. 284). "At the beginning of the age of heroes and gods it is the creative power of the *religious* consciousness whose activities most accurately mirror the various spiritual achievements of the period. . . . Most important of all these features is the establishment of the *State*" (p. 286). "The formation of the state was always conditioned by individual *rulership*" (p. 287). "The rise of monarchy appears to be an essential condition

of the emergence of mankind from savagery. . . . The old notion that the savage is the freest of mankind is the reverse of the truth. He is a slave, not indeed to a visible master, but to the past, to the spirits of his dead forefathers, who haunt his steps from birth to death. . . . The rise of one man to supreme power enables him to carry through changes in a single lifetime which previously many generations might not have sufficed to effect. . . . Even the whims and caprices of a tyrant may be of service in breaking the chain of custom" (Frazer, *The Magic Art*, Vol. I, p. 217).

"In addition there is the *breeding of domestic animals*. . . . The hunter is thought to have been seized one fine day with an impulse to domesticate animals instead of hunting them. He tamed the wild creatures, and thus turned from a hunter into a nomad. . . . The nomad is then supposed to have tired of his wandering life and to have settled down. . . . Instead of obtaining milk by herding his cattle, he hitched the ox to the plough, after having with that wisdom and foresight which such theories always attribute to primitive man, invented the plough. This theory is an impossible fiction from beginning to end" (Wundt, p. 289). "Primitive agriculture existed even at a very early age. We find it widely prevalent among the American aborigines who possessed no domesticated animal whatever except the dog, and . . . [this] was never tamed at all, but domesticated itself at the very dawn of prehistoric times" (p. 290). "The plough . . . was anteceded by the wagon. . . . The first traces of a wheel or of wheel-like objects are to be found in the latter part of the stone age" (p. 291). "The appearance of plough-culture *individualizes labour*. . . . Plough-culture gives rise to *private property* as regards both the soil and its products" (p. 298). "Bound up with these social distinctions is the *division of labour* which now arises. The land-owner no longer himself manufactures the tools which he needs or the weapons with which he goes to war. A class of artisans is formed consisting partly of those who have little property, and partly of slaves" (p. 300).

"Early, and still partly legendary, tradition tells of an organization of society on the basis of the number *twelve*. This . . . seems to have emanated from the Babylonians. They were the people who first attempted to govern human affairs in

accordance with celestial phenomena" (p. 304). "We may refer to the legendary twelve tribes of pre-exilic Israel, later a source of much difficulty to Talmudic scholars, inasmuch as these tribes are not to be found in history, and also to the twelve gods of Greece," etc. (p. 306). "The Book of Exodus no longer speaks of the legendary twelve tribes of Israel, but tells of only *ten* tribes" (p. 308).

"The representation which we have in Genesis and Exodus of *all* the house of Jacob migrating into Egypt to join Joseph there, or of *all* Jacob's descendants leaving it at the Exodus, may have arisen only afterwards, when the nation had become consolidated" (Driver, "Exodus," *Cambridge Bible*, Pref. xi). "How long the Israelites had been sojourners in Egypt cannot be determined with certainty. . . . In the Old Testament 400 or 430 years, and also four generations are assigned as the period (Gen. xv. 13-16). . . . The two statements may have been harmonized by the supposition that a 'generation' at the period in question consisted of 100 years; but naturally it cannot have done so in reality" (p. xlvi). "The fact that the ancient family comprised three generations may be due to the natural limit of life, which does not seem to have changed essentially since the beginnings of civilization" (Wundt, p. 313). "It is, however, quite uncertain how far the tribes which we find in Canaan under the monarchy correspond to tribes which existed before the conquest" (Rev. W. H. Bonnett, *H.D.B.*, Vol. IV, p. 810).

"Superior civilization, however, involves a strong tendency toward individual industry, and thus toward the differentiation of personal property from common property. . . . In addition to descent from privileged ancestors, it is property that gives the individual his social position" (Wundt, p. 319). "With the effort to abolish class distinctions, moreover, there gradually comes a demand for equality of rights . . . firstly, by the development of the State and of the judicial system, and, secondly, by the transformations which the character of the hero undergoes in the course of history . . . in the gradual displacement of the warrior-hero by the hero of peace" (p. 320). "In the totemic age, there were no cities, but at most fair-sized groups of huts or houses, forming villages" (pp. 323-4). "The course of development in Greece and Rome

differed from that of the Oriental realms. . . . Even in very ancient times they manifested a disposition to allow free play to the assertion of the individual personality" (p. 326). With them "we find no city apart from a State, and it is doubtful whether there was a State without a city . . . the mediæval city began as a market and reached its completion with the building of a castle" (p. 327).

"The northern Semites . . . whose progress up to the eighth century before Christ certainly did not lag behind that of the Greeks, were deprived of political independence, and so cut short in their natural development. . . . From this time onwards the difference between the Syrian or Palestinian and the Greek was not one of race alone, it was the difference between a free citizen and a slave of an Oriental despotism" (Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, pp. 34-5). "Religion as well as civil society was profoundly affected by the catastrophe of the old free communities" (p. 35).

"The social regulations . . . find their consummation in the *legal system* . . . law began by regulating the intercourse of individuals; later it acquired authority over family relations, which had remained under the shelter of custom . . . last of all, it asserted itself also over the political order" (Wundt, pp. 327-8). "The kingdom of the gods was but the terrestrial State projected into an ideal sphere . . . at a later period, the feeling that law represented a religious duty gave way to the moral law of conscience. . . . At first, the entire body of law was regarded as having been given directly by the deity, as was the case; for example, with the Israelitic Priests' Code, which clothes even the most external mode of life in the garb of religious commands" (p. 329). "No trace of such a conception was associated with the chiefs of the totemic period" (p. 330). "The administration of justice was vested, in the first place, in a relatively restricted group of the older and experienced men . . . powers were assumed, in the second place, by individual leaders in the chase or in war. . . . These initial stages of legal procedure indicate that the earliest judge was an *arbitrator*" (p. 331). "As soon as the State assumes the function of deciding the controversies of individuals, the judge becomes an *official*. . . . The secular power is limited by the authority of the priesthood, whose chief

prerogative comes to be penal justice" (p. 332). "The ruler possesses power over life and death during war with hostile tribes, he comes to exercise the same authority in connection also with the feuds of his fellow tribesmen. . . . In the beginnings of legal development, however, law always possesses also a *religious sanction*" (p. 333). "The gods are invoked as witnesses of the transaction or as avengers of broken pledges" (p. 334). "The means for determining guilt or innocence were fire and water, the same agencies that had long been employed by religious cults for purposes of lustration" (p. 338). "At the time when deity cults were at their zenith, the most serious crimes were held to be those connected with religion—namely, temple sacrilege and blasphemy" (p. 339).

"Relatively humane was blood-revenge . . . in comparison with the penal law of the Middle Ages" (p. 345). "In fundamental contrast with the Mosaic law, Christianity repudiated the requital of like with like . . . to seek in the cruelties of severe prison penalties a substitute for the suppressed impulse to revenge" (p. 347). "All the horrors that human cruelty can invent are carried over from the judicial administration of this world into that of the beyond" (p. 404). "Purgatorial lustration, after the pattern of terrestrial cult ceremonies, was believed to be effected by means of fire. . . . Dante's *Divine Comedy* presents a faithful portrayal of these conceptions" (p. 407), which go back to a very ancient past and constitute, in fact, a "human tragedy." The idea of retribution is not a primitive idea, nor, in its outset ethical, "but purely religious—a striking proof that morality and religion were originally distinct" (p. 408). It did not at first include all men. "The *idea of redemption*, born of the longing to exchange this world, with its sufferings and wants, for a world of happiness in the beyond, took possession of the age. . . . Succeeding the hero ideal, as its abrogation and at the same time its consummation, is the ideal of humanity" (p. 410).

"The gods are always pictured by the mythological imagination in human form, since it is only his own characteristics that man can conceive as magnified into the highest values in so absolute a sense" (Wundt, pp. 415-16). "For there can be no doubt that Christ and Buddha alike existed as human beings and that originally they were also regarded as such"

(p. 425). "Prior to the belief in gods, there were numerous demon cults" (p. 415). "The difference between gods and demons lies not in their nature and power . . . but in their relations to man. . . . A god who loses his worshippers falls back into the ranks of the demons. . . . The earth may be said to be parcelled out between demons and wild beasts on the one hand, and gods and men on the other. To the former belong the untrodden wilderness. . . . The triumph of the gods over the demons, like the triumph of man over wild beasts, must have been effected very gradually, and may be regarded as finally sealed and secured only in the agricultural stage" (*Smith, Religion of the Semites*, pp. 121-2).

"The three cult agencies—*prayer, sacrifice, and sanctification*—are absolutely at one" (Wundt, p. 427). "Prayer is regarded as imposing an obligation upon the god no less than upon man . . . the relation of the two is that of a contract. This idea . . . is fundamental in the Jahve cult of the Israelites" (pp. 429-30). "The same idea prevails when public sacrifice demands a human being . . . as a vicarious offering for the sacrificing community. . . . The individual sacrificed to the deity serves as a *substitute* for the community. In this form, however, human sacrifice does not antedate animal sacrifice" (p. 435).

"The gods stood as much in need of their worshippers as the worshippers in need of them. . . . If the gods made the earth to bring forth abundantly, the flocks and herds to teem, and the human race to multiply, they expected that a portion of their bounty should be returned to them in the shape of tithe or tribute. On this tithe, indeed, they subsisted, and without it they would starve" (Frazer, *The Magic Art*, p. 31). "The Druids believed that the more persons they sentenced to death, the greater would be the fertility of the land" (Frazer, *Balder the Beautiful*, Vol. II, p. 42). A party of Khonds in India said to a father, "'Your child has died that all the world may live, and the Earth Goddess herself will wipe that spittle from your face.'" "The flesh and ashes of the victim were believed to be endowed with a magical or physical power of fertilizing the land" (Frazer, *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, Vol. I, pp. 246, 250). "In short, the Meriah seems to have been regarded as divine." (p. 250). "The barbarous rites just described offer

analogies to the harvest customs of Europe" (p. 251). "The corn-spirit is conceived as embodied in an animal; this divine animal is slain, and its flesh and blood are partaken of by the harvesters. . . . Again, as a substitute for the real flesh of the divine being, bread or dumplings are . . . eaten sacramentally" (p. 303). "All that the people know, or rather imagine, is that somehow they themselves, their cattle, and their crops are mysteriously bound up with their divine king" (Frazer, *Balder the Beautiful*, Vol. I, p. 1).

"In the later ages of antiquity there was a very general belief . . . that in strictness the oldest rituals demanded a human victim, and that animal sacrifices were substituted for the life of a man" (*Religion of Semites*, p. 361). "The prevalent belief of ancient heathenism that animal victims are an imperfect substitute for a human life, arose by a false inference from traditional forms of ritual that had ceased to be understood" (p. 365). "Wherever we find the doctrine of substitution of animal life for that of man, we find also examples of actual human sacrifice, sometimes confined to seasons of extreme peril, and sometimes practised periodically at solemn annual rites." "Examples of human sacrifices, many of which subsisted within the Roman Empire, down to the time of Hadrian, are collected by Porphyry" (p. 366 and *note, op. cit.*).

"Finally, the Christian conception of the sacrificial death of Jesus combines the same ideas, though their religious significance is transformed and reinforced by the thought of redemption which has displaced the older protective and fortune-bringing magic. The sacrificial community has here become the whole of mankind, and the one who by his death brings about a reconciliation with the deity is himself the god. For this reason dogma insists—with a logic that is perhaps unconscious and mystical in nature, yet all the more compelling—on the unity of the divine personality with that of the redeemer who died the sacrificial death. This fusion of sacrificial conceptions thus gave rise to the most impressive and effective story that the human mind ever conceived" (Wundt, p. 436).

"We may doubtless say of the three eras following that of primitive man that totemism is the age of the *satisfaction of wants*, the heroic age, that of *art*, and the succeeding period of the development to humanity, that of *science*" (p. 448).

"Neither primitive nor totemic man shows the faintest trace of what we should, strictly speaking, call humanity. He gives evidence merely of an attachment to the nearest associates of horde or tribe, such as is foreshadowed even among the animals of social habits" (p. 471). "The earlier age is ever unconsciously preparing the way for one that is to come. The clan of primitive tribal organization had no idea of a coming State" (p. 474). "Mankind must prepare the way for human nature" (p. 475).

"The idea of a god-monarch arose wherever that of a world monarch was developed. . . . This led to a temporary compromise in which the ruler, though not himself regarded as a deity, was nevertheless held to be the son of a god" (p. 480). "Both ideas, that of a world empire . . . and that of a universe whose centre is the earth and whose boundary is the crystal sphere of the heaven . . . sprang from the same mythological world-view that also found expression in the conception of a divine State projected from earth into heaven" (p. 483). "In the East the national god tended to acquire a really monarchic sway. What is often described as the natural tendency of Semitic religion towards ethical monotheism, is in the main nothing more than a consequence of the alliance of religion with monarchy" (*Religion of the Semites*, p. 74).

"The king of Egypt exhausted all the possible conceptions of divinity which the Egyptians had framed for themselves. A superhuman god by his birth and by his royal office, he became the deified man after his death'" (Frazer, quoting A. Moret, *The Magic Art*, Vol. I, p. 418). "At Thebes in Egypt a woman slept in the temple of Ammon as the consort of the god, and like the human wife of Bel at Babylon, she was said to have no commerce with a man. . . . Next, according to the inscription, the mystery of incarnation takes place" (Vol. II, pp. 130-1). Of a child of a king of Egypt it was said: "'She shall reign in righteousness in all the earth, for my soul is hers, my heart is hers, my will is hers, my crown is hers, truly, that she may rule over the two lands, that she may guide the souls of all living'" (Vol. II, p. 132). "Thus the doctrine of the divine birth of kings presents no serious difficulty to people who believe that a god may be made flesh in a man and that a virgin may conceive and bear him a son" (p. 198).

"Once on a time a Norwegian exile named Gunnar Helming gave himself out to be Frey in person, and rode about on the sacred waggon dressed up in the god's clothes. Everywhere the simple folk welcomed him as the deity, and observed with wonder and delight that a god walked about among men and ate and drank just like other people" (p. 144). "In a society where every man is supposed to be endowed more or less with powers which we should call supernatural, it is plain that the distinction between gods and men is somewhat blurred, or rather has scarcely emerged. The conception of gods as superhuman beings endowed with powers to which man possesses nothing comparable in degree and hardly even in kind, has been slowly evolved in the course of history" (Vol. I, p. 373). "Our ideas on this profound subject are the fruit of a long intellectual and moral evolution" (p. 375). "The world empire was preparatory" (Wundt, *op. cit.*, p. 485). "In the course of the centuries, the clergy of the West developed a class of scholars who were out of sympathy with the prevailing tendencies toward national culture" (p. 490). "The inner dissolution to which the last of the great world empires . . . succumbed, overpowered also the Church as soon as the latter endeavoured to become a new world State and insisted on the duty of believers to render obedience to it" (p. 491).

"There can be little doubt that the most significant changes in history were not imposed upon the Church by the bishops from above, but forced upon the bishops by the pressure of popular opinion from below" (Bigg, *The Church's Task under the Roman Empire*, Pref., p. v). "If we want to understand the making of the medieval Church we must go . . . not to the masters of theology, but to the Campanian farmer complaining to St. Felix of the theft of his oxen, and menacing the saint, if he does not make good the loss caused by his neglect" (Pref., p. vii). "When the beloved Germanicus died, the people cast the images of the Penates into the gutter. Such wild revolt against the injustice of heaven is not unknown in Roman Catholic countries, where civilization is backward. Renan has told us of a Breton blacksmith who threatened to shoe the Virgin with red-hot iron if his daughter did not recover" (Bigg, *Neoplatonism*, p. 60). "At Palermo [in a drought] they

dumped St. Joseph in a garden to see the state of things for himself and they swore to leave him there in the sun till rain fell. Other saints were turned, like naughty children, with their faces to the wall. Others, again, stripped of their beautiful robes" (Frazer, *The Magic Art*, Vol. I, p. 300).

"Every community likes to have its scholars, and treats them with great respect, but always on the tacit understanding that they score for their side and advertise the principles of their backers" (Bigg, *Church's Task*, p. viii). "There are many traces of these shortcomings in the early history of the Church which ought not to be blinked" (p. xv). "Many writers, including the late Lord Acton, have spoken in language of the strongest reprehension of the superstition of the early Church. It begins about the middle of the third century; we see it first distinctly in Cyprian, Novatian, and Gregory Thaumaturgus, and in the fourth century it is very strongly marked. It showed itself partly as asceticism, partly in credulity, partly in persecution" (p. 83). "Good and intelligent men, like Gregory Thaumaturgus, the pupil of Origen, sanctioned practices of which they did not approve, in order to make it easier for the heathen to come over" (p. 84). "But the church ale was so like the old heathen festival that it was really the same thing, though a little better at every point" (p. 84, *note*). "As for persecution, of which Lord Acton speaks in such scathing words, we must not attempt to justify or to extenuate it. It began at once in Constantine's treatment of the Donatists, and culminated in the terrible laws of Theodosius, of which the best that we can say is that they do not appear to have been very often applied to their full extent. It is a mistake to suppose that the Church learned cruelty from the heathen, who indeed were very spasmodic and inefficient persecutors. The old persecutions were neither very numerous nor very fatal, and so far as they did not originate in the fury of the vulgar mob, were almost entirely political, like that of Queen Elizabeth, not inquisitorial, like that of Queen Mary. But the Christian Emperors and bishops were guided not by the example of their old enemies, but by that same mistaken reverence for the Hebrew Scriptures which caused so much injury in other directions. Because the Jew had been commanded to put the blasphemer to death, it appeared to be the sacred duty of the

Christian also not to suffer the heretic to live. Here we see most distinctly the evil results of that playing with history which was inculcated in the Roman schools" (p. 85).

"Every authority, of Cæsar, or governor, or magistrate, or tax-gatherer—I am afraid we must even say of bishop—was moulded upon the same bad analogy" (p. 144). "The state of things in the Empire, especially in Christian times, was worse than that in France just before the Revolution. The senators were enormously wealthy, and stood practically above the reach of the law; the people were exceedingly poor . . . the poor were ground down by heavy and ill-adjusted taxation. . . . Salvian tells us that the advent of the barbarian conquerors was in many places hailed with joy, and this is probably true" (p. 120). "The disgraceful treachery of Count Boniface, who called the Vandals into Africa to gratify his spite against the Empress Placidia, is characteristic of his age and would have been impossible in the old heathen times" (p. 121).

"The corruption of manners and principles so forcibly lamented by Eusebius, may be considered, not only as a consequence, but as a proof, of the liberty which the Christians enjoyed and abused under the reign of Diocletian. Prosperity had relaxed the nerves of discipline. Fraud, envy, and malice prevailed in every congregation" (Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Methuen, 1896, Vol. II, p. 118). "The Christians, in the course of their intestine dissensions, have inflicted far greater severities on each other than they experienced from the zeal of infidels. During the ages of ignorance which followed the subversion of the Roman Empire in the West, the bishops of the Imperial city extended their dominion over the laity as well as clergy of the Latin church. . . . The Church of Rome defended by violence the empire she had acquired by fraud; a system of peace and benevolence was soon disgraced by proscriptions, wars, massacres, and the institution of the holy office" (*ibid.*, Chap. XVI, pp. 138-9; and in Chap. XX). "The interested views, the selfish and angry passions, the arts of perfidy and dissimulation, the secret corruption, the open and even bloody violence, which had formerly disgraced the freedom of election in the commonwealths of Greece and Rome, too often influenced the choice of the successor of the apostles" (p. 317). "The

primitive Christians derived the institution of civil government, not from the consent of the people, but from the decrees of heaven. The reigning emperor, though he had usurped the sceptre by treason and murder, immediately assumed the sacred character of vicegerent of the Deity. To the Deity alone he was accountable for the abuse of his power." "But, as those princes presumed to extend their despotism over the faith, as well as over the lives and fortunes, of their subjects, the weight of their suffrage sometimes inclined the ecclesiastical balance; and the prerogatives of the King of Heaven were settled, or changed, or modified, in the cabinet of an earthly monarch" (Chap. XXI, p. 294).

"It is melancholy to say it, but the chief, perhaps the only English writer who has any claim to be considered an ecclesiastical historian, is the infidel Gibbon" (Cardinal Newman, *Development of Christian Doctrine*, p. 51). Possibly Newman overlooked Milman, because he was then only coming to the front, and was of a markedly different party.

Constantine "assumed a supreme power over this sacred community, with such liberty of modelling and controlling it, as public good should need" (Mosheim, *Ecclesiastical History*, edited by W. Stubbs, Vol. I, p. 238). "Upon established rights, however, great encroachments were gradually made from the time when various disturbances and quarrels and horrid contests everywhere arose, either on account of religious affairs or doctrines, or of episcopal elections. . . . The bishops too themselves, whose wealth and influence were not a little augmented from the times of Constantine, gradually subverted and changed the ancient principles of church government" (p. 239). "These marks of power and worldly greatness were so fascinating to the minds of Christians, even in this age [centy. IV], that often most obstinate and bloody contests took place at Rome when a new pontiff was to be created by the suffrages of the priests and people" (p. 242). "To these defects in the moral system of the age must be added two principal errors now almost publicly adopted, and from which afterwards immense evils resulted. The first was, that *to deceive and lie is a virtue*, when religion can be promoted by it. The other was, that *errors in religion*, when maintained after proper admonition, ought to be visited with *penalties and punishment*.

ments. . . . If some inquisitive person were to examine the conduct and the writings of the greatest and most pious teachers of this century, I fear that he would find almost all of them infected with this leprosy. I cannot except Ambrose, nor Hilary, nor Augustine, nor Gregory Nazianzen, nor Jerome" (p. 275). "To these evils must be added the rivalry and ambition of the patriarchs themselves, which gave birth to abominable crimes and the most destructive wars" (p. 334). "Of the vices of the whole clerical order, their luxury, their arrogance, their avarice, their voluptuous lives, we have as many witnesses as we have writers of integrity and gravity in this age [centy. V], whose works have come down to us. . . . These stains on the character of the clergy would have been deemed insufferable had not most of the people been sunk in superstition and ignorance, and had not all estimated the rights and powers of Christian teachers by those of the ancient priests, as well Hebrew as Greek and Roman" (p. 335). "The barriers of ancient simplicity and truth being once torn up, there was a constant progress for the worse; nor can it easily be said how much of impurity and superstition religion gradually received" (p. 417) [of centy. VI]. "Two irrefragable arguments were at hand: *the authority of the Church*, and *miracles*; for the working of which in these times of ignorance but a moderate share of dexterity was requisite" (p. 457) [of centy. VII]. "The corrupt moral principles of the times allowed the use of what are improperly called *pious* frauds; hence heralds of Christianity thought it no sin to terrify or beguile with fictitious miracles those whom they were unable to convince by reasoning" (pp. 480-1) [of centy. VIII]. "All orders of society . . . neglecting the duties of true piety . . . fearlessly gave themselves up to every vice and crime, supposing that God could easily be appeased and reconciled to them by the intercessions and prayers of the saints and by the friendly offices of the priests" (p. 503).

In the ninth century "a flood of superstitious and pious follies, and of base degrading opinions, rushed in from all quarters. . . . Everybody believed that God would never be found propitious to those who had not secured some intercessor and friend among the inhabitants of heaven" (pp. 550-1). "Thus transferring to the Almighty the habits and

failings of their own age, in the usual manner." "That the history of the Roman bishops in this [the tenth] century, is a history not of men, but of monsters, a history of the most atrocious villanies and crimes, is acknowledged by all the best writers; those not excepted even who plead for pontifical authority" (p. 594). "Nothing certainly can be thought of, so filthy, criminal, and wicked, as to be deemed incompatible with their characters by the supreme directors of religion and its rites; nor was any government ever so loaded with vices of every kind as that which passed for the most holy" (p. 594). These statements are not even questioned by Stubbs; and he would hardly have let such words pass if they had been untrue, for he was a historian of the first rank. Lord Acton was also a first-class writer, and he was a Roman Catholic. Cardinal "Baronius (*Annales*, ad ann. 900) says ' . . . What monsters, horrible to behold, were then raised to the holy see, which angels revere! What evils did they perpetrate; what horrible tragedies ensued! What filthiness defiled it ! ' " (p. 594, *note*).

They made a monster of God; men always think heaven looks on earth with eyes like their own. The autocratic East produced a despot deity, the republics of Greece and Rome a council of gods, those of Italy an oligarchy of nobles. It has even been suggested that "the multiplicity of Emperors at the time of Diocletian led up to the doctrine of the Trinity." The habits and thought of an age idealize themselves in religion: a savage race has a savage god, a dishonourable and self-seeking one, a deity after its own heart. It was when they were in trouble that the Jews discovered a pitying Father, an all-loving God. Perhaps we are creating a constitutional monarch, who judges all men by the laws in vogue at their time, with the result that some of the "saints" present a rather curious aspect to our standards of right and honour, which have changed from those in vogue during the dark ages of the Church. But when men claim to be in high office "by the grace of God" and act in a disgraceful way it is open to question if the association is not false; for good trees are known by their fruits, and these things were certainly not the outcome of any holy Spirit.

"At this time nothing was conducted regularly at Rome, but everything was carried by bribery or violence" (Mosheim,

p. 595). "The kings, princes, and nobles either conferred the sacred offices on their friends and ministers . . . or *sold* them to the highest bidders" (p. 600). "A great multitude of saints, *i.e.* of nobles of the heavenly court and ministers of the heavenly commonwealth, sprang up everywhere" (p. 606). "For people fancied that God and his friends must feel just as earthly kings and nobles do; whose favour may be gained by gifts and presents, and who delight in frequent salutations and external marks of honour" (p. 609). "Some of their arrangements flowed from the erroneous opinions on sacred and secular subjects which the barbarous nations derived from their ancestors and incorporated with Christianity" (p. 609).

"The tenth century is dark from its broad and manifest abominations. . . . Italy is, unquestionably, the scene of the most exciting political intrigues of the time; the capital of Western Christendom is the place in which its blackest enormities are gathered up, and from which they diffuse themselves abroad. . . . The Popedom becomes the prize for the counts, dukes, and harlots who, by one foul means or another, are enabled to make good their supremacy" (F. D. Maurice, *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*, 1872, pp. 502-3). "'Was it not to terminate,' men asked themselves, 'in the destruction of the visible world?' The crimes of all classes made such an expectation reasonable; they were greatest and most abominable in the class which existed to testify of righteousness" (p. 506).

"In view of their identical development . . . the Grecian Demeter, the Phrygian Cybele, and the Phoenician Astarte, were alike in nature. . . . All these cults became *redemption cults*" (Wundt, p. 495). "Related to Dionysius were other deities . . . Mithra, Attis, Osiris, and Serapis. All of these were gods who had been redeemed from pain and anguish and were therefore capable, in their sympathy, of redeeming man" (p. 496). In the faith of the Egyptians the cruel death and blessed resurrection of Osiris occupied the same place as the death and resurrection of Christ hold in the faith of Christians; as Osiris died and rose again from the dead, so they hoped through him and his dear name to wake triumphant from the sleep of death to a blissful eternity.

"Every dead Egyptian was identified with Osiris and bore

his name . . . and the resurrection of the dead was conceived, like that of Osiris, not merely as spiritual but also as bodily" (Frazer, *The Golden Bough : Adonis, Attis, and Osiris*, Vol. II, p. 16). "However, in later times the body with which the dead came to life was believed to be a spiritual, not a material body" (p. 16, note). "Another of those gods whose supposed death and resurrection struck such deep root into the faith and ritual of Western Asia is Attis. He was to Phrygia what Adonis was to Syria" (Vol. I, p. 263). "All three were believed to have died and risen again from the dead; and the divine death and resurrection of all three were dramatically represented at annual festivals, which their worshippers celebrated with alternate transports of sorrow and joy, of weeping and exultation" (Vol. II, p. 201). Sir William Ramsay is of opinion that at these Phrygian ceremonies "the representative of the god was probably slain each year by a cruel death, just as the god himself died" (*Ency. Brit.*, 11th Ed., Vol. XXI, p. 544).

"In Buddhism, as in original Christianity, human life is regarded as a suffering. . . . The difference between Nirvana and the Christian heaven is merely that, in the one case the emphasis falls on knowledge, whereas in the other it is placed on feeling" (Wundt, p. 499). "Christianity, which originated as a folk religion, fell a prey in its dogmatization to a theology which prescribed the content of belief" (p. 500). "The religious communities which they inspired sought to deprive them of the very characteristic which opens human hearts to them. . . . The need of a living god whose existence was historically attested led irresistibly to the elevation of the man into a god" (p. 501). There are "legends, prevalent in all parts of the earth, of the death and resurrection of a deity. Such legends everywhere grew up out of vegetation cults" (p. 502).

"The death and resurrection of Attis were officially celebrated at Rome on the 24th and 25th of March, the latter being regarded as the spring equinox, and therefore as the most appropriate day for the revival of a god of vegetation" (Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, and Osiris*, Vol. I, p. 306). "We need not, with some inquirers in ancient and modern times, suppose that these Western peoples borrowed from the older civilization

of the Orient the conception of the Dying and Reviving God, together with the solemn ritual" (Frazer, *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, Vol. I, p. 1). Of Dionysus, it is said in some myths that "shortly after his burial he rose from the dead and ascended up to heaven" (p. 14). "A different form of the myth of the death and resurrection of Dionysus is that he descended into Hades to bring up his mother Semele from the dead. The local Argive tradition was that he went down through the Alcyonian lake; and his return . . . was annually celebrated on the spot by the Argives. . . . Whether this was a spring festival does not appear, but the Lydians certainly celebrated the advent of Dionysus in spring; the god was supposed to bring the season with him" (p. 15).

"Christianity gained its supremacy, just as did Buddhism . . . through a capacity to assimilate auxiliary mythological conceptions to an extent scarcely equalled by any of the previous religions. . . . A motley collection of polytheistic beliefs . . . [which] crowded the Christ into the background" (Wundt, pp. 503-5). "Buddhism grew out of philosophy and then became a folk religion. . . . Christianity . . . began as a folk-religion . . . passed under the control of philosophy. Precisely because it lay outside the realm of philosophy . . . philosophical thought supplemented the real meaning of religious statements with an idealized interpretation" (p. 500). "In the philosophy of the Greeks the personal deity of popular belief had been displaced by a superpersonal being. . . . To a cult which is always concerned with personal gods, Christ became the supreme deity; in the Catholic Church there came to be also a large number of secondary and subsidiary gods, who sometimes even crowded the Christ into the background, as is exemplified particularly by the cult of the Virgin Mary. The deity is represented as . . . infinite in all the attributes that are held to express his nature; the conception of the infinite, however, contradicts that of personality" (pp. 504-5).

"Even though dogma may continue to maintain that belief in a personal God is fundamental to Christian faith, such a belief is nevertheless self-contradictory; the union of the ideas 'personal' and 'god' must be understood as a survival within the era of world-religions, where many such survivals

occur, of the god-idea developed by national religions" (p. 505). "The deity conception did not clearly emerge from a mystic incomprehensibility rendered inevitable by the combination of contradictory ideas . . . in addition to the non-personal deity, there is believed to be a personal god in the form of an exalted human individual. . . . In Buddhism, as well as in Christianity, the god-man became the personal representative of the non-personal deity. . . . The god-man is a representative in more than one respect" (p. 506). "The infinite god posited by the religious intellect is unable to satisfy the religious nature that is pressed by the cares and sufferings of finitude" (p. 507). "The god-man becomes an ideal human being who succours man in the afflictions of his soul. . . . Nevertheless the god-man is conceived as an ideal man only in the sense in which one may speak of any ideal as actual. . . . Religion can at no time emancipate itself from its historical development . . . the more advanced stages of culture actually embody many elements of the past" (pp. 507-8). "The present-day idea of salvation is no longer identical with that which animated the primitive Christian Church when it looked forward to the return of its Saviour" (p. 508). "However much the traditions associated with world religions may be interwoven with mythological and legendary elements, they nevertheless constitute a bond whose primary effect is to arouse among peoples who may otherwise be widely different in culture and history the idea of a universal human community" (pp. 514-15).

"Christian thought involves two pre-suppositions. The first of these is that the pathway of mankind was *determined by God* . . . it is the result of external causes. The second pre-supposition is that this development follows a *preconceived plan*" (p. 518). "In other words, it was thought of as a development of reason in time, or, in the phraseology of a religious world-view, as the living development of God himself" (p. 520). "History is really an account of mental life" (p. 522). "The philosophy of history has failed in the past centuries, to find a satisfactory solution of its problem, and its failure was inevitable" (p. 523).

Our thought of perfection, of a perfect being, has, within a certain position, strength; only it must be obvious that a proper

analysis of this great thought of Perfection will, so far from giving us a necessary guarantee of God's existence, only take us back to the ordinary world of "mixed" perfections (J. G. Vance, *Reality and Truth*, 1917). Cicero held that "the Creator of the world was obviously beneficent, but that he apparently had too much on his hands to attend to details." This is worthy of attention, as the thought of one free from prejudice. Compare this passage, quoted by Frazer: "Every natural phenomenon is believed to be the work of demons. . . ."

"The negro is wont to regard the whole world around him as peopled with invisible beings, to whom he imputes every misfortune.'" Frazer continues: "The Bantu negroes of Africa 'regard their god as the creator of man, plants, animals, and the earth, and they hold that having made them he takes no further interest in the affair. But not so the crowd of spirits with which the universe is peopled, they take only too much interest, and the Bantu wishes they would not'" (*The Scapegoat*, p. 74). This corresponds very nearly with Cicero's view, which really amounts to a finite deity.

"For some years theology has been more than usually familiar with the notion of a finite or growing Deity. It is a thought which has always hovered round the periphery of Christian speculation, making spasmodic efforts to reach the centre; and for some minds the theistic perplexities of the war have probably invested it with fresh attractiveness. Can God rightly be called infinite or omnipotent when such enormities as the present conflict occur in his universe? Easier by far, surely, to believe that He is still grappling with a task too great for Him, though eventually His increasing power and knowledge will master it. He really is working out a history, just like ourselves. He is the supreme Spirit, yet an individual inside the scheme of things, and thus far the scheme of things as a whole has partially frustrated His efforts. But it is faith to hold that time will bring equality between task and power. . . . We must not allow ourselves to be so prejudiced by the obvious dissimilarity between this and the Biblical conception of God. . . . It has never ceased to be a question how a perfect God can rule so imperfect a world." "They are working at the crux of all apologetic" (Prof. Macintosh, *The Expositor*, November 1918).

" Ne'er a peevish Boy  
Would break the Bowl from which he drank in joy ;  
Shall He that *made* the vessel in pure Love  
And Fancy, in an after Rage destroy ?

Ah Love ! Could you and I with Fate conspire  
To grasp this sorry Scheme of things entire,  
Would not we shatter it to bits—and then  
Re-mould it nearer to the Heart's Desire ! "

*The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam*, translated by Edward Fitzgerald.

## CHAPTER III

### THE HIGHER CRITICISM AND THE BIBLE

I AM distrustful of the soundness of the doctrine of Wundt's *Folk Psychology*. Like many arm-chair Germans, he is apt to commit himself to arbitrary assumptions as if they were well grounded in fact, whereas it can be shown decisively that this is not so. Nevertheless, a number of reputable and representative authorities actively approve of his theories.

" Prof. Wundt's conclusions are invariably suggestive, they could hardly fail to be, coming, as they do, from a psychologist of such ripe experience and distinction. The history of mankind is divided for psychological purposes into four great epochs: first comes the age of prehistoric man, our knowledge of whom is derived partly from archæological research, and partly from a study of primitive races, as the pygmies of Africa. This is followed by that stage of society which may be called totemic, the story of which has to be reconstructed from the customs and beliefs of peoples like the Australian Blackfellows. A new era opens with the heroic age and the stories of gods and heroes. Finally, and briefly, we have what Prof. Wundt calls 'the development of humanity.' Enough has been said to show that the book is one which neither the anthropologist nor the philosopher can safely neglect. The translator has performed an unusually difficult task, with distinct success" (*Critique in Scotsman*, July 31, 1916). " Even more than to Wundt, the teacher, is the world indebted to Wundt, the investigator and writer. The number and comprehensiveness of this author's publications are little short of amazing. No theory relating to these phenomena is acceptable, or even respectable, that does violence to well established psychological principles. The unpsychological character of many of the hypotheses that still abound in ethnological, socio-logical, and historical literature, in itself renders necessary such

discussions. . . . The *Elements* is an attempt to answer the question as to what beliefs and practices actually prevailed at the various stages of human development and what psychological explanation may be given of them" (Prof. E. L. Schaub, Preface to translation, pp. v, vii, viii).

According to Prof. Wundt, the development of mankind took place in three or four stages; but, of course, these are purely arbitrary and artificial assignments and depend on what is found to-day. When they are all co-existing, this is quite in keeping with what science has revealed in other spheres of evolution. Just as the creation of the world and the history of the Jewish race are now known to be much more elaborate and gradual than our fathers imagined, so the development of mankind was doubtless more complex and less uniform than Wundt's account of these processes would lead us to believe. His "ages" do not denote past periods, they are all concurrent now; their reality in the past is an inference and a dubious one—at least, in the form Wundt gives—since they have always practically run side by side. "The three types of religion or superstition I have selected as characteristic of three stages of society are far from being strictly limited each to its corresponding step in the social ladder. . . . We cannot really dissect the history of mankind as it were with a knife into a series of neat sections each sharply marked off from all the rest by a texture and colour of its own. . . . The facts of nature will always burst the narrow bonds of human theories" (Frazer, *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, Vol. II, p. 37). "Totemism, which may be roughly described as a species of superstitious respect paid to wild animals and plants by many tribes in the hunting stage of society, would be represented by the worship of the local sacred animals; the worship of cattle, which belongs to society in the pastoral stage, would be represented by the cult of Apis and Mnevis; and the worship of cultivated plants, which is peculiar to society in the agricultural stage, would be represented by the religion of Osiris and Isis" (p. 35).

"The Hebrews heard in the clap of thunder the voice of Jehovah just as the Greeks heard in it the voice of Zeus, and the Romans the voice of Jupiter" (Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, and Osiris*, Vol. I, p. 22, note). "Pour les Juifs, en particulier, le tonnerre

était toujours la voix de Dieu: l'éclair, le feu de Dieu" (Renan, *Apôtres*, p. 181; Ed. 11). "In times of storm, God was very near and very real to the Hebrews. They conceived of Jehovah as sitting on the storm-cloud . . . and the brilliance gleaming forth behind and through the black cloud was conceived to be due to the very presence of God: the light being the body or garment of God. . . . The wind is the breath of God, whether in the zephyr or the storm: and if so it is Divine. So thought the Jew; and, in course of time, the ruâh, which first meant 'breath' or 'wind,' was supposed to be endowed with the attributes of God—power, wisdom, holiness" (J. T. Marshall, *H.D.B.*, Vol. IV, p. 488). "In the Old Testament thunder is both poetically described and popularly regarded as the voice of God. . . . In Rev. x. 3-4 actual thunders are conceived to have an articulate meaning. In view of this last fact, and of the close Old Testament association between thunder and the voice of God, it seems probable that the 'voice out of Heaven' (John xii. 28-29) was a thunder-peal, as indeed most of those present thought; and that its significance was recognized and interpreted by Jesus alone. A similar construction may be put on the voices in the narrative of the Baptism and Transfiguration of Jesus, and the whole subject is illustrated by the Jewish doctrine of בָּקָרְבָּן פֶּרֶג, which was always supposed to be preceded by a thunder-clap (Barclay, *Talmud*, p. 16, note)" (p. 757).

"The West African perhaps conceives of God as transcendent, but not as immanent; a creation he possibly apprehends, but not an omnipresent government of the world by the Supreme Being. That government is carried on by Mawu at a distance by means of the many spirits or subordinate gods whom he has created for the purpose. . . . A portion of the gods fills the air, wherefore the forces and the phenomena of nature are deified as their manifestations. The elements are thought to be moved by the gods of the air. In the storm and the wind, in thunder and lightning the Ewe sees the manifestation of particularly powerful gods. In the mysterious roll and roar of the deep sea the Ewe, like the negro in general, beholds the sway of a very mighty god or of a whole host of gods. Further, the earth itself is also the abode of a multitude of spirits or gods, who have in it their sphere of activity. They inhabit certain

great mountains, great hollow trees, caves, rivers, and especially woods' " (G. Zündel, quoted by Sir James Frazer, *The Scapegoat*, p. 75). " Full details as to the religious creed of the Ewes, including their belief in a Supreme Being (Mawu), are given, to a great extent, in the words of the natives themselves, by the German missionary Jakob Spieth, *Die Ewe-Stämme* (Berlin, 1906) " (*The Scapegoat*, p. 76, note) [See also Miss Mary Kingsley, *Travels in West Africa* (1897)].

" Certainly at Jerusalem the regular clergy of the temple prophesied to the music of harps, of psalteries, and of cymbals; and it appears that the irregular clergy also, as we may call the prophets, depended on some such stimulus for inducing the ecstatic state which they took for immediate converse with the divinity " (*Adonis, Attis, and Osiris*, Vol. I, p. 52). Among the negroes of the Slave coast, a man, after his initiation, " is regarded as the priest and medium of the deity whom he serves, and the words which he utters in that morbid state of mental excitement which passes for divine inspiration, are accepted by the hearers as the very words of the god, spoken by the mouth of the man " (p. 68). Among the Tshi-speaking peoples of the Gold Coast " the ranks of the hereditary priesthood are constantly recruited by persons who devote themselves or who are devoted by their relations or masters to the profession " (p. 70).

[All this is very like the theories of the Jews, as shown in the early part of their history; in fact, the whole scheme of religion then is very like the ways of negroes. The above refers to the Slave-coast, but examples are given which show that similar ideas prevailed all over Africa and Asia: in other parts (Uganda) men were inspired by the ghosts or spirits of lions, etc., and in that state of exaltation they uttered oracles, roaring like a lion, growling like a leopard, etc. Compare Jahweh "roaring," in Joel and Amos—perhaps, as a bull. Bull-roarers were used even at Athens, on some religious occasions.—  
AUTHOR.] " Prophecy of the Hebrew type has not been limited to Israel; it is indeed a phenomenon of almost world-wide occurrence; in many lands and in many ages the wild, whirling words of frenzied men and women have been accepted as the utterance of an indwelling deity " (p. 75). It appears that " no sharp line of distinction existed between the prophets and the kedeshim: both were 'men of God,' as the prophets were

constantly called ; in other words, they were inspired mediums, men in whom the god manifested himself from time to time by word and deed—in short, temporary incarnations of the deity ” (p. 76). The appearance of the holy men in Syria, “ and the expressions regarding them, afford some illustrations of the popular estimate of ancient seers, or prophets, in the time of Hosea : ‘ The prophet is a fool, the man that hath the spirit is mad ’ (Hosea ix. 7), and in the time of Jeremiah (xxix. 26), the man who made himself a prophet was considered as good as a madman ” (S. I. Curtiss, *Primitive Semitic Religion To-day*, pp. 150 *sq.*; quoted by Frazer, p. 77). “ C. R. Conder says : ‘ It is natural to reflect whether the social position of the Prophets among the Jews may not have resembled that of the Derwishes ’ ” (p. 78, *note*). “ The belief in temporary incarnation or inspiration is world-wide. Certain persons are supposed to be possessed from time to time by a spirit or deity . . . their own personality lies in abeyance, the presence of the spirit is revealed by convulsive shiverings and shakings of the man’s whole body, by wild gestures and excited looks . . . there was a striking resemblance between the rude oracles of the Polynesians and those of the celebrated nations of ancient Greece ” (Frazer, *The Magic Art*, Vol. I, p. 377). “ The soul of the medium quits for a time his body, which is thus placed at the disposal of the deity, and up to the moment when his consciousness returns all his words and acts are regarded as proceeding not from himself but from the god ” (p. 379). “ ‘ I have seen,’ says Mr. Lorimer Fison, ‘ this possession and a horrible sight it is ’ ” (quoted by Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality*, Vol. I, p. 445). The whole appearance is that of a furious madman. “ When inspired, the priest as a matter of course spoke in the first person, as being the God for the time being ” (*vide* Mariner, *Tonga Islands*, 3rd ed., Vol. II, p. 87). “ The idea of the God as lawgiver is met with in the myth of Zeus and Minos, the Cretan institutor—himself a purely mythical figure, like Moses ; and, like him, presumably a deity of an earlier age.” “ Apollo . . . is the mouth of Zeus and revealer of his counsel, hence the typical God of oracles ; Athene, grouped with her brother and father in a triad, is also her father’s wisdom : and still later, in the period of developing theosophy . . . Metis essentially the personified Reason and

Intelligence of Zeus" (J. M. Robertson, *Pagan Christs*, pp. 212-14).

"The knowledge of foreign languages was frequently communicated to the contemporaries of Irenæus, though Irenæus himself was left to struggle with the difficulties of a barbarian dialect, whilst he preached the gospel to the natives of Gaul. (Dr. Middleton observes that as this pretension of all others was the most difficult to support by art, it was the soonest given up. The observation suits his hypothesis [*footnote*].) The divine inspiration, whether it was conveyed in the form of a waking or of a sleeping vision, is described as a favour very liberally bestowed on all ranks of the faithful, on women as on elders, on boys as well as upon bishops. When their devout minds were sufficiently prepared by a course of prayer, of fasting, and of vigils, to receive the extraordinary impulse, they were transported out of their senses, and delivered in ecstasy what was inspired, being mere organs of the Holy Spirit, just as a pipe or flute is of him who blows it." These descriptions are not very unlike the prophetic fury, for which Cicero expresses so little reverence (*Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Vol. II, Ch. XV, p. 28, *note*). "By these voluntary fasts, he [Julian the Apostate] prepared his senses and his understanding for the frequent and familiar visits with which he was honoured by the celestial powers. Notwithstanding the modest silence of Julian himself, we may learn from his faithful friend, the orator Libanius, that he lived in a perpetual intercourse with the gods and goddesses" (Ch. XXIII, p. 441). The latter points distinctly to a sexual origin of the notion, as suggested by Havelock Ellis; and it is not surprising that the Christians should have taken little or no care to preserve records of these messages, which they professed to come from heaven, but which they shared with such dubious people. All this coincides with what Philo-Judæus says of inspiration; so it cannot well be held that it differed among the Jews from what it was elsewhere.

The Hebrew prophets later became poets and philosophers, and, as poets, wrote many very beautiful things; but unprejudiced readers will admit that much of what they say is barely intelligible, and quite uninteresting to-day. "The burden of Tyre" is scarcely of importance to us, whatever its local

value at the time; yet, with prophesyings about Moab, Ammon, etc., it fills nearly as large a space as one of the Gospels. "We could easily understand not only the tradition of the sons of God [or rather 'the gods'] who begat children on the daughters of men" (*Frazer, Adonis, Attis, and Osiris*, Vol. I, p. 79). "In the opinion of Syrian peasants of the present day, women may, without intercourse with a living man, bear children to a dead husband, a dead saint, or a jinnee" (p. 91). "For a large collection of evidence as to the belief in the reincarnation of the dead, see E. S. Hartland, *Primitive Paternity* (1909-10) (pp. 156 *sq.*); also J. E. King, 'Infant Burial,' *Classical Review*, XVII (1903), pp. 83 *sq.*" (quoted by Frazer, p. 91, *note*). "The death and resurrection of Melcarth were celebrated in an annual festivity at Tyre" (p. 111 *note*). "Though Tarsus boasted of a school of Greek philosophy, which at the beginning of our era surpassed those of Athens and Alexandria, the city apparently remained in manners and spirit essentially Oriental" (p. 118).

"It would appear that at Tarsus, as at Boghaz-Keui, there was a pair of deities: a divine Father and a divine Son, whom the Greeks identified with Zeus and Hercules respectively. . . . It was the divine Son, the lion-god, who was burned in effigy or in the person of a human representative, at Tarsus" (p. 143). "When the practice of human sacrifice becomes too revolting to humanity to be tolerated, its abolition is commonly effected by substituting either animals or images for living men or women. At Salamis, certainly, and perhaps at Hierapolis, the substitutes were animals: at Tarsus, if I am right, they were images" (pp. 146-7).

St. Paul was bred amid inspirations like these, and it would have been strange if they had not tinged his thoughts and words.

"In discussing the nature of inspiration or possession by a deity, the Syrian philosopher Jamblichus notes as one of its symptoms a total insensibility to pain. Many inspired persons, he tells us 'are not burned by fire, the fire not taking hold of them . . . many, though they are burned, perceive it not. . . . These things prove that under the influence of inspiration men are beside themselves . . . that they lead another and a diviner life'" (p. 169). "'Asia Minor abounds in dervishes of different orders, who lap red-hot iron, calling it their "rose,"'

chew coals of living fire, strike their heads against solid walls, stab themselves in the cheek, the scalp, the temple . . . entirely insensible to pain' " (The Rev. G. E. White; quoted by Frazer, p. 170). At Bausana (in India) where " priests or sorcerers have been accustomed in the discharge of their functions, to walk through or over fire; they have sometimes done so as the living representatives or embodiments of deities, spirits, or other supernatural beings " (Frazer, *Balder the Beautiful*, Vol. II, p. 5). At Callirrœ " they bathe in the steaming water or allow it to splash on their bodies as it gushes in a powerful jet from a crevice in the rocks. But before they indulge in these ablutions the visitors, both Moslem and Christian, propitiate the spirit or genius of the place by sacrificing a sheep or goat at the spring and allowing its red blood to tinge the water " (Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, and Osiris*, Vol. I, p. 215). On another occasion, Frazer, describing a pagan scene, says: " To the carnal eye, the inspiration resembled intoxication " (p. 219).

" The idea was hence spread abroad that the martyrs of Christ, during the torture, were separated from the body, and that Christ himself assisted them and spoke with them. Fire produced on them the effect of delicious coolness. Exposed to wild beasts, dragged over sand full of jagged shells, they appeared insensible to pain " (Renan, *The Christian Church*, English translation, p. 234). See also his account of the " Babists " in Persia (*Apôtres*, pp. 378 ff). In Abammon, " the divine afflatus is explained, and the test of it laid down. Those who have it have surrendered their whole lives as mere instruments and organs to the inspiring gods. They either obtain the divine life instead of their human life, or they waste their own life in obedience to the god. Such persons may touch fire and not be burnt; may be struck with axes and knives on their backs and arms, and do not perceive it. Their actions are no more human; they may trample on fire or walk through water. There are various forms of this inspiration; it may possess some of the limbs, or the whole body " (F. D. Maurice, *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 337). The last point clearly connects the matter with hysteria, in which partial anaesthetics are a well-known phenomenon.

"In the great Phoenician sanctuary of Astarte at Byblus, the death of Adonis was annually mourned [See Jerome, *Com. in Ezekiel viii. 14.*] . . . but next day, he was believed to come to life again and ascend up to heaven in the presence of his worshippers" (*Frazer, Adonis, Attis, and Osiris*, Vol. I, p. 225). One of the "gods, whose supposed death and resurrection struck such deep roots into the faith and ritual of Western Asia is Attis. . . . Like Adonis, he appears to have been a god of vegetation, and his death and resurrection were annually mourned and rejoiced over at a festival in spring. . . . Cybele, the Mother of the Gods, a great Asiatic goddess of fertility, had her chief home in Phrygia. Some held that Attis was her son. His birth, like that of many other heroes, is said to have been miraculous. His mother, Nana, was a virgin" (p. 263). "Such tales of virgin mothers are relics of an age of childish ignorance when men had not yet recognized the intercourse of the sexes as the true cause of offspring" (p. 264). ["Nana" means mother.—AUTHOR.]

"The worship of the Phrygian Mother of the Gods was adopted by the Romans in 204 B.C. . . . Ambassadors were despatched to her sacred city Pessinus [in Phrygia]. . . . The small black stone which embodied the mighty divinity was entrusted to them and conveyed to Rome, where it was received with great respect" (p. 265). "The material facts of the Christian origins are almost always obscure; what is clear is the ardent enthusiasm, the almost superhuman boldness, the sublime contempt for reality, which makes this movement the most powerful effort towards the ideal whose memory has been preserved to us" (*Renan, The Antichrist*, p. 1). "The scanty and suspicious materials of ecclesiastical history seldom enable us to dispel the dark cloud that hangs over the first age of the Church" (*Gibbon, Decline and Fall*, Ch. XV). "By the wise dispensation of Providence, a mysterious veil was cast over the infancy of the Church, which, till the faith of the Christians was matured and their numbers were multiplied, served to protect them not only from the malice, but even from the knowledge of the Pagan world. The slow and gradual abolition of the Mosaic ceremonies afforded a safe and innocent disguise to the more early proselytes of the Gospel" (Ch. XVI, p. 82). "The passage concerning Jesus Christ, which was inserted into the

text of Josephus between the time of Origen and that of Eusebius, may furnish an example of no vulgar forgery. The accomplishment of the prophecies, the virtues, miracles, and resurrection of Jesus are distinctly related. Josephus acknowledges that he was the Messiah, and hesitates whether he should call him a man. If any doubt can still remain concerning this celebrated passage, the reader may examine the pointed objections of Le Fevre; the laboured answer of Daubuz, and the masterly reply of an anonymous critic, whom I believe to have been the learned Abbé de Longuevue" (Ch. XVI).

"Very few critics at the present day accept the passage as it stands as from the pen of Josephus; but there is a division of opinion as to whether the whole is an interpolation, or whether Josephus did make a brief statement about Jesus Christ, which was afterwards augmented by a Christian hand. . . . It is practically certain that Origen in the preceding [third] century did not find it in his text of Josephus. For while he is aware of the passage in Josephus concerning James, the Lord's brother, he says: 'The wonder is that though he did not admit our Jesus to be Christ' he none the less gave his witness to so much righteousness in James (Matt. x. 17). . . . The *internal* evidence is decisive against the genuineness of the passage as it stands: the *style* affords no certain clue: it is not markedly different from that of Josephus in this part of his work. It may be granted that the interpolater has done his work with some skill. But the *contents* are not such as Josephus could have written. . . . The passage is *out of place*, and breaks the sequence of the narrative. . . . The mention of Pilate has of course led to the insertion of the passage at this point. [The fact that the passage interrupts the sequence of the narrative is an argument for its spuriousness as a whole.—A U T H O R.] . . . We conclude then that the passage about Christ was introduced into the text by a Christian reader towards the end of the third century, between the time of Origen and that of Eusebius" (H. St. John Thackery, *H.D.B.*, Extra Vol. V, p. 472). This finding confirms Gibbon's accuracy. In this respect there has been a great change. My father used to speak of his mistakes and prejudices: but Archbishop Temple, as we shall see later, writes of him "as perhaps the greatest of historians"; and this, though it does not imply infallibility, does surely mean in main

outline that he had grasped the truth of events and their meaning. We are asked to believe, by Tertullian, "that Pontius Pilate informed the emperor of the unjust sentence of death which he had pronounced against an innocent, as it appeared, a divine person: and that, without acquiring the merit, he exposed himself to the danger of martyrdom; that Tiberius, who avowed his contempt for all religion, immediately conceived the design of placing the Jewish Messiah among the gods of Rome: that his servile senate ventured to disobey the commands of their master: that Tiberius, instead of resenting their refusal, contented himself with protecting the Christians from the severity of the laws, many years before such laws were enacted" (Gibbon, *Rome*, Ch. XI, pp. 108-9). The testimony given by Pontius Pilate is first mentioned by Justin. The successive improvements which the story has acquired as it passed through the hands of Tertullian, Eusebius, Epiphanius, Chrysostom, Orosius, Gregory of Tours, and the authors of the several editions of the "Acts of Pilate," are very fairly stated by Dom Calmet, *Dissertation sur l'Ecriture*, tom. III, p. 651, etc. (Gibbon, *Rome*, Ch. XXVI). "Apocryphal literature elaborated the story (*Ante-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. VIII). According to one version, Tiberius summoned Pilate to Rome to answer the charge of crucifying Christ. When, at the examination before the Senate, Tiberius uttered Christ's name, the statues of the gods fell to the ground." "Not only did Christian exegetes torture the Septuagint version, so as to obtain from it anything that might fit into their thesis; and abuse the new translators, who weakened the arguments which they drew from it; but they forged some passages. The wood of the cross was introduced into Psalm xcvi. 10, where it had never figured; the descent into hell into Jeremiah; and when the Jews cried out, protesting that nothing like it was found in the text, they were told that they had mutilated the text out of pure spite and bad faith; and that they had cut out the account of the prophet being sawn asunder with a wooden saw from the book of Isaiah, because the passage brought to mind too vividly the crime that they had committed against Jesus. A convinced and ardent apologist finds no difficulty in anything. They referred to the official registers of the returns of Quirinus, which never existed; and to a pretended report of Pilate to

Tiberius, that had been forged" (Renan, *The Christian Church*, Eng. tr., p. 143).

The account of the guard at the tomb of Christ bears all the signs of a manufactured article. The assertion of the centurion, that Jesus was " (the) Son of God," is of no weight; anyone at that time, in any country, would have called anybody a son of God. I submitted those considerations at Canon Sanday's symposium on religious subjects, before three Canons, four Professors, two score of clergy, and a hundred students of theology, and no one denied them. The particulars in question are in only one of the Gospels; and that Gospel is open to great doubt, as is also the English version of it. In a marginal note the Revised Version amends the expression to " a Son of God," apropos of which the Rev. J. M. Thompson, in *Miracles in the New Testament*, 1911, pp. 71-6, writes: " The earthquakes and appearances at the time of Jesus' death (Matt. xxvii. 51-3) represent an addition to the three hours' darkness and the rending of the veil which appear in the original tradition. The story is clearly of local origin. Jerusalem, as in Matt. iv. 5, is described as the ' holy city,' and the Old Testament heroes are called ' the saints.' The facts—it is admitted—were not known at the time. It was not till ' after His resurrection' (the ' His ' shows how detached the story is) that the appearances were reported. . . . The silence of St. Mark, who was probably living in Jerusalem at the time, and heard the gossip of the Christians, shows that the story was of late origin. The last case is that of the *earthquake and descent of an angel* on Easter morning (xxviii. 21). This is doubtless part of the same Jerusalem tradition as the last story, and rests on no better evidence."

As to the guard: " Jesus was discredited. His disciples had fled. Nobody expected a Resurrection—least of all, his enemies. Nobody was in a position to manufacture one. Secondly, the priests and Pharisees would not do business with Pilate, as the story alleges that they did, on the Sabbath. . . . The story is, in fact, a later evidential addition, to meet the theory that the disciples stole the body and simulated a resurrection. The *Gospel of the Hebrews* carries the same tendency a little further when it says that a servant of the high priest was also present" (p. 181). And the Gospel of Peter gives an

account of the Resurrection ; it is not till we come to this, that we find any attempt to do so. " It is extremely unlikely that Pilate would allow any interference of the Sanhedrin in matters of military discipline (vs. 14) ; or that such a plot would, under the circumstances, be worth making " (p. 183). " The incident of the guard, and the earthquake and descent of an angel bring confusion into the narrative, and offer no recommendations as against the earlier evidence of *Mk.*" (p. 184).

It is true that the then Bishop of Oxford (Gore) inhibited Thompson for this book ; but the method savours of the Middle Ages, when it was easier to silence an awkward opponent by force than to refute him by reason. At any rate, he is a cleric who is not afraid to speak out his opinions. " The absence of any power of diagnosing disease, the superstition which attributed physical ills to possession by evil spirits, and the tendency at once to exaggerate the successes and to ignore the failures of the healing ministry of Christ, warn us against too literal an insistence upon the accounts as we have them " (*Miracles in the New Testament*, Preface, p. vii). " The miracle-stories belong to Galilee, not to Jerusalem, to the earlier and obscurer times of the ministry, and to the enthusiasm of the lake-side fisher-folk " (p. 31). " The belief in ' possession ' and the practice of exorcism are phenomena common to many races and many religions. Among uneducated people, before the growth of psychology or medical science, madness, epilepsy, and the more violent or intractable forms of certain diseases are commonly believed to be the work of an alien spirit inhabiting the body of the patient " (pp. 36-7). A great body of evidence for " the savage theory of daemonic possession and obsession, which has been for ages, and still remains, the dominant theory of disease and inspiration among the lower races," may be found in Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, 4th ed., Vol. II, pp. 114 sq.

Bishop Gore " raises the unnecessary difficulty that ' the emphasis which Jesus Christ lays on diabolic agency is so great that, if it is not a reality, He must be regarded either as seriously misled about realities which concern the spiritual life, or else as seriously misleading others. And in neither case could He be even the perfect Prophet ' " (*M. in N.T.*, p. 38, note). " The cures claimed at Lourdes include . . . 217 of paralysis. . . .

The patients as a whole belong to the class which has always cured itself by faith—faith in a person, or in a place, or in the efficacy of a ritual act. The power to call out and exercise this faith—a power dependent upon simplicity of religious belief, calmness, and strength of will—was undoubtedly present in Jesus to an exceptional degree. But it was not a miraculous power” (p. 40).

The Doctor said: “We do not draw any conclusions when a nervous affection is in question” (Zola, *Lourdes*, Vizetelly translation, Chatto and Windus, 1900, p. 164). Monsignor Laurence, the Bishop of the Diocese, “felt the wretchedness of the suffering people . . . to be so great that he resigned himself to granting them the idolatrous religion, for which he realized them to be eager” (p. 193). “It was human wretchedness which had won the battle, human wretchedness with its eternal need of falsehood, its hunger for the marvellous” (p. 195). Still, “the first religious ceremony did not take place till six years after the apparitions” (p. 196). “What was the unknown force thrown off by this crowd, the vital fluid powerful enough to work the few cures that really occurred?” (p. 333; p. 398 in the French). “Some were praying. Others were shouting, imploring, and even clenching their fists in their rage with those cruel men who denied cure to their bodily sufferings and their mental wretchedness” (p. 397). “The orders to keep them back were rigidly enforced, however, for the most serious accidents were feared” (p. 397). “Bethlehem had become Sodom since an innocent child had seen the Virgin” (p. 422). Whatever may be thought of the conclusions drawn by Zola, the descriptions are those of an eyewitness with peculiar powers of minute observation and wonderful skill in narration, who had every opportunity of seeing the events, and judging them. “He [Zola] had beheld never-to-be-forgotten idolatry at Lourdes, incidents of naïve faith and frantic religious passion which yet made him quiver with alarm and grief. But the crowds rushing on the grotto, the sick dying of divine love before the Virgin’s statue, the multitudes delirious with the contagion of the miraculous—nothing of all that gave an idea of the blast of madness which inflamed the pilgrims at the feet of the Pope. Ladies were seen to . . . drag themselves on all fours over the marble

slabs and kiss his footprints and lap up the dust of his steps" (*Zola, Rome*, p. 21).

"Where the vital energy of nature manifests itself strikingly and impressively, a feeling of veneration is stirred, as on the sea-shore, in deep woods, on steep mountain sides. All such spots are supposed to be the abode of spirits of various kinds, whose mighty power is regarded with reverence and awe, whose anger is dreaded, and whose favour is hoped for" (S. E. Harthoorn, quoted by Frazer, *The Scapegoat*, p. 86).

"In India from the earliest times down to the present day the real religion of the common folk appears always to have been a belief in a vast multitude of spirits, of whom many, if not most, are mischievous and harmful. As in Europe beneath a superficial layer of Christianity a faith in magic and witchcraft, in ghosts and goblins, has always survived and even flourished among the weak and ignorant, so it has been, and so it is in the East" (p. 89). "For the great faiths of the world, just in so far as they are the outcome of superior intelligence, of purer morality, of extraordinary fervour of aspiration after the ideal, fail to touch and move the common man. . . . With the common herd, who compose the great bulk of every people, the new religion is accepted only in outward show because it is impressed upon them by their natural leaders" (p. 89).

"According to the creed of the Vedic ages, in unseen . . . or embodied in visible form spirits surround and hover about human habitations—bestial or misshapen goblins, souls of dead friends and souls of foes, sometimes as kindly guardians, oftener as mischief-makers, bringing disease and misfortune, sucking the blood and strength of the living'" (Prof. Oldenburgh, quoted by Frazer, p. 90).

Perhaps one of the most startling of the New Testament miracles "is the story of St. Peter's attempt to walk on water. This St. Matthew inserts into Mk.'s narrative of Jesus' walking on water. . . . If the incident happened, it must have been known to St. Peter and the other apostles; and it follows either that Mk.'s story does not . . . rest on apostolic authority, or that Mt.'s addition to it was omitted from the apostolic tradition. But no adequate reason for this silence has ever been alleged" (Thompson, *Miracles in the New Testament*, p. 72). "The more credence we give to the tradition of St. Mark's

connection with St. Peter, the more significant does this silence become" (p. 73).

"St. Luke is still almost entirely dependent on St. Mark. . . . The promise of the preface is unfulfilled. This is, after all, another gospel of the old type" (p. 79). "The voice is Jacob's voice, though the hands are the hands of Esau" (p. 80). [It can hardly have escaped his notice, that in the incident suggested, Jacob played the part of a deceiver and a cheat.—AUTHOR.]

In the case of the ten lepers he says "the fact that the men . . . remained at a distance shows that there was no means of telling whether or not they were healed" (cf. Luke xvii. 11-19) (p. 89). "St. John's representation of Jesus is reached by an unnatural selection and exaggeration of traits suggested by the Synoptists, as much as by a new supernatural characterisation" (p. 111). "*The fourth Gospel cannot be treated as a historically true account of the 'miracles' of Christ*" (p. 112). "The trustworthiness of St. Luke's evidence cannot be lightly assumed on the ground of his talents as a historian. . . . He is a born story-teller" (p. 119). "And we have no reason, unfortunately, to suppose that even the best texts which we possess are free from interpolations" (p. 149). "St. Matthew, then, is quite at variance with St. Luke as to the home of Joseph and Mary. . . . The flight into Egypt is quite incompatible with St. Luke's chronology, according to which the Circumcision took place eight days after the Nativity, the Purification and Presentation on the fortieth day, at Jerusalem. . . . Herod died in B.C. 4. By that date, according to St. Luke, the Holy Family had been living at Nazareth for some time. Joseph's wish to return to Judæa, his fear of Archelaus, and his settlement in Nazareth as a new home, are all incompatible with St. Luke's narrative" (p. 152).

"As Lk. i-ii represents a further stage of inquiry than Mk., so Mt. i-ii represents a still later development" (p. 154). "'It is beyond dispute that in the mind of both genealogists Jesus is the son of Joseph' (Lobstein, *The Virgin Birth of Christ*). . . . There was no feeling, as yet, that the sonship of David—however literally expressed—was derogatory to the sonship of God" (p. 155). "Jesus Himself, in the fourth Gospel, as elsewhere, speaks of Galilee, not Judæa, as the country of His birth. This is shown by the reappearance of the Synoptic

saying, ‘a prophet is not without honour, save in his own country’” (p. 158). “St. Mark knows nothing of the Virgin Birth. . . . St. Luke and St. Matthew in the body of their Gospels, accept the point of view of Mark. . . . *The positive evidence for the fact of a miraculous birth must be pronounced exceedingly weak. The negative evidence—i.e. the evidence for the existence of views which ignore, exclude, or supplant the Virgin Birth—is very strong.*” “St. Paul says nothing about the Virgin Birth.” “Mt. i-ii explicitly narrates a Virgin Birth; but doubt is thrown on its evidence by its inconsistency with Lk. i-ii . . . and its lateness and artificiality” (p. 159). Here again the alleged relations of John to Mary, make his silence very significant. The problem is one in which evidence is impossible: only an unquestioned revelation could establish its truth, and when these are inconsistent and contradictory, they do not carry conviction. The Right Rev. A. C. Headlam, a wholly unimpeachable witness, wrote: “The miracle of the Virgin Birth differs from that of the Resurrection in two important points: the testimony for it is not so good, and it never had the same evidential value for Christianity” (*Miracles in the New Testament*, p. 269). “We believe it not for the particular evidence in its favour, but because it comes to us as part of Christian tradition. I am not sure that its value as a witness has not been greater as time goes on, and that the beautiful figure of the Virgin Mother appealing to and arousing some of the highest human sentiments has not been one of the strongest influences in creating religious Devotion” (p. 270). “Irenæus himself tells us that St. John wrote his Gospel to contradict the errors of Cerinthus (*Haer.* III, xi, 1). He describes these as follows (*Haer.* I, xxvi) Jesus was not born from a Virgin, but was the son of Joseph and Mary like other men. . . . After his baptism the Christ descended on him in the form of a dove” (Headlam, *Gnosticism, H.D.B.*, Vol. II, p. 189). “We believe in the resurrection of Christ because it is testified to by eye-witnesses; St. Peter’s interpretation of Psalm xvi is, at best, only a corroboration of it. And in like manner we believe in the virgin birth because it is affirmed by ‘one who had traced the course of all things accurately from the first’ (Luke i. 3). The interpretation put on Isaiah vii. 14, in Matt. i. 22 *sq.*, occupies but the

secondary place of a confirmation of it (Prof. A. B. Davidson, "Immanuel," *H.D.B.*, Vol. I, p. 456). The translation given in the margin of the Revised Version is: "The maid is with child and beareth a son: and shall call his name 'God with us' (Immanuel). Curds and honey shall he eat, that he may know how to refuse evil and choose the good." "We cannot, therefore, argue from the usage of the word the meaning intended in Is. vii. 14, but the whole context of the passage, as well as the analogy of viii. 1-4, suggests that the sign intended did not consist in anything miraculous in the birth itself, but in the speedy coming of the event and in the symbolical name to be given to the child." "St. Matthew, quoting from lxx, takes the passage as a direct prophecy of the birth of Christ from a virgin (*v. Immanuel*). . . . It has been very naturally disputed by the Jews from the time of Justin Martyr" (*H.D.B.*, Vol. IV, p. 871).

The virgin birth has been disputed from the very beginning, so that the plea has been put forward that the idea got known and accepted only by degrees. As a truth it stands in exactly the same position as other supposed miracles: the so-called "laws of Nature" are, as Bishop Headlam urges, only formulas which we create to express our experience of the uniformity and due sequence in events; and our knowledge is far too imperfect to allow the assertion that anything is "supernatural"; at the most it is beyond our experience. I am not concerned to maintain that good thoughts do not come to men by a process which may be called "Revelation"; but every inspiration is an incarnation: it passes through a man, and comes out as the expression of his highest ideas in his own language, with the thoughts of his time and the ideals of his country. The proof of facts is something altogether different from this. In the case before us all that could be argued from the evidence is that certain people held the view, but such beliefs were commonplaces in those times: "Sons of Virgins" and "Sons of Gods" were equally numerous, and the record shows only that then, as now, opinions were adopted on insufficient grounds, and so tends to diminish rather than increase faith. The whole argument is connected with "proofs of virginity," in the Old Testament; of which modern science knows nothing. It is rare for *virgo intacta* to persist after

copulation, and if a similar event happened now, it would be urged at once that somehow the woman had got impregnated, just as rare cases occur of syphilis without contact. Science certainly will not maintain that microscopic germs cannot be conveyed in unknown ways. Parthenogenesis is common among plants, and even in animals, by a reversion to a bygone method, as a sort of last resort to prevent the species from becoming extinct. If it could be proved that a case had occurred in a woman, the unanswerable question would be raised whether it was not natural under peculiar circumstances.

"There can be no doubt that the miraculous conception was denied by several of the early heretics, who either maintained (with Cerinthus) the naturalistic birth of the Lord, followed by the bestowal of supernatural powers through the descent of the Spirit at His baptism, or held (with Marcion) that He was without earthly parentage, but descended from heaven in the fifteenth year of Tiberius, and showed Himself in the synagogue of Capernaum" (*J. B. Mayor, H.D.B., Vol. III, p. 287*). It is surely incredible that such views should have prevailed if any fixed doctrine of the divine Sonship had been taught from the beginning; but here again, as we shall see, the dogma was by degrees piled up during many ages of virulent contest; and this is easy to understand. "The cultus and invocation of the martyrs, and belief in their miraculous power, had been growing up as early as the third century, and the gradual paganizing of the Church, which followed the establishment of Christianity as the religion of the empire, led, in many places, to the substitution of Christian saints for the old local divinities. . . . The votaries of Demeter and Persephone and of other female deities found it easier to transfer their allegiance to the Christian Church when they were permitted to make their vows there to Mary as the Mother of God and the Queen of Heaven" (*loc. cit., p. 289*).

The fact was that some of the ancient heretics did maintain the Holy Ghost to be a female. On the other hand, the Divinity of Christ tended to obscure his Humanity; the loving sympathy of one who could be touched with the feeling of our infirmities was transferred to Mary. "Accursed is he who asserts that the Word of God was changed into flesh: Accursed is he who disparages the dignity of the divine nature

by attributing to it the acts and passions of the human nature which it assumed for the display of its Godhead" (Milman, *Latin Christianity*, Vol. V, p. 156). "The exquisite beauty and purity of the images, the Virgin Mother and the Divine Infant, though not as yet embodied in the highest art, by painting or sculpture, appealed to the unreasoning and unsuspecting heart" (p. 141).

"No doubt each Apostle would tell his story in his own way; but it would be the leading Apostles who had been in close intercourse with our Lord whose narratives would be the most attractive, and gradually an accepted tradition would grow up" (p. 192). Yet, "few would now consider the First Gospel to have been written by St. Matthew" (Headlam, *loc. cit.*, p. 176).

"The different aspects under which the life and work and person of Christ are presented in the Synoptic Gospels and John may be reconcilable. We have given some reasons for thinking they are so in great measure. The question remains how the existence of differences in the records can be explained. The difficulty is rather to understand how the first three evangelists should omit so much that we find in John. The same reasons did not exist in their case for passing over facts as in that of John" (Rev. V. H. Stanton, pp. 167-8. Cp. Sanday, *The Criticism of the Fourth Gospel*, Clarendon Press, 1903; pp. 167-8). "It has often been remarked that we are constantly left in doubt where the words of Our Lord end and those of the Evangelist begin. Probably the Evangelist himself did not discriminate or even try to discriminate . . . and the consequence is that historical recollections and interpretative reflection, the fruit of thought and experience, have come down to us inextricably blended. St. Paul was not an historian, or we may be sure that he would have furnished abundant parallels for the sort of procedure that we find in St. John. . . . [In his] account of the dispute with St. Peter at Antioch, the first few verses are strictly historical; but suddenly and without a word of warning [he] glides into one of his own abstruse doctrinal arguments as to justification by works" (pp. 167-8). "In case the Synoptic version is too much burdened by contradictions to be taken as it stands" (p. 153). "Memory may have played him false. The point is not really of any great

importance" (p. 150). "It is the mind of Christ, seen through the medium of one of the first and closest of His companions" (Sanday, *Criticism of the Fourth Gospel*, p. 169).

Dr. Headlam confirms this: "The position of the Fourth Gospel is at the present moment one of great uncertainty" (p. 176). "It is recognized more clearly than formerly was the case that the theological teaching of the book has undergone some translation into the thoughts and ideas of a later period, and that the comments of the Evangelist are mixed up with sayings of our Lord" (pp. 179-80). And he quotes, with approval, from Dr. Edwin Abbott's *The Fourfold Gospel*, p. 47. "'We shall have to consider whether John is not right, and all the Synoptists wrong, Mark being the only one of them who retains a vestige of the truth. . . . Not indeed, that we must consequently accept, as coming from the lips of the historical Jesus, every word of that long discourse about the mystical Bread which John puts into His mouth as being uttered in the synagogue at Capernaum'" (p. 224). He quotes also, from Prof. Burkitt, these words: "'It is true that "Mark" does not record the Lord's prayer or many of the most noteworthy sayings of Jesus, but these were not public events like the Raising of Lazarus. . . . Must not the answer be that Mark is silent about the raising of Lazarus because he did not know of it? . . . For all its dramatic setting it is, I am persuaded, impossible to regard the story of the raising of Lazarus as a narrative of historical events'" (*The Gospel History and its Transmission*, p. 225). To which he replies: "It is probable that many of the Galilean disciples, and among them perhaps S. Peter, were not with Jesus on this visit to Jerusalem. . . . We have then a Johannine, not a Petrine, tradition. That does not imply that the Marcan narrative is false; it may be inadequate. It was certainly incomplete" (p. 229). "We do not expect infallibility in any record which comes to us through human hands" (p. 322). "Although we had no reason for believing in the infallibility of the Gospels, they gave good evidence for the life of our Lord, and for miracles as part of His life" (p. 333). "I have frankly confessed throughout, that while the evidence that we have for miracles as a whole is good, the character of the Gospel narrative is not such as to enable us to be certain that every event took place exactly as it is reported"

(p. 339). "The evidence for Old Testament miracles is not good. . . . The books of the Old Testament, those for example which narrate the miracles of Moses, were in their present form probably produced nearly a thousand years after the events they describe. . . . The events connected with the departure from Egypt are so far back in history that it is very difficult for us to know what really happened" (pp. 340-1). "Although miracles are not proof of the Incarnation, the Incarnation makes miracles credible" (p. 345). [Surely curious words from one who has declared that "he unfeignedly believes all the Canonical Scriptures," *and solemnly asks others to do so*.—AUTHOR.]

"The first disciples preached Christianity because they believed that miracles had taken place. . . . We are clearly in a very different position. . . . We can only have second-hand evidence of the miracles of the past. Most people accept Christianity nowadays because of the fact of its existence, because of the authority of the Church" (pp. 347-8). "It is not what we might look for as an ideal" (p. 349). "If we doubt the evidence for the particular miraculous manifestations of the history of Israel, there can be no doubt of the miraculous character of the history as a whole" (p. 342). [To me this seems very like denying the premises and asserting the conclusions. The miraculous nature of the Hebrew history appears quite incredible, the more so because it gets less wonderful as time grows nearer; and the books that describe the earlier parts are discounted by the results of criticism.—AUTHOR.] As Headlam himself says, "I would say only to others that if this or that event seems to anyone incredible, there is no reason why a man should feel compelled to say or think that he believes it" (p. 338).

This recalls the doubts Livy raises as to the prodigies he describes, and the apologies Josephus makes for the wonders of the history of his nation; and also reminds one of Canon Sanday's surmise, taken from the unauthentic Epistle to the Hebrews, that Revelation was "at divers times and sundry places," that the truth had been communicated piecemeal, and that many religions were partial inspirations of it. But when it is confessed that the origin and history of the world have been misrepresented and obscured, and real knowledge hindered, that the progress and development of mankind are

misstated, and that the fundamental institutions and evolution of the "chosen race" are subject to multiform error, and need radical but uncertain correction; that the accounts of the life of Christ are unsatisfactory, and even in places spurious; that the history given of the rise and progress of the Church is misty and open to serious question, if not to solid charges of falsification—when it is seen that such methods were common through a great part of the story, that the miracles alleged in its support are really dependent for their credibility on the doctrine which they are supposed to reinforce, one can only say plainly that the position seems untenable. Moreover, when it is maintained that such methods were deliberately adopted by Christ, we are constrained to agree with M. Sabatier "that the doctrine without the miracles would command an easier assent."

"Mental disease was in Palestine in the time of our Lord a terrible infliction. Our Lord's attitude towards it was clear. In this, as in all other matters affecting the scientific knowledge of the age, He adopted unreservedly the current theories. However great a shock this may be to some, we must recognize that it is so. And if we are prepared to do this, it will become clear that there was no other attitude that would have been consistent with the character and purpose of our Lord's ministry. He came neither to teach a science nor a medical knowledge nor a biblical criticism which those whom He addressed would have been quite incapable of grasping. The psychological language which He used was that of His time" (Headlam, *loc. cit.*, pp. 303–5). Now, this is precisely what every conscientious scientific man carefully avoids. In all positions it is needful to consider words used so as not to assent to error and to confirm mistakes, but to lead people up to higher and truer views; to profess that, when omniscient knowledge and power were for once in this world, all that it could manage was just to conform to popular prejudices and ignorance, is surely very near to propounding a theory of scientific falsehood and a practice of a religious deception, and can hardly be accepted as a convincing explanation of the facts, or the truth. "It is wrong to use words so that they shall have one sense to some people and another sense to other people; wrong to suppress the truth when that suppression leads to false belief

in others" (W. K. Clifford, *Lectures and Essays*, Vol. II, p. 100).

We are apparently getting at a new morality in this; the Jews thought nothing of foisting books on to men who had no hand in their composition; the Church shut its eyes to much pious forgery when it thought it would aid the victory of truth! "Economy of truth," as Pascal says, "is perilously near superfluity of falsehood."

Headlam continues: "Our knowledge at present is most imperfect, and it is possible that supposing the purpose of the Gospels had been to give a complete account of demoniacal possession, it might be found to be as inconsistent with the present stage of medical knowledge as is their actual teaching. Our attitude towards the personality of evil in any form must be at present one of suspension of judgment" (p. 304). "What I would put before you is that those possessed with devils were men subject to nervous diseases, some of which take now, as they did then, very strange forms; that the extent to which moral and spiritual causes have been at work is at present unknown; that our Lord simply adopted the current theory in relation to them" (pp. 305-6). "I would say that I cannot personally conceive our Lord approaching these phenomena from any point of view but that of His own times; that nervous diseases could only be dealt with through the mind of the sufferer; that our Lord probably in no other direction did more to heal misery than in this; and that the spiritual power of the Christian Church, which has undoubtedly enabled it to cast out devils, has been one of the most powerful vehicles for suppressing mental suffering" (p. 309). "There is, then, a certain analogy between the miracles of healing recorded of our Lord and certain events which have happened within recent experience" (p. 311). "What exists at the present time in a weak, feeble, and tentative fashion existed in Him as a strong authoritative power" (p. 313). "What I would put before you is that on no grounds is it necessary for us to bar out miracles or make a sharp distinction between the time of our Lord and other periods in the Christian Church, or to say that miracles in the Church could not happen" (pp. 343-4)

"In a very large number of cases, undoubtedly, the evidence is poor and unsatisfactory; in some cases it is obviously

legendary" (p. 344). "We are quite prepared to believe that in times of religious movements when men's spiritual nature is strengthened, the influence of their spiritual nature on their material environment will be intensified. Some ecclesiastical miracles may have happened" (p. 316).

Is it not much more probable that at times of excitement mistakes have been made as to facts? This notion of miracles and revelation in spots and blotches, like a kind of spiritual measles, does not speak of a consistent and orderly development. If there were only one dominant religion of the world, it would hold a very strong position, from the difficulty of accounting for its rise and prevalence; but when there are several, they cancel and explain one another to a great extent. No one who considers the passages taken from Frazer and others can question the proneness of the human mind to baseless and absurd beliefs. As Frazer says, the one really catholic tenet of all mankind is the faith in magic—that is, the persuasion that effects can be obtained from insufficient causes, like incantations, sprinkling with water, or cabalistic signs. When he is satisfied, a man feels happy; when dissatisfied, he is ill at ease and discontented. But nothing conduces more to content and satisfaction than a conviction that you can influence events in your own favour by a special power over persons and things; it springs from and gratifies conceit. At Lourdes they profess "to take no account of cures in nervous cases; but a Catholic who went himself as medical attendant on a pilgrimage said he should like to know who made the diagnoses." "To the normal religious mind the miraculous is natural, to many it seems the only means of authenticating a revelation" (*Miracles in the New Testament*, p. 50).

The original attitude of primitive man to the order of nature on the one side was a mythological explanation of all the phenomena: the movement of the sea, the flow of the river, the eruption of a volcano, the produce of the earth—all these were the work of beings, beneficent or malignant, whose actions were supposed to be as incalculable as those of mankind. It was necessary, therefore, that they should be appeased; their friendliness must be secured by gifts and sacrifices or their actions neutralized by magic (p. 86). "According to the universal expectation of mankind miracles are looked upon as

the natural way in which God might be expected to witness to His presence" (p. 144). A natural instinct looked on a miracle as a sign of God's activity in the world. "Miracles as credentials seem now to be at a discount. . . . A miracle, *i.e.* an anomalous intervention of spiritual force indicating purpose, supposed to be established by testimony, would merely prove the energy of superhuman power" (Rev. J. H. Barnard, *H.D.B.*, Vol. III, p. 387). "No amount of evidence to the occurrence of a miracle, in short, is sufficient to justify us in inferring the intervention of divine power, unless the miracle be one which our conscience assures us is not unworthy of God" (p. 388). "Some present no particular difficulty of credence to anyone who is familiar with the remarkable phenomena of hypnotism or more generally with the influence of a strong will over a weak one" (p. 390). "Yet there are some that cannot be thus explained. The miracles ascribed to the Apostles in Acts stand on a somewhat different platform. Standing alone, the evidence for them would hardly be sufficient to compel their reception" (p. 392). The accounts of these two great prophets, Elijah and Elisha, stand somewhat apart from the general history of Israel. The miracles of Elisha are never alluded to in the Old Testament after the story of their occurrence, and they are only once mentioned in the Apocrypha. . . . It is an hypothesis with a good deal of *prima facie* evidence in its favour, that the miracle-stories of I K. xvii-xviii; II K. i-vi, are rather of the nature of Jewish Haggadoth than of sober history. . . . The song of the book of Jashar, which speaks of the sun standing still at Gibeon (*Jos.* x. 12) can hardly be taken as a scientific statement of fact. . . . It is poetry. The story of Balaam's ass speaking has been referred to its parallels, and the episode of Jonah and the whale seems to be of a similar class. . . . We cannot think that the evidence for several recorded miracles, such as Elisha making the axe-head to swim (II K. vi. 5), the speaking of Balaam's ass (*Nu.* xxii. 28) and the staying of the sun and moon at Gibeon (*Jos.* x. 12) is at all sufficient. With even greater probability may this be said of the stories of Daniel in the den of lions, and the Three Children in the furnace of Nebuchadnezzar" (p. 393).

"It is not too much to say that no recorded occurrences

in recent centuries seem to bear the character of *σημεῖα* in at all the same degree as the miracles of the Gospel" (p. 395). "Origen . . . says that he has seen many persons rescued from delirium. But the commonest exemplification of this gift was displayed in the expulsion of demons; exorcism is regarded quite as a thing of course by the second-century Fathers" (p. 394). "We observe here that the earliest notices of the power of prophecy imply also the presence of its counterfeit, and indeed prophecy is, of all the Divine 'gifts,' that which would most easily lend itself to imposture" (p. 394).

"The Ten Plagues, the Parting of the Red Sea (Ex. xiv. 21-31) and of the Jordan (Jos. iii. 14; cf. II Kings ii. 1-14), the water from the Rock at Rephidim (Ex. viii. 12) and at Kadesh (Num. xx. 7), the curing of the waters of Marah (Ex. xv. 23, cp. II Kings ii. 21), the budding of Aaron's rod (Nu. xviii. 18), the deaths of Nadab and Abihu (Lv. x. 1), as of Korah and his company (Nu. xvii. 18), did not involve any apparent breach in the continuity of the physical order" (p. 393). These concessions can hardly be regarded as a doughty defence of miracles. The "Higher Criticism" is clearly conscious of the necessity of getting rid of most of the Old Testament, and a considerable part of the New. How much of the Prophets or of the Epistles will remain when it has quite done with them is a piquant question as to which I at least have very small doubt. For instance, "There is much to be said for [Bishop] Ryle's conclusion respecting the patriarchs as a whole. Perhaps we should not be far wrong in regarding them as constituting a group of demigods or heroes, whose names, in the earliest days of Hebrew tradition, filled up the blank between the creation of man and the age of the Israelite patriarchs. Such a group would be in accordance with the analogy of the primitive legends of other races. The removal of every taint of polytheistic superstition, the presentation of these names as the names of ordinary human beings, would be the work of the Israelite narrator. . . . In such purification of derived material we see inspiration at work" (*H.D.B.*, Vol. III, p. 694).

But why, if so perfect, is it needful to alter altogether the plain meaning of clearly expressed and sharply cut accounts? "The editors to whom we owe the book of Genesis in its present

form evidently understood the Lamech of Ch. iv to be the same person as the Lamech of Ch. v. Yet one and the same man cannot have been the descendant in the direct line of two individuals so sharply distinguished from each other as Cain and Seth. And there is a striking similarity between some of the names on the one side and the other, compelling us to conclude that ‘P,’ altered Irad in Jared, Mehujael into Mahalalel, Methushael into Methuselah” (Rev. J. Taylor, *loc. cit.*, p. 694). “The internal evidence [II Peter] then, reviewed so far, is adverse to the Petrine authorship. But there is another element in the internal evidence of which, at this point, account must be taken. There are in the Epistle what appear to be clear signs of a date much later than the apostolic age.”

“In what sense is II Peter to be viewed as a *forgery*? When we regard the Epistle from the point of view of those who possess in the New Testament a fixed and definite collection of apostolic writings, our natural impulse, when we find ourselves unable to maintain its genuineness, is to condemn it as a shameless forgery” (Rev. F. H. Chase). “Irremovable doubt is the Nemesis of the early Christian habits of forgery and fiction” (J. M. Robertson, *Short History of Christianity*, 1903, Watts, p. 5). “La controverse religieuse est toujours de mauvaise foi, sans le savoir et sans le vouloir. . . . Calomnies, contre-sens, falsifications des idées et des textes . . . rien ne paraît déloyal à celui qui croit tenir en main les intérêts de la vérité absolue” (Renan, *Les Apôtres*, p. li). “Dieu n'est pas dans la tourmente. . . . La vérité n'est pas faite pour l'homme passionné” (p. lii). “La philosophie diffère de la foi en ce que la foi est censée opérer par elle-même, indépendamment de l'intelligence qu'on a des dogmes” (p. liv). “On ne peut être à la fois bon controversiste et bon historien” (p. lvii).

“Inscrire un nom célèbre en tête d'un écrit, comme on le fit pour la deuxième épître de Pierre, et très-probablement pour les épîtres de Paul à Tite et à Timothée, n'avait rien qui répugnât aux habitudes du temps” (p. xvii). “Les deux premières capitales du christianisme des gentils, Antioche et Ephèse, étaient les deux villes de l'Empire les plus adonnées aux croyances surnaturelles. Le II<sup>e</sup> et le III<sup>e</sup> siècle poussèrent jusqu'à la démence la soif du merveilleux et le crédulité” (p.

370). “ L’Italie, en adoptant la science grecque, avait su, un moment, l’animer d’un sentiment nouveau ” (p. 327). “ Pendant que Cicéron donnait avec un tact exquis une forme achevée aux idées qu’il empruntat aux Hellènes; que Lucrèce écrivait son étonnant poème; qu’Horace avouait à Auguste, qui ne s’en émouvait pas, sa franche incrédulité . . . que les grands stoïciens tiraient les conséquences pratiques de la philosophie grecque, les plus folles chimères trouvaient créance, la foi au merveilleux était sans bornes. Jamais on ne fut plus occupé de prophéties, de prodiges. Le beau déisme éclectique de Cicéron, continué et perfectionné encore par Sénèque, restait la croyance d’un petit nombre d’esprits élevés ” (pp. 328-9). “ La crédulité était une maladie générale.” “ . . . César même, dit-on, n’y échappaient pas ” (p. 330 and *note* 3). “ L’amateur instruit et lettré remplaçait le savant créateur.” [Self-made man and his Creator?—AUTHOR.] “ Voir surtout . . . Julius Obsequens sur les Prodiges, et les *Discours sacrés* d’Ælius Aristide ” (p. 330). “ La ville de Rome n’eut jamais de grande école scientifique. Le charlatanisme y regnait presque sans contrôle ” (p. 331). “ De la mort d’Auguste à l’avènement de Trajan, il faut donc placer une période d’abaissement momentané pour l’esprit humain ” (p. 331). “ Toutes les grandes créations religieuses ont eu lieu dans des sociétés dont l’esprit général était plus ou moins analogue à celui de l’Orient. Jusqu’ici, en effet, la foi absolue a seule réussi à s’imposer aux autres ” (p. 383). “ En religion il n’y a que les affirmations spontanées, et, si j’ose le dire, fanatiques, qui soient contagieuses . . . leur succès est en proportion de ce qu’elles disent au cœur du peuple . . . c’est une grande vérité d’instinct, entrevue par le peuple, exprimée par le peuple ” (p. 384). “ Il est probable que l’augmentation des facultés religieuses aurait lieu dans une progression plus rapide que l’augmentation de la capacité intellectuelle. . . . Le progrès aura donc pour effet d’agrandir la religion, et non de la détruire ou de la diminuer ” (p. 385).

“ La formation de christianisme est le plus grand fait de l’histoire religieuse du monde. Mais elle n’est pas un miracle pour cela. . . . L’hellenisme . . . est autant un prodige de beauté que le christianisme est un prodige de sainteté. Une chose unique n’est pas une chose miraculeuse. Dieu est à des

degrés divers dans tout ce qui est beau, bon et vrai" (pp. xlix-l). "Mais il n'est jamais dans une de ses manifestations d'une façon si exclusive, que la présence de son souffle en un mouvement religieux ou philosophique doive être considérée comme un privilége ou une exception" (pp. l-li). "L'*orbis* romain devint l'*orbis* chrétien, et en ce sens on peut dire que les fondateurs de l'Empire ont été les fondateurs de la monarchie chrétienne, ou du moins qu'ils en ont dessiné les contours" (p. 281).

"L'Empire le sentit bien au IV<sup>e</sup> siècle; il devint chrétien; il vit que le christianisme était la religion qu'il avait faite sans le savoir. . . . L'Église, de son côté, se fit toute romaine, et est restée jusqu'à nos jours comme un débris de l'Empire" (p. 282). "Presque toutes nos superstitions sont les restes d'une religion antérieure au christianisme, que celui-ci n'a pu déraciner entièrement" (p. 336). "Les stoïciens, maîtres de l'Empire, le réformèrent et présidèrent aux cent plus belles années de l'histoire de l'humanité. Les chrétiens, maîtres de l'Empire à partir de Constantin, achevèrent de le ruiner. L'héroïsme des uns ne doit pas faire oublier celui des autres. . . . Il y eut dans la résistance de la philosophie, au premier siècle, autant de grandeur que dans celle du christianisme" (p. 344).

Bishop Headlam's lectures suffer from having been given to a clerical audience to which that could be said which would hardly be ventured in an assembly of laymen; they appear to be affected by the recrudescence of superstition which has taken place in recent times, and especially during the War; indeed, both Headlam and Thompson on this subject seem to place too much stress on faith cures, and exaggerate their efficacy. Every medical man makes use of the effects of confidence, yet all recognize that the power of the mind over the body is unfortunately quickly exhausted, especially when weakened by disease; but theologians have not left off the habit of talking wildly on doubtful subjects, where guessing is possible.

Headlam conceives that if an observer had come to the earth at long intervals, he would have seen very marvellous changes. This demand for length of time is significant of a profound alteration in the clerical point of view; and perhaps

if, in place of mere visits, the observation had been continuous, nothing would have been seen more wonderful than we can witness in a limited period. Canon Sanday, with deeper insight, holds that nothing in Nature is done by leaps or bounds. All the indications of science are in the direction that slow and, for the most part, imperceptible advances have been the efficient causes of progress. It is evil that accumulates like heat, and discharges itself with explosive violence from time to time; a sort of dust-heap of the universe in which collect incongruous elements that cannot accommodate themselves to the course of orderly evolution, but have to fight it out among themselves. The "personality of evil" does not help at all; it only suggests Man Friday's question, "Why God not kill the Debil?" and recalls the monarch who wished that his enemies had only one head, so that he might cut it off with a single blow and end the whole at once. Headlam clearly does not know that "nervous diseases" are some of the most intractable of ailments, involving extensive paralysis with shrinking and distortion of limbs, which defy the most skilful treatment. Of course, there are pseudo-nervous maladies, in one of which I have seen a miracle worked. A girl was brought into hospital, "unable to move hand or foot." She was examined by an expert, who came to the conclusion that there was nothing really wrong. He injected some distilled water, said, "Run to the end of the ward," and she did so. Sham miracles in imaginary diseases only prove the skill and insight of the operator, and the effects are mostly transient. "The life of Christ in the Gospels is plainly the life of a man" (Canon Sanday). No other intelligible or rational account can be given of it; and I would ask if there is any independent evidence that mental affections were specially rife in the time of Christ, or took any peculiar forms; disease is always spoken of in the Gospels as if it were well known. If he was a "physician," Luke should have known.

Sabatier, the author of *L'Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion*, jeers at the "Kenosis theory," by which "the pre-existent and eternal Deity commits suicide, by incarnation, in order to be born again, gradually; and finds Himself God afresh at the end of His human life."

This description is an exact reproduction of the ideas which

Frazer records as prevailing in the countries round the Mediterranean at the beginning of our era, and still surviving in many parts of the world in more or less complete form. There is indeed something quite illogical in supposing that the knowledge which might have afforded by its insight a perpetual proof of the advance of science, and its active aid in promoting its progress, was given up; but the power to work wonders, which can afford to subsequent ages only a second-hand evidence very much the worse for wear, was retained. For instance, take the underlying principle of evolution—that nothing in animals or plants was contrived for their present purposes, but was adapted to bygone objects and creatures. This is exactly in keeping with Headlam's statement that, “The writers of the books of the New Testament composed their works to meet the needs of their own day, and did not write to assist people in the twentieth century in the particular controversy in which they might be engaged” (*op. cit.*, p. 278); and with Canon Sanday's dictum that religion needs re-statement for each age, and every generation must formulate its own beliefs—that is, “All is a development.” If valid, this would have been a wide generalization, which would have thrown a flood-light on the methods of Nature and instead of hindering would have helped the progress of knowledge; yet it cannot in truth be said to be recondite or hard to grasp in comparison with St. Paul's epistles, or even the Fourth Gospel, while as to the Book of “Revelation” or the “prophets” of Israel, it is broad daylight as compared to their misty doctrines. All teaching is done by precepts that in time become clear, of which the parables of Christ are a patent example. Here, however, the implication seems to be that we are to swallow unprovable dogmas, like the Virgin-Birth, while the prejudices and ignorance of Galilean peasants were to be saved from shocks, such as that to which people to-day are exposed by tenets like these. This savours of the politician rather than of the ethical teacher, and its success is doubtful. Nobody now questions the intellectual supremacy of Aristotle, or of Bacon and Newton, or probably even of Galileo and Darwin; but it has been said that there was one witness who had the best possible chance of seeing and judging the words and acts of Jesus, and yet was not convinced—namely, the Jewish people.

It has been said "that it was by reason of His humanity that he was divine," but Divinity making him God has lost this humanity; and according to a French theologian: "Orthodoxy, Catholic and Protestant, by making Christ the second person of the Eternal Trinity, a son of like substance and power with the Father, tears him from history, and carries him into philosophy and metaphysics; but thus to deify history is again in a way to destroy it. The dogma annuls the limited contingent character of Jesus of Nazareth, and his life loses all reality; we have no longer a man before our eyes; though the Church, in theory, asserts the humanity of Christ, besides his divinity: this fatally absorbs all; we have only a God walking in the midst of his contemporaries, hidden under a human figure. Traditional Christianity is incurably Docetic" (*Sabatier, loc. cit.*).

As Abraham "saw vaguely that human sacrifice was not pleasing to God," so Jesus clearly realized that the blood of bulls and sheep could not set aside sin. St. Paul enunciated this plainly; but he evidently attached no weight to the life of Christ. He never mentions his miracles, and only rarely refers to his deeds or words. The gravamen of our charge is that the life of a great ethical teacher has been obscured and marred by being written by one of inferior capacity who did not know of the Sermon on the Mount, the Parable of the Prodigal Son, and the Lord's Prayer, or who was so wanting in insight that he left them out. As to this there is, in truth, a very curious sequence. "Papias stated on the authority of the elder (Eus., *H.E.* III, 3915) that Mark had never been a follower of the Lord himself, but had served Peter as interpreter, and that his gospel represents the occasional discourses of St. Peter, which Mark reproduced from memory, accurately. Irenæus, after telling that (III, 1. 1) Matthew wrote while Peter and Paul were preaching in Rome, proceeds: "After their death (ἔξοδον; (exodus)), Mark also, the disciple and interpreter of Peter, delivered to us in writing the substance of Peter's teaching." "Mark apparently tried to collect parables as well as miracles; so also did the *Logia*: and yet neither of these documents has any trace of the Prodigal Son, or the Good Samaritan, or the Pharisee and the Publican, or the Rich Man and Lazarus . . . or the Importunate Widow, or the

Unrighteous Steward" (Sanday, *Criticism of the Fourth Gospel*, pp. 171-2).

"This is curious, for Papias says Mark wrote down all he remembered of what Peter said and made no mistake and said nothing false with regard to them" (Clement of Alexandria). Eusebius affirms that Mark wrote his Gospel to satisfy the importunities of the brethren, and, without the apostle's knowledge, before the death of Peter; and submitted it when complete to the apostle's judgment. Origen (*Homm.* III, i; *Eus. H.E.*, VI, 25.5) says that Mark wrote as the Apostle dictated to him ( $\omega\delta\pi\acute{e}rpos\acute{a}\phi\gamma\gamma\sigma\epsilon\nu\acute{a}\nu\tau\hat{\omega}$ ) (Bigg, "Peter and Jude," *International Critical Commentary*, p. 82).

To me this appears to be a typical piece of religious accretion: first we have recollection, then notes, then approval, and finally dictation. The first is doubtless true; the latter a false account, depending on a mistake as to the words "spoken by Peter." In the same way all doctrines of the Church seem to be piled up by degrees from small beginnings.

According to Papias, "The old man John," whoever he may have been, objected to Mark's Gospel that it was "altogether insufficient, and written in complete ignorance of the exact order of events in Christ's life"; and he had reason (*vide* Renan, *Christian Church*, English edition, p. 26). Presbuteros Johannes evidently thought he knew the real facts much better himself and could have given a more accurate account of them. Of St. John's Gospel Renan says: "Though the writer constantly asserts that he himself had witnessed what he describes, he never clearly states who he was, or claims to be John, the Apostle; though there is 'no doubt the forger intended to cause it to be believed.' This was merely one of those small literary artifices such as Plato is fond of affecting" (p. 27). "According to the spirit of the age, there was no more difficulty in putting discourses into Jesus' mouth than the authors of the Thora and the prophets of old found in making God speak according to their prejudices" (p. 31). "It is superior to the Synoptic Gospels in the order of facts, though it is of no value, if we wish to know how Jesus [really] spoke." Still, "it is clear that besides the Synoptists, there existed a collection of traditions; and to treat this Gospel as an artificial composition with no traditional

basis is to mistake its character, just as seriously as when it is looked on as a document at first hand and original from the beginning to the end" (p. 31). "The discourses which are put into the mouth of Jesus are certainly artificial. This Gospel does not contain a single parable, or any apocalyptic discourse about the end of the world; instead of that refined feeling of the poetry of the earth which fills all the Galilean Gospels, we find here nothing but a very dry system of metaphysics and dialectics in the structure of which Egyptian theology and Greek philosophy had their full share. The idea of Incarnate Reason, *i.e.* of Divine Reason assuming a finite shape, is quite Egyptian" (p. 32). "From the earliest ages, Egypt proclaimed a God living alone in substance, but eternally begetting his own likeness, one and yet twofold at the same time. Proceeding eternally from the Father, the Son is the first born; the Word who made everything, and without whom nothing has been made: on the other hand, it had for a long time been the tendency of Judaism, in order to escape from its somewhat dry system of theology, to create a variety of the Deity by personifying abstract attributes, such as Wisdom, the Divine word, etc.; already in Job and the Proverbs, Wisdom plays the part of an assessor to the Divinity: the expression 'the Word' became especially fruitful, 'God created everything by his Word.' Thus people were led to regard 'the Word' as a divine Minister, as an intermediary by whom God works on the outer world. That mode of expression had much greater consequences amongst the Egyptian Jews, who spoke Greek" (p. 34).

"The Alexandrine Book of Wisdom, which is attributed to Solomon, already delights in these theories. Philo combined such forms of expression with his notion of Greek Philosophy. His *Logos* (Word, Reason), is the divine in the universe, it is an exteriorized God, the Wisdom of Holy Scripture. He goes so far as to call it, 'a second God,' or 'the man of God,' that is to say, 'God, considered as Anthropomorphous.' Although such ideas were in their origin as far as possible removed from Messianic ideas, one can see that a sort of fusion might be brought about between them. The possibility of a full incarnation of the *Logos* is quite in accordance with Philo's ideas. It was a generally received opinion that in all the

various divine manifestations in which God wished to make Himself visible, it was the *Logos* who assumed the human form" (p. 35). "These ideas were favoured by numerous passages in the most ancient historical books, where 'the Angel of Jehovah' indicates the divine appearance. It was, then, natural that the Messiah should be considered as the incarnate *Logos*" (p. 36).

"Thus Hebrew thought tended to represent God's self manifestation as mediated by an agent, more or less conceived as personal and yet blending with the divine personality itself. . . . Since the time of Heraclitus, a *Logos* doctrine had been developing in Greek thought for the purpose of explaining how Deity came into relation with the world" (*H.D.B.*, Vol. III, p. 134). "By the *Logos*, however, in this connection the Greeks meant reason" (p. 134).

From the estimate formed of him in recent books so likewise St. Luke appears to have preferred his own stylistic amendments to the exact words of Jesus. A little turn in Greek phrase, some small quip or oddity was enough to make him desert his evidence and give a version of his own, in what he considered a better form of style. "Matthew," again, is a mere compilation of these items; the "Sermon on the Mount" and the "Journey Narrative" are conspicuous examples, as they give rise to a doubt whether the suppression of the original "Words of Christ" is not due to the fact that they were not found at all suitable to the purposes of the Church or capable of being "grasped by the people of those times." So that in the first and fourth Gospel they had to be worked up into systematic discourses, which savour of their origin and age. "We do not claim any other authority for the writers than that of being good historians, and they would therefore be subject to the same chance of error as other witnesses. They may have made mistakes in some cases, or there may have been some mistakes made by their authorities" (Headlam, pp. 300-1). "Our conclusion as to the whole question of the credibility of the Resurrection narratives, as of other narratives in the Gospel, depends upon the extent to which minor discrepancies may be held to vitiate a narrative. It is obvious as we read them that there are differences between the narratives. It is probable also that some

imaginative and legendary details have crept in" (p. 253). "The additions and rearrangements of S. Luke and S. Matthew obscure rather than emphasize what appears in S. Mark. . . . A conspicuous instance is the Sermon on the Mount. Here we have concentrated a large amount of material which in the Third Gospel is scattered through the ministry and is connected with different circumstances. S. Matthew cares about the teaching, S. Luke about the historical situation" (pp. 208-9). "S. Matthew omits all those vivid details which give life, and contents himself with the salient facts. His procedure is clearly that of a secondhand narrator" (p. 212).

They were men, and *Humanum est errare*; but the view put forward by Headlam, that "One with perfect knowledge deliberately spoke" in a way which was misleading and untrue, appears to be at once *dishonest and dishonourable*. Would he consider it right to cloak his opinions on the infallibility of the Bible; or that the Creation and Flood did not take place in the manner stated; or that Darwinism is in the main true; or that David did not write the Psalms, or Solomon the "Wisdom" books? Surely not; but he does speak as if Matthew wrote the First Gospel, which is perilously near falsehood. His words as to Christ recall those of Sir Alfred Dale, when he said, "The Bible does not tell us how the world was created, or how man was made; it teaches us who created the world and by whom man was made." To me now this appears to be an absolutely untrue account of the facts. Genesis does, in the most precise terms, describe the creation of the world, and, with the fullest detail, the making of man, using the ideas of its time and the knowledge of its age. It was not till science forced home the facts that any advocate of religion admitted that either the one or the other did not speak the exact truth. "In order to understand what was the mind of the Holy Spirit, when He wrote the book of Genesis . . . we must listen to the interpretations given . . . by Jesus Christ, the Son of God, and His Apostles, to whom He sent the Holy Spirit in order to teach them all things; and to guide them into all truth." "Every suggestion and hint which they give, every clue that they supply is to be thankfully accepted" (Bishop Wordsworth, *Preface to Bible*, pp. ix-x). "We cannot tamper with the phenomena of Genesis without

damaging the doctrines of the Gospel. . . . We cannot injure the one without laying violent hands on the other. They who would rationalize on the sacrifice of Isaac on Mount Moriah are not very far off from doing outrage to the sacrifice of Christ on Calvary. They who would pare away the facts of Exodus are silently sapping the foundations of belief in the Passion and in the whole mystery of Redemption wrought by the blood of Christ" (*loc. cit.*, p. xxx).

Which seems almost prophetic to-day. Even the Greeks of old knew, *πολλαὶ μὲν θητῶις γλῶτται, μία δὲ ἀθανάτουσιν* that there are many tongues among mortals, but to the deathless only one. Yet we are told of various voices that tell of very varying truth, in many lands and ages, using always the language of the period and the ideas of their time. Still, such shifty doctrines, resting on such dubious accounts and backed by miracles open to dispute, are no evidence sufficient to maintain an unprovable fact like the Virgin birth, or of a God who was a man, and not a man in some of the most essential qualities of human nature.

The chief thought of Christ was of an All-loving Father in Heaven, whose sons all men are. It is impossible that with this idea vividly before Him he should have accepted implicitly the elaborate ceremonies of propitiation and atonement embodied in all the religions of his time and race. St. Paul saw this clearly and enunciated it plainly; but it is incredible, if Jesus had not distinctly proclaimed it, that this should have been so readily accepted in the faith He founded. In Peter and others there was a reluctance to give up the traditions among which they had been reared, and it was not until after the destruction of the Temple that the Church finally broke with those notions. The way had already been paved in Israel by the prophets, who saw that rites and ordinances were of no avail if the heart was not truly pure. The concentration of the religion at Jerusalem shows the waning belief of the people in the mere performance of sacrifice. What every man had been accustomed to perform for himself, what had been done by local priests in every farmstead, by degrees had become the peculiar custom of a single place. It is hard to see how this revolution took effect; it is hardly conceivable that it could have happened but for the general upset caused by the foreign

incursions. The same sort of thing that occurred to the Romans at the invasion of the Gauls happened also to the Jews. The capture of their chief city destroyed their archives; and these were rewritten from memory, with some help from documents. This presumption is practically not now denied, and it is perfectly clear to anyone who reads the Bible with open eyes and mind.

The Protestant Reformers were steeped in the notion of an infallible Church, and in its place they put an infallible book; but they added to this canon their own infallibility as interpreters and put dates and headings to the chapters, etc.—for which there is no warrant whatever. The theory of inspiration by the Holy Ghost was invented because it was impossible otherwise to account for the knowledge of the writers, *e.g.*, in Moses, of the Creation, and of the talk between Balaam and Balak; or between Sampson and Delilah; or what passed between Judah and Tamar; or of the prayer at Gethsemane, and the events of the temptation. Directly one looks at the situation squarely, one must ask: “How did these men know this?” There were no reporters then; Solomon’s speech at the dedication of the Temple, St. Paul’s before Festus and Felix, Jotham’s parable, and countless other words and deeds, how were they recorded? None of these “*fasti*” had a shorthand writer, nor even a Boswell to jot down their sayings at the time. Many of them are plainly not what was really spoken. None of St. Paul’s as given in the text would take five minutes to speak; at the most they can be only short abstracts, a few striking phrases, or the gist of the whole. This kind of reporting does not seem a worthy function for the Holy Spirit; the world has been repeatedly reminded that “the facts of the origin of Christianity could not be all written down”; but surely four Gospels, as large as the whole Bible, could not be looked on as superfluous for the narration of such an event; nor do I think that a set of volumes as large as the records of a law court could be considered as too bulky for setting forth the dealings of God with the entire world and the plan of man’s salvation. The whole argument is quite unreal and a typical piece of theological make-believe. It is the lineal descendant of the old woman’s injunction “to be good boys and content with what is given you; it is what your father thought right,

and no doubt is for the best"; which has been reiterated *ad nauseam* from the pulpits for centuries, in the formula: "poor weak mortals of limited understanding, are we to dictate the method in which the All-wise should give His revelation or lay down rules for His procedure?"

All very proper and pious no doubt, and in exact keeping with the Romish tenet of submission; but when clerics themselves take to criticizing the "Word of God," they can hardly complain if others follow in their sanctified footsteps and hint that they would like something more than "substantial historical accuracy." Also "that inspiration by the Holy Spirit" which ends in obvious mistakes, whether in the original transcripts or in the copies made from them, seems a futile labour for so august an author. If it should be said that such verbal inspiration is no longer insisted on now, my reply would be: It is urged weekly in a thousand forcible-feeble pulpit discourses in nearly every country, and most town churches; that the Pope—who may certainly be taken as the authoritative mouthpiece of what is, after all, the main stem of Christianity, whatever may be the value attached to or claimed for his power of infallibility—has formally declared the policy in an Encyclical, in spite of criticism from without and within, and has adhered to certain rules for the guidance of the faithful in apparent collisions between science and the Bible. "That God is the author of Holy Writ." "There is no error in the Bible; the individual writers were what our hands are to our brain; and to deny the inerrancy of Scripture is either to pervert Catholic doctrine of inspiration, or to accuse God of error." "We are to follow Augustine's precepts; that if a thing is certainly proved we must demonstrate that Holy Writ does not deny it; if we cannot do this then we must reject the fact, and if that is impossible, we must believe in spite of it, without a shadow of doubt, that it is false."

To which pontificating, however, its opponents may retort that this is not a decree *ex cathedrā*, so that even Romanists may firmly believe that the Pope is wrong, though infallible; for he certainly is not exempt from ignorance; and "invincible ignorance" is always held to be an excuse for errors in faith. A faith which asserts that God is responsible for the whole Bible, and all its parts, and that there are no errors in it, would

swallow a crocodile raw. Such a theory lands us in the strange position that the Holy Ghost must have written in ten or more different styles of bad Greek, and is shaky in grammatical and logical accuracy; and, moreover, puts a flagrant mistake into the mouth of Christ—in “Zacharias, son of Barachias, who was slain between the horns of the altar.” If, as Renan states—and nobody is a better authority on all Hebrew questions—one of this name was really killed between the time of Christ and the writing of the Gospels, the fact throws a lurid light on the composition of them, and affords a striking commentary on the principle, now generally admitted (*Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, short note, Ch. III, p. 484). Luitprand relates and interprets the oracle of the Greeks and Saracens in which, after the fashion of prophecy, the past is clear and historical, the future is dark and ænigmatical and erroneous. From this boundary of light and shade an impartial critic may commonly determine the date of the composition. Christ is also made to say, “that except a grain of corn die, it will not live” (John xii. 24). This is apparently taken from I Cor. xv. 36–7; and is like Paul’s thoughtless assertions. In effect, what we are expected to believe is that, like the curate’s egg, the “Word of God” is good in parts. In practical application this means that the selector of what is conceived to be the actual revealed word, chooses in terms of his preconceptions, prepossessions, and partisan or sectarian affinities and interests. Plenary inspiration *pace* slips of the pen is surely a curious doctrine; and the “Holy Spirit” using men like pens and allowing their ignorance to mar the result seems like a *reductio ad absurdum*; or that he could confuse Quirinius with Quirinus (*H.D.B.*, Vol. IV, p. 183).

Acts manifestly is an incomplete and insufficient history of the development of the Church. The first ten or twelve chapters contain wonders of a kind which ceases when the writer comes to tell things that he knows from his own observation; apparently he got these from Mark, or certainly from one who was familiar with the household of Mark’s mother; and from Philip or his daughters, both of them credulous and confessedly suspicious sources of information. Even Luke’s accuracy with regard to the Census of Quirinius (Cyrenius) is now seemingly given up. “There is perhaps an error as to

its date"; and, as it is alleged as the reason why Christ was born in Bethlehem, "according to the Prophets," the mistake is surely of no small importance; and, taken in conjunction with the acknowledged difficulties, if not impossibility, of squaring up the version of the "nativity" given by him with that contained in the first Gospel, its bearing is almost crucial. In face of such facts, the infallibility of the most authentic books of the Bible cannot be credited by those who have followed the question with care and a desire to arrive at the truth without prejudice. "We have no right to assume that inspiration secures infallible chronology; and St. Luke bases his claim to be heard, not on inspiration, but on the excellence of his information and his own careful inquiry (*Luke i. 1-4*). Yet even well-informed and careful writers sometimes make mistakes, and he may have done so here (in A.D. 67, when Quirinius certainly *was* governor, and conducted the census, *Acts v. 37*; *Jos., Ant.*, XVIII, i, 1; ii, 1). But it is hard to see how Quirinius could be 'governor,' when Herod died in B.C. 4" (*Rev. A. Plummer, H.D.B.*, Vol. IV, p. 183). "It is incredible that Quirinius was governor before the death of Herod, and until that is established, we must admit that Luke is at least a year wrong in his chronology. If a mistake has not been proved, neither has it been disproved, like 'Barachias' for 'Jehoida' (*Mat. xxiii. 35*) it is perhaps a slip of the pen" (*ibid.*, Vol. IV, p. 183). Inspiration ending in mistakes and infallibility modified by slips of the pen, is a novel and peculiar idea. Logically, Dr. Headlam should freely admit that it is in keeping with the slipshod notions that have passed muster at various times on the subject, and agree that "the kind of inspiration" which suggests holy thoughts to men is quite different from that which is alleged to communicate facts and to ensure their accuracy. The former order is not denied, the second is hardly now affirmed by competent thinkers; in fact, Headlam himself says: "There are discrepancies in some cases between the narratives, which make us feel that neither account can be absolutely accurate. What the limits of error may be, it may not be possible to judge, but no difficulty about any detail ought to prevent us from accepting the general teaching of the Gospel" (*Miracles of the New Testament*, p. 339). Certainly not its ethical teaching, so far as it approves itself to our moral

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sense; but its doctrinal and theological dogmas can hardly be made to rest with security on narratives which may "perhaps" be substantially true, but of which the details are open to question that becomes more persistently pressing, and at each turn is seen to be still more formidable even by those who have made it their business to defend what, as a truth, they must know to be dubious in the extreme. It is the old, old sad story of a humanity, that "faith, fanatic faith, once fixed" will lead them to tread *ignes suppositos cineri doloso*. The fiery ordeal may have been exchanged for an intellectual or moral one, but in essence it is analogous to the bygone physical trials and pains which faith has had to endure.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE SCIENCE OF HISTORY

WHILE general history never exactly repeats itself, that of all religions affords many examples to the contrary. This is so in a special sense of the repetition of the progress of Judaism in the development of Christianity. Both start with an era of mythology, and each has about a dozen patriarchs, of very questionable worth, who are supposed to be the prime recipients and original witnesses of the divine revelation. On this foundation is piled up a stupendous structure of doctrine the authority of which is derived from teachers whose warrant and commission are, to say the least, doubtful. The earliest of these, whose position might seem the best authenticated, appear to have been strangely neglected and set aside by their immediate followers. No one who has studied the subject with care and candour fails to recognize that the Law of Moses was altogether disregarded in the kingdom of Israel; indeed, the "higher criticism" makes an attempt to explain this anomaly by showing that the Law is really of much later date, and was put together by unknown authors, when the Jewish State had practically ceased to exist. A still more cogent reason is that the moral tone of the histories and precepts embodied in the Hebrew writings is not such as could be accepted in the light of modern opinion as a true or a just representation of the wishes and orderings of an "All-loving" Deity.

With few exceptions the ordinances and ceremonies pertaining to the worship of Jahveh are common to all the races of primitive times and imperfect culture. The character assigned to Him is parallel to that of other divinities of the same age; the prophets themselves came to see that the "law" was a survival of barbarism resting on the beliefs and customs of a semi-savage people. In vain they struggled and endeavoured to inculcate a higher morality, but the materialistic spirit of

their nation overcame their impulse, and even affected their own teaching and mental outlook. The reaction was so strong that the more modern open-minded theologians maintain that through the prophets the Spirit of God was striving to raise His "chosen race" to an elevation undreamed of before, and even then far from successfully achieved. For, instead of rising to this ideal, Hebrew thought is represented as falling back on a feigned reinforcement of this rejected code, and the Jews as binding on their foreheads and limbs the fetters of a discarded ceremonial system. Though they became acquainted with wider ideas in their contact with Persian and Greek views, they set themselves to maintain rigidly the exclusiveness and unamiable seclusion of the "peculiar people of the Lord," till the common verdict of mankind about them was that they hated, and were hateful to all. As St. Paul recognizes clearly, this is not the Spirit of the Father of Love in Heaven; yet it was the natural outcome of the religious education that the Jews had received from the Law, which they supposed to be given to them, in preference to all other races, by the express favour of the Almighty.

There is no occasion to deal further or more fully with the position of the Israelites, for the case has really been surrendered by the plea of extenuation proffered by the advocates of modern "historical" methods. We have no longer to deal with the assertion of a fixed and distinctly formulated polity, but with the shimmering, misty remains of a semi-barbaric nationality reduced, long after, to codified form by a prejudiced and unenlightened priesthood who strenuously opposed and rejected the higher leadings of the more inspired of their fellow countrymen. Those who have studied the subject with the greatest care and honesty have been able to extract from these later documents the signs and finger-posts of the road along which evolution took place in the history of the Jews. As in all scientific research, the indications are not such as to convince those who are set in their own prejudices and preconceived theories. A very able teacher was wont to say: "A chemical frame of mind is essential to grasp the intricacies of the science. Insight of necessity hangs on and demands previous investigation and familiarity with the subject."

The crucial question is whether the partial and ineffectual

inspiration of the prophets is so cogent and convincing as to compel us to admit that it was beyond the scope of man, and must be accepted as a special revelation from above. In this inquiry two considerations are of great, and, especially to the scientific man, of overwhelming import: firstly, if the alleged phenomena are reconcilable and in keeping with the principles of evolution in origin and progress; and secondly, whether they fit into that system in such a way as to produce consistent action and an appropriate effect. For, as the Bible itself lays down, "If the words of a prophet do not mature and coincide with the sequence of events, so as to prove themselves potent, and in accordance with truth, that prophet has not spoken the divine will; he has not heard the word of the living God." To-day the teaching of heaven is looked for in the facts of the world, in the outcome of the present; nor was it different in the past, so far as we can see; but people judged of realities by different standards. To our ideas, there is something ludicrous in the spectacle of the ancients gazing into the entrails of animals or watching the flight of birds. Yet in primitive times they clearly thought that they learnt much of value from this inspection; and the maintenance of such methods in ages when enlightened men no longer believed in their efficacy tells really of the abiding influence of the empty ceremonies on the popular mind.

Among the Hebrews, "Urim and Thummim" and the Terāphim lingered down to historic times, as divinely appointed means of augury. According to Canon Ottley, "the sacred lot" was looked on as a reliable method of obtaining judgments. In all ages of ignorance and darkness the same idea has prevailed. As might be expected we see the Galilean fishermen resorting to sortilege to select a twelfth apostle, and in council laying down a scheme of ceremonial law, which the wider learning and open mind of St. Paul at once rejected. This was natural; it would have been impossible—nay, almost a miracle—for such men to avoid the ordinance of little things suited to small surroundings and a narrow outlook; but it does not induce confidence in a divine guidance or warrant a credit of supernatural wisdom. The principle of having "all things in common" which, like similar communistic precepts in the Hebrew Legislation, shows little sign of being accepted by

Christians in general, or adopted by the Church even as a counsel of perfection in the early ages, points towards what Canon Ottley euphemistically terms "idealism." No doubt in the first enthusiasm of religious fervour a few may have sacrificed their all, in hope perhaps of a greater reward in the present or the near future; a prospect which was distinctly favoured by the expected abolition shortly of all earthly things. Yet St. Paul knew little or nothing about it; he finds it necessary to urge his hearers to put by, as fortune permits, for the relief of the saints at Jerusalem. In other places not wholly without reference to himself, he quite realizes that sheets are not let down from heaven; and animals, clean and uncleaned, offered for him "to kill and eat." It is surely not without significance that, from the tenth chapter of Acts onwards, records of miracles are few and far between; especially having regard to the fact that from that point also we are given testimonies of original witnesses, in place of second or third-hand reports. The problem of the Fourth Gospel is thus summed up by Canon Sanday: ". . . it was written by the Apostle in his old age, when he had forgotten a great deal, and imagined a great deal more."

St. Matthew is in a still more parlous position, since the Gospel attributed to him is generally admitted to be a compilation of comparatively late date. Luke and Mark do not profess ever to have seen Christ; the former apparently got many reminiscences from the mother of Jesus, and from the wife of Herod's steward, and other similar sorts of authority. These "memorabilia" he patched on to the version given by Mark of the teaching of Peter, heard by him in Rome.

Similarly, all the doctrines of the Church seem to have been piled up by degrees from small beginnings. It commences with the Last Supper, and the injunction "Do this in remembrance of me," followed by the Agape and the constant breaking of bread, apparently in an ordinary meal. In the Church of Corinth and elsewhere this led to unseemly incidents, and restrictions had to be placed on the freedom, which was abused. "There are few things more tragic in the history of Christ's Church than the fact that its central act of worship has for centuries been, and still continues to be, a subject for the keenest controversy; and that Christians have cruelly

persecuted, and even put to cruel deaths, other Christians, for not holding doctrines (respecting the Lord's supper) which cannot be proved and which are possibly not true. The Sacrament of Love and of Life has been made an instrument of hate and of destruction, because men have insisted upon possessing knowledge which cannot be possessed and upon explaining what cannot be explained" (Rev. A. Plummer, *H.D.B.*, Vol. III, p. 148). Prof. Jevons says nothing can be evolved from what does not already contain it, at least in germ. I should like to know if he really thinks Christ's ordinance involved the whole Romanist doctrine of the Mass, in embryo. If he does, I should respect his position, but under such a supposition there could be nothing in common between us which carries with it all the claims of Papistry.

In the history of Israel, "Judges" are clearly local in their origin and influence, until the miserable state of the land in the time of Samuel forced the demand for a central authority. How, in the face of the Law, he could resent and resist such a claim is one of the difficulties evaded by the new views of the composition of the Old Testament. "The different sources present quite different pictures of Samuel. According to the later ones, he is the last 'judge,' which means not only temporary leader, as in the 'hero-stories' of Judges, but simply 'ruler,' one who wants only the title in order to be king. . . . Saul is chosen by lot out of all the tribes of Israel as king. This does not, however, prevent Samuel from continuing to act as before, as the real ruler." In I Sam. xv. 10 sq. "a passage of a highly prophetic strain, he appears to display a caprice and a lust for rule which have long caused this passage to be regarded as containing the original type of hierarchic demands in opposition to the secular power." Similarly, in the church the beginning is with separate congregations, from which by degrees bishops who meet in synods emerge as predominant, and something like Presbyterianism results. "While we find deacons and elders (or bishops in the New Testament sense) in the Apostolic age, there is no clear trace of bishops (in the later sense)" (H. M. Gwatkin, *H.D.B.*, Extra Vol. V, p. 652, and Vol. I, p. 442).

The bishops, as representing the Church in councils, become more important, and bodies composed almost wholly of prelates

gain complete ascendancy. The presidents of such bodies, as patriarchs, get to be supreme; and only one step more is needed in the demand for a king. But, as in the temporal State so in the spiritual, the elevation of a monarch is not an unmixed blessing or a matter arranged without bickering and jealousy. The envy, hatred, and malice aroused in the one are exactly reflected in the other, and, indeed, far exceeded; the most venal arts of the political wire-puller were exercised without scruple in the election of God's "Vicar on earth," until at last the kingdoms of the world have invaded the Empire of Heaven, just as the Babylonians and Assyrians overwhelmed the people of Jahveh. The parallel established is carried still further by the critical survey. In each case a doctrine really late in conception was read into the primitive elements of the faith, an interpretation, which in our times most thinking men believe to be far-fetched and false, was put upon tenets that certainly, to begin with, did not bear it. Ceremonies unknown to earlier periods, except perhaps in a very rudimentary form, were imposed on the credulity of later ages by authorities whose warrant to power was dubious, and who based such practices on superstitions current among the people.

To believers, this parallelism may seem to support the divine origin of both systems; yet when impartial students allege that there was not only a persistent falsification of history, but also fraudulent claims to supremacy and worldly possessions, which have been backed up by forgery, false pretences, and perjured oaths, that resistance has been strangled by violence, persecution, and political and military force, it becomes difficult for ordinary men to credit the theory. For instance, Mosheim says of the Nestorian dispute: "This contest between two bishops of the highest order originated rather from the depraved passions of the mind than from a sincere love of truth" (*History of the Church*, Vol. I, p. 367; Bishop Stubb's edition). "That base artifices and intrigues had not a little weight in the event, and that Cyril was influenced more by his passions than by justice and piety, no wise and good man will readily deny" (p. 368). "The imperial commissioner gave his public protest against the proceeding, and then retired. . . . The emperor, therefore, thought it necessary to bring the matter before his court, and to proceed rather upon principles

of good policy that of strict justice" (*note* by Dr. Murdock, p. 368). To which Bishop Stubbs adds: "Cyril and his friends are accused of having procured this decision by subserviency, court favour, and bribery. There is much that is discreditable to both sides, but Cyril's want of principle does not justify Nestorius's heresy, nor Nestorius's heresy Cyril's violence."

Dean Milman, in his *Latin Christianity*, Vol. I, writes thus: "In the East, religion ceased more and more to be an affair of pure religion. It was mingled with all the intrigues of the Imperial Court, with all the furies of faction in the great cities. The council was the arena, not merely for Christian doctrine, but for worldly ascendancy. . . . Religious questions being decided by the favour of the Emperor, the Empress, or the ruling minister, the eunuch, or the barbarian, that favour was sought by the most unscrupulous means—by intrigue, by adulation, by bribery" (p. 138). "Men like Cyril of Alexandria, in whom religion might seem to have inflamed and embittered, instead of allaying, the worst passions of our nature, pride, ambition, cruelty, rapacity; and councils like that of Ephesus, with all the tumult and violence without the dignity of a senate or popular assembly, convulsed the East, and led to a fierce and irreconcilable schism" (p. 140). "Christianity would avert its sight in shame and anguish, that such a champion should be accepted as the representative of the Gospel of peace and love" (p. 144). "While ambition, intrigue, arrogance, rapacity, and violence are proscribed as unchristian means, barbarity, persecution, bloodshed as unholy and unevangelic wickedness, posterity will condemn the orthodox Cyril as one of the worst of heretics against the spirit of the Gospel. Who would not meet the judgment of the Divine Redeemer loaded with the errors of Nestorius rather than with the barbarities of Cyril?" (p. 145).

"Jealousy had been, no doubt, the latent cause of the bitter and persevering hostility of Theophilus towards Chrysostom. The more ambitious Cyril might now renew the contest with less suspicion of unworthy motives: he was waging war, not against a rival, but against a heretic" (p. 149). "All the monks were furious partisans of the 'Mother of God'" (p. 151). "The exquisite beauty and purity of the images, the Virgin Mother and the Divine Infant, though not as yet

embodied in the highest art, by painting or sculpture, appealed to the unreasoning and unsuspecting heart" (p. 141). Against this confederacy Nestorius could array only the precarious favour of the Emperor. He put his views somewhat as follows, and it is incredible to me that words like these should have been spoken in the Capital of the Roman Empire, by its patriarch in the fifth century, if the orthodox opinions had been so far fixed and settled as to command general acceptance among the catholic adherents of the Church. "'The heathen notion of a God born of a mortal mother is directly confuted by St. Paul, who declares the Lord without father and without mother. Could a creature bear the Uncreated? Could the Word, which was with the Father before the worlds, become a new-born infant? . . . God was not born; he dwelt in that which was born; the Divinity underwent not the slow process of growth and development during the nine months of pregnancy'" (pp. 142-3). "'To degrade the Divinity to the brute and material processes of gestation, birth, passion, death, the inalienable accidents of the flesh and the flesh alone, was pure heathenism, or a heresy worse than that of Arius or Apollonius'" (p. 150). "'Accursed is he who asserts that the Word of God was changed into flesh. Accursed is he who disparages the dignity of the divine nature by attributing to it the acts and passions of the human nature which it assumed for the display of its Godhead'" (p. 156).

"The Council of Nicea (321) had determined against Arius that Christ was truly God, co-equal and co-eternal with his Father, separate and yet one; the Council of Constantinople (381) had determined against Apollinaris that he was also truly man; that of Ephesus (431) had established that the two natures were indivisibly one; and that of Chalcedon (451) that they were nevertheless perfectly distinct. All four dogmas became fixed constituents of the Christian creed" (J. M. Robertson, *Short History of Christianity*, 1st ed., p. 185). "'At each episcopal election or expulsion,' says an orthodox writer, 'the most exalted sees of Christendom—Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch—furnished scenes that would have disgraced a revolution'" (p. 156). "Gregory of Nazianzun, whose own ferocities of utterance illustrate the character of the period, declared truly that he had never seen a synod do aught but

worsen a quarrel" (p. 157). "Arius was sent into exile; and the leading bishops on his side were deposed. It was a mere snatch vote by a packed jury, since only some 300 bishops were present, whereas the Church contained at least 1800. . . . Athanasius, the new bishop of Alexandria, having refused to reinstate Arius, *he* in turn was deprived of his office by the Council of Tyre (335) and banished to Gaul. . . . No vainer dispute had ever convulsed any society" (pp. 149-50).

"The total schism was in the main racial, Egyptian opposing Greek; and the carnal jealousies of the patriarchs and bishops seem to have played a great part in creating it. . . . In every doctrinal strife in turn the parties proceeded to bloodshed with a speed and zest which turned to derision the moral formulas of their creed. Such social delirium was chronic in Christendom from the age of Constantine to the triumph of the Saracens; and, needless to say, under such conditions there was no progress in civilization" (p. 190). "That a year after Julian's death there should be on the throne a Christian Emperor who caused offenders to be thrown to wild bears in his own presence is a memorable item in Christian history" (p. 191). "The Apollinarians, however, had a stronghold in their deification of Mary, whom they called *Theotokos*, or *Deipara*, 'the mother (bearer) of God.' . . . Thenceforth, orthodox Christianity was for all practical purposes a worship of a Goddess and two supreme Gods" (p. 184). "The Monophysites professed to regard the 'one nature' as a union of two, 'yet without any conversion, confusion, or commixture.' On this absolutely unintelligible difference the sects finally sundered their very nationality" (Milman, *Latin Christianity*, pp. 185-6).

"A little more than twenty years after, the wisest and holiest man in the East was writing of Cyril, just deceased: 'His death made those who survived him joyful: but it grieved most probably the dead: and there is cause to fear, lest, finding his presence too troublesome, they should send him back to us. . . . May it come to pass, by your prayers, that he may obtain mercy and forgiveness.' So wrote Theodoret, in days when men had not yet intercalated into Holy Writ that line of an obscure modern hymn, which proclaims to man the good news that 'there is no repentance in the grave.' Orthodox, or unorthodox, they knew not God, for they knew neither

righteousness, nor love, nor peace" (C. Kingsley, *Hypatia*, pp. 338-9). "His enmity to the Byzantine pontiffs was a sense of interest, not a sally of passion; he envied their fortunate station in the sunshine of the Imperial court" (Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Ch. XLVII, p. 110). Like the German Kaiser, he wanted a place in the sun. "A chronological error concerning the festival of Easter was punished as an offence against the Church and State. Lydia and Caria, Sardes and Miletus, were purified with the blood of the obstinate Quartodecimans; and the edict of the emperor, or rather of the patriarch, enumerates three and twenty degrees and denominations in the guilt and punishment of heresy. But the sword of persecution, which Nestorius so furiously wielded, was soon turned against his own breast . . . ambition was the genuine motive of episcopal warfare" (p. 111). Cyril was nephew of the "bad" Theophilus. "Whatever is superstitious or absurd might claim the protection of the monks. . . . It was the duty of Cyril to enlighten the zeal and ignorance of his innumerable monks. In the school of Alexandria he had imbibed and professed the incarnation of one nature; and the successor of Athanasius consulted his pride and ambition when he rose in arms against another Arius, more formidable and more guilty, on the second throne of the hierarchy" (pp. 112-13). "The vanity of Celestine was flattered by the appeal; and the partial version of a monk decided the faith of the pope, who with his Latin clergy, was ignorant of the language, the arts, and the theology of the Greeks. . . . But the patriarch of Alexandria, whilst he darted the thunders of a god, exposed the errors and passions of a mortal . . . a guard was stationed to protect and confine the fathers, till they should settle the mysteries of heaven and the faith of the earth . . . a crowd of peasants, the slaves of the Church, was poured into the city to support with blows and clamours a metaphysical argument; and the people zealously asserted the honour of the Virgin, whose body reposed within the walls of Ephesus" (pp. 113-14).

"The adversaries of Cyril and Mary were insulted in the streets or threatened in their homes; his eloquence and liberality made a daily increase in the number of his adherents" (pp. 114-15).

"The Christians of the first four centuries were ignorant of

the death and burial of Mary. The tradition of Ephesus is affirmed by the synod . . . yet it has been superseded by the claim of Jerusalem: and her *empty* sepulchre, as it was shown to the pilgrims, produced the fable of her resurrection and assumption in which the Greek and Latin Churches have piously acquiesced. See Baronius (*Annal. Eccles.*, A.D. 48, No. 6, etc.) and Tillemount (*Mem. Eccles.*, tom. I, p. 467) " (p. 114, *note*). "Candidian, in the Emperor's name, requested a delay of four days; the profane magistrate was driven with outrage and insult from the assembly of the saints. . . . The weary prelates, as they issued from the church of the mother of God, were saluted as her champions: and her victory was celebrated by the illuminations, the songs, and the tumult of the night. In a chamber of the inn, before he had wiped the dust from his shoes, John of Antioch gave audience to Candidian, the Imperial minister, who related his ineffectual attempts to prevent or to annul the hasty violence of the Egyptian."

"John of Antioch and Cyril of Alexandria condescended to explain and embrace, but their seeming reunion must be imputed rather to prudence than to reason, to the mutual lassitude than to the Christian charity of the Patriarchs" (p. 117). "The feeble son of Arcadius was alternately swayed by his wife and sister, by the eunuchs and women of the palace; superstition and avarice were their ruling passions; and the orthodox chiefs were assiduous in their endeavours to alarm the former and to gratify the latter. . . . At the same time every avenue of the throne was assaulted with gold . . . and so intimate was the alliance between the thunders of the synod and the whispers of the court that Cyril was assured of success if he could displace one eunuch and substitute another in the favour of Theodosius" (pp. 118-19). "The power of the Virgin in the Court of Heaven was a precedent for that of holy females in the courts of earth" (Milman, *Latin Christianity*, Vol. I, p. 170). Here we have another case of earthly things reflecting themselves in heavenly, after the common style of such matters.

At the second council of Ephesus, "the same spiritual and carnal weapons were again drawn from the arsenals of Egypt; the Asiatic veterans, a band of archers, served under the orders of Dioscorus; and the more formidable monks, whose minds

were inaccessible to reason or mercy, besieged the doors of the cathedral. . . . Flavian was instantly delivered to the wild beasts of this spiritual amphitheatre . . . it is said that the patriarch of Alexandria reviled, and buffeted, and kicked, and trampled his brother of Constantinople; it is certain that the victim expired on the third day of the wounds and bruises which he had received at Ephesus, before he could reach the place of his exile" (*Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, pp. 122-3). "It is to be feared that matters were decided by political intrigue rather than by reason or justice" Sanday and Canon Bigg wholly confirm this version of the methods used by these holy fathers. "If we fairly peruse the acts of [the council of] Chalcedon, as they are recorded by the orthodox party, we shall find that a great majority of the bishops embraced the simple unity of Christ" (p. 125). "In the name of the fourth general council, the Christ in one person, but *in two natures*, was announced to the Catholic world; an invisible line was drawn between the heresy of Apollinaris and the faith of St. Cyril; and the road to paradise, a bridge as sharp as a razor, was suspended over the abyss by the master hand of the theological artist. During ten centuries of blindness and servitude Europe received her religious opinions from the oracle of the Vatican, and the same doctrine, already tarnished with the rust of antiquity, was admitted without dispute into the creed of the reformers, who disclaimed the supremacy of the Roman pontiff. The synod of Chalcedon still triumphs in the protestant Churches" (p. 126).

"Jerusalem was occupied by an army of monks; in the name of the one incarnate nature, they pillaged, they burnt, they murdered; the sepulchre of Christ was defiled with blood; and the gates of the city were guarded in tumultuous rebellion against the troops of the Emperor" (p. 127). "This deadly superstition was inflamed, on either side, by the principle and the practice of retaliation; in the pursuit of a metaphysical quarrel, many thousands were slain, and the Christians of every degree were deprived of the substantial enjoyments of social life and of the invisible gifts of baptism and the holy communion" (p. 128). "The Trisagion, with and without this obnoxious addition, was chanted in the cathedral by two adverse choirs, and, when their lungs were exhausted, they had

recourse to . . . sticks and stones" (p. 131). "Day and night they were incessantly busied either in singing hymns . . . or in pillaging and murdering" (p. 131). Vitalian, "with an army of Huns and Bulgarians, for the most part idolaters, declared himself the champion of the Catholic faith. In this pious rebellion he depopulated Thrace, besieged Constantinople, exterminated 65,000 of his fellow Christians, till he obtained the recall of the bishops, the satisfaction of the pope, and the establishment of the Council of Chalcedon, an orthodox treaty, reluctantly signed by the dying Anastasius. . . . Such was the event of the *first* of the religious wars" (p. 132).

"The reign of Justinian was an uniform yet various scene of persecution; and he appears to have surpassed his indolent predecessors both in the contrivance of his laws and the rigour of their execution" (p. 134). "The insufficient term of three months was assigned for the conversion or exile of all heretics" (p. 134). "It has been computed that 100,000 Roman subjects were extirpated in the Samartian war, which converted the once-fruitful province into a smoking and desolate wilderness. But in the creed of Justinian the guilt of murder could not be applied to the slaughter of unbelievers: and he piously laboured to establish with fire and sword the unity of the Christian faith. . . . But, while Justinian strove to maintain the uniformity of faith and worship, his wife Theodora . . . had listened to the Monophysite teachers; and the open or clandestine enemies of the Church revived and multiplied at the smile of their gracious patroness" (pp. 136-7). "Justinian was neither steady nor consistent in the nice process of fixing his volatile opinions and those of his subjects. In his youth, he was offended by the slightest deviation from the orthodox line: in his old age, [A.D. 564] he transgressed the measure of temperate heresy, and the Jacobites, not less than the Catholics, were scandalized by his declaration that the body of Christ was incorruptible, and that his manhood was never subject to any wants and infirmities, the inheritance of our mortal flesh" (p. 139). "The narrow bigotry of Justinian was punished by the emigration of his most industrious subjects; they transported into Persia the arts both of peace and war; and those who deserved the favour were promoted in the service of a discerning monarch. The arms of Nushirvan, and his

fiercer grandson, were assisted with advice, and money, and troops, by the desperate sectaries who still lurked in their native cities of the East" (p. 148).

But the same process is repeated and a like evolution re-enacted in all religions. The God of the Hebrews was an Asiatic despot who willed what he would, being in fact, an idealization of the fury of Nature, before which the worshipper could only bend in humble submission. Christ protested against this atrocious belief, and asserted a faith in the All-loving Father of heaven: St. Paul, while discarding the absurd and intricate expiation of Jewish Law, maintained the notion of redemption by sacrifice and blood in which he had been brought up. The Church exalted the divinity of Jesus at the expense of his manhood till he also became unapproachable and hard to be entreated by men: His mother then went into the place of mediator between the sinner and the sinless, till she, too, was made immaculate, and St. Joseph was set up as the link between God and man. It might well seem that one who had corrected the Creator of the Universe, and taught the All-loving and the All-wise the prudence of this world, and the right manner of dealing with his fellows on earth, should be all-powerful as an intercessor in heaven.

"St. Bonaventura, who expressly maintained that the same reverence must be paid to the Virgin's image as to herself—a doctrine established in the same period by Thomas Aquinas in regard to Christ—arranged a Psalter in which *domina* was substituted for *dominus* (*in te domina speravi*). . . . It is not generally known among Protestants that the deification of Joseph has long been in course of similar evolution. . . . St. Teresa seems to have regarded him as the "plenipotentiary" of God, (Jesus) obtaining from the deity in heaven whatever he asked, as he had done on earth, according to the Apocrypha . . . [and] the latter-day litany of St. Joseph treats him as at least the equal of the Virgin. . . . The process is strictly in keeping with religious evolution in general: and the official apotheosis of Joseph may one day take place" (J. M. Robertson, *Short History of Christianity*, 1st ed., pp. 235-6). Anyone who has seen "the Room of the Immaculate Conception" in the Vatican where the Virgin is enthroned between the Father and the Son, and the Holy Ghost has become a mere dove in the

skies, must feel that the process is complete. As my brother, who was deeply versed in such questions, used to say: "It is just a toss up that the Trinity was not the Father, the Mother, and the Son."

But the thoughts of the gods are not those of human beings; the boyhood of the Deity is to us an absolutely incredible event; and, if looked at with open eyes, it appears to result in preposterous positions, and even ludicrous ideas. For instance, we may imagine such a scene as this, on a difficulty arising between St. Joseph and his reputed son: though of course it would be really enacted in thought, and not in words: "I am the Creator of the Universe as you know well." "Never mind, I can create in you a sense of pain which will be quite a new experience to you." "But I am Almighty and know everything." "Yet in this case it is committed to me to decide what is right and to lay down the course you must follow." "Still I am omniscient, and fix the rules of right and wrong." "Notwithstanding, it is for me to judge, and tell you what you must and should do: I am your father." "But I was in being ages before you began to be, therefore—" "No more talk. It is not a matter of what is before; but what is behind now, and the result will be painful to us both." He thereupon gives a striking demonstration of his views and makes a forcible appeal to the feelings of his son.

The early Christians, who, from being nearer in touch with the facts, were more conscious of this absurdity, formulated the opinion that Jesus only became divine at his baptism, and the Gospels are clearly written under the influence of this idea: "Joseph is told that 'his name is to be called Jesus, because he shall save his people from their sins.' Mary is told, in addition, that 'he shall be called the Son of the Highest; and that the Lord God shall give him the throne of his father David, and he shall reign over the house of Jacob for ever.' There is surely nothing in these words which would disclose the Christian mystery. 'God manifest in the flesh.' . . . As there was nothing in the announcement made to them which could enable them to realize the astounding truth that He who was to be born of Mary was Very God of Very God, so there is nothing in the subsequent life of Mary which would lead us to believe that she, any more than His Apostles, had realized it before

His resurrection. . . . Such a belief fully realized, would have made it impossible for her to fulfil . . . her duties towards the Lord Himself during his infancy and childhood. . . . There can be no doubt that the miraculous conception was denied by several of the early heretics, who either maintained (with Cerinthus) the naturalistic birth of the Lord, followed by the bestowal of supernatural powers through the descent of the Spirit at His baptism, or held (with Marcion) that He was without earthly parentage, but descended from heaven in the fifteenth year of Tiberius, and showed Himself in the synagogue of Capernaum" (Prof. Mayor, *H.D.B.*, Vol. I, p. 325; Vol. III, p. 287). It is surely impossible that such views should have been held if any fixed doctrine of the Divine Sonship had prevailed from the first; on the other hand, it is easy to see how such a dogma should be evolved by degrees. The same writer continues: "The votaries of Demeter and Persephone and other female deities found it easier to transfer their allegiance to the Christian Church, when they were permitted to make their vows there to Mary as the Mother of God and the Queen of Heaven. 'The fact that some ancient heretics actually did maintain the Holy Ghost to be a female only serves to show the reluctance with which mankind bade adieu to that sex as an object of worship' (Blunt, *loc. cit.*, ch. 3). . . . On the other hand, the Divinity of Christ tended to obscure their Humanity. The loving sympathy of one who could be touched with the feeling of our infirmities was transferred to Mary" (p. 289). "The Annunciation (Lady Day) . . . was instituted about the end of the sixth century. The pagan feast of the *Hilaria Matris Deum* was held on the same day (25th March)" (Vol. III, p. 291). "It is not till the ninth century that we find her enthroned as Queen of Heaven in the centre of the apse. The climax is reached in the twelfth century, when we find the Virgin enthroned with Christ as His equal, in a mosaic of the Church of St. Maria in Trastevere. As *Mater Misericordiae* . . . she is sometimes represented as endeavouring to shield mankind from the wrath of her Son. . . . The idea of goodness has been exchanged for that of mere weak indulgence. . . . By the fatal error which led to the separation of the spheres of mercy and justice, assigning the former to the Madonna, the latter to her Son, the God of

love, the meek and lowly Saviour, are robbed of their highest prerogatives" (p. 292). "By the triumph of the Athanasian Trinitarianism, and by the gradual dominance which it had obtained over the general mind of Christendom, the co-equal and con-substantial Godhead in the Trinity had become an article of the universal creed in the Latin Church. Arianism survived only among the barbarians. . . . The Son, therefore, had become, if the expression may be ventured, more and more divine; he was more completely not merely assimilated, but absolutely identified, with the original, perfect, uncontaminated Godhead" (Milman, *Latin Christianity*, Vol. I, p. 139). As the Father had receded, as it were, from the earth and the sight of man, into a vague and unapproachable sanctity; as the human soul had been entirely centred on the more immediate divine presence in the Saviour, so the Saviour himself might seem to withdraw from the actual, at least the exclusive devotion of the human heart which was busied with intermediate objects of worship. Christ assumed more and more of the awfulness and incomprehensibleness of the Deity, and men sought out beings more akin to themselves, more open to human sympathies. "There were not wanting those who from the beginning styled Christ a man; but they were dismissed by the faithful as heretics and calumniators" (Mosheim, *Institute of Ecclesiastical History*, pp. 113, 116). "According to Sabellius' opinion, Christ was a *mere man*, in whom resided a *divine power* that produced those effects which we regard as the acts of the divine nature" (p. 206, *note*, from Schlegel). "Paul of Samosata . . . so concealed his real sentiments under ambiguous forms of speech that repeated ecclesiastical councils were wholly unable to convict him" (p. 207). "Whether he distinguished between the *Word in God* (*Λόγος ἐνδιάθετος*) and the *Word produced from God* (*Λόγος προφόρικος*) is doubtful" (p. 208, ed. by Bishop Stubbs). "Photinus, in the next age, came very near to Paul of Samosata—not indeed, in his statements and expressions, but rather in his grand error—namely, that Christ was a mere man, and superior to other men only on account of his pre-eminent gifts" (p. 208, *note* by Schlegel). "The Ebionites . . . though they supposed Christ to be an ambassador of God, and endowed with divine power, yet they conceived him to be a man

born, in the ordinary course of nature, from Joseph and Mary" (p. 140). "So, while we find that the name of Jesus held a conspicuous place in their creed, we find them also believing him to be born of human parents" (*note* to p. 140). "And that Christ was an emanation from God which descended on Jesus at his baptism (Burton, *Eccl. His.*, quoted by Soames)" (p. 140). The Ophites "supposed the serpent which deceived our first parents, was either Christ himself or Sophia," and "the descent of Christ joined to the man Jesus into our world to overthrow the kingdom of the *Demiurge*," or Creator of this earth (p. 151). "A sample of the process of adaptation lies in the ecclesiastical calendar, where in the month of October are (or were) commemorated on three successive days, St. Bacchus, St. Demetrius and Sts. Dionysos, Rusticus and Eleutherius, all described as martyrs. The five names are simply those of the God Dionysos whose rustic festival was held at that season. In the same way Osiris becomes St. Onuphrius, from his Coptic Name, *Onufri*" (J. M. Robertson *A Short History of Christianity*, 1st ed., p. 171). "Baptism . . . was become a close copy of an initiation into pagan mysteries, being celebrated twice a year by night with a blaze of lights: and when Constantine enacted that the Day of the Sun should be treated as specially holy, he was merely bracketing together pagan and Christian theology. . . . Mithra as the Sun being the first of the seven planetary spirits on whose names the week was based. In the third century, the chief place of the cult in the empire was on the Vatican mount at Rome; and there it was that Christian legend located the martyrdom of St. Peter, who, as we have seen, was assimilated to Mithra both in name and in attributes" (*loc. cit.*, p. 148).

"*Theurgy* is the *science* of the gods and the various classes of superior spirits, of their appearing to men, and their operations, and the *art*, by certain acts, habits, words, and symbols, of moving the gods to impart to men secrets which surpass the powers of reason, to lay open the future to them." "This worthless Science is very similar to what has been called *allowable magic*" (*note* to Moshiem by Schlegel, p. 113). *It is surely significant that such things should have been debated in the early Church.* "The figure of Isis suckling the infant Horus is so like that of the Madonna and child that it has sometimes

received the adoration of ignorant Christians" (Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, and Osiris*, Vol. II, p. 119). "Indeed, her stately ritual, with its shaven and tonsured priests, its matins and vespers, its tinkling music, its baptism and aspersions of holy water, its solemn processions, its jewelled images of the Mother of God, presented many points of similarity to the pomps and ceremonies of Catholicism. . . . Ancient Egypt may have contributed its share to the gorgeous symbolism of the Catholic Church as well as to the pale abstractions of her theology" (pp. 118-19).

"Several of the externals in Romish worship have undoubtedly been borrowed from Paganism" (Mosheim, *Institutes of Ecclesiastical History*, footnote by Soames, Vol. I, p. 4). "For the prudence (or shall I call it imprudence?) of prelates shaped many parts both of Christian discipline and worship after the pattern of the old religions; and no little deference has been paid to the pleasure of sovereigns, and to human laws, in regulating the Church of God" (p. 4). "After the Jews, in fact, saw the sacred rites, as well of neighbouring nations as of the Greeks and Romans, not a few ceremonies, with which the gods were worshipped, seemed so attractive as to overcome the fear of adopting them, and making them ornamental additions to the rites of God's appointment" (p. 29). "The Christian doctors thought it necessary to introduce some external rites which would strike the senses of the people, so that they could maintain themselves really to possess all those things of which Christians were charged with being destitute, though under different forms" (p. 173). "This circumstance led the Christians, in order to impart dignity to their religion, to say that *they* also had similar *mysteries*, or certain holy rites concealed from the vulgar; and they not only applied the *terms* used in the pagan mysteries to Christian institutions, particularly baptism and the Lord's Supper, but they gradually introduced also all the *rites* which were designated by these terms" (p. 133). "The new converts were to be taught that those are *born again* who are initiated by baptism into the Christian worship, and that they ought to exhibit in their conduct the innocence of infants; therefore, *milk* and *honey*, the common food of little children, were given to them" (p. 134).

In Mexico, "the man who wore the skin of the dead woman and personated the Mother of the Gods, lifted up his arms and stood like a cross before the image of the god" (Frazer, *The Scapegoat*, p. 290). A statuette in the Art Museum at Bale "represents a man seated on his haunches with his feet crossed in front of him, and his hands resting on his knees. His own skin, of which the legs, feet, hands, wrists, neck and part of the face are visible, is coloured a terra-cotta red. The rest of his body is covered by the representation of the skin of a human victim, of a greyish colour, quite distinct from that of the wearer" (p. 291, *note*). "This remarkable festival in honour of the Mother of the Gods is said to have been immediately preceded by a similar festival in honour of the Maize Goddess" (p. 291). "The concluding act of the sacred drama, in which the body of the dead Maize Goddess was flayed and her skin worn, together with all her sacred insignia, by a man who danced before the people in this grim attire, seems to be best explained on the hypothesis that it was intended to ensure that the divine death should be immediately followed by the divine resurrection. . . . This interpretation of the Mexican custom of flaying human beings and permitting or requiring other persons to parade publicly in the skins of the victims may perhaps be confirmed by a consideration of the festival at which this strange rite was observed on the largest scale, and which accordingly went by the name of the Festival of the Flaying of Men. . . . The exact date of the Festival was the 20th March, according to one pious chronicler, who notes with unction that the bloody rite fell only one day later than the feast which the Holy Church solemnizes in honour of the glorious St. Joseph . . . men who had made a special vow to the god put on the skins of the human victims and went about the city in that guise for twenty days, being everywhere welcomed and revered as living images of the deity" (pp. 296-7).

"The women of Jerusalem wept for Tammuz at the gate of the temple (Ezekiel viii. 14). . . . Such rites appear, in fact, to have been common all over Western Asia; the particular name of the dying god varied in different places, but in substance the ritual was the same. Fundamentally, the custom was a religious or rather magical ceremony intended to ensure

the revival and reproduction of life in spring" (pp. 399-400). "The real sorrows of our fellow-men touch us more nearly than the imaginary pangs of the gods" (Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, and Osiris*, p. 270, note), for they cannot really suffer; and, in the case of Attis, "When night had fallen, the sorrow of the worshippers was turned to joy. For suddenly a light shone in the darkness: the tomb was opened: the god had risen from the dead; and as the priest touched the lips of the weeping mourners with balm, he softly whispered in their ears the glad tidings of salvation. [Compare with this the ceremony at the Holy Sepulchre, in Jerusalem at Easter, as given by Bartlett.—AUTHOR.] The resurrection of the god was hailed by his disciples as a promise that they too would issue triumphant from the corruption of the grave. On the morrow, the twenty-fifth day of March, which was reckoned the vernal equinox, the divine resurrection was celebrated with a wild outburst of glee. At Rome, and probably elsewhere, the celebration took the form of a carnival. It was the Festival of Joy (*Hilaria*). A universal licence prevailed" (pp. 272-3). "The fast which accompanied the mourning for the dead god may perhaps have been designed to prepare the body of the communicant for the reception of the blessed sacrament by purging it of all that could by contact defile the sacred elements" (p. 274). In the baptism, "the bath of bull's blood (*taurobolium*) was believed to regenerate the devotee" (p. 275, note) "who had been born again to eternal life, and had washed away his sins in the blood of the bull" (pp. 274-5). "At Rome the new birth and the remission of sins by the shedding of bull's blood appear to have been carried out above all at the sanctuary of the Phrygian goddess, on the Vatican Hill. . . . From the Vatican as a centre this barbarous system of superstition seems to have spread" (Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, and Osiris*, Vol. I, p. 275). "The worship of the Great Mother of the Gods and her lover or son was very popular under the Roman Empire . . . the two received divine honours . . . in Africa, Spain, Portugal, France, Germany, and Bulgaria" (p. 298).

"Like other Saviour cults, Mithraism, too, anticipated Christism in avowing the attraction of a Mother-Goddess; the worship of Cybele being adapted to this, as it had to that

of Attis. In one other aspect it seems to have run closely parallel to early Jesuism; the singular phrase in the Apocalypse about garments 'washed in the blood of the Lamb' points to an early use of the practice of the 'kriobolium,' which, with the 'taurobolium,' was one of the most striking of Mithraic rites" (J. M. Robertson, *A Short History of Christianity*, 1st ed., p. 72). "The most striking of all the rites of Mithras was the Taurobolium, or baptism of blood. This ceremony, whereby the worshipper was drenched with the warm blood that flowed from the victim's throat, was supposed to bring certain regeneration. And it is to be remarked that it could be performed on a priest for the benefit of some other person. The stress was laid on the *opus operatum* of the magical sacrament. In the third century the tide of ill-regulated religious feeling produced a flood of superstition against which men of the keenest intellect found it well nigh impossible to stand. The old Roman religion was barren and cold. The stress was laid on formal observances, the whole matter being neither more nor less than a bargain. Apropos, it has been remarked that the Roman Church 'founded on St. Peter has become petrified'" (Rev. C. Elsee, *Neo-Platonism in Relation to Christianity*, pp. 13, 16, 17).

"Ecstatic frenzies, which were mistaken for divine inspiration . . . the theory of a new birth and the remission of sins through the shedding of blood, have all their origin in savagery." "A good instance of such an attempt to dress up savagery in the garb of philosophy, is the fifth speech of the Emperor, Julian, 'On the Mother of the Gods' (Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, and Osiris*, p. 299 and note). "The revival of Roman law, of the Aristotelian philosophy, of ancient art and literature, at the close of the Middle Ages, marked the return of Europe to native ideals of life and conduct, to saner, manlier views of the world . . . the tide of Oriental invasion had turned at last" (p. 301). "In respect both of doctrines and of rites the cult of Mithra appears to have presented many points of resemblance not only to the religion of the Mother of the Gods but also to Christianity. The similarity struck the Christian doctors themselves. . . . To the Spanish conquerors of Mexico and Peru many of the native heathen rites appeared to be diabolical counterfeits of the Christian sacraments" (p. 302).

"When the historic Church set about a statement of its history, it could not even fix satisfactorily the year of its supposed founder's birth . . . ultimately, his birth was placed at the winter solstice, the birth-day of the Sun-God in the most popular cults . . . the date of his crucifixion is made to vary from year to year in order to conform to the astronomical principle on which the Jews, following the sun-worshippers, had fixed their Passover." "Christ's birthday had been naïvely assimilated to the solstitial birthday of the Sun-God, 25th December, long before the Church ventured to endorse the usage" (J. M. Robertson, *Short History of Christianity*, pp. 15-16, 44).

"That Christmas is a solar festival of unknown antiquity, which the early Christians appropriated to their Christ in total ignorance of the real time of his birth, is no longer denied by competent Christian scholars. . . . That Easter is also a solar festival is perhaps not so freely recognized (or rather a luni-solar). It is singular that this movable feast should be celebrated as an *anniversary* of an event with apparently no orthodox misgivings" (Robertson, *Pagan Christs*, ed. 1903, p. 319 and *note*). "The pre-eminently solar Herakles dies on the funeral pyre, descends to Hades, and reascends to Heaven; the obviously solar Samson of the Semitic myth . . . dies ostensibly in his solar capacity with shorn hair, blinded, and placed between the 'pillars' (Herakles' pillars)" (p. 321). "In view of the duplication of the motive on all hands: in the cults of Osiris, Attis, Adonis, Dionysos, it is impossible to doubt that we are dealing with a universal myth" (p. 320). In the older Persian form of the cult [of Mithra], again, the Sun-God rode 'with his hands lifted up towards immortality' or heaven (*Mihir Yast*, xxxi: in Darmesteter II, 152). . . . He would further be associated with that form of the cross which stood for the four-spoked sun-wheel, as in the myth of Ixion" (p. 335, *note*). "Compare the Assyrian sculpture of the Sun-God with the solar-wheel in presence as his symbol" (p. 335). "That the 'crown of thorns' is a variation on a nimbus has long been surmised" (p. 335).

"It is remarkable that whereas a cave long was (and I believe is) shown as the birthplace of Jesus at Bethlehem,

Saint Jerome actually complained (Ep. 58, *ad Paulinum*) that in his day the Pagans celebrated the worship of Thammuz (= Adonis), and presumably, therefore, the festival of the birth of the sun, Christmas Day, at that very time” (p. 338). “Mithra was ‘the Persian’ *par excellence*, and the very God of the Persian host. There can be little doubt that Jovian’s instant choice of Christianity as his State creed was in large measure due to this. . . . Though Mithraism had many attractions, Christianity had more, having sedulously copied every one of its rivals” (p. 347).

“From the old Accadians the Semites received the conception of a trinity, the ‘divine father and mother by the side of their son the Sun-God’ (Sayce, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 193). But their own ruling tendency was to give every God, up to the highest, a ‘colourless double or wife’ (p. 215)” (p. 308). “The Sun-God (Apollo) . . . is the mouth of Zeus, and revealer of his counsel, hence the typical God of oracles: Athene grouped with her brother and father in a triad is also her father’s wisdom; and still later, in the period of developing theosophy, . . . Metis, essentially the personified Reason and Intelligence of Zeus. . . . The idea of God as law-giver is met with in the myth of Zeus and Minos, the Cretan Institutor —himself . . . presumably a deity of an earlier age” (pp. 213–14). The word in Hebrew for Spirit is feminine; so this does not seem likely to lead to anything resembling the Christian Trinity; but the mental attitude that results in genders is so peculiar and absurd that it is hard to say what might come of it; fork, knife, and spoon are of the three genders in German.

“Respecting the month and day of Christ’s birth, we are left almost wholly to conjecture. . . . Nor will this surprise us, if we consider that the earliest Christians knew not the day of their Saviour’s birth, and judged differently of the subject” (Mosheim’s *Ecclesiastical History*, and note thereon by Dr. Murdock, Vol. I, p. 31). “In the Julian calendar the 25th of December was . . . regarded as the Nativity of the Sun” (Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, and Osiris*, Vol. I, p. 303). If we may trust the evidence of an obscure scholiast, the Greeks used to celebrate the birth of the luminary at that time by a midnight service, coming out of the inner shrines and crying, ‘The

Virgin has brought forth. The light is waxing' ('Η Παρθένος τέτοκεν, ἀνέξει φῶς').'" "Now, Mithra was regularly identified by his worshippers with the Sun, the Unconquered Sun as they called him. . . . The Western Church, which had never recognized the sixth of January as the day of the Nativity, adopted the 25th of December as the true date, and in time its decision was accepted also by the Eastern Church. At Antioch the change was not introduced till about the year 375 A.D. (Bingham, *Ant. of Christian Church*, Bk. XX, Ch. iv; Duchesne, *Or. du Culte Chret.*, Vol. I, p. 257 *sq.*)" (*Adonis, Attis, and Osiris*, p. 304). "The Churches of Egypt, Asia, and perhaps Gaul, celebrated on the same day (the sixth of January) the nativity and the baptism of their Saviour. The Romans, as ignorant as their brethren of the real date of his birth, fixed the solemn festival on the 25th of December (the Brumalia) or winter solstice, when the Pagans annually celebrated the birth of the Sun" (Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, Ch. xxii, p. 408, *note*).

"Certain it is that the winter solstice, which the ancients erroneously assigned to the twenty-fifth of December, was celebrated in antiquity as the Birthday of the Sun, and that festal lights or fires were kindled on this joyful occasion" (Frazer, *Balder the Beautiful*, Vol. I, p. 248). "The Easter rites still observed in Greece, Sicily, and Southern Italy bear in some respects a striking resemblance to the rites of Adonis" (*Adonis, Attis, and Osiris*, Vol. I, p. 306). Under the names of Osiris, Tammuz, Adonis, and Attis, the peoples of Egypt and Western Asia represented the yearly decay and revival of life, especially vegetable life, which they personified as a god, who annually rose again from the dead.

"The tradition which placed the death of Christ on the 25th of March was ancient and deeply rooted. It is all the more remarkable because astronomical considerations prove that it can have had no historical foundation. The inference appears to be inevitable that the passion of Christ must have been arbitrarily referred to that date in order to harmonize with an older festival of the spring equinox. This is the view of the learned ecclesiastical historian Mgr. Duchesne" (p. 307). "The practice of the Church in Gaul seems perhaps to have placed the death of Christ on the 23rd and his resurrec-

tion on the 25th of March. If that was so, his resurrection coincided exactly with the resurrection of Attis" (p. 309). "The annual mourning for Tammuz or Adonis, which supplied the closest parallel in point of form to the fasting and humiliation on the Hebrew Day of Atonement, is the scenic commemoration of a divine tragedy, in which the worshippers take part with appropriate wailing and lamentation" (Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, 2nd ed., p. 411).

"It is very probable that John, for certain reasons, did ordain in Asia that the feast of Easter should be kept at the time the Jews kept it, and that Peter and Paul ordered otherwise at Rome" (Mosheim, Vol. I, p. 77, *note*). "There is good reason to suppose that Christian bishops multiplied sacred rites for the sake of rendering the Jews and the pagans more friendly to them. Both had been accustomed to numerous and splendid ceremonies from their infancy. . . . When, accordingly, they saw the new religion without such things they thought it too simple, and therefore despised it" (p. 132). "The public supplications by which the pagans were accustomed to appease their gods were borrowed from them, and were celebrated in many places with great pomp. To the temples, to water consecrated with certain forms, and to likenesses of holy men, the same efficacy was ascribed and the same privileges assigned as had been attributed to the pagan temples, statues, and illustrations" (p. 267).

"Taken altogether, the coincidences of the Christian with the heathen festivals are too close and too numerous to be accidental. They mark the compromise which the Church in the hour of its triumph was compelled to make with its vanquished yet still dangerous rivals" (Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, and Osiris*, Vol. I, p. 310). "On the whole the evidence goes to shew that the great Christian festivals were arbitrarily timed by the Church so as to coincide with previously existing pagan festivals for the sake of weaning the heathen from their old faith and bringing them over to the new religion" (*The Scapegoat*, p. 328). "Christmas and Easter, the two pivots on which the Christian calendar revolves, appear both to have been instituted with this intention: the one superseded a mid-winter festival of the birth of the sun-god, the other superseded a vernal festival of the death and resurrection of the vegetation

god " (p. 328). "An instructive parallel might be drawn between the history of Christianity and the history of Buddhism. Both systems were in their origin essentially ethical reforms born of the ardour, the lofty aspirations, the tender compassion of their noble Founders, two of those beautiful spirits who appear at rare intervals on earth like beings come from a better world to guide and support our weak and erring nature. Both preached moral virtue as the means of accomplishing what they regarded as the supreme object of life, the eternal salvation of the individual soul. . . . If such faiths were to be nominally accepted by whole nations or even by the world, it was essential that they should first be modified or transformed so as to accord in some measure with the prejudices . . . of the vulgar. . . . Thus as time went on the two religions in exact proportion to their growing popularity absorbed more and more of those baser elements which they had been instituted for the very purpose of suppressing. . . . By their glorification of poverty and celibacy both these religions struck straight at the root not merely of civil society but of human existence. The blow was parried by the wisdom or the folly of the vast majority of mankind, who refused to purchase a chance of saving their souls with the certainty of extinguishing the species " (*Adonis, Attis, and Osiris*, Vol. I, pp. 310-12).

" Latin Christianity, which struck at the root of official or civic paganism, has always been tolerant of its rustic cousins, the popular festivals and ceremonies which, unaffected by political and religious revolutions, by the passing of empires and of gods, have been carried on by the people with but little change from time immemorial " (*The Scapegoat*, p. 346). " When we survey the existing races of mankind from Greenland to Tierra del Fuego, or from Scotland to Singapore, we observe that they are distinguished one from the other by a great variety of religions, and that these distinctions are not, so to speak, merely coterminous with the broad distinctions of race, but descend into the minute subdivisions of states and commonwealths . . . we shall find underlying them all a solid stratum of intellectual agreement among the dull, the weak, the ignorant, and the superstitious. . . . Thus universal faith, this truly Catholic creed, is a belief in the efficacy of

magic. . . . If the test of truth lay in a show of hands or a counting of heads the system of magic might appeal with far more reason than the Catholic Church, to the proud motto, ‘*Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*’ as the sure and certain credential of its own infallibility” (Frazer, *The Magic Art*, Vol. I, pp. 235–6).

Magic is trying to get something for nothing: to make  $2 + 2$  equal 5. “Whilst repudiating and anathematizing the chimeras of the Gnostics, orthodoxy received a number of happy popular devotional inspirations from them: and from the ‘Theurgical’ view the Church advanced to the sacramental one. Her feasts, her sacraments, her art were in great measure taken from those sects which she condemned” (Renan, *The Christian Church*, p. 84). “The most respectable bishops had persuaded themselves that the ignorant rustics would more cheerfully renounce the superstitions of Paganism, if they found resemblances, and compensation, in the bosom of Christianity. The religion of Constantine achieved, in less than a century, the conquest of the Roman Empire; but the victors were themselves insensibly subdued by the arts of their vanquished rivals” (*Decline and Fall*, Ch. XXVII, p. 267).

There was accordingly little difference in these times (fourth century), between the public worship of the Christians and that of the Greeks and Romans. “In both there were . . . processions, lustrations, images. . . . No sooner had Constantine renounced the religion of his ancestors, than magnificent temples were everywhere erected, adorned with pictures and images. Intelligent readers will easily conceive how much injury the Church received from the peace and repose procured by Constantine, and from an indiscreet eagerness to allure the populace within her pale. This ill-advised piety of the people opened a wide door for endless frauds” (Mosheim, Stubb’s ed., Vol. I, p. 267). “Opportunities of sinning were offered to the licentious, by the *vigils*, as they were called, of Easter and Whitsuntide” (p. 286). “As no one in those times (fifth century), prohibited Christians from retaining and transferring the opinions of their pagan ancestors respecting the soul, heroes, demons, temples, and the like, and transferring them into their devotions: as no one proposed utterly to abolish the pagan institutions, but only to alter them

somewhat and purify them; it was unavoidable that the religion and worship of Christians should be contaminated by these faults" (p. 351). "On the authority of the Venerable Bede, St. Augustine was invited by the Pope Gregory not to destroy the heathen temples of the English, but only to remove the images of their Gods, to wash the walls with holy water, to erect altars and deposit there relics of saints and convert them into Christian Churches, not only to save the expense of building new ones, but also that the people might be more easily prevailed on to frequent those places of worship to which they had been accustomed" (T. F. Bumpus, *A Guide to Gothic Architecture*, p. 46).

"Ten thousand Angli were claimed as baptized by Augustine in Kent on Christmas Day in the year 597—a transaction which reduced the rite to a nullity, and the individuality of the converts to the level of that of animals" (J. M. Robertson, *Short History of Christianity*, p. 209). "All the while, Popes and prelates complained bitterly that many of the converts thus won were baptized and re-baptized, yet continued to live like heathens, slaying priests and sacrificing to idols" (p. 212).

In the sixth century, "several barbarous tribes . . . were converted to Christianity . . . but there is abundant evidence that nothing was required of these nations, except externally to profess Christ, cease from offering victims to their gods, and learn certain forms, like a necessary charm" (Mosheim, *Ecclesiastical History*, p. 389). "Of these holy enterprises among the heathen no one will form a high opinion, when he shall have learned from the writers of this and the following ages that these nations still retained a great part of their former paganism, and so worshipped Christ as to reject his precepts in their lives, deeds, and institutions" (p. 391). "They were only to worship the images of Christ and of holy men, instead of those of their gods, and, for the most part, with the same ceremonies; and to commit to memory certain Christian formulas" (p. 392).

"Those who deduce these rites from Scripture and reason, talk nonsense. . . . If they had been acquainted with ancient opinions and customs, and had examined the pontifical laws of the Greeks and Romans, they would have taught much more correctly, for from this source were derived many of the

rites which were looked upon as sacred" (p. 425). "After the conversion of the Imperial city the Christians still continued, in the month of February, the annual celebration of the Lupercalia; to which they ascribed a secret and mysterious influence on the general powers of the animal and vegetable world. . . . The inveterate abuse subsisted till the end of the fifth century" (Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, Ch. XXXVI, pp. 33-4).

"Ecclesiastical historians have been puzzled to say why after much hesitation and great diversity of usage in different places the Christian Church finally adopted forty days as the proper period, for the mournful celebration of Lent. Perhaps in coming to this decision the authorities were guided, as so often, by a regard for an existing pagan celebration of similar character and duration which they hoped by a change of name to convert into a Christian solemnity. Such a heathen Lent they may have found to hand in the rites of Persephone, the Greek goddess of the corn, whose image, carved out of a tree, was annually brought into the cities and mourned for forty nights" (Frazer, *The Scapegoat*, p. 348).

"The accumulated misfortunes and sins of the whole people are sometimes laid upon the dying god, who is supposed to bear them away for ever, leaving the people innocent and happy. The notion that we can transfer our guilt and sufferings to some other being who will bear them for us is familiar to the savage mind. . . . Because it is possible to shift a load of wood, stones, or what not from our own back to the back of another, the savage fancies that it is equally possible to shift the burden of his pain and sorrows to another who will suffer them in his stead. . . . The principle of vicarious suffering is commonly understood and practised by races who stand on a low level of social and intellectual culture" (p. 1). "The Indians of Peru sought to purify themselves from their sins by plunging their heads in a river; they said that the river washed their sins away" (pp. 3-4). "He took them down into the running waters of the Jordan; he made them plunge in or let the waters close over their heads, and then he led them out again with the consciousness that they had left their sinful past behind them" (Sanday, *H.D.B.*, Vol. II, p. 610).

"The Athenians regularly maintained a number of degraded

and useless beings at the public expense; and when any calamity, such as plague, drought, or famine, befell the city, they sacrificed two of these outcasts as scapegoats . . . apparently by being stoned to death outside the city" (*The Scapegoat*, p. 253). "The city of Abdera in Thrace was publicly purified once a year, and one of the burghers, set apart for the purpose, was stoned to death as a scapegoat or vicarious sacrifice for the life of all the others: six days before his execution he was excommunicated, 'in order that he alone might bear the sins of all the people'" (quoted by Frazer from Strabo, p. 254). "Elsewhere it was customary to cast a young man every year into the sea with the prayer, 'Be thou our offscouring'" (pp. 254-5). "The word which I have translated 'offscouring' ( $\pi\epsilon\rho\bar{\imath}\psi\eta\mu\alpha$ ) occurs in I Corinthians iv. 13" (p. 255, note).

"Just as at the Saturnalia in its original form a man was dressed as King Saturn in royal robes, allowed to indulge his passions and caprices to the full, and then put to death, so at the Sacaea, a condemned prisoner, who probably also bore for the time being the title of Zoganes, was arrayed in the king's attire and suffered to play the despot, to use the king's concubines, and to give himself up to feasting and debauchery without restraint, only however in the end to be stript of his borrowed finery, scourged, and hanged or crucified. From Strabo we learn that this Asiatic counterpart of the Saturnalia was celebrated in Asia Minor wherever the worship of the Persian goddess Anaitis had established itself" (Frazer, *The Scapegoat*, p. 355). "The particular name of the dying god varied in different places, but in substance the ritual was the same" (p. 400). "All over Western Asia from time immemorial, the mournful death and happy resurrection of a divine being appear to have been annually celebrated" (p. 421).

"Among the Semites of Western Asia the king, in a time of national danger, sometimes gave his own son to die as a sacrifice for the people. Thus Philo of Byblus, in his work on the Jews, says: 'It was an ancient custom in a crisis of great danger' that the ruler of a city or nation should give his beloved son to die for the whole people, as a ransom offered to the avenging demons; and the children thus offered were

slain with mystic rites. So Cronus, whom the Phoenicians call Israel, being king of the land and having an only-begotten son called Jeoud (for in the Phœnician tongue Jeoud signifies ‘only-begotten’), dressed him in royal robes and sacrificed him upon an altar in a time of war (quoted by Eusebius, *Preparatio Evangelii*, I x, 29) ” (Frazer, *The Dying God*, Vol. I, p. 166). “ ‘Phœnician history,’ says an ancient writer, ‘is full of such sacrifices’ (Porphyry, *De Abstinentiâ*, II, 56) ” (p. 167).

“ We have the express statement of Porphyry that in the annual sacrifice of a man to the ancient Semitic deity Kronos at Rhodes, a prisoner condemned to death was selected and kept till the festival; he was led outside the city gates, and having been given wine to drink, put to death—*De Abstinentiâ*, II, 54 ” (Robertson, *Pagan Christs*, p. 129). “ Long before the more civilized peoples revolted from the act of human sacrifice, they would recoil, we must suppose, from the act of anthropophagy; and in regard to many rites of human sacrifice, we find stories of substitution of animals and of waxen images, *vide* Porphyry, *De Abstinentiâ*, II, 55 ” (*Pagan Christs*, p. 130). “ Thus King Eurypylus is associated with the abolition of the human sacrifice to Artemis Triclaria and Cecrops with the substitution of cakes for living victims to Zeus Lycaeus ” (p. 156).

“ The Carthaginians bought children from poor parents and slaughtered them, says Plutarch, as if they were lambs or chickens (*De Superstitione* 13) ” (*The Dying God*, p. 167; cf. Psalm cvi. 36–8; 2 Kings xvii. 16–17). “ They caused their sons and their daughters to pass through the fire ” (Jer. vii. 31; xix. 5; xxxii. 35; Ezek. xvi. 20 *sq.*; cp. xx. 26–31). “ Cause to pass through the fire,” in Scripture meant to burn the children. (Cf. II Chron. xxviii. 3, with II Kings xvi. 2). “ Shall I give my firstborn for the sin of my soul? ” (Micah xi. 6–8). “ He hath shown thee, O man, what is good: to do justice and love mercy.”

“ It is the answer of morality to religion. . . . It may be questioned whether history and precedent were not on the side of his adversaries ” (*The Dying God*, p. 174). “ The obscure story told by the Israelites to explain the origin of circumcision seems also to suggest that the custom was supposed

to save the life of the child by giving the deity a substitute for it (Exod. iv. 24–26) ” (p. 181). “ It is plain from various passages in the prophets that the sacrifices of children among the Jews before the captivity, which are commonly known as sacrifices to Moloch, were regarded by the worshippers as oblations to Jehovah, under the title of King. Moloch, or rather Molech (Heb.), is nothing but Melech, ‘ king,’ with the vowel points of ‘ Bosheth ’ ” (W. R. Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, 2nd ed., p. 362).

“ In the great army of martyrs who in many ages and in many lands, not in Asia only, have died a cruel death in the character of gods, the devout Christian will doubtless discern types and forerunners of the coming Saviour—stars that heralded in the morning sky the advent of the Sun of Righteousness ” (Frazer, *The Scapegoat*, p. 422). We have, then, here again another parallelism, like that which Canon Ottley thought so remarkable, and seemingly so pleasing, in the case of the Eucharist. Contrary to my expressed intent, I have given the foregoing quotations from Frazer’s voluminous writings, because they so strikingly illustrate the truth of a remark made by Dr. Farnell in Canon Sanday’s symposium, that the notion of the death of a God and his resurrection, and the propitiation by blood, was prevalent all round the Mediterranean. No one could be a better authority on such a subject; and he urged it on Sir E. B. Tylor, the anthropologist, and made him acknowledge its truth.

As Sir William Ramsay shows, this was especially the case in Asia Minor, and it would have been little short of a miracle if this cult had not affected the thoughts and words of St. Paul, for it flourished greatly about Tarsus. Thence a materialistic interpretation flowed which coloured all the decrees of the Church for centuries. Nobody will deny that these ordinances were qualified by the science and philosophical tenets of the times in which they were formulated, or that they were of the least enlightened type. “ The declining age of learning and of mankind is marked by the rise and rapid progress of the new Platonists. . . . The knowledge that is suited to our situation and powers, the whole compass of moral, natural, and mathematical science, was neglected by the new Platonists, whilst they exhausted their strength in the

verbal disputes of metaphysics, attempted to explore the secrets of the invisible world, and studied to reconcile Aristotle with Plato, on subjects of which both these philosophers were as ignorant as the rest of mankind" (*Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Ch. XIII, p. 392). "The strong and subtle sense of Aristotle with the devout contemplation and divine fancy of Plato." "The ancient sages had derided the popular superstition; after disguising its extravagance by a thin pretence of allegory, the disciples of Plotinus and Porphyry became its most zealous defenders. . . . The new Platonists would scarcely deserve a place in the history of science, but in that of the Church the mention of them will very frequently occur" (*loc. cit.*, Ch. XIII, p. 393).

This school took hold of Christian thought; its writers allegorized the Old Testament; they allegorized the New; even their histories were composed on similar lines. "The Platonists and Pythagoreans deemed it not only lawful, but also commendable, to deceive and lie for the sake of truth and piety. The Jews living in Egypt learned from them this sentiment before the Christian era. . . . And from both this vice early spread among the Christians" (*Mosheim, Eccles. Hist.*, p. 130). "That the Sibylline verses were fabricated by some Christian in order to bring idolaters to believe in the truth of Christianity, has been well shown. . . . That the pagans were indignant at this forgery which they attributed to the Christians, appears from Origen" (p. 130). "It is much to be lamented that such a cause was not defended by abler advocates. They expose with superfluous wit and eloquence the extravagance of Polytheism. . . . But, when they would demonstrate the divine origin of Christianity, they insist much more strongly on the predictions which announced than on the miracles which accompanied, the appearance of the Messiah. . . . In the unskilful hands of Justin and of the succeeding apologists, the sublime meaning of the Hebrew oracles evaporates in distant types, affected conceits, and cold allegories; and even their authenticity was rendered suspicious to an unenlightened Gentile by the mixture of pious forgeries which, under the names of Orpheus, Hermes, and the Sibyls, were obtruded on him as of equal value with the genuine inspirations of Heaven" (*Decline and Fall*, Ch. XV, p. 69).

" In an age of unbounded credulity the invitation to deceive was constant; and, while credulity itself means the faculty for innocent false witness, it could not be but that frauds were common in matters of miracle working of all kinds. To suppose that all the miracle stories arose in good faith when the deliberate manufacture of documents and calculated tamperings with the genuine were a main part of the literary life of the Church, is to ignore all probability. The systematic forgery and interpolation of 'Sibylline Books,' by way of producing pagan testimonies and prophecies on the side of Christism, is to be regarded as a clerical industry of the second century. A bishop's business was to forward the fame and interests of his Church; and in Ambrose's transparent account of his discovery of miracle-working relics of saints at Milan in the fourth century we have a typical instance of the methods by which the prestige of the faith was advanced. Ambrose was above and not below the moral average of previous bishops. To find what might pass for the bones and relics of saints and martyrs, to frame false tales concerning them, to win illiterate and poor pagans to the Church by imitating their festivals and ceremonies—these were, by the grieving admission of many Christian historians, among the common activities of the Church from the second or third century onwards; and the priesthood were the natural agents of the work" (J. M. Robertson, *A Short History of Christianity*, pp. 107-8). "In the second century began the practice of open priestly concubinage; often on the naïve pretence of a purely spiritual union: denounced periodically by bishops and councils for hundreds of years, it was never even ostensibly checked in the period of the Empire" (p. 110). "The period of clerical supremacy in literature is a period of enormous superstition. Under that term even religious people now include a habitual belief in diabolical agency, a constant affirmation of miracles, portents, divine and fiendish apparitions" (p. 281). "On the moral and æsthetic side, however, popular Presbyterianism tended to be hard and joyless, with the natural result, seen alike in Geneva and Scotland, of breeding much licence" (p. 369).

" The writers of the fifth century were, at the best, gathering together some of the higher thoughts and speculations of

former days; which they were so conscious did not belong to themselves, and had received nothing but corrupt additions, that with a strange mixture of fraud and honesty they gave the credit of them to some man of former days, who had considerable celebrity, or had fortunately left no writings with which those attributed to him could be compared" (Maurice, *Moral Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 471). "Jews allegorized the Old Testament, finding a hidden sense in sentences, words, letters, and (in the centuries after Christ) even vowel-points, in order to satisfy their consciences for the non-observance of laws that had become impracticable, or to justify traditional and often trivial increment, or to defend God against apparent inconsistency, or the writers or historical characters against impiety or immorality . . . before the writer's determination to extract the allegorical at all costs and in any sense that at the time suited his mood, the facts often disappeared; the narrative was turned upside down (of Philo). . . . The early Christians therefore found this current and acknowledged method of interpretation to their hand in the arguments they drew from the Old Testament against the unbelieving Jews and, in particular, St. Paul and the Paulinists in their efforts to turn the law itself against the law-worshipping Judaizers" (p. 65). "The allegory," in Hebrews, "of Melchizedek . . . can hardly be considered without regard to Philo's treatment of Melchizedek as an allegory of his apparently impersonal Logos" (p. 66) (Massie, *H.D.B.*, Vol. I, p. 471).

"El Elyon occurs in R.V. of A. (Gen. xiv. 19 *sq.*) where R.V. text has 'God most High,' and A.V. 'the most high God.' It is probably a proper name, the appellation of a Canaanite deity. In v. 22, 'I have lifted up mine hand unto Jehovah, God most High,' there can be little doubt that the introduction of the word 'Jehovah,' and the identification of the latter with El Elyon are due to a redactor. . . . The word 'Jehovah' is wanting in the LXX and the collocation of names reminds one of 'Jahweh-Elohim' of Gen. xxiv. 3" (Rev. J. A. Selbie, *H.D.B.*, Vol. I, p. 682). This is an example of "Economy of Truth" (*v. supra*).

"Some very eminent men of the anti-supernaturalist school, especially in Germany . . . have asserted that our Lord and his disciples publicly taught many things which privately they

repudiated, and an attempt has been made to save them from the charge of downright dishonesty which this would involve, by an appeal to the usage of many ancient teachers who had an exoteric doctrine for the multitude, and an esoteric for their disciples. . . . These writers, however, contend that though our Lord and his apostles did not make use of a *positive* accommodation of their doctrine to the prejudices or ignorance of the Jews, they did not refrain from a *negative* accommodation; by which they intend the use of *reserve* in the communication of truth or the refutation of error, and the allowing of men to retain opinions not authorized by truth without express or formal correction of them. They adduce as instances . . . Acts i. 6; i Cor. iii. 12; viii. 9, etc. By these passages, however, nothing more is proved than that in teaching men truth our Lord and his apostles did not tell them *everything at once*" (Lindsay Alexander, Kitto's *Encyclopædia of Biblical Literature*, 3rd ed.; A. and C. Black, p. 42). What is meant by this casuistry is shown a little further on, where it is suggested that the destruction of Achsan, with all his family and cattle, and his goods, was due to "one of those sudden impulses of indiscriminate popular vengeance to which the Jewish people were exceedingly prone; and which, in this case, it would not have been in the power of Joshua to control." To me this appears to be described as perfectly deliberate; and I suggest that the feigned approval of God, as signified by the "sacred lot," really covers the fact that many or all of the Israelites had stolen goods; so that whoever was taken would have been equally guilty and would probably have owned up to the misdeed, if it had been fixed on him by an appeal to superstitious fears and absurd practices.

"'Either,' says Augustine, 'immutable truth speaks to man ineffably of itself to the minds of rational creatures or speaks by a mutable creature, either by spiritual images to our minds, or by corporeal voices to the bodily senses.' But God speaks not *properly*, but *anthropopathically*, when his decrees and their execution are described in human methods, or in the form of dialogues and conversations, as in the phrase (Gen. i. 2) 'Let there be light and there was light.'" "This," says Maimonides, 'is to be understood of the will, not of the speech'; and in like manner, St. Augustine, 'This was performed by

the intellectual and eternal, not by the audible and temporal word' (*City of God*, ch. vii).'' A typical specimen of the Saint's usual obscurity: "Anthropomorphic phrases, generally considered, are such as ascribe to the Deity mixed perfections and human imperfections." (W. W. Wright Kitto, Vol. I, p. 156). "Human form, human organs, human members (anthropomorphism)" (*ibid.*). "In the same manner human affections as grief, repentance, anger, revenge, jealousy, etc., are ascribed to the Deity" (*ibid.*). "Anthropomorphic phrases are found throughout the whole Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments" (p. 157). I cannot myself see that anything of the sort was necessary, and it really is diagnostic of the straits to which an irrational theory has reduced apparently intelligent and honest men that such a rigmarole and jumble of unintelligible statements should be required to express what either could have been put simply or need not be spoken.

"'Some,' says Thcodoret, 'imagined Paul to have written an epistle to the Laodiceans, and accordingly produced a certain forged epistle. . . . The *Epistle of Peter to James* is a very ancient forgery. It was first published by Cotelerius, and is supposed to have been a preface to the *Preaching of Peter*, which was in great esteem among some of the early Christian writers, and is several times cited as a genuine work. . . . The *Epistles of Paul and Seneca* consist of eight pretended Latin letters from the philosopher Seneca to St. Paul, and six from the latter to Seneca. Their antiquity is undoubted; St. Jerome had such an idea of the value of these letters that he was induced to say, 'I should not have ranked Seneca in my catalogue of saints, but that I was determined to it by those epistles of Paul to Seneca and Seneca to Paul.' . . . St. Augustine also observes . . . that 'Seneca wrote certain epistles to St. Paul, which are now read.' The epistles are also referred to in the spurious *Acts of Linus*, the first bishop of Rome after the Apostles. But these *Acts* are a manifest forgery. . . . Indeed, there are few persons mentioned in the New Testament as companions of the Apostle, who have not had some spurious piece or other fathered on them" (p. 813). "These are the principal of the ancient forged epistles. Among those now universally rejected are the well-known *Epistle of Lentulus* to the Roman Senate, giving a description

of the person of Christ . . . and some pretended epistles of the Virgin Mary. One is dated from Jerusalem, in the 42nd year of 'our Son' 'nones of July, Luna 17, Feria quinta'" (Kitto, p. 813). The old verse, *Teste David cum Sibylla*, shows how completely this hocus-pocus had got hold of the Church, and how utterly incompetent at that time bibliolaters were to arrive at a sane judgment on any subject.

To realize how completely these parasitical accretions had corrupted early Christians, it is only necessary to read the articles on "Andrew" and "Apocrypha," in *H.D.B.*, which can be judged by the following samples.

"Philo presents the results of his deepest study and reflexion and of his highest insight, in the form of an exposition of the Pentateuch, making of this a hidden book, which only the initiated could understand" (Vol. I, p. 112). "Great numbers of books were put forward during the century before and the century after Christ, in the name of patriarchs or prophets, as books that had been hidden. . . . In one of these books the tradition is related that Ezra was inspired to dictate to his scribes the sacred books that had been burned at the destruction of Jerusalem" (p. 112). "By the theory of a secret tradition the scribes sought to give their law the authority of Moses, and yet account for its late appearance" (p. 113). "The Messianic hope is the genuinely Jewish element in the apocalypses" (p. 113). "The Christian religion made its start in the Jewish world in close connection with the Messianic ideas as they had been developed, especially in the apocalypses from Daniel onwards. This led, naturally, less to the production of new Christian revelations than to the keeping and Christian editing of the old Jewish patriarchs and prophets were in this way made to testify to the truth, and to forecast the future, of Christianity" (p. 114). "Even when apocalypses in the names of Christian apostles were put forth, their material was of necessity largely traditional and Jewish in origin. . . . They are books usually put forth as having been hidden (the pseudepigraphic form) and always contain accounts of hidden things miraculously disclosed. . . . The cultivation of such 'hidden' books by no means belonged at first to heretical sects, but was characteristic of early Christianity in general. . . ." St. Paul's language in I Cor. i.

and ii. discloses the existence in Corinth of those who valued a hidden wisdom more than his gospel of the crucified Christ. And later, at Colossa, St. Paul urges against an essentially Gnostic tendency. . . . The special Colossian gnosis, with its worship of angels, its asceticism, its visions, and its secret doctrines, reminds us of Essenism. The strongest influence . . . came, however, from Alexandria. . . . As the Jewish Apocalypse furnished one way of connecting the new faith with the old, Hellenist allegorical interpretation supplied another ready means of finding Christ and Christianity in the Old Testament, thus making of it, as Philo did, a hidden book. But the allegorical method was capable of a further use. . . . Basilides and Valentinus claim to derive their secret gnosis from pupils of St. Paul; the Ophites, from a pupil of St. James (p. 114). "The conviction, however, gradually prevailed that the cultivation of secret books was dangerous, both because of the errors they contained and because of the secretarianism they fostered. . . . The gradually prevailing Catholic principle, "*Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus,*" would give to the very word *apocryphus*, the meanings; false, spurious, heretical. . . . Irenæus stands early in the line of this growing Catholicism. He opposes the theory, which Clement Alex. defends, of the existence and value of secret traditions: and condemns the 'countless multitude of apocryphal and spurious writings'" (p. 115). Tertullian "applies the word *apocryphus* to an apocryphal book which he regards as spurious. . . . The *Chronography of Nicephorus*, in a revised form which originated in Jerusalem about 850, contains a stichometric list of Biblical books which has inner marks of a much earlier date (Zahn, 'perhaps before 500'). . . . *Apocrypha of O.T.* Enoch; Patriarchs, Prayer of Joseph, Testament of Moses, Assumption of Moses, Abram, Eldad, and Modad, Elijah the Prophet, Zephaniah the Prophet, Zachariah father of John, Pseudepigraphia of Baruch, Habakkuk, Ezekiel, and Daniel. *N.T. Apocrypha*. Itinerary of Paul, of Peter, of John, of Thomas, The Gospel according to Thomas, Teaching of the Apostles, Clement's two Epistles, Epistles of Ignatius, of Polycarp, and of Hermas. This list is repeated in the so-called synopsis of Athanasius" (Vol. I, p. 115).

If genuine, these books should throw much-needed light on

obscure parts of human history, and fill up the strange lacuna left by the sudden termination of Acts, which leaves us completely in the dark. "We must be permitted to express our surprise that in no part of the authentic scripture occurs the slightest allusion to the personal history of St. Peter, as connected with the Western churches" (Milman, *History of Latin Christianity*, Vol. II, p. 43). "Christian gratitude and reverence soon began to be discontented with the silence of the authentic writings as to the fate of the twelve chosen companions of Christ. It began first with some modest respect for truth, but soon with bold defiance of probability, to brighten their obscure course, till each might be traced by the blaze of miracle into remote regions of the world, where it is clear that, if they had penetrated, no record of their existence was likely to survive" (p. 61). And, again: "The Bishop gradually assumed the title of pontiff; the presbyters became a sacerdotal order. From the Old Testament, and even from paganism, the Christians, at first as ennobling metaphors, adopted their sacred appellations. Insensibly the meaning of these significant titles worked into the Christian system. They assumed, as it were, a privilege of nearer approach to the Deity; and a priestly caste grew rapidly up in a religion which, in its primary institution, acknowledged only one mediator between earth and heaven. We shall subsequently trace the growth of the sacerdotal principle, and the universal establishment of the hierarchy" (pp. 78-9). "The Asiatic mind impersonated, though it did not, with the Greek, humanize every thing. Light and Darkness, Good and Evil, the Creative and Destructive energy of nature, the active and passive Powers of generation, moral Perfection and Wisdom, Reason and Speech, even Agriculture and the Pastoral life, each was a distinct and intelligent being . . . one great elementary principle pervaded the whole religious systems of the East, the connection of *moral with physical ideas*, the inherent *purity, the divinity, of mind or spirit*, the inalienable *evil of its antagonist, matter*" (p. 84).

"The more the man put off his own nature, and sank below the animal to vegetative existence, the more consummate his spiritual perfection. The full growth of this system was of a much later period. It did not come to maturity till

after Christianity had passed through its conflict with Gnosticism; but its elements were, no doubt, floating about in the different western regions of Asia. . . . Unless the same profound wisdom had watched over its inviolable preservation, which presided over its origin; unless it had been constantly administered with the same superiority to the common passions and interests and speculative curiosity of man, a reaction of the several systems over which it prevailed was inevitable" (pp. 93-4) "If it lost in purity, it gained in power, perhaps in permanence" (p. 95). "It is difficult to estimate how far the admission, even the predominance, of these foreign elements, by which it was enabled to maintain its hold on different ages and races, may not have contributed both to its original success and its final permanence. . . . No doubt, in its first contest with Orientalism were sown those seeds, which grew up at a later period into Monasticism" (p. 95).

"Origen denies the existence of living Simonians in his day; which implies that they had subsisted nearly up to that time" (p. 98, *note*). "Whether the opinions of Simon (Magus) were derived from Platonism, or, as it is much more likely, immediately from Eastern sources, his history is singularly characteristic of the state of the public mind at this period of the world. An individual assuming the lofty appellation of the Power of God, and, with his female associate, personating the male and female Energies or Intelligences of the Deity, appears to our colder European reason a fiction too monstrous even for the proverbial credulity of man. . . . In the East, superstition had in general repudiated the grossly material forms, in which the Western anthropomorphism had embodied its gods: it remained more spiritual" (p. 100). We moderns can hardly realize how far creeds, with all the subtlety and acuteness of intellect with which they had been framed were inchoate in their ideas of duty. One has only to look at the status of the gods, and still more at the representation given of these in theistic literature, to perceive that the view of such things then held was wholly different from that now prevalent. The truth is that the divinities of that age were an expression of the powers of Nature and reflected the defects plainly seen in the order of the universe. Men saw a contest of forces in the world, and they gave form to

this in their own way. In this respect they really did only what man is ever doing—making God in his own likeness. Hence it invariably comes to pass that theistic and other theories entertained at any period are inevitably antiquated, and do not represent the knowledge of facts which existed then or shortly afterwards. The distinction between divine and human, mental and bodily, spiritual and material, was not then fixed. God could walk on earth and assume human form; the material could change to the spiritual, which was but a rare form of the same thing.

“Thus Christ, who to the vulgar Jew was to be a temporal king, to the Cabalist or the Chaldean became a Sephiroth, an Æon, an emanation from the One Supreme. . . . Directly it got beyond the borders of Palestine, and the name of Christ had acquired sanctity and veneration in the Eastern cities, he became a kind of metaphysical impersonation, while the religion lost its purely moral cast, and assumed the character of a speculative theogony” (pp. 102–3). “Gnosticism was pure poetry: and Bardonanes was the poet of Gnosticism” (p. 124). “With him, the primal Deity dwelt alone with his consort, his primary thought or conception. Their first offsprings, Æons or emanations, were Christ and the Holy Ghost, who in his system was feminine, and nearly allied to the Sophia or Wisdom, of other theories” (p. 125). “The fundamental principle of Marcion’s doctrine was unfolded in his Antitheses, in which the contrasts he arrayed against each other . . . the Old and the New Testament, the Law and the Gospel. . . . On the plundering of the Egyptians, on the massacre of the Canaanites, on every metaphor which ascribed the actions and sentiments of men to the Deity, Marcion enlarged with contemptuous superiority, and contrasted it with the tone of the Gospel. It was to rescue mankind from the tyranny of this inferior and hostile deity, that the Supreme manifested himself in Jesus Christ. . . . He was not the Immanuel; he was not the son of David: he came not to restore the temporal kingdom of Israel. His doctrines were equally opposed: he demanded not an eye for an eye, or a tooth for a tooth; but where one smote the right cheek, to turn the other. He demanded no sacrifices but that of the pure heart” (Milman, *loc. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 127–9) (*vide* Psalm li).

It may be asked why I have made citations which refer to something ostensibly different from Christianity. It is because they appear to bear out Renan's contention that there was a tradition, wholly opposed to the orthodox view, which developed by degrees, and in process of time became crystallized into its present form, in Canon Ottley's favourite and revealing expression. It is admitted by theological Professors and Bishops that two of the Gospels cannot be relied on, even as to sayings of Christ; and that in all there is a neatness and roundness in the Greek version of His words which compare in a marked way with the angularity and ruggedness of the Greek translation of the Old Testament in LXX to such an extent as to make it clear that they had been passed from hand to hand, or lip to lip, until the corners had been worn off, and they had become smooth like water worn pebbles. It is common knowledge how the expressions of one language and its thoughts differ from those of another, and cannot be closely rendered or fitted together so as not to show ugly joints and awkward junctions. In the Gospels the parables and maxims of Jesus are essentially Greek in their phraseology; they show no abruptness and little unevenness of structure, such as occur in German or French translations of English. Either they came to the writers already worn smooth by constant repetition or these authors allowed themselves liberty to vary and amend them, so as to make a pretty turn in the sentences. Such lapidation has been charged against Luke, and anyone who has studied his text with care will not be inclined to deny it; Harnack especially maintains this thesis, and it is now generally admitted that the other Gospels are the result of a long course of tradition and modification during nearly half a century.

"The Church writers found no difficulty in sheltering the second Gospel under the ægis of the apostle Peter, and the third Gospel under the ægis of the apostle Paul. The Gospels, as well as the Epistles, were 'Apostolic.' If the apostolic idea had been limited to a body of documents, which with every generation grew more ancient, and to a creed the exact form of which goes back some 1200 years, and can be traced farther still for half as long again, and scholars have been able to reconstruct it in almost verbal accuracy, it might have been

possible to say that the idea thus limited belonged to . . . the dead past . . . Recourse to the ‘apostolic’ past, whether to its creed or to its Scripture, has become clogged and barren, whenever the needs of the living Church in each present day are not brought into vital relation with it” (*Swete, Early History of the Church and the Ministry*, Macmillan, pp. 103-4).

“The Gnostic movement was borrowing more and more Christian elements, creating a more complete organization of systems or societies on lines that emulated the Catholic Society, claiming more insistently to be the real heir to the future of the Christian religion. . . . While the West was extending its material empire over the East, the East was permeating at a thousand points the life and thought and worship of the West” (pp. 96-7). “The devotees of the Great Mother from Phrygia and of the Bona Dea from Syria, Isis worship from Egypt and (somewhat later) Mithras worship from Persia jostled . . . the followers of Moses and of Christ” (pp. 96-7). “Basilides and Valentinus and Marcion did at least assert, unlike their own predecessors, a real historical connection between themselves and the original disciples of Christ. . . . Everywhere . . . the Gnostic taught that the taint of evil in the material world around us is not merely accidental but essential, and therefore if the Supreme God is good, he cannot also be the Creator . . . and the Son of God, if he is found in fashion as a man, can be so only in appearance, not in reality” (p. 98). “Gnosticism possessed so much vitality and so much attractiveness in its Christianized forms, that it was able to make a serious bid for the religious leadership of the Roman world. Catholic Christianity has in fact never passed, humanly speaking, through any other crisis of such utter peril. . . . The idea of a Catholic Church was no less repugnant to the existing Roman State than to contemporary Jewish theology. Under Nero and the Flavian emperors it became a settled principle of imperial policy that Christianity was in itself illegal” (p. 99).

Dean Milman goes on: “The rescript of Antonine, in Eusebius, to which Xiphilin alludes (*Euseb.* IV, 13), in favour of the Christians, is now generally given up as spurious” (p. 158, *note*). “With Aurelius, nevertheless, Christianity found not only a fair and high-minded competitor for the command

of the human mind; not only a rival in the exaltation of the soul of man to higher views and more dignified motives, but a violent and intolerant persecutor. During his reign, the martyrologies become more authentic and credible" (p. 159). "While the Emperor himself condescended, in Greek of no despicable purity and elegance for the age, to explain the lofty tenets of the Porch, and to commend its noble morality to his subjects, the minds of a large portion of the world were preoccupied by writers who, in language often impregnated with foreign and Syrian barbarisms, enforced still higher morals, resting upon religious tenets altogether new and incomprehensible, excepting to the initiate" (Vol. II, p. 161). "Yet Christianity left the emancipation of mankind from these deeply-rooted distinctions between the free and servile races to times which might be ripe for so great and important a change" (pp. 162-3).

"Many of these forced prophetic writings belong to the reign of the Antonines, and could not emanate from any quarter but that of the more injudicious and fanatical Christians. The second (Apocryphal) book of Esdras is of this character, the work of a Judaizing Christian" (pp. 164-5). "The visible throne of Christ, according to these writings, was to be erected on the ruins of all earthly empires: the nature of his kingdom would, of course, be unintelligible to the Heathen . . . the Sibylline verses, which clearly belong to this period, express, in the most remarkable manner, this spirit of exulting menace at the expected simultaneous fall of Roman idolatry and of Roman empire" (p. 165). "It is scarcely credible that the fathers of this time would quote contemporary forgeries as ancient prophecies" (p. 166). "Nothing would be more tempting to the sterner or more ardent Christian, than to enlist, as it were, on his side, these authorized pagan interpreters of futurity; to extort, as it were, from their own oracles, this confession of their approaching dissolution" (p. 167). "But the Sibyls are made, not merely to denounce the fall of Heathenism, but the ruin of Heathen states, and the desolation of Heathen cities" (p. 168).

*καὶ σὰ Θέμεθλα ὄνοι καὶ ἀλώπεκες οἰκήσουσιν. καὶ τότε ἔσῃ πανέρημος ὅλως, ὡς μή γεγονῦται. Ποῦ τότε σοι τὸ κράτος; ποία γῆ*

σύμμαχος ἔσται; (p. 170). Αὐτὸς παντοκράτωρ ὅταν ἐλθὼν βῆμασι κρίνῃ Ζώντων καὶ νεκύων ψυχὰς, καὶ κόσμον ἄπαντα. “According to the Sibyls, Nero was to make an alliance with the Kings of the Medes and Persians, return at the head of a mighty army . . . and then conquer Rome” (p. 171, *note*). “Whether or not these predictions were contained in the Sibylline poems, quoted by all the early writers, by Justin Martyr, by Clement, and by Origen, the attempt to array the authority of the Sibyls against that religion and that empire, of which they were before considered almost the tutelary guardians, would goad the rankling aversion to violent resentment” (pp. 172–3). “Superstition, which had slept in careless and Epicurean forgetfulness of its gods, suddenly awoke, and when it fled for succour to the altar of the tutelary deity, found the temple deserted and the shrine neglected. . . . Superstition shudders at the manifest anger of the gods, yet looks not within to correct the offensive guilt, but abroad, to discover some gift or sacrifice which may appease the Divine wrath, and bribe back the alienated favour of Heaven. Rarely does it discover any offering sufficiently costly, except human life” (p. 174). “It was the deep and general voice of fanatic terror, solemnly demanding the propitiation of the wrathful gods, by the sacrifice of these impious apostates from their worship” (p. 175). “Alexandria was the ripe and pregnant soil of religious feud and deadly animosity. The hostile parties which divided the city, the Jews, the Pagans, and the Christians . . . awaited nevertheless the signal for persecution, and for licence to draw off in sanguinary factions, and to settle the controversies of the schools by bloody tumults in the streets” (p. 209).

“From Tertullian to Augustine, the climate [of Africa] seems to be working into the language, into the essence of Christianity.” Even “in the fifth century, the Queen of Heaven, according to Salvian, shared the worship of Carthage with Christ” (p. 211 and *note*). “There is a singular correspondence between Phrygian Heathenism and the Phrygian Christianity of Montanus and his followers. The Orgiasm, the inward rapture, the working of a divine influence upon the soul, till it was wrought up into a state of holy frenzy” (p. 213). As Celsus says, “Each people has its gods, whom it

must worship in a peculiar manner, according to their peculiar character; and the worship of all these different deities is reflected back to the Supreme God, who has appointed them, as it were, his delegates and representatives. . . . Since the Supreme God can only produce that which is immortal and imperishable, the existence of mortal beings cannot be explained, unless we distinguish from him these inferior deities, and assert them to be the creators of mortal beings and of perishable things" (*Origen, contra Celsum*, Lib. VII, p. 236).

"The skill, as well as the dreamy mysticism, with which this school of writers combined the dim traditions of the older philosophy and the esoteric doctrines of the mysteries, to give the sanction of antiquity to their own vague but attractive and fanciful theories, appears in the Life of Pythagoras, and in the work on the Mysteries, by a somewhat later writer, Iamblicus" (p. 238). "The more refined it became, the less was it suited for common use, and the less it harmonized with ordinary Paganism. Thus that which, in one respect, elevated it into a dangerous rival of Christianity, at the same time deprived it of its power" (p. 239).

"The acts of Diocletian are the only trustworthy history of his character. The son of a slave—or, at all events, born of obscure and doubtful parentage—who could force his way to sovereign power, conceive and accomplish the design of reconstructing the whole empire, must have been a man at least of strong political courage, of profound, if not always wise and statesman-like views" (pp. 261-2). "The new constitution of the empire might appear to require a reconstruction of the religious system" (Vol. II, p. 266). "Galerius proposed that all who refused to sacrifice should be burned alive. Diocletian stipulated that there should be no loss of life" (p. 273). "The sufferings of the Christians, however, still inflicted with unremitting barbarity, were lost in the common sufferings of mankind. . . . The rights of Roman citizenship, which had been violated in their persons, were now universally neglected" (p. 281). "At this juncture all eyes were turned towards the elder son of Constantius. If not already recognized by the prophetic glance of devout hope as the first Christian sovereign of Rome, he seemed placed by providential wisdom as the protector, as the head, of the

Christian interest" (p. 282) (*Milman, History of Latin Christianity, ut supra*).

If it is asked: "Why all these quotations? For as you have yourself admitted, *humanum est errare.*" This is the real *raison d'être* of the case. Error is mortal. Where there is a sign, there also is the thing signified. The root of the matter lies essentially in the argument that all is a development—namely, the imperfect becoming less so after the manner of all modes of the process. When we see a manufactory or business, such as a railway, ill-contrived for its purposes so that it fails of its objects, we are entitled to complain that it has not been well-ordained. In Russia we have a government professing to aim at the good of the people by suppressing those who have been successful in working out their own salvation; and the result is utter confusion and distress. The position in Russia is the direct outcome of gospel precepts; Tolstoi based his opinions of the words of Jesus, which discourage prudent thrift and economical foresight for the future, and favour a feckless trust in Providence. Anyone who doubts this need only study the teaching in *Resurrection* in which a noble is made to do on a small scale exactly what State agencies have brought about now universally: the land is given over to the peasants, and a step back is made in civilization. This is only what might be expected by any who know the history of the world; a lower and less intelligent class is made supreme; and, as a necessary consequence, everything is managed in an inferior manner. It is hard to say what may be the ultimate result; but for the present the effect is just like that of the fall of Roman domination: all has become hugger-mugger and slipshod. Nor does the example of France induce confidence that the permanent effect will be good. There the peasant class is all powerful; and as a natural result narrow-minded and ignorant maxims prevail. The majority live by the produce of the soil, and their aim is to keep up its price; and so they favour the exclusion of foreign commodities. The outcome is that the food supply is restricted and the population has fallen off. This fact raises the question of the advantages of the "Industrial System" to which we are definitely committed. It enables a number of people to be fed beyond the possible output of the land for their nutriment. Whatever its faults,

the abolition of this entails suffering of widespread and incalculable extent. It might have been better never to have allowed it to come into being, but now it is at work to stop it would be fatal, a death blow to thousands, among working classes rather than monied men who can transfer their wealth to other lands: the workers are by their poverty tied to the soil and unable to succeed elsewhere.

In a well-regulated concern if accidents happen which kindly forethought and far-seeing care might easily have avoided, we think the management is becoming lax and inattentive. Both in the Jewish economy and in the Christian dispensation "most lamentable disorders occurred"; and these are largely due to the facts that wise prevision was absent, and that things were left to themselves to evolve, with consequences which were far from desirable or "happy." Moses went up into a mountain for forty days, and the people, left without a leader, made a mistake as to golden calves (Canon Bigg). In the Church all sorts of mishaps arose; really because no rule had been laid down as to who were responsible for doctrine or order in the community. We see St. Paul struggling with the disorder at Corinth; we hear of Peter and Paul contending at Antioch, of dissension between Paul and the party represented by James. From the beginning, the upshot is a compromise, and often not a happy one; and in the end Protcsstants, at least, must confess that the Papal Monarchy which excluded the Eastern Church was at the best a poor contrivance "to keep alive the beacon of religion and knowledge in the dark ages." This pseudo-unity was disrupted by the dissemination, from the taking of Constantinople, of the very tenets of liberty, and the "priesthood of the people," which its entire system had practically abrogated and denied.

In the evolution of hierarchical Christianity the course pursued resembles that of the Jews: disorder and misrule at first, followed by tyranny and overbearing measures, forcing invasion, and finally an arbitrary form of self-government which results in crucifying and suppressing the truth because of an antiquated and materialistic system of formalism. All the signs and wonders leading up to the established dogmas of which we have heard so much, virtually resolve themselves into a belief "that which conquers is right." If Germany had

been victorious, no doubt historians and even theologians would have found reasons for holding that the "Fatherland" did really represent and embody the spirit of truth which underlies the wayward wills of men; just as perfervid patriots now protest that the English race is destined to grow, and inherit the earth. "*Vae victis: Io triumphe; macte virtute esto, imperator, morituri te salutant.*" Quite the reverse of Dean Milman's "Ride on, in lowly majesty to die." It is the apotheosis of the most shifty, not of the best; of the most canny, not of the bravest. Ca' canny *in excelsis*, grab all you can; and stick to what you are able. "Let him take who has the power and let him keep who can." What an ironical contrast this to the precepts of the mild and lowly Jesus!

Among the Jews, and in the early Church, there was a constant expectation and credence of the miraculous; the dealings of the patriarchs with the deity are of a kind we do not expect and can hardly believe nowadays. Even in what are supposed to be contemporary accounts modern theologians detect discrepancies and variations due to different authors and changed times and faiths. In the older versions God appears in person, and talks and acts as a man; in the later we are told that none can see him and live. Dreams, visions, presentiments, omens, oracles, the sacred lot, Teraphim, the ephod, Urim and Thummim, and all the well-known apparatus for "inquiring of the Lord" replace these stories of actual interviews with the Almighty. The Plagues of Egypt and the adventures of the Exodus are now commonly explained as exaggerations of natural events; the conquest of Palestine is definitely known not to have been of the sudden and marvellous type portrayed in the Books of Joshua and Chronicles; Judges, Samuel, and Kings give a more authentic and earlier history; but even these books are now barely received implicitly as truth by anyone who knows, unless indeed by very old or very youthful persons. The *Wars of the Lord*, the doings of David and Solomon, the marvels of Hezekiah and other pious kings are discounted *cum grano salis*. When we reach the captivity and return, and the age of the Maccabees, miracles are no longer wrought with a high hand and mighty power, but are almost if not quite indistinguishable from ordinary things which turn out favourably for the chosen people of the

Lord. So in the Church of the Gospels Matthias is chosen by lot and Judas falls asunder. "It is certainly singular that the disease vulgarly called being 'eaten by worms' should have been the destiny of Herod the Great, of Galerius, and of Philip II of Spain" (Milman, *History of Latin Christianity*, Vol. II, p. 281). To whom may be added Herod Agrippa, the account of whose death in profane authors seems to show that here also history is seen and reported, *à la* Canon Ottley, through the medium of priests and prophets. To them the end of the world was at hand. Christ was coming to judge the Earth quickly, and intervention by Him in behalf of the saints seemed reasonable and probable; occasions were discovered of it, and no doubt firmly believed at the time.

As time passed and the climax was delayed, faith grew cold, and it was found needful to invent fresh theories and new hopes; even the selection of pastors was no longer committed to the chance of God directing a system of lottery: doubtless the results of this soon proved unsatisfactory, though the pretence of it is still maintained in the word "Cleric" (*διδόναι κλήρους*). Prophets and the gift of the Spirit were evidently trusted to as guides in the direction of affairs. In theory acclamation by the people, often depending on chance coincidences, decided the appointment; as for instance "the dove alighting on the head of Fabian in 250, like the voice which in later days designated St. Ambrose to be bishop, was recognized as divine guidance for the election" (Swete's *Essays*, Howard Frere, *Ordination*). Even this was found fallacious, and eventually all the laity retained was the power to veto the nomination by persistent outcry. Parallel with this emergence is the fall off in the claim to miraculous powers. It has now come to "inspired men" in place of inspired books—a revival of the original tenet. Papias and all the earliest authorities speak of the testimony of mere writing as dead, in comparison with the living witness by word of mouth. We are ourselves quite conscious of something like this. One preacher touches us and carries home conviction, and persuades by the "unction of the Holy Spirit," another whose life may be far more conscientious and exemplary fails altogether to get a hearing; though, in the opinion of experts, his doctrine is much more sound. The former's preaching

may be mere sound; even in politics, literature, and art the windbag prevails—*vide Carlyle, passim*—and he, curiously, is a patent example of it, though he has been described as the nearest approach to the prophets of Israel in our days. [Did not John Morley, with exquisite irony, describe Carlyle as having taught the virtue of silence in nineteen volumes?—**AUTHOR.**]

It is surely appropriate that this prodigy should hail from the Northern Kingdom; and we may compare with him Elijah and Elisha, whose marvellous deeds for the most part, are now dismissed curtly with a covert sneer that they represent the least advanced portion of Israel. Principal Cairns speaks of “The miracles of Elijah and Elisha” as something quite different from those of the New Testament; “for an element of folklore and tradition may be present in them, coming as they do, from early ages and very superstitious people.” Whether this be so is at any rate open to question. The prevalence of Judah and its temple at Jerusalem was followed by formalism and a revival or invention of ceremonial observances, just as the hegemony of Rome led to a formulated system of *opus operatum*, of mere performance of rites to the extent that baptism of an unborn child by a sceptic is valid in that church so long as the material and the words are regular. It is true that Confirmation is needed, to ensure “the Holy Spirit”; but what does this mean? Popes have attained their position by the vilest means. They have used their holy office to attempt objects wholly alien to the spirit of Christ: St. Paul says: “If I give my body to be burnt, and have not charity, it is nothing worth.” The Church authors write: “Though a man be burnt as a martyr, it is of no avail if he holds heretical opinions.”

The “true Church” does not absolutely state that he is damned, whatever that may mean; but its anxiety for baptism, even in such a mere formal way, is clearly pivoted on the maxim “that there is no salvation outside the Church,” which is defined as “in communion with Rome, or with the Catholic hierarchy,” and those Christians before Christ of whom St. Augustine speaks are left to God’s tender mercies, of which apparently so little account is taken that to exclude a bishop of doubtful views from a council—really from interested

motives, to all seeming—was reckoned as almost equivalent to sentence of eternal death. It is impossible for an unbiassed reader to feel any respect for decrees passed by synods which began by excluding the majority who were thought heterodox. If the Emperor was Arian, the assembly turned out the Catholics; if he were Catholic, all dissidents were repelled. Of course, in this sort of way it is quite easy to be unanimous. It recalls the rump Parliament, and American methods in municipal affairs. It does not even remotely suggest the “one voice of the Catholic Apostolic Church, inspired by the Holy Spirit,” and reaching a divine solution by indefeasible paths. Wire-pulling, political influence and bribery, intrigue, flattery, and back-stairs contrivance, may be legitimate in worldly matters, but they do not strike the ordinary man as the cleanest or most reputable roads by which to arrive at the will of Heaven. The resort to such chicanery is clear evidence that its perpetrators were not convinced that the truth would prevail, or that the Deity was able or wished “to override the wayward leanings of men,” so as to bring out of them “the reliable declaration of eternal facts.” The whole ignoble business savours of the flesh and of earthly manners; it is not convincing as a way to divine knowledge, and to the unprejudiced does not seem a likely scheme for the All Wise and Almighty to have appointed as the plan for arriving at the most important conditions of human life and the necessary faith of mankind. Grant that it is in keeping with the usual doings of Nature, yet it is not in accordance with the practice of careful men who consider and decide what is right, and provide for the future and the welfare of those who depend on them for necessities and instruction in life, and who would be blamed if they did not. The Church did not start as a “going concern”; if you buy a business which is working, it has its books, records, methods, peculiar products, perhaps patents; a reputation to maintain, a fame in the world, a reliance on its turning out work up to recognized quality. But from the first, if you begin for yourself, all this has to be built up; you learn methods by experience, you perfect processes, you bring your books into a satisfactory condition, by trial and error you attain the needful skill and gain the needed caution. The Jews claim that at

the beginning their system was launched by Moses as a going concern; modern criticism denies this claim, and has fairly proved its point. Nothing short of wilful blindness, or "that dense fanaticism which brooded over all the religions of primitive man," could have led to a belief that the Hebrew scriptures were homogeneous or authentic in the sense which that term now conveys. Quite obviously they are compilations of different ages and by various authors. The same process is quickly denuding all parts of "the impregnable Rock of Holy Scripture" To no small extent the Gospels are now known to be compilations; the Acts do not profess to be anything else; the Epistles and Revelations are open to question, and subject to considerable suspicion. When the doings of the Church in succeeding times are considered, there are no "books," no reliable accounts; the decrees even of the great Council of Nicea are veiled in impenetrable dimness. For even when the religion was recognized and patronized by the State, and the Emperor himself attended the debates, no satisfactory or reliable records were made. Moreover, the very "Council of Jerusalem" reported in the Acts is irreconcilable with the Epistles of St. Paul, which carry far greater weight. What was decided, and how far it was binding, and for how long, are insoluble problems. No one can read the history of the early Church with an open mind, and not recognize that its leaders and members were floundering about in doubt and well-nigh without guidance, just like a man who starts a business which he does not completely understand. Plainly there is no settled plan, no preordained scheme. All that Canon Sanday could urge in mitigation is that "the whole was over-ruled for good; and that in the end the result was pretty satisfactory." This is in line with the doctrine "that theology is a development, an evolution in man's knowledge of what was already fixed" (Gore), though it was unknown. Jevons, with his predeliction for joining old things with new, and patching unfulled cloth on to worn-out garments, attempts to apply this principle to anthropology and primitive religion. Such an application, however, would in no way satisfy scientific thought. The clergy are deceiving themselves, or trying to mislead others, when they profess that divinity and science can be reconciled

by any such artifices; for this would be to reduce the struggle for existence into a sham fight, a mere mimic battle, the results of which were arranged and foreseen—in other words, a “frame-up.” When Prof. W. Robertson Smith was arraigned for heresy, he maintained, “I cannot believe that a legislation given by God to Moses would contain so many obscurities, and appear in so disjointed, puzzling, and apparently contradictory a form as the Pentateuch exhibits.” This conclusion applies *a fortiori* to the anatomy of man. It can be rationally explained only as the result of a development, in the real sense of the word; and given this, nobody will care to deny the rest. As Lord Salisbury said in his Presidential Address to the British Association at Oxford, “Whether you believe that Creation was the work of design, or of inconscient law, it is equally difficult to imagine how this random collection of dissimilar materials came together.”

## CHAPTER V

### SOCIOLOGY. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSTITUTIONS

*Nunquam alia natura, alia sapientia dicit.*

—JUVENAL.

I know that these men and women were not for nothing ; I know they belong to the scheme of the world every bit as much as we belong to it : some naked savages, some in tents, hardy men, patriarchs, tribes, horsemen ; some prowling in woods, some living securely on farms. I believe all these men and women that filled the unnamed lands, everyone exists this hour here or elsewhere, invisible to us ; in exact proportion to what he or she grew from in life, and out of which he or she did, felt, became, loved, sinned in life. I suspect their results curiously await in the yet unseen world ; counterparts of what accrued to them in the seen world.

—WALT WHITMAN, *Leaves of Grass.*

*Sibi quisque profecto est Deus.*

—OVID.

Human morality is as blind and imperfect as man himself.

—HOBHOUSE, *Morals in Evolution*, Vol. I, p. 17.

Nowhere is the feat harder of escaping from one's own shadow than in the world of ethical and religious thought.

—*Ibid.*, p. 20.

There is a difference between the rule to which Society expects you to conform and the rule which it keeps for Sunday use only.

—*Ibid.*, p. 31.

Are we not all Gods to ourselves ? and there are deep reasons for this, if our animal origin is considered.

—J. H. ROBINSON, *Mind in the Making*, p. 77.

I HAVE now come to a part where I can pretend to no personal knowledge, and so must bring forward witnesses as in a court of law and submit their testimony to the verdict of the reader. I think no one can go through the evidence adduced without a feeling that the laws and customs set out in the Old Testament are merely a reflection and reproduction of those common among all semi-civilized nations and are the result of development evolved by means of "trial and error," as in experiments on inorganic matter. We find at present all stages and degrees of advance ; a people may be almost wholly without any scheme of government, they may be nearly as much without rules of conduct as animals, they may herd together in families

or small groups in which rule appears quite absent or rudimentary in the extreme. "The simpler societies, particularly those of hunters and gatherers and the lower agriculturists and pastoralists, for the most part live in small communities, varying in number of inhabitants from perhaps a score to two or three hundred." (Report on *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*. Issued by the London School of Economics under the editorship of Professor L. T. Hobhouse and Professor E. A. Westermarck. No. 3 of the Monographs in Sociology, 1915; p. 46.) "Little communities of this kind form the effective social unit in the lowest economic stages. They are in a measure self-dependent. They own a definite area of land. They join, more or less effectively as the case may be, in repulsing the assaults of any other group: and again, in varying degrees of energy and community of feeling, they will protect their members against others. They may have a chief or a council, formal or informal, of the older men" (p. 47). "A number of such groups probably speak the same dialect, and call one another by the same name, intermarry freely, perhaps meet at certain times for religious or ceremonial purposes, are generally on friendly terms, and perhaps are ready to co-operate for mutual defence. Such an aggregate of groups is generally known as a tribe, even if it possesses no common government or corporate individuality" (p. 47). "If there is a chief, is he hereditary, or does he owe his position to election, or to prowess in war or the hunt, or to wealth?" (p. 49). [This was practically the position of the Hebrews in the time of the Judges, and the earlier part of the Books of Samuel.—AUTHOR.]

Of 403 groups, "in 58 cases, the chief has 'power,' while in 127 he has influence merely. . . . Government by discussion is as familiar as government by the 'strong man'" (p. 50). [This is very much what we find in Homer, which implies higher organization.—AUTHOR.] "In the lowest societies there is in nearly half the cases no organized government at all, and in three out of four cases no government at all beyond the primary group. In the highest pastoral and agricultural societies there is organized government in all cases, and in three out of four the organized government includes more than one 'primary' group, and extends to a large village, a tribe, or perhaps a 'nation'" (p. 53). "In the first place there may be

no regular action on the part of society as a whole. Murder, theft, abduction, or adultery may be treated as injuries to the individual affected, and they may seek redress either of their own strength or with the aid of their kindred or friends. Justice in such a case is a private matter. . . . At the other extreme justice may be a public function, regularly exercised by a chief, a council, or a special court for the punishment of all serious offences. . . . To begin with, the public authority, be it what it may, may concern itself only with offences held to injure the whole community, *e.g.*, ceremonial offences" (p. 54). "Next, the community may intervene irregularly or in special cases" (p. 55). "Next, a public authority may deal with some cases of private wrong and not others, *e.g.*, with homicide and not theft . . . or with theft and not homicide" (p. 56). "Possibly there is even a regular trial, but sentence is left to the accuser to execute, and if he cannot enforce it there is no further means of redress. Again, it may be wrong for him to exercise revenge until he has obtained a judgment in his favour which states what the revenge ought to be" (p. 57). [No one can fail to see that this has its parallel in the earlier parts of the Bible.—  
AUTHOR.]

" Apart from punishment for wrong done, the chief or the community may intervene to settle disputes. This is the rudiment of civil justice, and nothing is more common than to hear that it is the business of the chief to 'settle disputes.' But if we read further of the functions of the chief we are quite likely to find that he has no definite power, that he trusts to his influence, that this depends on his character and circumstances, or that he rules by persuasion rather than authority. We cannot then regard him as a civil judge with powers to execute his decisions. . . . In some cases our information takes the form of a denial of any regular method of redress" (p. 58). "In some instances, the reason for the lack of this function is that happily it is not needed. Grave crime is so rare that no provision is made for dealing with it, and the question what would happen if it occurred can only be answered hypothetically" (p. 59). "There is a very clear notion in early society, as in our own childhood, that many, if not all, offences may be wiped out by a certain sacrifice on the part of the doer. This is not true compensation. It is atonement" (p. 60). "We class under 'Atonable' cases in which we are told that all or

most grave crimes can be made good by payment. . . . Our figures tend to show that the principle of atonement rather extends than restricts itself as we ascend the scale. . . . This result is what we might expect from the economic development" (pp. 60-1). "Our information about procedure is somewhat scanty, particularly among the lower peoples. . . . What sort of enquiry is held, and by what means the guilt is ascertained, we are not informed. In Australia, indeed, the spear throwing ordeal may be regarded as trial and punishment in one. . . . Trials are hardly mentioned until we reach the Agricultural stage. . . . On the other hand, the figures as to ordeals and oaths show that the direction of this advance is towards the adoption of supernatural tests rather than of rational procedure. In this respect the higher barbarian resembles the archaic civilization" (p. 80).

"As we advance from the Lower Hunters we get always larger societies, and by degrees provision for the maintenance of justice within these extended groups. At our highest point we get a large proportion of the cases in which public justice is fully developed over the whole of an extensive group, and this brings us to the threshold of civilized order just as economically we have come to the point at which civilization is usually held to begin" (p. 82). "As between groups, vengeance and consequent feud was frequently avoided by a regulated fight or by the submission of the offender to the spear-throwing ordeal. [In Australia.] In this case there might be negotiations between groups. It would be for the offender's group to decide whether they should expose him or fight it out, and we can imagine these discussions dealing more or less with the merits of the case, and so developing into the rudiments of a trial. But at the bottom it is a question of vengeance or averting it" (p. 125). "The question has been raised whether the traditional view of early society as one of constant warfare is justified by the facts. There is, in fact, no doubt that to speak of a state of war as normal is in general a gross exaggeration. Relations between neighbouring communities are in general friendly, but they are apt to be interrupted by charges of murder owing to the belief in witchcraft, and feuds result which may take a more or less organized form. In the lower stages it is in fact not very easy to distinguish between private retaliation

when exercised by a kinsfolk or a body of friends, and a war which is perhaps organized by a leader" (p. 228). "War implies a certain development of social organization, and is probably not so common at the lowest stages as it becomes higher up" (p. 228). "The attitude to the enemy and the general character of war may be best judged by the treatment of the vanquished, which may also have important reactions on the structure of society. First of all, quarter may be refused, and even women and children may be massacred. . . . Our next head is 'Men only slain,' *i.e.*, women and children are by custom spared. One alternative to death is slavery, and it may be applied to both sexes or among adults to women only. . . . Instead of being enslaved, prisoners may be 'adopted' into the conquering tribe, and this is especially frequent in the case of children. Again they may be 'ransomed, exchanged, or set free.' . . . Lastly, in place of being merely put to death they may be tortured, while in some instances torture is antecedent to adoption or liberation" (p. 229).

"When prisoners are taken as slaves it does not always follow that they are held permanently as slaves. The woman may be married or, becoming first concubines, they may be set free on the birth of a child. Prisoners generally may be taken to sell again rather than to hold" (p. 233). "Besides the distinction of slaves and free, there may be other important social gradations. There may be a nobility, by which we mean something more than a family from whom the chief is chosen. We mean an order distinguished by certain privileges standing above the ordinary free man" (p. 234). "Lastly, we note the cases in which, either as an alternative or as an addition to true caste or slavery, there are peoples held as tributary to other of superior force" (p. 235). "The total number of tributary peoples is small, and the cases in which women are held as slaves as distinct from captive wives in a more or less inferior position are also negligible" (p. 236).

"Allied with the question of the treatment of enemies, in fact in many cases directly dependent on it, is the question of the extent of cannibalism and also of human sacrifices" (p. 240). "Cannibalism occurs in about one people in four in all grades of the lower cultures, except the Pastoral, in which it is a vanishing quantity" (p. 241). "On the other hand, the practice

[of human sacrifice] reaches a maximum in the two higher grades of Agriculture, no doubt in response to well-known developments of religious belief . . . by the growth of those special superstitions which connect the shedding of blood with the fertility of the soil. In the case of infanticide the cultural influence is more marked" (p. 242). "The mere extension of regular industry makes for social differentiation since the effects of energy and thrift are cumulative. Hence we have the partial rise of a nobility, and the more extensive development of a servile or semi-servile class" (p. 254). "On all sides social and economic differentiation replace the comparative equality of the hunting peoples. The extension of order is also, upon the whole, an extension of subordination" (p. 254). As Prof. L. T. Hobhouse warns us, however, "the difficulties of interpretation and the absence of admitted standards of comparison combine to make the measurement of social progress an exceedingly difficult task. There is no reason to think that any animal, except man, can enunciate or apply general rules of conduct. Nevertheless, there is not wanting something that we can call an organization of life in the animal world" (L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, p. 1). "Not only the social insects whose case presents peculiar difficulties, but many of the higher birds and mammals live in societies which are much larger than the natural family" (p. 7). "When we come to human society we find the basis for a social organization of life already laid in the animal nature of man" (p. 11). "Human morality is as blind and imperfect as man himself" (p. 17). "The Primitive Man custom, as such, is sacred. It is true that it often has some theory to back it. It may be that it was a rule received from the heroes of old, or brought down graven on stone from Sinai. . . . Nowhere is the feat of escaping from one's own shadow harder than in the world of ethical and religious thought" (p. 20).

"If a barbarous practice, such as human sacrifice, is tolerated as a part of religion, the mere fact that the moral sense does not rise in revolt against it is painful evidence of the stunted growth of that side of human nature" (p. 22). "A rule of conduct may be a genuine expression of what people actually feel and think, or it may be an ideal bearing as little relation to common practice as the Sermon on the Mount to the code of the Stock

Exchange. In other words, there is a difference between the rule to which society expects you to conform and the rule which it keeps for Sunday use only" (p. 26). "If men are to live together at all, they must know what they may expect and what is expected of them under given conditions" (p. 31). This is not quickly arrived at; for, "There is an evolution of evil as well as of good, a veritable fall of man, not accomplished at a stroke by the eating of an apple, but working itself out progressively through the development of forces which bring out what is worst in human nature among the germs of what is better" (p. 36). "That the ethical like the legal code of a people stands in need of constant revision will hardly be disputed by any attentive and dispassionate observer. The old view that the principles of right and wrong are immutable and eternal is no longer tenable. . . . If they seem so to us, as they have probably seemed to men in all ages who did not extend their views beyond the narrow limits of their time and country, it is in all likelihood merely because the rate of change is commonly so slow that it is imperceptible at any moment and can only be detected by a comparison of accurate observations extending over long periods of time. . . . The mountains, too, are passing away, though we do not see it; nothing is stable and abiding under or above the sun. We can as little direct the process of moral evolution as we can stay the sweep of the tides or the course of the stars" (*Frazer, Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, pp. vi-vii).

"Ethical evolution . . . is not the same thing as social evolution, but it is intimately connected with it" (Hobhouse, p. 40). "As to this, contemporary, or nearly contemporary, observation has to tell us that there are certain tribes the organization of which is, to say the least, in a very rudimentary condition" (p. 42). "Primitive and savage society appears to rest generally on kinship" (p. 49). "The clan, or group, organization, with generally something of a wider tribal unity, forms the normal society of the primitive world" (p. 49). "In the clan most familiar to us where kinship is based on 'father-right'—that is, where the child inherits its father's name and status—the government rests on the eldest male ascendant. . . . This is the familiar patriarchy of Genesis" (p. 51).

"The totem is a class of objects, *e.g.* animals or plants, with which certain human beings have a mysterious affinity" (p. 49). "The members of the totem are bound to mutual defence, and, as the same totem may be found in quite remote parts—as, *e.g.* there will be Bears or Beavers all over North America, there is a potential bond of union over a wide district" (p. 54). "Of course even in early society the principle of kinship is not as rigid in practice as it is in theory. It admits of an element of fiction, since the inclusion of strangers and slaves, which is seldom wholly unknown, makes the community of blood in part at least imaginary" (p. 57). "Again, distinct clans may be parts of a still wider, if looser union, bound by a sense of kinship . . . each maintaining a certain bond between its members resting on real or supposed kinship, [as in the Greek *genos* or *phratry*]. Accordingly, the paternal clan has very naturally formed the starting-point for the development of the civilized races, Aryan, Semitic, and Mongol, in all of which the earlier Totemism and mother-right have left the merest vestiges" (p. 58). "Under mother-right the ties formed by intermarriage cross and conflict with those of the family. Under father-right they rather supplement one another. Both forms of society are consecrated by religious or magical beliefs, totemism being specially associated with the maternal clan, and father-right having formed a basis for the strong development of ancestor worship" (p. 59).

"How, then, are larger aggregations built into compact societies? The most direct method is that of forcible subjection to a single chief or ruling class. . . . The war chief surrounds himself with his following, his comites, who attach themselves to his fortunes, and is a simpleton if he cannot make the state of war or the fear of war so permanent that his own absolute authority becomes indefinitely prolonged" (pp. 61–2). "The political exaltation of the monarch is often accentuated by a certain phase in the growth of religious conceptions. He becomes a man-god like the Pharaohs; his person is sacred; no one may look on him and live; finally he becomes taboo and so full of danger to his subjects that he has to be secluded, and the almighty being ends in becoming a helpless puppet in the hands of his priests. . . . Where religion is too far advanced for the actual deification of the king . . . he may yet

be God's representative, and so, *e.g.* the theory of divine right arose in England" (p. 62). "The simple but comprehensive code of despotism merely lays down that one man is divinely appointed to determine what is best for all the others, and therewith transmutes arbitrary power into righteous authority and slavish subjection into loyal service" (p. 64). "The law emanates not from society as a whole but from its central figure and chief ruler. . . . Or it is the possession of a priestly caste to whom it has been entrusted by the powers that rule the Universe" (p. 65). "In the state all this is greatly changed. The individual is now a responsible agent. As soon as he comes to mature years he stands or falls by himself. . . . He is free to alienate his property. . . . He even forms his own church and holds his own creed, and his gods need not be those of the state" (p. 69). "The state does not really resemble the primitive community as closely as it appears to do. In the latter, custom has a magical or religious sanction, and in its main lines is unalterable. In the state it is freely modifiable by legislation" (p. 68, *note*). "Thus law in the Greek state expressed not the will of a superior but a moral authority, freely recognized by free men, and equally binding on the ruler and the ruled" (p. 73).

"Yet primitive ethics works upon rules in which a certain measure of justice is embodied. . . . The simplest and earliest of these rules is the *Lex Talionis*, 'An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth,' familiar to us from the chapter of Exodus, but far earlier than Exodus in its first formulation. We find it, like other primitive rules of law, in the recently discovered code of King Hammurabi, which is earlier than the Book of the Covenant perhaps by 1300 years; and we find it at the present day among people sociologically at an earlier stage of development than the Babylonians of the third millennium before Christ" (pp. 84-5). "A palaver is held. The avenger comes with his kinsmen and friends. They state their case and announce their intention of seeking revenge. The accused is also present, backed by his kin, and repels the demands made on him. It may be that the matter is settled between the groups concerned. It may be that the neighbours or the chief give sentence, but even so it does not follow that they enforce it" (p. 99).

" Thus, in Deuteronomy (xix. 12), if the deliberate murderer flies to a city of refuge, then the elders of his city shall send and fetch him, and deliver him into the hand of the avenger of blood that he may die." [So still in Priestly Code, Numbers xxxv. 12-25.—AUTHOR.] " The primary function of a court thus established is not so much to discover the merits of the case and make an equitable award, as to keep the peace and prevent the extension of wild and irregular blood-feuds " (p. 101). " Success in the cause will depend not on the opinion formed by the court as to the veracity of one side or the perjury of the other, but on the ability of the parties to get the full number of compurgators required " (p. 102). " For any given charge the law may call upon a man to purge himself by oath, perhaps . . . with a specified number of oath-helpers " (p. 103). " The oath—though less than evidence as we consider evidence—is also more, for it is an appeal to powers in which primitive man implicitly believes " (p. 103). " Probably no institution is more universal at a certain stage of civilization than that of testing the truth or falsity of a case by a certain magico-religious process. . . . It is quite intelligible that in a credulous age the false oath would bring its curse in the form of a will paralysed by terror, just as we know that amongst many savages witchcraft really kills through the sufferer's intense fear of it " (pp. 103-4).

" The elders or the petty chief of the village community hesitate to carry out a death sentence or inflict corporal punishment for fear of involving themselves in the blood-feud. . . . Hence the decay of blood revenge and the rise of public justice are frequently associated with the growth of kingly power " (pp. 104-5). " The tribe or group whose member is accused of course run the risk of a feud if they stand by him. They may accordingly discuss the case among themselves or in palaver with the aggrieved tribe. Out of such discussions a trial might be evolved " (p. 123, *note*). " Sometimes blood vengeance is satisfied by submission to an ordeal of spear-throwing " (p. 123). " The accused is 'painted white,' and along with one of his brothers—this, of course, on the principle of collective responsibility—undergoes the ordeal. . . . 'As blood must be spilt to satisfy the injured party, the trial ends on his being hit ' " (p. 123; quoting Dawson, *Australian Aborigines*, p. 76).

" In many cases where a settlement of disputes by a council of elders, or a chief, is spoken of, we find on further examination that this method is merely subsidiary to that of self-help and private vengeance . . . litigants voluntarily submitting to their arbitration. But . . . there is not a shadow of constituted authority " (p. 126). " The ' justice ' of a chief is often of the same subsidiary kind. . . . He might seek to appease the feud by getting the parties to accept composition. . . . Smaller quarrels were generally fought out, and it was thought discreditable to bring them to the chief. . . . Higher up in the scale we find numerous instances in which the function of the court is to enforce composition " (p. 127). " A distinction is drawn between offences which merely affect the individual, and are therefore left for him to redress, and those which may be called tribal offences . . . witchcraft, incest, treason, sacrilege " (p. 131; quoting Howitt). " Where state justice is very weak, an asylum may be granted within which revenge must not be executed " (p. 105).

" In other cases where the process is further advanced, and justice is getting the upper hand, revenge is allowed only with the consent of a court. . . . From its beginning . . . social order rested on the readiness of every man to stand by his kinsmen in their quarrels. Hence the duty of avenging the injured kinsman and therefore of loving one's neighbour in this sense and hating one's enemy was the most sacred of primitive principles " (pp. 105-6). " Professor Robertson Smith remarks on the appearance of corporal punishment in Deuteronomy that it is evidence of the comparatively settled state of the country and the growth of the social order since the time of the Book of the Covenant. No Arab Sheik would inflict corporal punishment on a tribesman for fear of revenge—Deut. xxv. 3 (Robertson Smith, O.T.J.C., p. 368) " (p. 105, *note*).

" Nothing marks the re-barbarization of Europe in the Early Middle Ages so strongly as the fact that the system of public justice built up in the Græco-Roman civilization gave way to the barbaric system " (p. 107, *note*). " Once become serious in its determination to investigate the case before giving sentence, public justice could not long be satisfied with the older supernatural machinery. . . . ' We are,' says the Lombard King Luitprand, ' uncertain about the judgment of

God'" (p. 108). "Charlemagne, on the other hand, ordered all men to believe the judgment of God without any doubt" (p. 109, *note*; quoting Shröder). "It was therefore a great step in advance when ordeals, which had been adopted by the Church after the barbaric invasions, were condemned by the Lateran Council of 1215. . . . But even-handed justice is not reached at one stride. . . . Torture became a recognized method of supplementing defective evidence. The judicial conscience was easier if it extorted a confession" (pp. 109-10). [In the old burgh of Nuremberg there is preserved a collection of the instruments of torture in common use down to the age of the Reformation. It is an arsenal of horror (J. M. Robertson, *Short History of Christianity*, p. 263).] "While domestic justice may flourish at very early stages . . . public justice, in any wider sense, appears to develop independently in relation to offences which either on magical or political grounds are held to constitute a public danger" (Hobhouse, p. 132). "At the lowest stages, the collective intervention is limited to a few acts held in horror and conceived as dangerous to the common weal" (p. 132). "The central authority at its best acts in the interests of public order, and on the whole represents the principle of impartial judgment. . . . The criminal law now reaches the acme of its rigour" (p. 111). "As society becomes more confident in its power to maintain order the cruelty and callousness that are born of fear are seen in a new light. . . . Its dealings with the criminal mark, one may say, the zero point in the scale of treatment which society conceives to be the due of its various members" (p. 113). "Vindictiveness has its natural sphere in the stage at which crime is only known as an injury to be revenged" (p. 118).

"Death penalties or savage mutilations are inflicted for offences of the second and third order, torture is freely used to extort confession, and the brutality of the mob is called in to supplement that of the executioner" (p. 111). "A natural impulse makes us desire to harm the wicked, but the history of criminal law and the philosophical analysis of responsibility combine to prove to us that this is the impulse of the old Adam, and not warranted by reason or justice" (p. 118). "The criminal, too, has his rights, the right to be punished, but so punished that he may be helped in the path of reform" (p.

119). "Heredity is not a force controlling a man from without, but a short expression for the supposed antecedent causes of the qualities which make him what he is, and by what he is, he is to be judged, so far as he is judged at all. Responsibility, properly understood, is definable as the capacity to be determined by an adequate motive. A man is responsible who knows what is expected of him" (p. 117, *notes*). "When a wicked act was supposed to be something arising in a spontaneous, arbitrary manner from the unmotived evil choice of a man, the vindictive retribution which is founded on instinct and fostered by the needs of early society seemed amply justified" (p. 118). "At the outset, the community interferes mainly on what we may call supernatural grounds" (p. 119). "We have at the outset purely private and personal retaliation. This develops into the systematized blood feuds of consolidated families and clans . . . there is no question of assessing punishment according to the merit of the individual" (p. 120). "It is the binding together of these three elements, the common good, private rights, and moral responsibility, which determines the rise of public justice" (p. 133).

"The case of Leah and Rachel illustrates a family in which there were two legitimate wives as well as concubines" (p. 135, *note*). "It is certain that the class restrictions on marriage are held much more vital by most savages . . . than the marriage tie itself . . . wife-lending is habitual, and divorce is easy . . . and the tie, whatever we call it, is exceedingly loose. On the other hand . . . a man must not marry within his totem, or his clan, but sometimes, owing to the multiplication of restrictions . . . the result is to confine the intending spouse to a specific group. . . . It is easy for him to change his wife within the group . . . this we may, if we please, term group marriage. But the expression is undesirable. . . . In name, an Australian has not one father, but a group of fathers, *i.e.* all the potential husbands of his mother; not one brother, but a group of brothers" (p. 139, *note*). "This scheme of marriage may be classified as a form of polyandry combined with polygamy . . . complicated by the taboos which limit the intercourse of the sexes" (p. 139).

"Apart from cases in which kinship is only reckoned on one side, so that inter-marriage is allowed within the half-blood, the

permission of incest within the nearest degree appears very rare" (p. 145). "An immense extension of the forbidden degrees was effected by the medieval Church. . . . Protestantism swept away this mass of prohibitions" (p. 146). "What precisely are the physical disadvantages of in-and-in breeding or the advantages of crossing are, however, harder to say than is popularly supposed. . . . But . . . it has the important sociological function of binding distinct groups together. . . . For us the prohibition of incest is the only form of exogamy which persists" (p. 147). "To say that the horror of incest is instinctive is merely to say that there is in it something rooted in the character which the average man inherits . . . where mother-right holds we shall find inadequate provisions against marriage with the paternal kin" (p. 148).

"Divorce may be perfectly free to either party . . . open to either party on certain conditions . . . or wholly forbidden. . . . Thus the Hebrew who found anything unseemly in his wife merely gave her a writing of divorce and had done with her" (pp. 150-1).

"In the early stages of historical investigation into the beginnings of civilization it was thought that society arose out of the patriarchal family, and that in Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, or again in the Roman *paterfamilias* . . . we have a type of primitive human government" (p. 160). "The researches of Bachofen, McLennan, Morgan, and others opened up an entirely new field of speculation. . . . These observations led to the setting up a matriarchal, as opposed to the patriarchal, theory. . . . What is really common among the lower savages, and may even have been universal at a certain stage, is not matriarchy, but mother-right" (pp. 160-1). "Under mother-right the children take the mother's name and belong to her kindred. . . . Her brother is their natural guardian, and exercises all the rights and duties which may belong to that position. . . . In extreme cases the children are not held to be related to their father or to their father's family at all, whence in some peoples half brother and half sister may intermarry, as in the well-known case of Abraham and Sarah. Under father-right, on the contrary, it is relationship through the male which counts. . . . It is to him and his kin that wife and children look for

protection" (pp. 161-2). "Lastly, under mother-right the property passes through the woman, if not to the woman. Under father-right it goes from father to son. . . . Mother-right extends over a great part of the savage world to-day" (p. 162), and probably "represents the primitive form of family" (p. 163). "If the first condition of the paternal system is the recognition of the man's relation to his children; the second condition is that he should appropriate the wife as his own" (p. 164). "The bride purchased from her own family passes out of it and into that of her husband" (p. 165). But "it must not be assumed that marriage by purchase always implies father-right. Under mother-right, a man may pay a bride price for the usufruct of a woman" (p. 165, *note*). "Hence the position of the woman seems, if anything, to change for the worse as society takes its first step in advance" (p. 167). "The wife is at the mercy of her husband . . . he may sell her, give her away, or lend her. . . . At best she may escape from him" (p. 166). "The appropriation of the wife consolidates the 'natural' family, but at the cost of a more or less complete subordination of the wife" (p. 167). "The common facility of divorce, even where the conditions are equal to the two parties, tells against the woman" (p. 173). "She is not in our modern phrase a person with the full rights of self-respect and respect from others attaching to personality. . . . The claim to fidelity is usually one-sided" (p. 174).

"Broadly speaking, however, in the savage world, under mother-right or father-right, the husband is master of the wife's person" (p. 175, *note*). "The early Babylonian marriage law contemplates marriage by purchase or exchange of gifts with a restricted polygamy . . . [later] a woman could protect herself against the advent of a second wife by pecuniary penalties in the marriage contract" (p. 182). In Egypt, "she also can secure herself against divorce by a fictitious dowry which the husband is to pay back to her in case he sends her away" (p. 183). But "we are dealing with a period of four thousand years or more, in the course of which there is time even in the slow-moving East for many things to change. In fact, our fullest information relates to . . . the time of the subjection to Persians, Greeks, and Romans" (p. 183). "The very fact that the wife protected herself from

divorce or from the marriage of a second wife by special clauses in the marriage contract goes to prove that she was not so protected by the general law. . . . As good authorities hold, this pecuniary security against the possibility that the husband 'should be averse to her, and seek another wife,' formed the chief difference between the wife and the mistress" (pp. 183-4). "It would seem, however, that the position of women generally improved through Egyptian history. . . . In the early dynasties the king boasts of having carried off the wives of other men, and these outrages are alleged in proof of his truly royal nature" (p. 186).

"The unspeakable corruption of the Egyptian Pantheon . . . would reflect the manners of the earliest period" (p. 187, *note*). "The union of Osiris with his sister Isis was not a freak of the story-teller's fancy: it reflected a social custom which was itself based on practical considerations of the most solid kind" (Frazer: *Adonis, Attis, and Osiris*, p. 323). "With this system, probably, survivals of primitive mother-right were conjoined. Descent was reckoned through the mother down to late times, and guardianship was exercised by the mother's brother" (Hobhouse, pp. 188-9). "The attitude to women in Egyptian literature is not particularly respectful. Often she is represented as the temptress" (p. 189, *note*). "In the twelfth dynasty women were definitely part of the family property, a man's widow being counted among the possessions inherited by the son. . . . Capture was probably an alternative to purchase" (p. 190, *note*).

"The net result of this sacramental conception of marriage, impinging on actual law and usage was, in the Brahmanic codes, the greatest liberty for the man and the most complete bondage for the wife" (p. 194, *note*). "The chastity of women was to be preserved by their seclusion, and their unfaithfulness punished by their husbands. . . . The infringement of chastity is regarded mainly as an offence against the woman's owner" (p. 195). "On the whole . . . nowhere has the subjection of women been more complete than in India, and Mohammedan influence, far from improving matters, has only furthered the practice of seclusion" (p. 195, *note*). "The Levirate [cp. Deut. xxv. 5] is usually connected with the principle that the widow belongs to her husband's family, and probably this was

its historical origin in India. But in Manu it rests on religious considerations and is reduced to the dimensions necessary for religious purposes. The brother must only cohabit with the widow so far as is necessary for the purpose of raising up seed to his brother (Manu, lx. 60) " (p. 196, *note*).

In China, "the *She-King*, chiming in with the literature of the Hebrews and Hindoos says, 'Disorder does not come down from heaven, it is produced by the woman.' . . . The Hebrew marriage law begins when we first come across it in the fully developed patriarchal stage" (p. 200). "A man acquires a wife by purchase, or by service, from her father or her nearest male relative. . . . The marriage affairs of Jacob illustrate some further points which we can understand well from the Babylonish code. . . . Though Jacob took no more wives, each of his two wives gave him a handmaid precisely as is contemplated in the Code of Hammurabi. . . . Polygamy is contemplated in the Law, the only limitation being that in the Priestly Code two sisters are not to be married at the same time" (p. 201). "None of the codes are at pains to define the grounds of divorce clearly. They assume it as a right of the husband" (p. 202). "Judah, as the head of the family, proposes to burn Tamar, his daughter-in-law, for unchastity, but acknowledges in time that he was bound to give her as a widow of his son Onan to his other son Shelah. . . . Such being the position of women, it is not to be expected that the attitude expressed to them in literature should be one of great respect or admiration. At best their virtues as housewives were admitted" (p. 203). "Among the primitive Arabs mother-right and polyandrous unions prevailed, but in Mohammed's time the women were mere chattels. . . . Whether the temporary marriage in practice in Mohammed's time is still allowed is debated between the sects. But free divorce Mohammed was compelled to tolerate. . . . The wife, however, is protected by the dower. . . . Her position is therefore somewhat similar to that which the provident Babylonian or Egyptian woman secured for herself by the marriage contract" (p. 204). "'Admonish your wives with kindness, because women were created from the crooked bone of the side'" (p. 205). "'Not one of you must whip his wife like whipping a slave'" (p. 205).

"The Greeks founded Western civilization, but their rapid advance in general culture was by no means accompanied by a corresponding improvement in the position of women" (p. 206). "We never hear of more than one legitimate wife. On the other hand, the carrying off of women as bond-slaves was habitual. . . . If the bridegroom could not take the bride in a raid, he bought her for a goodly number of cattle, and over his concubines, at any rate, he exercised powers of life and death. . . . The father was the religious and legal head of the family" (p. 207). "In early times the father might sell his daughters, or brothers their sisters. . . . The wife passed into the husband's family, and was separated from her own kin and their *sacra*. . . . Brothers might share a wife in common, and wife-lending was recognized" (p. 208). "Yet it was a Greek thinker who first frankly argued the case for the free admission of women to all the duties and rights of men: Plato's position differs from that of his modern successors in that he insists rather on women's duties than on their rights," and "Xenophon's ideal wife is a good housekeeper, like her of the Proverbs" (p. 209).

In Rome, "marriage might be accomplished by either of two forms, and . . . apparently without any form at all. The first form was *confarreatio*, in which the essential feature was the eating by both bride and bridegroom of a cake, an act of the kind which we call symbolic, but which to primitive man is rather magical, actually efficacious in establishing a unity of the man and woman. The second form was called *coemptio*, and was of the nature of a formal sale, almost certainly . . . preserving the memory of a real purchase of the wife" (p. 210). "At no period of Roman history are there any traces of polygamy or concubinage" (p. 211). "But even in the days of the Twelve Tables a wholly different union had made its appearance . . . this new form of free marriage rapidly ousted its older rivals. The bride now remained in her father's power; she was still a member of her own family, and by consequence had no position in that of her husband" (p. 212). "Further, with the general emancipation of women the necessity for a guardian appears to have gradually died away. . . . Practically independent of her father, she was legally independent of her husband" (pp. 213-14). "How far the freedom of women

had the demoralizing results which have been generally attributed to it by those whose business it has been to paint the Roman Empire in the darkest colours, is a matter on which the best authorities do not speak with confidence" (p. 215). "Upon the whole, the Roman matron would have seemed to have retained the position of her husband's companion, counsellor, and friend, which she had held in those more austere times when marriage brought her legally under his dominion" (p. 216).

"The old Roman faith was remarkably simple. There was hardly any mythology, and for a long time the gods had no statues. It was also strongly moral. The gods gave every man his duty, and expected him to perform it. Filial obedience, chastity, respect for women, decency and gravity, good faith in public and in private, respect for law, sobriety, diligence, patriotism, all these were good old Roman virtues, commanded by the gods and enforced by the Censors" (Bigg : *The Church's Task under the Roman Empire*, pp. 35-6). "Prætextatus and Paulina belong to the age of Julian the Apostate. . . . If we compare them with their contemporaries and equals in rank who were friends and disciples of St. Jerome—and we have ample means for making the comparison—we shall find that these high pagans were superior in intellectual culture, in their sense of duty to the state, and even in their view of the possibilities of the married life" (pp. 88-9).

"The primitive law of the Germanic tribes which overran the Roman Empire closely resembled the early law of the Romans themselves" (Hobhouse, pp. 216-17). "Both as to the tutelage of women and as to the general power of the father. . . . Both were modified by the impact of civilization, of the civil law, and of Christian influences" (p. 223). "The Church worked along with the growing sentiment of social justice to emancipate the unmarried woman from bondage, and make her her own mistress. . . . Yet in law the whole personality of the married woman was as much or even absorbed in that of her husband" (p. 226). "The Church regarded marriage as a concession to the weakness of the flesh . . . of the nature of a hindrance in spiritual duties" (p. 217).

"Second marriage is a decent sort of adultery," wrote Athanagoras. "It was no part of God's primitive design that

the race should be continued by sexual union." "Marriage is the outcome of sin" (St. Gregory of Nyssa). "Why was woman created at all?" (St. Augustine). "Marriage is not far removed from fornication" (Tertullian). "Woman was not made in God's image, like man" (St. Ambrose). "God took a rib out of Adam's body, not a part of his soul to make her." "Woman is the root of all evil" (St. Jerome). At the Council of Auzerre, A.D. 578, women were forbidden "on account of their impurity" to take the sacrament in their hands like men. "There is the fierceness of the dragon, and cunning of the asp, but woman has the malice of both" (St. Gregory of Nazianzum).

From an early period the Church had given sacramental sanction to the concubinate; *i.e.* to marriage of the unfree, or between unfree and free. On the other hand, the sacramental view enables the Church to justify the dismissal of a mistress for a wife of free status. "*Ancillam a toro abjicere et uxorem certae ingenuitatis accipere non duplicatio conjugii sed profectus est honestalis*" (Pope Leo. in *Decret. Grat.*, p. 1123). "This was to invest the most callous and heartless form of wickedness with an air of piety" (Hobhouse, p. 220, *note*). "On the whole, the marriage tie during the Middle Ages seems to have been almost as loose in practice as it was rigid in theory" (p. 222, *note*). "The filthiest view of love and marriage was taken by the ascetics, and is embodied in the Penitentials. The horrible saints of the desert could scarcely bear to see a sister or a mother" (p. 226, *note*). "The influence of the Old Testament told both ways on the reformers. On the one hand it aided them in cutting down . . . to reasonable limits the absurd mass of restrictions on marriage which the medieval Church had accumulated. On the other, it tended to justify a barbaric view of the prerogatives of the husband, and led Luther and other early reformers to admit polygamy and concubinage" (pp. 227-8, *note*). In modern states "marriage is on the whole regarded as a contract, but not like other contracts voidable by the agreement of the parties to it . . . from being a sacrament in the magical, it has become one in the ethical sense" (p. 237).

"Morality is in its origin group-morality" (p. 240). "An outcast tribe like the Bushmen lives largely by pillaging its

more settled neighbours, who reply whenever they can with pitiless massacres" (p. 242). "The Kaffirs . . . generally speaking, showed a certain chivalry in war which they have unlearnt in contact with the whites. Among the Eastern Carolinas the victor carries off the movables, but does not take the land of the vanquished, and avoids cutting down their fruit trees. Even the Book of Deuteronomy, which lays down a kind of ideal code of extermination based on religious principles, deprecates the cutting down of fruit trees, but rather for the advantage of the invader than from any more magnanimous motive" (pp. 243-4, *note*). "A distinction may be and in practice often is drawn between the adult males among the enemy on the one hand and the women and children on the other." But "at least so far as regards males the milder alternatives are by far the rarer" (p. 245). "Refusal of quarter in battle is widespread" (p. 246).

"Cannibalism may have either a magical, or a religious, or a purely materialistic value" (p. 247). "There comes, indeed, a stage, perhaps the most revolting in the history of human development, at which the weaker tribes are made almost to perform the functions of cattle. . . . The human victim may be a feast for the gods. Or it may be that by eating the dead man, and particularly by eating certain parts of him, such as his heart, the conqueror is held to acquire his virtues" (p. 248). "The Mexicans maintained an eternal warfare with the Tlaxcala in order that the supply of captives for sacrifice might be kept up. The victim was identified with the god, and his killing and eating meant a resurrection of the god and a renewal of his strength" (p. 249). "In Melanesia the idea of human sacrifice is prominent and we are closer to cannibalism. . . . But with these customs we are passing away from the special ethics of war into those of primitive religion generally" (p. 250). "Indiscriminate slaughter of women and children is frequent, but not universal, in savage and barbaric warfare. . . . It is a bright spot in the sombre picture of North American Indian warfare that women were respected. The reason was a magico-religious belief . . . that unchastity would bring misfortune. The Dakotas, we are told, 'generally treat female captives with respect. . . . They must keep themselves from women all the time they are out at war.' . . . This is the

more intelligible when the fighting tribes are exogamous, so that the wife of a warrior on one side is sister or daughter of a champion on the other" (pp. 250-1). "The general idea is clearly that women are taboo to fighting men as injuring their powers" (p. 251, *note*) (cp. I Samuel xxi. 4-5). "It is then not until the higher savagery, or perhaps the lower levels of barbarism, that we find slavery beginning to develop in any marked degree" (p. 252). "In Fiji the slaves are not worked hard, but are fattened for eating; and throughout Melanesia on the whole slavery rather subserves cannibalism. . . . Throughout the Malay world the enslavement of captives is found as an alternative to cannibalism" (p. 253). "In ancient Egypt we find traces of cannibalism in the pyramidal inscriptions. . . . Something of the nature of human sacrifice appears to have persisted to a late epoch" (p. 254). "In some cases the bulk of the males were simply exterminated, but chiefs were selected, either for sacrifice or for special vengeance" (p. 255). "The appropriate god, of course, took a part with zest in these proceedings: 'He is content when he sees blood.' . . . Mercilessness is idealized. . . . The ideas of vengeance and retaliation were practically unmitigated and no softening influence was exerted by religion" (p. 256). "More is known of the warlike methods of the relatively barbarous Assyrians than of the relatively civilized Babylonians" (p. 256). "The religious motive . . . became among the Hebrews a reason for carrying the savage practices of extermination to the extreme. . . . The rules of war, as held by a strict Jahvist in the sixth century, are laid down in the twentieth chapter of Deuteronomy. . . . This corresponds closely enough to what we have found to be the most common practice of barbarian warfare" (p. 258). "The spirit of retaliation and the taking of captives persists even in the exilic writer of Isaiah xiii. and xiv." (p. 260). [Driver would have us believe that this scribe means everything in a *Pickwickian* sense, but this is incredible.—*AUTHOR.*]

"Chinese thinkers, so different from Indian in other respects, agree with them in their attitude to warfare. Yet Chinese warfare itself was, at any rate in early times, thoroughly barbaric" (p. 262). But "Mencius's prescription for making one's self a universal monarch was to prove one's self the best

and most just monarch" (p. 264). "Under the Chinese system a population larger than that of Europe live in permanent peace . . . they have, in a sense, as their own religious books recommend, absorbed those who have conquered them by peaceful arts" (p. 265).

"The Greeks were perhaps the first people to develop something like a regular international law" (pp. 266-7). "They developed a regular system of arbitration" (p. 267). "This milder practice is only insisted on in wars between Greek and Greek. . . . The barbarian is ordained by Nature as slave to the Hellene, but the Hellenes should be free" (pp. 267-8). "At Rome a defeated enemy was in principle righteous. . . . Stranger and enemy are identical terms. . . . The alien, and therefore still more the captured foeman, is at the disposal of the conqueror" (pp. 268-9). "The enslavement of prisoners, if desired, and the confiscation of property were admitted to be regular. . . . But a more liberal system grew up as the Roman conquests were extended" (p. 270). "There was in this a certain approach to universalism. . . . In the teaching of the Koran . . . no Moslem captive might be enslaved. Very different was the attitude to unbelievers. . . . Captives might be slain, since the Prophet did so. . . . Slavery, then, was the second alternative, and beyond this there was the milder possibility that the captive might be released as a . . . non-Moslem subject liable to tribute" (p. 271). "Within the Moslem world it looks forward to universal peace and forbids the enslavement of the captive" (p. 272).

"The Gospels pronounced definitely against violence. . . . The Church accommodated her teaching to the practice of a warlike age. . . . To enslave a fellow-Christian or to put him to death, except in the actual fighting, was forbidden from an early date. . . . 'A captive's goods are unjustly extorted from him, but are justly proffered to redeem his life' (Gratian, *Corpus Juris*, 896). . . . How far these relatively enlightened principles were from restraining the barbarity of the Middle Ages every one knows. . . . Yet the idea of chivalry . . . is a true product of the Middle Ages" (pp. 272-3). "'*Turcos non licet interficere infantes, imo nec feminas inter infideles*'" (p. 273, note, from Franciscus à Victoria). "The economic or administrative

interest of the Church was always the determinant of its action. It supplied no fixed principle conducive to peace . . . it was always a force the more for war in Europe" (J. M. Robertson, *A Short History of Christianity*, p. 273). In the Crusades, "as a display of Christian against 'pagan' life and conduct, the process of conquest was worse than anything seen in the East in the Christian era" (p. 275). "In the name of Jesus were slain a great multitude of every age; mothers with the infants in their arms, little children, youths and maidens, and men and women bowed with age" (p. 276). "They sacked Constantinople (1204) with every circumstance of vileness and violence. The Pope . . . burst out in bitter indignation at the deeds of the men to whom he had given his indulgences" (p. 277). "It is a reasonable calculation that in the two centuries from the first crusade to the fall of Acre (1291) there had perished, in the attempt to recover and hold the Holy Land, nine millions of human beings, at least half of them Christians" (p. 278).

"With the Peace of Westphalia the period of the religious wars came to an end. Men were sickened with horrors, and were the more ready to listen to those who, like Grotius . . . expressed the profound ethical truth that the . . . citizen of the conquered country, even the soldier of the beaten army, is not in fault. He has merely done his duty . . . the victor owes as much consideration to the vanquished as to his own side" (Hobhouse, pp. 274-5). "In fighting savages the white man deliberately lowers himself to the savage level" (p. 275, note). "Even savages recognize the obligations of good faith, and the wickedness of breaking a covenant when once made. . . . Men are never content to destroy their enemies without first proving them to be wholly in the wrong and utterly unworthy to live" (p. 276). "People recognize that justice is justice even though there be no power to enforce it. In the medieval world such a power was in fact found in the spiritual supremacy of the Pope" (p. 277).

"The recrudescence of militarism in our day has been associated, not in this country alone, with economic Protection. . . . Just as international law rests in its beginnings on the conception of humanity as incarnate in the person of every human being, so in the consummated conception of right and

brotherhood between nations it touches the other pole of modern ethics, the conception of humanity as a whole, the sum of all human beings and their collective history. . . . The true patriotism is the corner stone of true internationalism. In all this it is true that we are describing the ideals of thinkers and statesmen rather than the practice of nations"; "of each nation, as a member of the family of nations, which constitute humanity as possessing duties as well as rights in virtue of its position." "The result to which Mazzini was led by one road, and Comte by another" (pp. 278-9).

"As there may be servile castes falling below the normal level of freemen, so there may be privileged castes of nobles . . . the whole community may suffer a similar depression in relation to the king. . . . All these methods of the gradation of rights . . . rest ultimately on the principle of group-morality . . . one of the dominant facts, if not *the* dominant fact, ethically considered, in the evolution of human society" (p. 283). "Egyptian Society, in fact, was organized upon a feudal basis; 'from the top to the bottom of the social scale every free man acknowledged a master, who secured to him justice and protection'" (p. 296; quoting Maspero). "The history of slavery among the Hebrews is interesting, both for the strong distinction made between Jew and Gentile, and still more for the progress which we can trace in law and custom affecting the position of the slave" (p. 297). "According to the later law all the Canaanites ought to have been utterly destroyed upon the conquest, but this represents an ideal of barbarity which there is no reason to think was ever realized. . . . Whether by capture or by purchase Gentiles clearly became slaves. . . . The Hebrew father might sell his children into slavery, and the daughter who had been thus sold was not released in the seventh year, as were the men servants" (p. 289). "As in the code of Hammurabi, the master takes the value of the servant when he is killed by another man's ox" (p. 299). "The provision for releasing the slaves in the seventh year was practically, if not avowedly, a novelty in Josiah's time. It is of course treated by Jeremiah as having belonged to the original Covenant; but nevertheless it appears from his account that King Zedekiah proclaimed this liberty as a new thing: *vide* Jer. ch. xxxiv." (p. 300). In India, "much more

moderate rules for their punishment are laid down than by the Hebrew law-giver" (p. 301). "Debt-slavery no longer exists, and in the pacific land of China war has ceased to be a source of supply; but the slave trade is general, and the sale of daughters by their parents, and of wives by their husbands, particularly in times of famine. . . . Kidnapping is also frequent" (p. 305).

"Slavery, like polygamy and divorce, was an institution which Mohammed found fully established among his fellow-countrymen" (p. 305). "The holding of Moslem slaves was not, as such, prohibited, but their emancipation was regarded as an act of special merit. . . . Mohammed sought mitigation of the slave's lot by ethical rather than legal means." He said: "'Whenever any one of you is about to beat a slave and the slave asks pardon in the name of God, then withhold'" (p. 306). But "the recognition of the slave traffic by Mohammedanism . . . is to this day a curse to Africa" (p. 307). "Like the Chinese, the Greeks had a tradition of a prehistoric epoch in which there were no slaves. . . . Apart from legitimate warfare, piracy . . . was a frequent source of slavery . . . the stranger is also outside the protection of the law . . . the growth of wealth meant, as always in the ancient world, increase in the number of slaves . . . work was not compatible with the dignity of a free man. . . . But through the institution of debt-slavery the poorer classes . . . were frequently menaced. . . . The prohibition of debt-slavery and the pledging of the person by Solon was thus the salvation of civil freedom for Athens" (p. 308). "At Rome . . . any unprotected foreigner was liable to enslavement . . . and all those who were omitted from the census could be sold" (p. 310). "Cruelty, even to animals, was subject to religious and even legal penalties. Gross cases might involve the intervention of the censor . . . the Stoic philosophy was the champion of the slaves . . . the jurists . . . laid down that by natural law all men are equal and that slavery is a human institution contrary to nature" (pp. 310-11).

"Paul, in a passage which has been garbled in the English translation, expressly urges that a Christian slave should remain so even if he have a chance to become free (1 Cor. vii. 20, 21). He and some of the Fathers certainly urge that slaves should

be kindly treated ; but many pagans had done as much . . . Laws for the protection of slaves, too, had been enacted by many emperors long before Constantine. . . . A diligent slave, in fact, could usually count on getting his freedom by five or six years of service ; and many were allowed to buy it out of their savings, or out of earnings they were permitted to make" (J. M. Robertson, *Short History of Christianity*, 1902, pp. 268-70). "For centuries manumission had been a common act, the number of freedmen in Rome being notoriously great at all times, from the day of Cicero onwards" (p. 269).

"Under Pius the slave who was cruelly treated could claim to be sold, and by a special refinement it was held cruelty to employ an educated slave on degrading or manual work. . . . A new form of serfdom was growing up under the name of the Colonate . . . the Colonus could not quit his holding nor could he marry off the property of his lord . . . rural slaves obtained a settlement upon the land as quasi-Coloni or Casati." They "could not be sold apart from the land" (Hobhouse, p. 312). Under Constantine "the laws against fugitive slaves were made more cruel" (Robertson, p. 270). "By raising slaves to the status of half-free peasants the State increased the number of taxpayers. 'The labourer of the soil then became an object of great interest to the treasury, and obtained almost as important a position in the eyes of the fisc as the landed proprietor himself.' . . . The legal change was thus made from economic motives" (p. 271). "In the process the small freeman was put in a worse position than before. . . . The Church, like the fisc, had a good deal to gain pecuniarily from the freeing of slaves ; and, especially in the West, though it supported slave laws, it encouraged masters to manumit for the sake of their souls' welfare in the next world" (p. 271). "The Jews were the great slave dealers for Europe in the Dark Ages, thus dangerously deepening their own unpopularity and moving the Church to thwart the traffic on Christian grounds," yet "Christians everywhere were long eager to buy and sell barbarians such as the Slavs" (p. 272). "Even in Merovingian times the slave was a true chattel" (Hobhouse, p. 313). "Like the Stoics, the Church accepted slavery . . . many men were, unfortunately, unbelievers, and the brotherhood of man was for many purposes limited to members of the Church" (p. 314).

" Until the conversion of the Slavs it left them as the one source open to the Western European countries for the acquisition of fresh slaves. . . . 'Servus' was now accurately represented . . . by the 'serf'; a 'Slav' was with slight modification, in German, English, and French, a 'slave'" (p. 315). "The sale of men was on the whole opposed by the Church, and debt slavery was also limited under religious influences. From the Carlovingian age onward it became limited to a period necessary for paying off of the debt" (p. 315).

" Universalism, introduced by the Stoic philosophy and favoured with limitations by the Church, was in principle fatal to slavery. . . . The transition to serfdom was favoured by the economic situation" (p. 316). "The barbarian conquerors introduced into the constitutions of Western Europe imperfectly distinguished classes of semi-free citizens. . . . Thus medieval serfdom represents . . . a progress from slavery and . . . a degradation of free men" (p. 317). The serf "might not leave his land. . . . He could acquire property, but had not complete control of it" (p. 318). "As the Middle Ages advanced the heaviest burdens of serfdom tended to disappear. . . . The right to marry was acquired by the serf, and here . . . the influence of the Church was probably decisive . . . payment upon marriage, however, was continued. . . . His personal tribute was converted into a rent upon his holding and his stock. . . . Finally, the growth of free cities favoured freedom. . . . Serfdom had already become rare, and in some provinces had disappeared" (pp. 318-19). "In England, as on the Continent, freedom might be acquired by escaping from the lord's jurisdiction" (p. 320). "With the growth of the kingly power and the better settlement of society, this primitive check upon oppression would naturally disappear. . . . The growth of civilization meant the prolongation of the old bondage and even, as in Russia and Germany, deterioration in its character. In England and France . . . it tended to encourage the system of money payments as a substitute for labour service . . . scarcely distinguishable from that of a tenant farmer. . . . There were Scottish miners who remained serfs down to 1799, and were not particularly desirous of having their condition changed. . . . The Statute of Labourers in 1348 was passed [with] the

intention of preventing workmen from taking advantage of the rise in wages due to the depopulation of the country by the Black Death. . . . The Statute of Apprentices (Fifth of Elizabeth) restricted the right to carry on a trade to those who had served their apprenticeship " (pp. 320-1). " The historian of the Poor Law declares that with this Act the ' iron of slavery entered into the soul of the English labourer ' " (p. 322). " In the effort to deal with vagabondage the law has at different times come perilously near to reintroducing slavery " (p. 322, *note*).

" In the seventeenth century the question whether a man would be hanged for larceny or not depended on whether he could read, unless indeed he had forfeited the benefit of clergy by contracting a second marriage or by marrying a widow . . . benefit of clergy was gradually withdrawn . . . but it was not until 1827 that it was finally abolished. . . . The nominal freedom of the English labourer, down to the beginning of the reform period, was a blessing very much disguised " (p. 323). " Serfdom was finally abolished in France without compensation on the night of August 4, 1789 " (p. 324). " It was abolished in Russia in 1861. The emancipation of the Russian serf may be taken as the final termination of the enslavement by law, whether complete or partial, of white men " (p. 325). " The obligations of group-morality were extended so as to cover all Christians . . . or at any rate all white Christians. Slavery grew up again in a new and . . . a more debased form. . . . The Portuguese began importing negro slaves in 1442; and obtained a bull sanctioning the practice from Pope Nicholas V. in 1454," on the plea that, "' the souls of many from among them may be made of profit to Christ ' " (p. 326). " The Popes themselves had Turkish galley slaves to the eighteenth century " (p. 327). " The equality of all classes before the law can hardly be said to have been accepted . . . before the revolutionary period " (p. 329). " As long as class, racial, and national antagonisms play a part in life we cannot say that group-morality has been altogether overcome " (p. 330). " The colour line is the last ditch of group-morality. . . . Unification intensifies the difficulties of ethics, hence law and morals do not show a regular, parallel advance " (p. 331).

" Property in its early stages is based on occupation and use.

. . . It may be also secured by taboo " (p. 332). " In ancient Babylon boundary stones were secured by an imprecation. . . . The heap of stones which Jacob and Laban set up were to be witnesses between them. . . . The moral attitude to the whole matter differs seriously from that of more developed races. . . . Strangers have no rights " (p. 333). " Among the Kaffirs the children of chiefs may steal within their own tribe " (p. 334). " The conception of property . . . is somewhat irregularly developed in the uncivilized world . . . in some cases stolen goods are not even recoverable. . . . My right to my property, like my other rights, is in the earlier stages only mine in the sense that I shall be expected to avenge its infringement by certain recognized methods " (p. 336). " With the rise of the monarchical or aristocratic kingdom the communal system is apt to be qualified or superseded by some form of feudal tenure " (pp. 339-40). " As long as the old grouping remains by which a man has a fixed place as member of a clan, a joint family, a village community, he is scarcely free to enter into obligations upon his own account " (p. 342). " Free contract and private property are the foundations of civilized economics, but they bring their own problems in their train. . . . The old communal rights are refurbished up anew as in the Sabbatical year and the later year of Jubilee. The prophets thunder against those who grind the face of the poor. . . . In particular, usury is denounced as unnatural by the philosopher or as wicked by the prophet " (p. 343). " The starving man may be free by the law of the land, but is not free by the law of the facts to reject the only bargain which enables him to obtain food " (p. 344). " With the growth of property and the development of trade is closely bound up the question of the treatment of those who are submerged in the process " (p. 345). " Toward the poor and helpless generally the Oriental civilizations teach the beauty and virtue of beneficence and consideration " (p. 350). In Egypt, " corn was left, as among the Hebrews, for the widows who came to glean " (p. 352). " ' It is God who is the giver, therefore have pity.' " " ' He who was prosperous last year, even in this may be a vagrant ' (Griffith's *World's Literature*) " (p. 352).

" Hebrew legislation dealt with the problem of poverty, both with a view to prevention and to cure . . . the depression of

the poorer citizens . . . the limitation of debt-slavery; release of debts according to Deuteronomy in the seventh year and according to the later code in the fiftieth" (p. 354). "A plan of pensions for all Moslems was set on foot by Caliph Omar" (p. 355). "During the first century after Christ there were charitable organizations of many kinds in the Roman world. . . . Poor parents received help in the bringing up of their children" (p. 357, *note*). "Endowed charities were, in fact, springing up rapidly in the fourth century" (p. 358).

"In some countries great measures of agrarian reform accompanying the emancipation of serfs have established a free peasantry upon the soil. In our country, where the divorce of the labourer from the land remains, much has been done by reducing or abolishing the taxes on the necessaries of life, by sanitary legislation, by Factory Acts, and by the recognition of the right of combination. . . . It is something to have recognized that 'to have the poor always with us' is not a blessing" (p. 361). "In early society the individual is nothing apart from his community . . . if there is no wealth, there is also no pauperism. . . . The modern world rests in a fuller sense than previous civilizations on the free individual" (pp. 362-3). "The claims of government are based not on self-constituted authority backed ultimately by the sword, but on the necessity of an ordered rule. . . . The problem is again to reconcile the claims of personality and the duties of a common life" (pp. 364-5). "A firm authority is hostile at the outset to the maintenance of individual freedom. . . . Liberty and order become opposed. But the opposition is not essential" (pp. 366-7). "The universalism which the idea of personality holds within it cannot be satisfied with the limits of the nation state. 'Humanity' as a whole is the society to which, by virtue of the 'humanity' within each of us, we really belong" (p. 368).

"From the moment that honesty is recognized as a duty it becomes increasingly repugnant to penalize the beliefs to which it may lead . . . the only logical alternative is to admit the necessity for divergencies in an imperfect world" (p. 369). "To suppress free speech is to bring force into the true spiritual world . . . words alone cannot impede a resolute majority from doing what they wish to do, unless indeed their convictions

are a little shaky" (p. 370). Because it uses compulsion, the State "has to give fair consideration to all classes and all sections. . . . But there is also a form of common life into which men fall, if not hindered, by a kind of instinct, a life based on old traditions, and a certain community of character, language, custom, and generally religion, all that goes to make up the impalpable but very real bonds of nationality" (p. 373). "Whether trust be put in the machinery of law or the efforts of voluntary agency, the sphere of combined action grows in proportion as the respect for human personality deepens" (p. 375). [The foregoing extracts or paraphrases of the text are taken from pages 7 to 375 of *Morals in Evolution*, by Prof. L. T. Hobhouse, Vol. I. There now follow references to and quotations from the second volume of the same work, pages 1 to 278.—EDITOR.]

"Besides the question what kind of action is expected from us by our neighbours, how is it that these expectations arise?" (p. 1). "The beliefs held by primitive men are by no means uniform. . . . To begin with, Animism sees spirits everywhere, the conception . . . raises questions of identity and of individuality which might puzzle us, but do not puzzle primitive man" (p. 3 and *note*). "Whatever its character stone-worship as an element in early religion is widespread." "Stone-worship must be ranked among the most paradoxical developments of animism, a stone being to our minds the very type of the inanimate. . . . It may remain in a spiritual religion as a mere symbol" (p. 4, *note*). According to Tylor, "they may be regarded as receptacles of a divine spirit," in image worship. "The spirit of man goes out in dreams and appears to other people. . . . Since the spirit is a mere attenuated double of the man himself, it appears also in his shadow and can be seen mocking him when he stands by the side of a pool" (p. 5). "Though the soul of things is as impalpable and subtle as we have seen . . . it is nevertheless capable of being dealt with as we deal with visible and tangible objects. It may be tied with cords, or driven away with weapons" (p. 6). "But the commonest evidence of the material character of the soul is its power of eating and drinking like an ordinary man" (p. 7). "It turns out to be itself just such another visible and material thing, only thinner and less palpable; a mere double of the

appearances which it should explain" (p. 8). Mental and material are hopelessly intertwined, mere functions and qualities become substantial beings. The same spiritual agency by which men explain their own behaviour and that of their fellows is imputed also to animals, plants, and inanimate nature; to the wind and to stones. "Disease, for instance, may be possession by a temporary demon. . . . Yet animism is far from being satisfied that the soul can do without some bodily support. . . . But since in reality the corpse decays, what is the soul to do?" (p. 10). "It should find itself a new home by passing into another being. It then belongs for life to the body which it inhabits, but it existed before the body, and will survive it" (p. 11).

"Animal-gods and man-gods belong to the animistic level of religion. . . . Often the god may, with due observance of the proper solemnities, be killed and eaten by his votaries" (p. 13). "The man-god is an ordinary human being conceived as the incarnation of a powerful spirit or as possessed of magical powers" (p. 14). "To drink of his cup or eat the remnants of his food is fatal. His touch and his glance are deadly" (p. 14). "In this idea of incarnation, death and rebirth necessarily play an important part. . . . The man-god in fact may be killed and even eaten like any ordinary human being" (p. 15). "The spirits of early religion may be abused or coerced if they do not do their duty. . . . be managed as occasion serves, by prayer, entreaty, deception . . . so that when one fails another is tried" (pp. 15-16). "Magic is an attempt to control nature without resort to a spiritual agency . . . to operate on the food left by a man . . . to attack his shadow . . . you can, at least, make a likeness of him" (p. 17). "Animism and magic find, especially in primitive times, many points of contact. Totemism is one instance" (p. 21).

"The Totem is in some sense incarnate. . . . The Bear is in all bears. . . . Joining in the same meal has a similar effect" (p. 18). "We eat the flesh of the bear and the Bear is within us . . . the species survives, though one individual is sacrificed. A barren fig-tree must be a male. A woman's petticoat placed upon it transfers to it the feminine quality, and it becomes fruitful. . . . There is probably a little more in the matter than a too hasty generalization. There is the conception of a

quality as something quasi-substantial. . . . When sins are loaded upon a scapegoat and driven away into the wilderness " (p. 19). The complex of ritual is the outcome of a " luxuriant growth of speculative generalization " (Sir Alfred Myers, quoted in Pattison, *Gifford Lectures*, 1923). " In all such cases the quality is treated as something that you can almost pick up and carry about. It is at least as substantial as vapour, and in some cases it really becomes a spirit. . . . Substance and attribute are not yet distinguished. Of this confusion personification is merely the extreme case " (p. 20). " One conception melts readily into another . . . similarity is treated as if it were physical identity. . . . In a word, primitive thought has not yet evolved those distinctions of substance and attribute, quality and relation, cause and effect, identity and difference, which are the common property of civilized thought " (pp. 20-1).

" If I am right, the idea resolves itself into a simple confusion between the material and the immaterial, between the real possibility of transferring a physical load to other shoulders and the supposed possibility of transferring our bodily and mental ailments to another who will bear them for us. When we survey the history of this pathetic fallacy from its crude inception in savagery to its full development in the speculative theology of civilized nations, we cannot but wonder at the singular power which the human mind possesses of transmuting the leaden dross of superstition into a glittering semblance of gold " (Frazer, *The Scapegoat*, Preface, p. v). " The Aztec ritual, which prescribed the slaughter . . . of men and women in order that the gods might remain forever young and strong, conforms to the general theory of deicide. . . . On that theory death is a portal through which gods and men alike must pass to escape the decrepitude of age. . . . The conception may be said to culminate in the Brahminical doctrine that in the daily sacrifice the body of the creator is broken anew for the salvation of the world " (p. vi). " To primitive man the idea of spiritual and ghostly powers is still more indefinite than it is to his civilized brother: it fills him with a vague uneasiness and alarm; and this sentiment of dread and horror he, in accordance with his habitual modes of thought, conceives in a concrete form as something material which either surrounds and oppresses him

like a fog, or has entered into and taken temporary possession of his body. In either case he imagines that he can rid himself of the uncanny thing by stripping it from his skin or wrenching it out of his body and transferring to some material substance . . . which he can cast from him" (p. 23).

"It is difficult to speak with confidence about the tastes of spiritual beings, but as a rule they bear a remarkable likeness to those of mere ordinary mortals. . . . Yet it is quite possible that a ceremony which at first was purely magical may in time have a religious gloss or interpretation put on it even by those who practise it" (p. 26). "That primitive man should mistake the mental association for a real connection was inevitable. . . . The reality . . . was not for him a matter of argument; it was a self-evident fact of which he had direct consciousness and immediate certitude . . . not an induction based on observation, experience, and experiment, but an *a priori* conviction" (Jevons, *Introduction to the History of Religion*, 2nd. ed., 1896, p. 68). On this theory it would appear that animism arose from a false association of ideas. Anthropomorphism and Personification are very much in the same category, though they were held as realities by the greatest nations of antiquity. Personality is of the same order, in attributing the qualities of man to the Deity. If a dog could think of God he would be likely to think of him as a great dog. "The very beasts associate the ideas of things that are like each other or that have been found together in their experience; and they could hardly survive for a day if they ceased to do so. But who attributes to the animals a belief that the phenomena of nature are worked by a multitude of invisible animals or by one enormous and prodigiously strong animal behind the scenes? It is probably no injustice to the brutes to assume that the honour of devising a theory of this latter sort must be reserved for human reason. . . . Among the aborigines of Australia, the rudest savages as to whom we possess accurate information, magic is universally practised, whereas religion in the sense of a propitiation or conciliation of the higher powers seems to be nearly unknown" (Frazer, *The Magic Art*, I, pp. 234 sq.).

"A Melanesian wizard affects things at a distance, not by a projection of a spirit, but by his *mana* or power. . . . A man may pass on his *mana* by imposition of hands; he may throw it

into a material object, which becomes then a source of danger. . . . Thus when Uzzah touches the Ark, he is immediately struck dead . . . the Ark being intrinsically dangerous, just like an highly electrified body" (pp. 21-2). "Recent authorities contrast magic as resting on a belief . . . in uniform natural processes with animism as depending on the caprice of a spirit" (p. 22, *note*). Bergson (*Creative Evolution*) compares the "fixed order" of inanimate nature, with the "growing freedom" of the animate to act on things, and influence them, according to choice and will, limited by power and skill. "It is an important element in the next higher state of religion to produce an order of gods no longer open to these illicit influences . . . the spirits that primitive man recognizes fall rather below the level of humanity and are easily rendered subservient to its worst passions" (Hobhouse, *loc. cit.*, p. 23).

"The higher animals have apparently reached so far that they can perceive the objects that surround them in their temporal and spatial order, and use the result of this perception in guiding their own actions" (p. 24). "Our everyday experience . . . falls into certain familiar categories . . . but these categories do not at once emerge into clear consciousness. The mind uses them long before it is clearly aware of them. . . . This is the stage of 'common sense.' But below 'common sense' again is a stage in which the . . . mind is not only unconscious of the categories, but fails practically in sorting experiences so as to accord with them. . . . At this stage, though 'general' ideas are already formed, they are loose in meaning and wavering in application" (pp. 24-5). "Experience, if used at all, is applied in the form in which any chance instance that appears to confirm the mental prepossession is taken for proof. . . . The world of ideas is largely a world of make-believe. . . . The ideas make their junction, as it were, in their own world, and out of this the child-savage derives the mental comfort he requires" (p. 26). "Beliefs in either animism, magic, or witchcraft are . . . general among the ruder races . . . the same beliefs underlie the higher religions and intermingle with them" (pp. 26-7). "All ideas are more or less self-manufactured; the outcome of previous experience, modelled by vague generalization" (Bergson, *Creative Evolution*).

"Mind has another method of explaining facts of nature or customs of man—namely, that of telling a story about them. . . . It is characteristic of these tales that what happens once happens always . . . that slippery identification of one and all. . . . The savage can people the world, not merely with spirits and powers, but with persons . . . with wives and children . . . all in a world of their own upon the mountains, beneath the earth, or in the sky" (Hobhouse, pp. 27-8). "What has sometimes been taken for a supreme god appears . . . as a 'venerable, kindly headman of a tribe, full of knowledge and tribal wisdom, and all-powerful in magic' . . . a spirit like the other spirits of men, but greater and more powerful" (p. 29). God is a superhuman and supernatural being, modelled on human lines by primitive man: not all powerful or all good or all wise (Pringle Pattison, *Gifford Lectures*, 1923).

"Our ideas on this profound subject are the fruit of a long intellectual and moral evolution, and they are so far from being shared by the savage that he cannot even understand them when they are explained to him" (Frazer, *The Magic Art*, I, p. 375). "The conception of gods as superhuman beings endowed with powers to which man possesses nothing comparable in degree, and hardly even in kind, has been slowly evolved in the course of history" (p. 373). "If we could trace the whole course of religious development we might find that the chain which links our idea of the Godhead with that of the savage is one and unbroken" (p. 376). "The Indian spirits are so little individualized that they all seemed one to the inquirer . . . they are conceived . . . as animals, men, or monsters in the forms familiar to the magical and animistic way of thought" (Hobhouse, pp. 31-2). "It is easier to feel than to define the difference between a 'spirit' and a 'god.' . . . Captain Ellis associates the transition with the rise of images" (p. 32). [According to the Hegelian Edward Caird, they are all stages in a development, defining itself.—AUTHOR.]

"Ghost-gods, who were originally human spirits, have a separate origin, but similar history. . . . 'Olorun made Obatala, who is also the god of the sky and of the earth as well; but he is an anthropomorphic god, he made the first man and woman.' . . . The greater gods, then, are conceived as human. . . . The spirits who dwell in water give

place to a lord of the sea, and the divine sky to a God who directs rain and snow, thunder and lightning, a king who reigns over skyland. . . . Anthropomorphism, of which the rudiments have already been noted . . . now receives a great extension. . . . Often, as we know, the gods retain traces of their lowly origin" (Hobhouse, pp. 33-4). "They become . . . more and more distinctively human, and in becoming human they also become superhuman. . . . By the anthropomorphizing genealogies and hierarchies the many gods are brought into subjection to one father and ruler of all" (pp. 34-5). "The cult of the greater gods has its central point in the earlier civilizations. . . . The Egyptians had an animistic religion before they worshipped the greater gods Osiris and Ptah. . . . Gods in fact were virtually conceived as men in their essential nature, having bones, flesh, and blood" (pp. 36-7). "Maspero writes [of Osiris] 'He spareth not those who love him; he beareth away the child from its mother . . . only . . . by feeding him . . . could living or dead escape the consequences of his furious temper.' . . . Some of the gods were cannibals. Sahû . . . hunted the gods, killed, and devoured them" (p. 38). "What is even more remarkable, a man might do the same. . . . Isis obtained control over Ra in his decrepit old age by stealing his name" (p. 39).

"As the unity of Egyptian culture grew, the separate nome-gods were necessarily united in one pantheon . . . the nome-god being associated sometimes with wife and son, sometimes with two goddesses. . . . The personalities of father and son within the triad slid into one another . . . as two aspects of the same god" (p. 40). "At once, his own father, his own son. . . . All the divine sons were step by step identified. . . . Under many names, in many shapes, at divers places, one deity was the real object of worship. . . . Yet each form may be as real as the substance. . . . The One Being, reached by the method of slippery identification, is not distinct enough to be exclusive. . . . 'Egypt had as many "sole" deities as she had large cities'" (p. 42). Sole king is he even in the midst of the gods. [Compare the Irish boast, "On Tara's hill there were a thousand kings, but my forebear was supreme king on the top of them all"—AUTHOR.] "'Many are his names, none knoweth their number.' 'He judgeth the cause of the

weak and the oppressed,' 'One and one only, the maker of all that are'" (p. 42) (quoted from *Hymns to Amen Ra*). "This is not a monotheism. It reminds us rather of the Psalm that begins, 'God sat among the congregation of gods,' in which Jehovah appears as the chief figure of a Pantheon" (p. 43) (*vide* Ps. lxxxii).

"The subject of Khu-en-aten's revolution had a deep interest for the student of comparative religion, inasmuch as if the claims alleged were valid the history of monotheism and of the monotheism of Israel, as generally understood, would require different treatment. However much Egyptian scholars might develop as to the monotheism supposed to underlie religious beliefs in Egypt before the advent of Khu-en-aten, there was no appreciable difference of opinion among them as to the absolute unity of the Power which he adored as divine; whether that was spiritual in its nature was the question at issue" (Rev. Dr. Colin Campbell, *Gunning Lecture*, 1917). [It is a fair presumption that in this Egyptian conception there lies the norm of the dogma of the Athanasian Creed, for the Valley of the Nile seems to have been the home of superstition.—  
AUTHOR.] In Babylon, "often the gods are described in terms of the crudest animism" (Hobhouse, p. 44). "They sanction the Flood and they bitterly regret, but cannot undo, what they have done" (p. 45). Among the Greeks "we have the demons of animism . . . driven away with sticks or purged with strong scents . . . the animal god, the bogey, the monster brood" (p. 46). "But the Olympian gods, though human in their essence . . . are 'the happy ones.' . . . The Greek mind outgrew anthropomorphism . . . greatly influenced by the esoteric doctrine of the Egyptian priests" (p. 47). "A truer spirituality is to be found in the reasoned theism of the philosophers . . . who first taught the world, what it has too often forgotten, that goodness and God are identical" (p. 48).

"The breaking of taboo carries its own punishment; the process works automatically" (p. 52). "The stones set up by Laban and Jacob are witnesses . . . (Gen. xxxi. 45-52). At a later stage the stone has become inanimate, but a curse on any one who shall move it is pronounced by the whole people. (Deut. xxvii.). The curse is still the punishment, though its operation is perhaps theological rather than magical" (p. 52,

*note).* "We have the well-known list of curses in the Book of Deuteronomy, and a quite analogous set of inscriptions recording the curses pronounced against offenders in the early Greek states" (p. 52). "I use the word taboo deliberately as implying a more mechanical sequence of sin and punishment than we associate with the idea of divine judgment; see the description of the operation of the curse in Zech. v. 1-4." "Among the Hebrews (Deut. xxi. 7 and Numb. v. 11 *sq.*), where the connection with very primitive ideas of taboo is unmistakable" (Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, Ed. 2, p. 164).

"Jacob secures by fraud the blessing intended for Esau, and, once given, the blessing cannot be withdrawn" (Hobhouse, p. 53). "Grotesque as the magical doctrine of punishment appears . . . there remain for all of us certain things to do which affect us with a greater or less degree of mental discomfort: before we can reason out all that a bad act implies we have a feeling about it" (pp. 53-4). "In South-East Australia 'a belief exists in an anthropomorphic supernatural being who lives in the sky and who is supposed to have some kind of influence on the morals of the natives' (Howitt, p. 500). Howitt adds that 'no such belief seems to obtain in the remainder of Australia.' . . . The only possible exception is in the case of the Kaitish tribe who recognize a superior being . . . who is displeased if the bull-roarer is not sounded in the initiation ceremony. . . . Tylor considers that savage animism is almost devoid of the ethical element" (p. 57, *note*). "Worship of evil spirits together with the comparative neglect of those which enjoy a good character is in itself a strong mark of the low ethical standard of animism" (p. 58). "A step forward is taken when spirits arise which are themselves personifications of the moral order" (p. 58). In Homer "Zeus acts in accordance with Themis" (p. 60). "We get a similar development in the Roman religion . . . the tendency to personify abstractions persisted in Rome" (p. 62, *note*). "Different epithets are themselves half personifications, and . . . the function wavers between being a god itself and being only the attribute of a god" (pp. 60-1). "A father brings down a curse which besets the children and the children's children, all of whom add to the guilt until the accumulated iniquity is washed out by a tremendous catastrophe," in

Æschylus. "In Herodotus . . . the overweening presumption of the individual awakens the jealousy of God and brings down punishment" (pp. 61-2, *note*). "In an elementary form the conception of retribution in a future life appears within the savage world. . . . Sometimes the future life is itself a privilege of caste; sometimes the fate of the dead depends on the manner of death" (p. 62). "The good achieve this more easily, and therefore do not require the fire to be burnt for so many nights after their death to light them. . . . The soul haunts the grave, and requires supplies, and yet it goes to another world or is re-incarnated in another human being or an animal" (p. 63). "The development, however, is very irregular. We find nothing of it, for example, in the Babylonish religion, nor, till Monotheism was well established, in that of the Hebrews" (p. 64). [Many of these views survive in civilized times.—AUTHOR.]

By what internal merit, or external grace preventing him, does a man come to reject the evil and choose the good? Under the magical conception, sins, if we may call them so, are, like other evils, things that can be purged out of a man; they may be transferred to a scapegoat and driven away into the wilderness. "Human scapegoats . . . were well known in classical antiquity, and even in medieval Europe the custom seems not to have been wholly extinct" (Frazer, *The Scapegoat*, p. 214). "Physical methods of getting rid of an infectious taboo characterize the lowest forms of superstition. The same form of disinfection recurs in the Levitical legislation, where a live bird is made to fly away with the contagion of leprosy. Lev. xiv. 53; cf. Zech. v. 5 *sqq.*" (Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, Ed. 2, p. 422).

"Some Chinese tribes protect themselves from pestilences by selecting a man to attract all the evil influences into him by certain rites, after which he is driven away from the village" (Hobhouse, p. 65). "To us the holy and unclean stand at opposite poles of thought, but in the primitive world they are not yet distinct" (p. 66). "The city of idolaters devoted to destruction by the Hebrew invaders is not sacred in our sense, nor were their possessions too holy to touch as we conceive holiness. . . . They were set apart for Jehovah to do what he would with them" (p. 67). [That is, they were devoted to the

"God of Battle." Compare with this, the French word "sacré," which is very nearly equivalent to "damned."—  
AUTHOR.] "The purification of the community from all ills, physical and moral, is often an annual affair . . . it is sometimes preceded by an annual confession of sins. . . . The simplest method of ridding oneself of sins is merely to deny or repudiate them. . . . This method of purification was highly developed in Babylonia" (p. 67). "It has been rightly pointed out that the penitential psalms have many of the characteristics of magical formulæ. . . . Hence the length of the list of sins, which is due to the desire to make it exhaustive" (p. 68). In Egypt "the point is that he [the dead] rids himself of them by repudiating them in the proper formulæ. . . . The first thing that the deceased says to Osiris is, 'I know thee, and I know thy name'" (p. 69). "He has 'heard that mighty word which the spiritual bodies (e.g. the Ass) spake unto the cat.' . . . Where the religious element predominates wrong-doing is held to be an offence against a spirit . . . as the sacrifice may be offered to secure a boon, so it may be used to avert wrath" (p. 70). "On the one hand, the idea of punishment developed until it seemed that no salvation was possible for any one; on the other, 'purely mechanical means were provided, which, as it would seem, the greatest sinner could embrace with full assurance of bliss'" (p. 70, *note*). "Men gave to the gods what they held most dear to themselves." "Of course, this is not the sole origin of human sacrifice . . . but in earlier civilizations it had a special tendency to crop out anew" (p. 70 and *note*). "A step in advance is taken when spiritual agencies arise who take interest in certain moral acts as such. . . . Unfortunately the conception of judgment is too often associated with means of appeasing the divine wrath" (p. 72). "Yet even at this stage gods are not always, or necessarily, perfect beings" (p. 74).

"Awakening reason demands a theory of the universe and ceases to be satisfied with the patchwork schemes of mythology . . . a deeper religion and a higher ethics are the outcome" (p. 85). "As in Taoism the supreme principle of things may be left undefined as something that we experience in ourselves. . . . This mystical interpretation is not confined to Taoism, but in one form or another lies near at hand to all spiritual

religions" (p. 86). "Springing from the same stock as the Aryan invaders of India and worshipping the same gods, the ancient Persians developed a form of religion which is in one respect unique. The dualism of gods and demons, a frequent incidental feature of polytheism, became the central fact of their creed" (p. 91). The Zend-Avesta (ii, p. 315) uses the expression "faithful": "'And it seems to him as if his own conscience were advancing to him in that wind in the shape of a maiden fair, bright, white-armed, strong, tall-formed, high-standing . . . beautiful of body'" (p. 96). "The conscience of the wicked appears to him in the form of a 'profligate woman, naked, decayed, gaping, bandy-legged, lean-lipped.' . . . It was a unique expression of the dualism of nature which few other creeds, if any, have ever attempted to face. As such it left a legacy in the conception of the devil to later religions. . . . It conceived that man's duty is to master the earth, to tend the kine, to be fruitful and multiply, and that this was to lend power to the good spirit and aid its ultimate triumph over the demonic forces of Death and the desert" (p. 97). "Long before the age of Buddha, at a date quite unknown to us, the Vedic religion was developed into a metaphysical system, probably the first metaphysical religion of history" (p. 97).

"We have here the first principle of all mysticism, that God and the self are one. But we have also something greater than mysticism. . . . Matter is not spirit, nor do images and conceptions drawn from matter serve to define the Spirit . . . which we find when we get beneath the bodily shell and think away the objects of sensuous knowledge" (p. 98). "'I am below, I am above, I am behind, before, right, and left.'" Self is below, above, behind, before, right, and left: Self is all this (*Upanishads*, I, 123-4) (p. 99). "'To act solely from a desire of rewards is not laudable.' . . . Abandonment of all earthly affections is the final condition" (p. 100). "With this feature we have the elevation of an inward state of mind as the highest goal. . . . We come in Brahminism upon the beginnings of a spiritual theory of man's regeneration . . . a distinct advance towards an ethical conception of repentance" (pp. 100-1). "The old magic crops up by the side of the higher spiritualism. . . . If a man did not suffer for guilt in

this life, it came upon him in the next. ‘ If punishment falls not on himself, it falls on his sons; if not on the sons, on his grandsons ’ ” (p. 102). “ The eating of meat except in sacrifice is forbidden ” (p. 102). Yet “ ‘ One oil-press is as (bad) as ten slaughter houses; one tavern as (bad) as ten oil-presses; one brothel (as bad) as ten taverns; one king as (bad as) ten brothels. A king is declared to be equal (in wickedness) to a butcher who keeps a hundred thousand slaughter-houses ’ (*Manu* iv. 84) ” (p. 104). “ It is the code of a society in which barbaric elements survive . . . the way is prepared for the series of emanations—Vishnu, an emanation from Brahma; Krishna, an emanation of Vishnu; and Krishna himself impersonated in many successive incarnations ” (p. 105).

“ Buddha’s great discovery was the want of permanence in the whole world of phenomena. . . . The soul according to the strict Buddhist is a figment. . . . My personality does not survive, but my good and my evil works survive ” (p. 106). “ Transient existence involves suffering ” (p. 107). “ ‘ Full of hindrances is household life, a path defiled by passion; free as the air is the life of him who has renounced all worldly things ’ ” (p. 108). “ Liberality, courtesy, kindness, and unselfishness—‘ these are to the world what the lynch-pin is to the rolling chariot ’ (*vide Rhys Davids, Buddhism*) ” (p. 110). The true Buddhist “ ‘ refrains from carrying out those commissions on which messengers can be sent . . . from bribery, cheating, fraud, and crooked ways. He refrains from maiming, killing, imprisoning, highway robbery, plundering villages, or obtaining money by threats of violence ’ (*Suddras*, p. 189) . . . from games of many kinds ‘ detrimental to progress in virtue,’ mean talk, such as ‘ tales of kings, of robbers, or of ministers of state.’ ” “ Sacrifices to the gods are included among the ‘ low arts ’ ” (p. 111 and *note*). [Surely the Germans could learn something from these heathen Chinese; sincere Christians could gain somewhat; and the Jews a great deal.—AUTHOR.] “ ‘ One may conquer a thousand thousand men in battle, but he who conquers himself alone is the greatest victor. Let a man overcome anger by kindness, evil by good; let him conquer the stingy by a gift, the liar by truth ’ (Rhys Davids, p. 128). . . . Spiritual perfection is the supreme object and higher than all sacrifice. . . . ‘ By oneself the evil is done . . . by

onself one is purified. . . . No one can purify another' (*Dhammapada* viii. 106)" (pp. 112-13). "The noblest prize that Buddha offers to man is to attain in this life and now to inward perfection . . . and its manifestation in universal love . . . in humility and self-respect" (p. 114). "The selflessness of spiritual religion is carried to the point of self-emptying, the negation of action along with desire. . . . It is the giving oneself over to the inevitable" (pp. 114-15).

"The line of development which lies through the exclusive worship of one national god . . . is the path through Mono-latry to Monotheism . . . the Yahveh of early Judaism was not the one God . . . but was the only God whom it was lawful for the Jews to worship. Yahveh was the God of Israel" (p. 119). "Even in Deuteronomy, the First Commandment does not deny the existence of other gods. . . . The oneness of God and His supremacy over the whole earth are ideas which arose comparatively late in Hebrew thought" (p. 120). "The earlier Yahveh had a well-defined human personality. . . . He is not wholly without fear of the men that He has made. . . . Adam 'is become one of Us.' When men have all one language they attempt, like the giants who piled Pelion on Ossa, to build a tower that will reach to heaven. . . . As a human personality He is half a barbaric chief, half an Oriental despot . . . capable of punishing the children for their fathers, according to the barbaric principle of collective responsibility" (p. 121). "The God of Righteousness in the sense that He is the source and upholder of the law. But it is the law of a barbaric people, and a warlike race" (p. 122). "This is the ever-recurring theme of the older prophets. 'I hate, I despise your feasts . . . and I will not accept them' (Amos. v. 21 sq.). They bargained with the gods and offered a bull or a ram, or in extremity their own children to make up for their iniquity. The ethical stage proper begins when these childish things are put aside. . . . Yet in the older prophets it is rather social righteousness and social salvation than the justification of the individual that occupy the first place" (pp. 122-3).

"The prophetic teaching was hardly yet humanitarian. It was rather an intensified form of group-morality . . . the exclusive religious spirit which . . . draws a deep line

between Jew and Gentile" (p. 124). "God's servant is 'despised and rejected of men, a man of sorrows.' . . . He bears his suffering in silence and humility." We are reaching "the doctrine of renunciation" of Buddha by a very different road (p. 125). "In proportion as Yahveh became the God of the whole earth the old group-morality was compelled to yield in a measure to universalism. The warrior's song is changed to a prophecy of peace . . . unfortunately. . . . Judaism feared to lose itself in the great world . . . universalism survived only in kindness to the stranger and in the effort to proselytize. . . . The early prophets do not hesitate to attribute vengeance and even deceit to Yahveh" (p. 126). "At a later stage, on the contrary, we find the authorship of evil imputed to Satan. . . . God was the creator and father of all, though all men were not yet brothers" (p. 127). "God is a spirit, and His communion with men is spiritual. . . . But the conception could not maintain itself in so simple a form . . . or was the shape taken by dogma determined by the pure monotheistic idea alone" (p. 128). "If pressed hard this conception militates against God's infinitude. Man and the world are separate from Him, and in so far as they have independent existences must be held to limit Him" (p. 129). "God made the world but He is not the world. He made man, but is not man. In so far His Being is limited" (p. 130). "The optimistic doctrine that the evil of the world is merely the dark colour which serves to throw up the bright would be tenable on two hypotheses. If evil and good were so distributed that physical suffering, external calamities, and moral wrong-doing played an essential part in the growth of each personality, and could be shown to tend ultimately to its greater perfection, the existence of evil would be reconcilable with a divine justice which should take every personality into account. . . . The second alternative was not possible for any system which took account of personality at all. . . . Evil which involves eternal suffering as its punishment cannot be dismissed as something merely negative, nor yet accepted as a mere incident in the working out of an higher order" (p. 131). "To permit evil in the plenitude of power that might prevent it is all one with the doing of evil" (p. 132). "Thus, though . . . theologians may still endeavour to attribute foreknowledge of sin without responsi-

bility for sin, the far more logical consequence is that drawn by Calvin" (p. 133).

"The Deity lays down an ideal code for man, but the code which men ascribe to the Deity is not ideal and can only be excused as being unintelligible to the human mind" (p. 135). "Furthermore, on either conception of Freewill the ultimate responsibility of the Creator for evil remains" (p. 136). Darwin tells us: "Thousands of animals perished in the droughts of S. America"; Mackenzie "that they were caught in bituminous pools in geologic ages and starved." "Sorrow and suffering do not begin with the Fall . . . even if all evil resulted from the wicked will of man, yet it is God who made man and gave him freedom to act as he would. . . . It was above all the doctrine of eternal punishment which converted the difficulties arising from God's foreknowledge and unlimited power into ethical impossibilities." "Moral responsibility implies the dependence of action upon the self with its definite character, and since the self does not arise out of nothing its character, and therefore its conduct, must at the next remove be referable to the conditions out of which the self arose. . . . It is only when taken in conjunction with the belief in an all-knowing and all-powerful Creator that this doctrine gives rise to the ethical difficulties of Predestination" (pp. 136-7 and *note*). "It seems indeed impossible to state this explanation except in terms which condition the creative power of God . . . we are instead brought nearer to an evolutionary conception of a spirit striving in the world of experience with the inherent conditions of its own growth and mastering them" (p. 138).

"Amid all metaphysical difficulties monotheism remains clear as to the basis of the ethical order. . . . Sin is an act of rebellion against a supreme authority . . . in the Christian conception, man inherited from Adam—whether through the Fall or by a primeval decree of which the Fall itself was but the first consequence—an original inherent sinfulness." "Atonement implies the primitive doctrines of vicarious justice and the transference of guilt, both of which belong to a relatively low stage of ethical development . . . it is a question rather of the transfer of merit than of guilt . . . by a gracious consideration for the noble act of another" (p. 139). "The death of

Christ, however, does not win salvation for all men at a stroke" (p. 140). "To die for Christ has become a small thing compared with acceptance of precisely the right formula to express his relations to the Deity . . . for the old circle of the fellow-citizens marked off rigidly from the rest of the world, is substituted the circle of the true believers" (p. 141). "The Anglican Article XIII denies that 'works done before the grace of Christ' are pleasant to God—"yea rather, for that they are not done as God hath willed and commanded them to be done, we doubt not but they have the nature of sin." This view is satisfactorily anathematized by the Council of Trent" (p. 140, *note*). "The Council of Trent pronounce an anathema . . . on those who assert that true repentance is shown in a new life rather than in the performance of penance" (p. 143). "The doctrine of indulgence as laid down by Clement VI is a very crude statement of the transfer of merit, and the consequent cancelling of sin. . . . This is not much above the level of the sin-eater" (p. 143, *note*). "The whole question of Justification, the moralistic theory of nicely graduated penalties for sin, and of the cancelling out of sin against merit had ended in ethical disorder" (p. 144). "Neither faith nor works merit justification. 'All our best actions judged by their intrinsic merit are already defiled and polluted; we have therefore merely to submit to the Divine mercy' (Calvin; *Justitatis*, i, 603-4)" (p. 145 and *note*). "To elaborate a system of rewards and punishments is to run the risk of degrading morals into a form of spiritual calculation. . . . Neither Protestantism nor the Roman Church advanced to the ethical position that it is the good man through his goodness who is nearest to God. . . . Not being willing to surrender the conception of the Deity as an omnipotent Creator standing outside His world, they have been compelled under whatever disguises to impute to Him its evil along with its goodness. To explain the history of Christ they have maintained, with whatever refinements, the doctrine of transferable merit, and in magnifying faith they have made true lovableness and beauty of character secondary in God's eyes" (p. 147).

"Potential universalism is common to Islam and Christianity. But in its fundamental teaching Christianity has really more affinity to Buddhism. . . . Pride is now the deadliest

of all the deadly sins" (p. 148). "Lao-Tsze . . . taught that as water wears away the rock, so the weakest things of this world overcome the strong. . . . Self-surrender has no room for hate . . . revenge is a matter of physical strength and a poor satisfaction at best. 'Hatred,' Buddha taught, 'does not cease by hatred but by love.' If we judge others, shall we not ourselves be judged? . . . The kingdom of God is not peopled by those who have proved themselves the strongest on this earth" (pp. 149-50). "It is in monotheism that there first arises a clear distinction between the natural and the supernatural. . . . This antithesis dominates Christian teaching from first to last. . . . The great institutions of humanity, marriage, fatherhood, citizenship, are things of this world. . . . The true saint finds no joy in it" (p. 151). "The common life that it contemplates is a life of brotherly love, a community of saints. . . . What need for equal rights among men who claim nothing for themselves and yield all they have to all who want?" (p. 152). "Excellent precepts, though they bore singularly little fruit; and for fifteen centuries the criminal codes of most Christian nations remained a standing reproach to civilization." "In fact, the Christian life, far from being a scheme of permanent social regeneration, was originally conceived as preparatory to an imminent millennium" (p. 152 and note). "In descending from the mountain to the plain [it] loses much of its purity" (p. 155). "The religious persecutions stand as instances of what human savagery, pushed to its extreme limit, can achieve" (p. 156). "Christian teaching, apart from all inadequacies of historical application . . . carries one side of ethics to the highest possible pitch of perfection, but it leaves another side comparatively neglected. . . . The ideal of loving self-surrender is beautiful, but not always right" (p. 157). "The life of the Gospel could only be lived by a select community of saints" (p. 158). [For the revolting conception of womanhood held by many of the Saints, see Lecky's *History of European Morals*, vol. ii, p. 116 sq.—*AUTHOR.*]

"The fundamental moral qualities are widely diffused, but not the intellectual attainments which direct them" (p. 164). "Confucius said, 'I hate your good, careful men of the villages, lest they be confounded with the truly virtuous'"

(p. 165). "The 'golden rule' to treat others as we would have them treat us, which Confucius was the first to formulate, is as much a matter of justice as of benevolence" (p. 167). "These principles are not infused into us from without—'Seek and you will find them, Neglect and you will lose them' (Mencius, Book VI, pt. 1, ch. 6, sec. 7)" (p. 172). "Returning of good for evil is set aside in favour of a severer application of justice" (p. 177). "The Chinese masters inculcated some profound truths and arrived at results often closely similar to the best teaching of the Greeks. But they seem to have laid them down almost as dogmatically and with as little attempt at rational proof as though they had been dogmas of theology" (p. 179).

"Its own processes and methods, the principles and pre-suppositions of all its thinking, are the last things of which the mind becomes conscious. In the earliest stages of its development in humanity it forms ideas under the stimulus of experience by methods which have all the roughness and imperfection of hereditary or instinctive reactions" (p. 180). "Thought seeks to determine its own value as a measure of reality" (pp. 180-1). The judgments we pass, "are they anything more than expressions for our feelings? . . . not necessarily well adapted to the actual conduct of life," "or have they a higher authority?" (p. 183). "The early Greek, as we have seen, held to the magico-religious basis of law and morals" (p. 184). "'For these are not things of to-day or yesterday, but live for ever, and none knows whence they sprang' (Sophocles, *Antigone*, 1)" (p. 185). "The efforts of the constructive thinkers of Greece during the latter part of the fifth century, and throughout the fourth, were devoted to the reconstruction of private morals and public law . . . to replace the old supernatural basis of virtue" (p. 187). "To the Christian theologian and to the moralist handling the subject with theological conceptions behind him, the difficulty is to see how men came to do good. To the Greek thinker the paradox is rather that so many men do wrong" (p. 192). "If men knew what is good, they would do it" (Plato). "The first duty of man, whether in the *Republic* or in the *Ethics*, is to be a good citizen. . . . He should feel a proper pride in himself, and trust to that pride to keep him from anything degrading" (Hobhouse, p. 196). [Cp. Lord Shaf-

bury, *Noblesse oblige*.—AUTHOR.] “He must, as far as possible, put off his mortality and put on the likeness of the divine intelligence” (p. 198). “To live in accordance with virtue is laid down as the end of life, and it is the object of the wise man to render himself independent of all external conditions over which he himself cannot exercise control” (p. 199). “His tub sufficed for Diogenes, and, if asked of what state he was citizen, he replied that he was a citizen of the world. . . . With the abstract assertion of the human personality as the supreme object of life and as ruler of its own destiny, there arises also the conception of universal humanity” (p. 200). “The wise man learnt, in the first place, to contain himself and to bow to the universal order of things. . . . A god is given to each man, a deity (in the shape of his own reason) to guard over him . . . who, if you shut the doors and make it all dark, is still there with you” (pp. 200–1). “Since God is the father of all, it follows that all men are brothers; the slave differs from the emperor only by accident” (according to Epictetus) (p. 201). “Virtue, though springing from the individual and resting on his personal wisdom and self-control, is eminently social in its manifestations” (says Marcus Aurelius) (p. 202). “‘Are justice and the other virtues natural or merely conventional? Are they founded on Nature, or the products of human agreement, which may be relegated at will to the lumber-room of disused ideas?’” (p. 203). “And what would remain if we conceive them done away with? . . . from their conception of Nature as one of Kosmos, animated by One God, the father of all mankind, the Stoics arrived at the idea of a Law of Nature” (p. 204). “Independent of convention and superior to the enactments of kings. . . . Such an ideal was unattainable in the second century after Christ” (p. 205). “It was an assertion that such a principle could be found; and it recognized . . . an ideal to which social as well as individual custom should be made to conform” (p. 206). “In part it was incorporated in Roman law . . . in part it coalesced with the leading ideas of Christianity” (p. 207).

“The logic of facts drove men to the admission of private judgment . . . the moral nature common to all human beings” (p. 208). “It was complicated by the relatively new antithesis between private judgment and authority. . . . The

claims made on the individual by the moral law in modern times were more exacting than in antiquity, and in some measure consisted in ideals to which the mass of men have never been brought to render much more than lip service" (p. 209). "The modern world has the ancient paradox before it in a yet sharper form . . . the happiness which a man experiences within his own consciousness, and the excellence which another may praise and admire in him, but which may have brought him a heavy balance of sorrow" (pp. 210-11). "A man might come to identify his pleasure and pain with those of others, and deliberately sacrifice all purely personal happiness" (p. 212). Yet "it is only man himself who can impose this law upon himself. He is at once sovereign and subject, sovereign as a rational being, a member of the spiritual world, which underlies phenomena; subject as a phenomenon existing in time and space. . . . As [a] rational [agent] he prescribes to himself a law which, as a being in the world of sense, he may obey or disobey. If he were pure reason, he would conform to law without effort and be perfect." Yet "a rational law cannot disregard circumstances or consequences, as Kant would have it do" (p. 213). "Reason on its practical as on its theoretical side is that which makes for coherence, connectedness, harmony. . . . The work of reason is to gather up all feelings into one steady movement. . . . In part our impulses are harmonized and set in one definite direction, and it is here that we feel that our true self lies" (p. 214). "The very distinction between self and others disappears in the conception of a Universal Self which is the underlying reality of each. . . . Philosophy then has still to find a satisfactory method of stating the theory of moral obligation in terms which do full justice at once to the individual personality and to the spiritual unity" (p. 215).

"Law which I recognize must be something which I adopt as a law binding on myself, and in that sense subjective. Yet it must be a law which binds me, even though I do not adopt it, and in that sense objective" (p. 216). "Of course, this implies the Aristotelian view that the 'practical reason' has its basis as much in the moral character as in any logical reasoning" (p. 217, *note*). "The moral consciousness has all the characteristics of mind in growth, not of mind that has attained. But

in this growth, and amidst the mass of partial and often inconsistent truth, we may find a tendency, a movement, an unfolding of a single idea" (p. 218). "Now, the germ of such an idea the teachers of mankind have found with singular consistency in the golden rule of Confucius, which bids each man treat others as himself" (p. 219). "'What will befall him if he ignores it?' . . . In our thinking on this subject we are often tempted to get the best of both worlds, to claim superiority to all selfish considerations when insisting boldly on the supremacy of the moral law, and then by an elastic interpretation of happiness to make terms with prudence" (p. 221). "Man is bound by spiritual ties to a community with a life and purpose of its own. But the tie is not such as to destroy his separate personality" (p. 223). Unfortunately, "the belief grew up that in international matters men were bound by no obligations whatever, and the belief was practically exemplified by the amazing horrors of sixteenth and seventeenth century warfare" (p. 224). "Humanity is a growing organism, and the problem of the thinker is to understand the laws of its growth and adjust the code of conduct which his disciples are to preach to the needs of the present phase" (p. 234). "In this conception of a self-directing humanity lies the basis of scientific ethics. As conceived by Comte, it was more than a basis of ethics. Collective humanity [is] a being that never dies, but grows, learns, and develops throughout the ages. . . . Men began by explaining everything they did not understand as the action of a spirit. At first there was a special spirit for the action of every special object; this was the stage of fetishism. Then there was a greater spirit, a God presiding over great classes of objects; this was the stage of polytheism. Finally there was one spirit ruling the whole universe, which was the stage of monotheism" (pp. 234-5). The "process of incarnation had robbed the spiritual of half its character" (p. 236). "'Of each man's life one part has been personal, the other social'" (p. 238). "So the Mind of Humanity is the unity in process of formation of multitudinous minds of men" (p. 238, *note*; quoting J. H. Bridges). "The Spirit, continually seeking realization, arrives finally at self-consciousness" (Hegel) (p. 239 and *note*). "The idea of Development is the central conception of modern thought, and the idea of Humanity in development holds that

place in modern ethics" (p. 240). "As far as the widest synthesis of our experience goes, it shows us Reality neither as a providentially ruled order, nor as a process of fortuitous combinations and dissolutions, but as the movement towards self-realization of a mind appearing under rigidly limited conditions of physical organization in countless organisms, and arriving for the first time at a partial unity in the consciousness of a common humanity with a common aim" (p. 241; *vide* J. H. Bridges, *Discourses on Positive Religion*).

"The developmental, 'orthogenic' line of humanity lies in the direction of social growth, and accordingly man finds his principal source of abiding satisfaction in social relations . . . modes of life in which abiding satisfaction could be found" (p. 244). "In this movement of the human spirit towards the full realization of its powers and to the mastery of itself and of the world, every side of human nature can find its scope, and at the same time its discipline. . . . The end is the spiritual growth in which happiness is found . . . the ordering of conduct by the needs of human development" (p. 246). "Love, affection, generosity, candour, honesty, truthfulness, modesty, courage are as much a matter of 'natural' instinct, reacting on early surroundings, as the desires for personal gain and esteem. . . . Self-development is as much a duty as self-negation" (p. 247). "The quiet, resolute maintenance of rights as useful to society as the performance of duties. . . . Crystallization of the moral code, however valuable in itself, is an obstacle to further development . . . reason, acquiring more confidence in itself, demands a basis for conduct in some principle by which assent will be compelled as it is compelled by science" (pp. 247-8).

"*De facto* laws, customs, institutions, and beliefs of society are seen as growths arising from mental and social conditions. . . . Nature is itself a growth, the products of which are appropriate each to its own stage" (pp. 250-1). "The effect of this principle once recognized is a Copernican change of attitude. . . . Instead of religion being the basis of ethics . . . the relative value of the creeds is measured by their ethical efficacy. . . . Institutions have grown up in rough accordance with the circumstances of social life . . . and contain elements, however roughly put, of ethical truth" (p. 252). "Thus

they lie ready to hand as a basis for a scientific sociology. . . . One of the chief factors in the welfare of society is that its members should know what they are entitled to expect" (p. 253). "And in social development, be it remembered, a hundred years are but as yesterday" (p. 254). "We find the humanitarian spirit in that recasting of values which makes the infliction of misery on mankind a sin not to be erased by any access of national glory. We find it in the heightened belief in the power of reason. . . . Freedom to advocate error is the best social safeguard for truth" (p. 255). "It has justified individuals, classes, creeds, nationalities that have stood resolutely by their rights and fought for their liberties" (p. 256). "The rational ideal must be an ideal of growth that can accept change and assimilate it" (p. 257). "We may attribute not merely the gregarious instinct, but also the rudiments of a social intercourse to the higher animals . . . the adaptation of actions not only to the immediate, but to the somewhat more remote satisfaction of the agent, and also to the satisfaction of others whom the agent loves. . . . The rise of general conceptions—a process which may be regarded as at once the effect and the cause of the growth of language—enlarges the scope of purpose and renders possible the laying down of fixed rules by which action is judged" (p. 261). "Customs change and grow and disappear unconsciously as an individual stretches a point here or makes a new application of precedent there" (p. 262). "We have no difficulty in conceiving the original growth of custom out of the inherited impulses of gregarious man" (p. 262). "The broad conditions of stock preservation indirectly determine the main lines of conduct just as they do in the animal world" (pp. 263-4). "In the lowest stages of human thought . . . distinctions that are most elementary in the structure of knowledge are quite insufficiently grasped, and the result is seen in magic, witchcraft, and the primitive doctrine of the quasi-material spirit" (pp. 26-45). "Its theory of the world process, its God, if it finds the solution in a God, is an embodiment, so to say, of the categories which it finds most satisfactory" (p. 266). "The human mind is a structure which has grown up under conditions, and the thoughts which it forms and the criticisms which it passes on its thoughts depend upon that structure. . . . It does not follow

that because we find limits, these must be limits fixed for ever. On the contrary, the study of evolution indicates the possibility of indefinite growth. It helps us to understand how our mental structure has arisen from very humble beginnings, and how its methods, its logic, and its philosophy have grown up in the continuous endeavour to grasp and organize its experience, and so direct and understand its own life. . . . Reality is conceived as something more than experience and the truth attainable by man is seen to be only a partial approximation to the final truth of things. . . . Thought is recognized as a growth, and its conceptions as the products of a given phase" (pp. 267-8). "Every man as a responsible agent stands under certain obligations whether to himself, to others, or to society as a whole. . . . It is in the way in which obligation is conceived, and in the conduct which it covers, that ethical evolution is principally seen" (p. 269). "Even personal identity is not clearly conceived when the actions of a man may freely be attributed to a spirit which possesses him temporarily" (p. 270). "In the lowest grades of ethical thought the sanction of conduct is found in taboos and other magical terrors or in the fear of vindictive and resentful spirits. . . . The moral consciousness is still drenched through with the old spirit of self-assertion, the passions appropriate to the struggle for existence among small and ill-organized groups of mankind" (p. 271). "And even if the gods prefer justice they are hardly as yet incorruptible judges" (p. 272).

"Though the teaching of the world-religions laid the foundations of humanitarianism, it has often tended paradoxically enough to paralyse humanitarian energy, and by holding up an unrealizable ideal to remove virtue from the world and make it possible only in the monastery" (p. 273). "What humanity claims is self devotion rather than self effacement. . . . When modern thought returns from the supernatural to Nature, it learns from physical and moral science alike that 'nature' is not fixed, but changing. It has, then, still to decide where in the series of changes lies the true upward path" (pp. 273-4). "Every rule of conduct must be based upon the demonstrable needs of human life. . . . Rules are in an indirect manner fashioned by racial experience, since they are handed on by tradition. . . . To this extent early morality

may be said to direct conduct towards social welfare " (p. 275). " In the ethics of the spiritual religions the correlation is more complete. . . . It is of a kind which leaves much that is most valuable outside its scope . . . at each stage the mind as it expands brings within its scope the conditions and influences which have previously acted upon it unawares. . . . But such words as 'right' or 'virtue' carry weight only because men make moral judgments, approve certain types of character, etc.; and . . . the next step is that this ideal enters consciousness and is set before man as his end " (pp. 275-6). " The evolution of mind in man from being a blind, unconscious, fitful process has become a purposive, self directed movement " (p. 278). " Progress is sure and continuous . . . in proportion as the gains of the past can be handed on " (p. 281). " Ethical progress is essentially a progress in ethical conceptions, acting through tradition " (p. 283). " If the evil of the world overthrew the doctrine of unconditioned creation, the disorders and reactions of history are no less fatal to a purely teleological doctrine of the world-process. There remains the possibility, however difficult to conceive in concrete shape, of a spirit subject to conditions and achieving its full growth only by mastering them " (p. 280). " Our sympathies cease where our imagination fails to reach, and the great fabric of government is apt to become an inhuman machine advancing blindly over the living flesh and blood that happens to come in its way " (p. 283). " It is enough for the moment to reach the idea of a self-conscious evolution of humanity, and to find therein a meaning and an element of purpose for the historical process which has led up to it. . . . This slowly wrought out dominance of mind in things is the central fact of evolution. . . . It gives a meaning to human effort, as neither the pawn of an overruling Providence nor the sport of blind force. It is a message of hope to the world " (p. 284).

" The worship of humanity is as truly the revival of specific New Testament Christianity as the scientific view of the Universe is the revival of the austere Jewish theism " (Seely, *Natural Religion*, p. 138). " The truth is that all virtue which is genuine and vital springs out of the worship of Man in some form. Wherever the higher morality shows itself, Humanity is worshipped " (p. 160). " Beyond all that we can know, we

attribute all the perfections of ideal humanity to the Power that made and sustains the Universe" (p. 160). "Religion is a popular thing, meant for the multitude" (p. 161). "Heaven and hell all can understand" (p. 161). "But to the end of the Bible there are to be found no such heaven and hell as are put before us in Dante" (p. 164). Their future is on the earth; it is not a book of the dead, but of the living. "Religion is not a man's private philosophy. . . . It is the atmosphere of common thought and feeling which surrounds a community; because all at once breathe it and live on it" (p. 186). "We are under a prepossession which causes us to overlook the leading part which *nationalities* have played in the great religious revolutions and to attribute everything to persons and individual opinions" (p. 186). "Under the modern State there lurks an undeveloped Church" [as conceived by Comte] (p. 190). "Collective humanity is a being that never dies; but grows, learns, and develops throughout the ages: the mind of Humanity is the unity in process of formation of multitudinous minds of men."

## CHAPTER VI

### THE IDEA OF REVELATION IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE

*Tria sunt genera theologiae, unum mythicon, alterum, physicon, tertium civile. Mythicon appellant quo maxime utuntur poetae, physicon, quo philosophi, civile, quo populi.* —Quoted from VARRE by AUGUSTINE, *De Civitate Dei*, VI, 5.

*Talis scientiae scintilla, qualis de Deo haberi potest, per lumen naturae, et contemplationem rerum.* —BACON.

I HAVE already drawn fully upon Sabatier's standard work on the history of Christianity (see Appendix) because I find myself more in a line with his outlook than with that of most rationalizing theologians. Next to him in this respect are some of the contributors to *Essays on Some Theological Questions*, edited by Professor Swete (Cambridge University Press), to which the following references are made, and from which a number of extracts are taken, especially in illustration of the basic principle enunciated by Canon Maurice Wilson, that "materialism wants to have God in the flesh: the Spirit of Good in man is not enough for them. They cannot see that there is a good spirit in each of us—a sort of Incarnation—and that if this is regarded, listened to, and followed, it will lead on to all truth: they wish a word of God that is definite: 'Do this, avoid that.' *Nullum est verbum Dei quod non spiritus intus audit.* The world is still at the beginning of the study of the nature of revelation" (*loc. cit.*, p. 22). "Anyone who can faithfully express what is true to himself may be drawing from a region of universal consciousness; and may help others to interpret, even if not exactly in the same way, their own experience" (p. 223). "It is the revelation and not the method that is primary in the teacher's aim; it is open to him to use either method. As Pascal says: 'We must have a hindmost thought, and judge all things by it, and yet must we speak as do the people (*Pensées*, XVII, 109)' " (p. 223). "Neither in national nor in universal history, nor in the interaction of natural laws,

can we yet find clear proof of a purpose in the whole " (p. 224). " Our inveterate habit of finding reasons for 'conclusions' which were rooted in our minds prior to any *reasons* warns me that here also our 'conclusions' may come first and our reasons second " (p. 224). " First individuals, then a family, then a nation, and then a Church, are the Divinely selected channels and depositaries of God's revelation to man in the past " (p. 225). [This is presented as the Biblical account of the development, but Wilson expressly recognizes that it is not compatible with the facts and findings of science.—  
AUTHOR.]

" But to modern thought the second, as an exclusive or dominant theory, is becoming impossible. Nevertheless it is still very strongly entrenched in our minds. It may be described as being 'in possession.' . . . Great is the power of words to preclude thought. It seems impossible to abandon a familiar word, though on reflection we see that it begs the question " (p. 225). " From the mere uttering of the word 'revelation' it has come to be assumed as self-evident, as admittedly unquestionable, that revelation is the communication to men, by some external agency, of truths which they could not arrive at by internal processes of their own minds" (p. 226). " Revelation may be the wrong word for the group of experiences we mean to denote by it" (p. 227). " The popular conception of the method of revelation as consisting of transactions in the phenomenal world is clearly responsible for most of the disbelief in any revelation at all. For there is no freshly renewed experience to be appealed to as verifying this conception; it rests on testimony; and the testimony, when examined, is incomplete, uncertain" (p. 228). " The conception of revelation, or of revealed religion, as a graduated series of objective communications from God, forces on us the difficulty of understanding why it is so imperfect. . . . We picture God as standing apart from man, and educating mankind gradually according to His will; ' accommodating' as we say, His teaching to man's capacities, an accommodation which in matters of science seems unnecessary and unaccountable, and in matters of conduct and belief sometimes shocks our moral sense" (p. 229).

" In fact, the whole conception of an external revelation

is felt to be untenable, when once it is realized. We cannot really conceive the tablets of stone written with the finger of God, nor a voice from heaven declaring in audible words some revelation of God to man" (p. 230). "The work of sceptics and unbelievers, as they are called, seems therefore to be as essential to progress in our present condition as that of believers" (p. 231). "Men very soon get into the habit of contentedly worshipping idols, not of wood and stone, but thoughts of God, once inspired by reverence, but now unworthy. . . . Is there any authenticated evidence of a revelation made to man which can be rightly called external, phenomenal? Is there any direct and explicit communication *ab extra* to men of facts of science, or history, or ethics, or theology? The whole trend of modern knowledge and research surely compels us to answer 'No,' with the reservation that appears later on" (p. 231). "'What is it that has been revealed?' If revelation were of this nature, this question must, it would seem, admit of a clear answer" (p. 233). "It is of course conceivable that a book beginning with legend and containing rudimentary ethics and theology and ending with symbol might be as it stands an objective revelation from God, though its ethical and spiritual value resides wholly in the interpretation of it by each age in accordance with its own light" (p. 233). "'The whole of the Church's Creeds and Doctrines' would be, or would have been, another reply. Witness the Biblical Theologies that have been constructed. But such an answer would scarcely bear cross-questioning" (p. 233). "If we replied 'The Person and character of our Lord Jesus Christ and His teaching about God and man,' we do not escape the difficulty. We see Him with different eyes. We cannot escape from our personality" (p. 234).

"In the region of objectivity science rightly claims to be supreme. Science is therefore expelling an unintentional and mistaken trespasser. . . . Slowly a conviction has set in, for which scientific method is responsible, that the pegs on which logical deductions hang, in any and every science of observation, can bear little but their own weight" (p. 234). Prophecy "was once thought to be an evidence of a distinct prevision of the future granted to some of the Old Testament

prophets; such that passages could be selected from them which fitted more or less accurately into a detailed picture or mosaic of Christ's life. That whole conception has passed away. . . . Again, the literary criticism of the Gospels is directing our thoughts inwards, by slowly unfolding Christ's method" (p. 236). "Revelation is education, not instruction. . . . The revelation of God, like the Kingdom of God, is within" (p. 237). "What we call progressive revelation is an increasing presence and influence, we may call it an evolution, of the Divine in man. There is an evolution of the soul as well as an evolution of the body. . . . Not . . . a semi-disclosure of the unknown future, but as a growing intuition of what is" (p. 239). "The Apostolic age, so far as we can judge, dwelt but little on the life of Jesus of Nazareth, or on any creed or code which He bequeathed to them" (p. 240). "The faith committed to the saints is the new Life" (p. 241). "We are surely preferring a great claim, claiming nothing less for humanity than did St. Paul—the power of the Indwelling Spirit" (p. 244). "One secret of effective preaching is the conviction that there is a Word of God speaking in every heart" (p. 245). But "were not Christ Himself, His Life and words, His death, His resurrection, and His ascension, a real and also an objective revelation? And to this the answer is, 'Yes'; though the qualification is repeated that we have no right, 'in the light of modern knowledge and research,' to postulate the historical accuracy, or on the other hand the historical inaccuracy, of the New Testament records respecting these alleged facts" (p. 252). "The serious attacks on Christianity are not attacks on Christ, but on the use that is made of His name, and on our affirmations about Him" (p. 253). "Myriads who cannot think of Christ as the pre-existent and eternal Son of God, or as the second Person in the Trinity, sent down from Heaven to reveal God to man, can and do think of Him as the Son of Man who lived on earth to reveal God in man" (p. 254).

"The historic validity of early traditions as to events in our Lord's life, the speculations of theology as to His precise nature, the relations of history to doctrine, are of great philosophical interest, but they are not part of revelation" (p. 255). "We cannot demonstrate that we ever have Christ's actual words.

We possess but fragments, occasional fragments, of His teaching; and deductive theology, like intuitive criticism, as was remarked above, is insecure" (p. 256). "Slowly this revelation of the Christ within—this living presence of God in the human heart—by which the soul is helped to come to its true nature seems to have been lost sight of, in spite of the Sacrament of the Body and Blood" (p. 257). "Christ within was lost in a metaphor; and the Christ on earth, or the Christ in the heavens became the main object of Christian thought" (p. 258). "For Christ's redeeming work did not begin when He was born in Bethlehem; it had begun as the Word of conscience, the Word 'very nigh' to man, in all men, in all ages" (p. 259). "No one can look on the melancholy failure of mankind in spite of all its civilizing influences, all its religion and philosophy and science, all its practical common sense, all the motives of kindly feeling and self-interest that urge it to do away with the curses of our political and social life; the awful contrasts of luxury and starvation, militarism, the drink traffic, religious jealousies, corruption, slums, and the ceaseless growth of the unemployable, without feeling that some fresh impulse is needed for human nature" (p. 260).

At a conference of Evangelical clergymen held at Oxford some years ago the Rev. J. R. S. Taylor thus described the moral condition of England in the eighteenth century: "It was an age of drunkenness, immorality, ignorant cruelty and crime. Most of the country squires were six-bottle men, and gin shops bore the sign, 'Drunk for a penny; dead drunk, twopence; clean straw for nothing.' Filth passed as the choicest form of wit, and the favourite form of amusement for the London mob, as well as fashionable women, was the public execution. Highway robbery and murder were common." Mr. Taylor admitted that circumstances had changed enormously since then; but were they walking in the true succession of the evangelical fathers? There were rival claimants for attention among them—the Press, books, and the radio. But he contended that the presentation of Christianity would always require living agents. Books would never supplant the sermon, nor would the microphone displace the pulpit. If this were so ten years ago, how much more must it be so to-day; no one can think this was a satisfactory

end to nineteen centuries of religious teaching. This recalls the saying "that Christianity had been tried long enough; it remains to try the religion of Christ." To me it appears that the whole idea of the deity as a "God of battle" has created a false estimate of things. The victors in a fight rejoice, forgetful of those who have fallen; the nation which conquers triumphs without thought of those which are subdued: it is really a worship of success, an illustration of the maxim "Whatever is, is right." *Victrix causa dis placuit* is a shallow inference from the self-satisfaction of those who win. We do not to-day believe that the Roman Empire was spiritually—that is, intellectually—better than the Greek civilization. We do not regard the restoration of the Stuarts as good evidence that God favoured them and overruled the efforts of their enemies, in the way set forth in the service for the "Blessed Saint and Martyr," Charles I, in the old Prayer Books. The Germans and the Jews were alike mistaken in their notion that they had a monopoly of divine favour. Such a view savours rather of the concepts which precede a fall than of real inspiration from above. "We do not identify Revelation with the Old Testament" (Dr. W. E. Barnes, *loc. cit.*, p. 345). "We may doubt whether Isaiah, if he had been asked whether the ideal King of his vision was human or Divine, could have answered the question at all. . . . We must not imagine that Isaiah had a philosophic conception of the unity of Jehovah. As contrasted with the gods of the heathen the God of Israel was doubtless *one*, but the prophet could nevertheless attribute to Him the words, *Who will go with us?* (Is. vi. 8)" (p. 356). "The one God of Israel was as yet found compatible with a kind of dualism by which His Angel could at one moment be identified with, and at another distinguished from Himself. During the century which separates Isaiah and Micah from Jeremiah and Ezekiel some progress seems to have been made in the definition of Doctrine. In the interval Deuteronomy was published and in it the great formula, *JEHOVAH our God, even JEHOVAH is one*. Jeremiah . . . mentions no angels, no cherubim; he stands himself alone in the presence of a God who is *one*" (p. 357). [The occurrence of the names in capitals indicates an advance, but the advance is qualified by the perpetuation of an exploded system of spelling. Books

abandoning the entire Christian creed will perhaps be printed all in upper case.—AUTHOR.]

“ Messiah is—for all that Jeremiah and Ezekiel say to the contrary—human ” (p. 359). “ JEHOVAH fights his battles for him ” (p. 359). “ In practice, as distinct from theory, the monotheism of the Hebrews was not always easily to be distinguished from the devotion of Moab to Chemosh, the national God of Moab, and of Assyria to Asshur, the eponymous God of Assyria. . . . Points of contact between the Jewish religion and the faiths of their neighbours are not evidence that all these early religions are equally false . . . rather they enable us to see that if one imperfect religion was helpful in preparing the way for the Christian Revelation among the Hebrews, other imperfect faiths might perform the same office among the Gentiles ” (pp. 362–3). [In his Munro Lectures Sir William Ramsay elaborated the view that the superstitions of Asia Minor aided Christianity.—AUTHOR.]

“ We see in Assyrian penitential psalms and in Vedic hymns a side of the old Gentile faiths which perhaps the prophets never saw, a side which has kinship with the teaching of the Hebrew prophets themselves, and through the prophets with the teaching of Evangelists and Apostles ” (p. 364).

This theologian’s ambiguity of diction is shown very clearly in the following passage: “ We come . . . to a somewhat fuller revelation given to Noah after the Flood. All the living creatures are delivered into Man’s hand for his use or to slay for his food. Only Man is taught that the shedding of blood, even of the blood of a beast, is an awful thing ” (p. 364). “ Abraham *was called the friend of God*, but we shall entirely misunderstand both the man, and God’s dealings with the man, unless we realize at what a low state of morality he stood at the beginning, and even towards the end of his career. . . . The denial of Sarai was a specially revolting act, since it was accompanied with Abraham’s own enrichment. . . . The temptation to offer up Isaac could only have happened to one whose moral condition was below that of the generation which Prophets taught ” (p. 365). “ God does not hurry (be it reverently said). A thousand years of moral evolution are *with Him as one day*: ‘ So many a million of ages have gone to the making of man ’ ” (p. 366). “ It may

be granted that the first chapter of Genesis contributes nothing to modern Natural Science" (p. 366). [It would be nearer the truth to submit that the Genesiac cosmogony and theogony have retarded and warped the progress of science for ages, and continue adversely to affect it. How vastly different it would have been if only these conceptions had contained even the germs of the scientific spirit and divination!—AUTHOR.]

"A large number of serious and devout Christians thankfully allow that methods of investigation which seemed at first to threaten revolution have in truth taught them fruitful and abiding lessons. Such men do not think of the early chapters of Genesis as their fathers thought" (Rev. F. H. Chase, *loc. cit.*, p. 375). "As the Gospels were not necessary for the genesis of the Church, so the discovery that they were unhistorical in their presentation even of important elements in our Lord's life would not of itself cause the dissolution of the Church" (p. 377). "The traditions as to the First Gospel are meagre and obscure, and we can make no positive assertion as to its authorship and early history" (p. 379). [In the New Testament there is the same dubious provenance as to the authorship and authenticity as in the Old, as described by Canon Ottley.—AUTHOR.]

"The Fourth Gospel presents problems a *complete* solution of which has not been found, and probably never will be found" (p. 381). "Idealization is perhaps a necessary condition for the preservation of the memory of a momentous spiritual crisis. . . . That remembrance was moulded by meditation. . . . The version of [Christ's] utterances preserved by the Synoptists cannot but have been limited and shaped by the memories through which they passed" (p. 382). "Dr. Drummond, in his remarkable book on *The Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel*, says Johannine authorship is compatible with 'the presence of a large ideal or allegorical element'" (p. 426). "Few scholars in the present day would refuse to find in the Fourth Gospel *some* signs of a process of idealizing. . . . There was the moulding influence of memory" (p. 384). "The moulding influence of translation. . . . The comparative freedom and ease of the representation of our Lord's words in the Greek Gospels as contrasted with

the rendering of Old Testament sayings in the LXX, is an indication that here we have the outcome of a long process, and that constant repetition has rubbed smooth the rough places" (p. 386).

"There was the moulding influence of the editor's hand. . . . Seldom indeed can we venture to say: 'Here we have a precise and exact representation of what the Lord actually said'" (p. 387). "Criticism then enforces the lesson of caution on all who are tempted to base important conclusions on the exact phraseology of the report of our Lord's words in the Gospels, and to claim for these conclusions the authority of Christ Himself" (p. 388). "God has not given us an infallible oracle. . . . St. Matthew (xxvii. 34) describes the 'myrrhed wine' (Mark xv. 23) in the story of the crucifixion as 'wine mingled with gall,' plainly in order to connect the incident with the words of the Psalm (lxix. 21). St. Mark ascribes to our Lord such strong human emotions as surprise, anger, horror; St. Matthew and St. Luke appear deliberately to omit or to tone down such notices as unbefitting our Lord's Divine Person" (p. 389). "When in St. Matthew (xxviii. 2 *sq.*) we read the description of 'the angel of the Lord' who 'descended from heaven, and came and rolled away the stone' of the sepulchre, 'and sat upon it'—'his appearance was as lightning, and his raiment white as snow'—we can hardly resist the feeling that here we have something akin to what we find in the Jewish apocalypses, and in particular to the story of the Resurrection as told in the so-called Gospel of Peter. Again, from the same Gospel (xxvii. 51 *sq.*) we take the reference to the resurrection of many bodies of the saints and their appearance to many after the Resurrection. . . . These instances appear to reveal a tendency on the part of the disciples of the first age, however narrow the limits within which it worked, to mould the narrative of the Lord's life in accordance with a current view of prophecy" (p. 390). "To enhance the wonder of His miracles, and even to include in the record something analogous to legend" (p. 390). "The Evangelists speak *e.g.* of the [risen] Lord eating with His disciples. St. Paul is silent even as to whether the Lord spoke to those who saw Him" (p. 395).

"It has been repeatedly shown by critics," writes Professor

Gardner (*Historic View of the New Testament*, p. 166), ‘that the mass of testimony as to the physical appearances of Jesus Christ after the crucifixion is formless and full of inconsistencies.’ ‘Who of us can maintain,’ asks Professor Harnack (*What is Christianity?* p. 161), ‘that a clear account of these appearances can be constructed out of the stories told by Paul and the evangelists?’” (p. 394). “A candid student of the Gospels claims for them substantial veracity, not infallible accuracy” (p. 395). “No historical evidence can compel men to believe that an alleged event in the past actually took place. . . . If the alleged event belongs to the sphere of religion, when historical criticism has done its work, the result becomes the material on which religious faith works” (p. 401). “Few would now maintain that the miracles are *to us* proofs of the Divine mission of Jesus Christ” (p. 402). “‘Marvels follow the steps of the saint by an inevitable law of human nature,’ says Professor Gardner, in his *Historic View*, p. 146” (p. 403).

“The Gospel according to St. Mark, which appears to be the earliest and simplest of the Gospels, presents the Lord far less as the teacher than as the healer and succourer of men” (p. 403). [As Harnack points out, Mark was essentially a realist. His narrative dwells mainly on the objective side of Christ’s ministry. It is a serious loss that the leading record of Christian origins should have been given by men of so little intellectual power as Mark and Luke.—AUTHOR.] “The New Testament outside the Gospels contains two references and only two references to our Lord’s miracles” (p. 403). “Elsewhere in the New Testament [after Acts x.] there is a complete and unbroken silence as to the miracles of our Lord. A similar statement may be made as to the Apostolic Fathers” (pp. 403–4). [From this circumstance Harnack draws the obvious inference that the Evangelists, being men of small education and humble social position, were prone to believe in and to magnify the miraculous element in the life of Christ.—AUTHOR.]

“Physical science teaches us a twofold lesson. On the one hand, everyone knows that science reveals to us a universe, vast in relation to space and in regard to time, in which forces are found to act according to fixed and undeviating

laws. . . . But we have no experience which enables us to form any conception of the essential potency of a will never weakened by sin and always controlled and quickened by uninterrupted communion with God" (p. 405). [Why essential? Is this not to beg the whole question? Surely, the issue is one of evidence. The foregoing argument is an attempt to instil prejudice. There is a similar tendency in the claim of peculiar favour vouchsafed to the Hebrews, whereas the Rev. R. J. Campbell justly surmises that very little would be heard of the Old Testament were it not for its connection with, and support from, the New, a proposition that savours of *petitio principii*.—AUTHOR.] "It is as unfair for the defender as it is for the assailant of the so-called miraculous element in the Gospel history to maintain that Christian belief, or even the substantial veracity of the records of our Lord's life, depends on the accuracy of every detail of every narrative . . . in which miracle has a place" (p. 406). "There is no allusion to the circumstances of the Lord's birth in any book of the New Testament except the First and the Third Gospels: no reference to the Virgin birth is found in the doctrinal teaching of St. Paul, St. Peter, or St. John." "There is no clear evidence of a tradition on this subject in the Church independent of the Gospels of St. Matthew and of St. Luke" (p. 407). "When we compare the two versions of the story of the Lord's birth it must be allowed that, though the discrepancies between them are often exaggerated, it is not easy to harmonize them" (p. 409). [In more straightforward language this means that it is impossible.—AUTHOR.]

"The sight, for example, and the sound of a multitude of the heavenly host singing in the sky have nothing analogous to them in the experiences of the most spiritually-minded men in these days" (pp. 410-11). But, "in the first place, to the mind of a pious Jew the world around him was peopled with spirits, good and bad. . . . Secondly, we cannot but think that Divine revelation is conditioned as to its methods by the beliefs of those to whom it is vouchsafed. Thirdly, some at least of these details in the story may be due to the influence of poetic instinct" (p. 411). "We cannot say that it was necessary, however congruous it may appear to many devout and thoughtful minds, that the Word, when becoming

Incarnate, should be born of a Virgin mother" (p. 414). "Is the story of our Lord's birth a romance intended, in point of wonder and of Divine interposition, to raise His birth above the birth of Isaac, the child of promise?" It "is, we may say with confidence, alien in its very nature to Jewish ideas" (p. 413). Yet "it is not too much to assert that there are very serious difficulties as to the genesis of the story of our Lord's birth, if we give up its historical truth" (p. 415). "'Neither religious faith in general, nor any doctrine of primary religious importance, will ever depend mainly upon the evidence of abnormal events recorded to have happened in the remote past' (Dr. Rashdall, *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 58)" (p. 415). "'It is impossible to evolve a historical fact out of our inner consciousness, or to have any real belief that anything took place 1800 years ago, merely because we wish it did and because we find such a belief comforting and consolatory' (Dr. Salmon, *Non-miraculous Christianity*, p. 6)" (p. 416). "The thoughtful Christian will recognize more clearly than in past days that he lives his religious life by faith, not by sight, not by that demonstrated certainty which in the intellectual sphere corresponds to sight" (p. 417). "The mistakes of an earnest seeker after truth must not be treated with harshness" (p. 418). "It will, I believe, be more and more clearly seen that, in regard to the events of our Lord's life on earth recorded in the Gospels, there is a wide difference between the amount and the nature of the evidence available in the several cases" (p. 417).

"Later generations are . . . in some ways, in a better position to understand Christ than His own contemporaries were" (Rev. A. J. Mason, *Essays on Some Theological Questions*, p. 423). "Not all who observed Him saw in Him precisely the same thing . . . the earliest estimate of Jesus Christ which we possess, so far as the literary chronology can be ascertained, is the estimate formed by one who never saw Jesus Christ before His death" (p. 424). "He mentions that Christ had laid it down that the preachers of the Gospel should be supported by those to whom they preached, and that wives should not quit their husbands, nor husbands put away their wives. In a speech recorded in the Acts he quotes the words of the Lord Jesus, how He said: 'It is more blessed to give

than to receive.' These are his only direct references to Christ's teaching" (p. 425). "To have 'known Christ after the flesh' was in his eyes a comparatively unimportant thing. It might even become a hindrance. . . . Christ was alive . . . Christ is a present Christ. . . . Not that St. Paul had any fantastic notions about the unreality of His human nature. . . . But St. Paul had no doubt that Jesus Christ was something higher first, and man afterwards" (p. 427).

"Without Him, if there could be a world at all, it would not be the world of order and consistency in which we live. . . . Until He came, the world did not know what it was making for" (p. 428). "Christ was the key to the riddle of the universe. In Him the divisions of the human race were abolished. . . . Nor does it differ in any important features from the presentation conveyed by the writers of the almost contemporary First Epistle of St. Peter or the Epistle to the Hebrews" (p. 429). "It follows almost necessarily that St. Peter cannot have written the Epistle himself. The apostle could not speak even his own native tongue with refined precision, but was easily recognized by dialect or accent as a Galilæan. He struck his own countrymen as an unlearned and ignorant man" (Canon Bigg, *International Critical Commentary, St. Peter and St. Jude*, p. 5).

"Without question there was amongst the early Christians an experience known as 'receiving the Holy Ghost,' which produced upon their imaginations, as upon all other faculties, an extraordinary effect, creating in its highest examples an audacity of religious thought. . . . That men under the influence of this novel inspiration should have seized upon those elements in the thought of their time which lent themselves to a philosophy like St. Paul's is natural enough. The Christian doctrine of Christ is, no doubt, the product of prophetic activity, of intelligence carried beyond itself by an illuminating and transporting force. . . . Whence came that strange *afflatus*, which was universal, so far as we know, among the first Christians?" (Mason, *Essays on Some Theological Questions of the Day*, p. 431).

To this question we may find an answer in Canon Bigg: "More important than all is the entire absence in I Peter of any allusion to Christian prophecy. . . . In the Gospels

of St. Matthew and St. Luke. . . . Prophecy is a miraculous gift, analogous to the power of casting out devils, and might be bestowed on or assumed by people whose conduct was not good (Mat. vii. 15). . . . At the beginning of the book of Acts we read of the outpouring of the spirit of prophecy on the day of Pentecost, and on several occasions we find the same gift bestowed on the newly baptized" (St. Peter and St. Jude, pp. 43-4). "In I Peter, James, Jude, Hebrews, we read of no prophets at all. . . . If we take the Pauline Epistles, we find little or no trace of the existence of prophets at Ephesus, or Philippi, or Colossus, or in Galatia, or at Rome. . . . But in two Churches, at Thessalonica and at Corinth, we find a very different state of things. Both were new Churches, composed probably in the main of Gentiles, who but a few months before had been idolaters. Yet in both these communities prophets were very numerous, and the Apostle gave them great encouragement (I Thess. v. 19; I Cor. xiv. 39). At Thessalonica the prophets were busily doing exactly what our Lord forbade, they were proclaiming that the day of Christ was imminent, and for this error they were rebuked by St. Paul (II Thess. ii. 2). Even in this town, prophetism appears to have been very active and, on the whole, mischievous. There were those who regarded it with disfavour, and wished to suppress it altogether—or, at any rate, to bring it under control by the imposition of restraints, which St. Paul thought too rigorous. 'Quench not the Spirit,' he says, 'despise not prophesying' (I Thess. v. 19-20). . . .

"But at Corinth the state of affairs was really extraordinary. The number of those who laid claim to the spiritual gifts of speaking with tongues and of prophesying must have been very large. But these miraculous endowments, instead of leading to meekness and unity, caused much angry rivalry, which turned even the public worship of the Church into a scene of disorder. These were not good fruits; indeed, to speak quite plainly, they are the contradiction of anything that we can reasonably attribute to the spirit of God" (p. 45). "But St. Paul could not absolutely forbid this outbreak of fanaticism. . . . After all, among the tares would be blades of wheat, and he would not dare to run the risk of plucking up these. But the consequences are very clearly to be dis-

cerned. The Church of Corinth was full of the most shocking disorders, both in faith (I Cor. xv. 12) and in morals. If there was any control there we cannot see where it resided, or what was its good. It is not too much to say that if this form of prophetism had not disappeared the Church could not possibly have endured" (p. 48). "A close parallel to the conduct of St. Paul is to be found in that of George Fox towards the Bristol fanatics. Fox was in the same position as the apostle. He too had fostered and encouraged prophecy, and, when the behaviour of Naylor opened his eyes to the gulf at his feet, he acted in the same way as St. Paul, not denying his own principles, but building the necessary fence along the edge of the precipice with authority, discretion, and reserve" (p. 46).

"At Corinth, as elsewhere, prophecy bore its usual and proper form of 'revelation' (I Cor. xiv. 26)—that is to say, of immediate communication from the Holy Spirit. Revelation always implies Ecstasy (Acts x. 10; xi. 5; xx. 17), that state which is also called being in the Spirit (*Apoc.* i. 10), and is described by St. Paul himself (II Cor. xii. 2) as a condition in which the man knew not whether he were in the body or out of it. It was, in fact, a trance, in which sense was suspended, but intelligence, though not active, was quickened into a condition of high receptivity. The prophet understood what he saw or heard, and when he spoke, spoke intelligible words" (p. 46). [With this compare Hume's distinction between superstition and enthusiasm in religion: superstition, proceeding from fear and leading on to priesthood and mediation; enthusiasm, arising in boldness and self-conceit and ending in want of order and fanaticism (*Essay on Superstition*).—AUTHOR.] "Prophecy was ecstatic (those later writers who denied this only meant that Christian ecstasy differed from Pagan); it was a direct communication from the Spirit, a revelation, not, like Teaching, an exposition of other men's revelations" (p. 47). "*Prophetism* sums up in one word the difference between St. Paul the mystic and St. Peter the disciplinarian. Where a body of prophets has assumed the direction of affairs, discipline is impossible" (p. 48).

"We may suppose that the whole Church was violently agitated by the circumcision dispute, and did not settle down

in quiet for some years; and this is the view which has been derived from too exclusive a use of the Epistles of St. Paul. Or we may suppose that the heat was generated by a handful of fanatics, that it was a mere crackling of thorns, which never received any support from the Twelve, and died away at once; and this is the view which we should gather from the Book of Acts" (pp. 41-2). "What St. Paul wrote about the Law, except in Galatians, is not directly polemical—it is simply the free expression of his mystic belief that all external authority disappeared with the advent of the Spirit. That St. Peter did not share this belief is abundantly evident" (p. 42). "Hence in St. Peter we find that same sense of the continuity of history which is so nobly expressed in Hebrews. There has been no rejection of the Jew; he has simply been called like everybody else to move on to a higher plane" (p. 42).

"The writer does not use the word 'Church,' a peculiarity which he shares with Hebrews, for in that Epistle also 'Church,' though it twice occurs (ii. 12, in quotation from O.T. xii. 23), does not bear its familiar technical sense" (p. 48). "Of the sacraments, Baptism is spoken of as having a saving power (iii. 21); the Eucharist is not mentioned. Thus the organization also appears to be marked by the same primitive simplicity that we have noticed as characteristic of the Epistle in other points. If we attach any historic value to Acts—and how can we help doing this?—the polity of the Petrine Churches is more conservative than that depicted in or suggested by any of the Pauline Epistles. But now, if the relation between the Petrine and Pauline Epistles is as it has here been described, if in dogma they agree and in practice they differ, and if, when they differ, the Petrine Epistle is more primitive, as it proved to be more enduring, how are we to explain these singular facts? We may say that the sub-apostolic Church, with all its reverence for St. Paul, failed to understand his idea of Freedom, that his pure and noble mysticism was too hard for them, that the time for it was not yet come, and that God sent His people back again into the wilderness after a first glimpse of the Promised Land. But then how are we to account for the fact that where the Petrine writer falls away from St. Paul, he is falling back upon the Synoptic Gospels?" (p. 49).

"St. Luke says that immediately after his conversion St. Paul preached Christ in the synagogues at Damascus, and does not mention his retirement into Arabia. . . . But, in any case, if the retirement to Arabia lasted but a few weeks, the word 'immediately' may very well pass" (p. 56). "In Acts we read that St. Paul spent some time in Jerusalem, disputing against the Hellenists. St. Paul himself says simply that he abode with Peter fifteen days: we are to understand either that he spent a fortnight in Peter's house, or that at the end of this fortnight Peter was called away from Jerusalem" (p. 57). "As regards the second meeting (Gal. ii. 1-6; compared with Acts xv.), there is much perplexity. . . . On this second visit to Jerusalem (Acts xi. 30; xii. 1) possibly *Barnabas and Saul* did not see *apostles*, only elders; *Paul and Barnabas* went up again later about the circumcision. According to St. Luke, the two envoys went up to Jerusalem by commission from the Church of Antioch; St. Paul tells us that he was directed or permitted to go by 'revelation,' by an immediate communication from the Holy Spirit. The two modes of expression are easily reconcilable. A commission from the Church of Antioch implied a revelation (Acts xiii. 1); but we may observe that here again St. Paul is striking the note of independence" (pp. 57-8). [Renan (*Apôtres*) considers these discrepancies fatal to the credibility of Acts, and rejects altogether its "second visit" as a consequence.—AUTHOR.]

"He had been met by agreement, where perhaps he did not quite expect it, and he had been obliged to make concessions of which he did not quite approve; hence he manifests a certain uneasiness lest his authority should have suffered disparagement in the opinion of his more immediate followers" (p. 59). "It would seem that St. Paul in the heat of the moment did not make the necessary distinction between St. Peter and St. James or between these two Apostles and that extreme party whom they were anxious to conciliate and against whom he himself had so much reason for legitimate indignation" (p. 68). "That St. Paul never can have approved of the Decree, that he could not on principle regard this, or any other ecclesiastical canon as binding upon the conscience, is certain" (p. 61). "Even at Antioch his position was not secure; there was a Jew as well as a Gentile party.

The question of the hour was not really one of principle but of compromise, of policy, of comprehension. The Council of Jerusalem had decided that there should be a compromise, with the usual result that neither party was satisfied. It is true that beneath this question of the hour there lay a question of principle, of mysticism or disciplinarianism; of the kind and degree of respect due to ecclesiastical regulations" (p. 63).

Having regard to these facts Renan says positively that the decree never can have existed as a declaration of the Church promulgated with the most solemn sanctions. "By the time when he wrote to the Corinthians, St. Paul had quite made up his mind about the Jerusalem Decree, and laid down clearly his two great principles, that the 'spiritual man judgeth all things,' and that 'meat commendeth us not to God.' Those who observed precepts and insisted upon rules appeared to him . . . as the weaker brethren, as the carnal agents of strife and division" (Bigg, pp. 63-4). "Can we not imagine that Mark or Silvanus may have been equally ready to take their orders either from St. Peter or from St. Paul?" (p. 74). "On the contrary, the difficulty is to understand how either Mark or Silvanus can ever have been thorough-going advocates of the distinctively Pauline teaching. Let it be remembered that Mark parted from St. Paul . . . and that Silas was the chosen advocate of the Jerusalem Decree" (p. 85). *Tantæ animis calestibus iræ?*

"Dr. Harnack thinks that the Epistle [I Peter] does not profess to be the work of a personal disciple of Jesus. . . . He maintains that it cannot be the work of St. Peter himself because of its Paulinism, of its impersonality, and of the vagueness of its references to the Gospels. Hence it becomes necessary *a priori* to regard the address and subscription as forged; but Dr. Harnack also finds these passages full of difficulty. . . . For that harmless masquerading which we find later on in the *Judicium Petri*, the *Clementine Homilies*, the *Constitutions of the Apostles*, or *Dionysius the Areopagite*, is in the present instance quite out of the question often" (pp. 78-9). "There is therefore some internal and strong external evidence in favour of the authenticity of the address. But if the address is genuine, no one will care to dispute the genuineness of the subscription. The difficulties involved in the latter passage

are not of a kind that can be regarded as insuperable" (pp. 79-80).

"Pseudonymous composition seems to have begun in the centuries immediately preceding the Christian era. Its earliest productions, letters of Plato, Aristotle, Phalaris, and so forth, were mere *jeux d'esprit* . . . but the flood of Orphic and Pythagorean fictions . . . had a serious object, that of recommending peculiar doctrines under shelter of an ancient and venerable name. Alexandrian Jews . . . practised the same dishonest art, in order to persuade cultivated Greeks that the doctrines of the Bible were 'stolen' by the classic poets. . . . In the Church we find the manufacture of Pauline Epistles carried on in the lifetime of the apostle. In the second century Gnostics are accused of tampering with the text of scripture. They retorted that Scripture, as read by the Catholics, was spurious or interpolated. From this time we find a great mass of pseudonymous writings" (p. 242). "Spitta observes with perfect truth that the reasons for which documents were accepted or rejected by the early Church were not what we understood by the word 'critical.' Men guided their judgment largely by what we may call the pedigree of the document in question, but still more by its relation to the orthodoxy of the time" (p. 245). "Barnabas cites Enoch three times, twice as scripture. . . . In short, at the time when Barnabas wrote, Enoch was held to be an inspired book; it retained this reputation more or less throughout the second century" (p. 309) (Canon Bigg on *Jude* 14).

With this we may compare some passages from his book on *The Church's Task Under the Roman Empire*, 1905: "The old Roman faith was remarkably simple. There was hardly any mythology, and for a long time the gods had no statues. It was also strongly moral. The gods gave every man his duty, and expected him to perform it. Filial obedience, chastity, respect for women, decency and gravity, good faith in public and in private, respect for law, sobriety, diligence, patriotism, all these were good old Roman virtues, commanded by the gods and enforced by the Censors. Among the ancient Gentile cults there is none so respectable, and none so prosaic, as the Roman. It is the religion of men who are too busy to have any time for sentiment. When Rome

became the mistress of the world there was no doubt a change. The gods of Greece found their way into the city along with Greek culture and Greek vices. But the mythology never made itself at home in the West" (pp. 35-6). "The old Roman religion still lived on and found its natural consummation in Cæsar-worship. The Emperor while he lived had been the ruler and saviour of the world; what more natural than that he should continue after death to watch over the destinies of his people?" (pp. 36-7). "Cæsar-worship was an attempt to perpetuate the theocracy, under the changed conditions of society. *Praesens divus habebitur Augustus*, says Horace, *Carm.* 111.5.2. . . . The Christian Emperors made a very similar claim . . . the soldier swore, *per Deum et Christum et Sanctum Spiritum et per maiestatem imperatoris* because he owed obedience to Augustus, *tamquam praesenti et corporali deo*. Constantine and his successors claimed to be the vice-regents of God, in the same sense as King David or King Solomon. In the Eastern Church the claim is still recognized" (p. 37 note). "Finally we must notice the strong and oppressive grip which the State maintained upon the Church in the palmy days of the Four Great Councils. At no other time have the clergy been reduced to such an Erastian servitude, and this fact helps us to explain many painful features of that period" (p. 136).

In this context the following illustrations are instructive: "Isis is figured as a woman bearing the divine child Horus upon her knees, and claims the titles of Queen of Heaven, Queen of the Sea, *cp.* our 'Lady of the Sea.' Did Isis borrow from the Church or the Church from Isis? . . . The same question will recur when we come to examine the worship of Mithra" (p. 42). "'What saw I there,' says Apuleius, 'I would tell if it were lawful. . . . I trod the confines of death, and the threshold of Proserpine; I was swept round all the elements and returned; I beheld the sun at midnight shining with purest radiance. Gods of heaven and gods of hell I saw face to face and adored in presence.' In that dark cell, illuminated by flashlights and filled with surging stupefying vapours, dizzy as he was with protracted fasting and excited by wild anticipations, he saw Osiris ruling among the dead, and heard the magic formula by which the awful judge is appeased. The ancients were

past masters in the scenic art, and could have taught our modern thaumaturgists a good deal that has happily been forgotten" (p. 43). "Mithra was originally but one among the lower gods of Persia; but his figure is of such force and vitality, and has been animated by such profoundly religious conceptions, that he pushes all the others into the background, and remains the one sufficient object of adoration. He is mediator between God and man, creator, regenerator, the giver of all light . . . the comforter of man in all trouble, and his strong helper against the evil Ahriman, who by his grace can always be overcome" (pp. 51-2).

"We find exactly the same thing in that supposed Mithra Liturgy, to which I made allusion in the preceding Lecture, and in magical documents—for instance, in the Ephesian Letters. These unmeaning and reiterated yells were intended, no doubt, to work up the devotee into a state of frenzy, but they were also supposed to form a sacred language, understood of God though not of man, and powerful to call down divine help which might otherwise be refused. We find them in the old Baal worship, and in some of the Gnostic Acts, and they probably formed a leading feature in all the newer types of paganism. Another striking feature of the Gnostic sects is the great influence which they allowed to women. Many of their leaders had an Egeria, and some were attended by troops of ecstatic female devotees. They attributed exaggerated honour to the Virgin Mary, 'the pleroma of all pleromas' [she is called in the *Pistis Sophia*, p. 28]" (p. 65). [The following passage sheds light on the misty and foggy atmosphere from which the doctrines of the Church arose.—**AUTHOR.**] "The line of Platonism runs on through Maximus Tyrius and the Neoplatonists. Some of these latter were little better than spiritualistic mediums; some of them we might call charlatans" (p. 72).

"He [Maximus] defends idolatry thus: The statue cannot really express the glory of God, who is 'father and creator of all things; older than the sun, older than heaven, stronger than time or eternity'; but it quickens our dull susceptibility, as the portrait of our beloved ones or the lute on which they used to play" (p. 74). "Even a highly accomplished and most vicious man, like Petronius, was afraid to go

out in the dark. When Germanicus, the darling of the people, was carried off by an untimely death, men dragged the little images of the Penates out of their houses and flung them into the gutter" (pp. 76-7).

[Students of European folk-lore, and of that of Italy in particular, are aware of the large extent to which it has been incorporated in Catholic belief and practice. For example, Lord Acton animadverted in the strongest terms on the laxity of the early Church in furtively adopting or conniving at Pagan superstitions. He points out that Gregory Thaumaturgus, the pupil of Origen, sanctioned practices of which he and other Patristic writers did not approve in order to make it easier for the heathen to come over.—AUTHOR.]

"The best commentary is supplied by Paulinus of Nola, who followed the same policy in the fourth century in Campania. The object was to some extent attained; but the church-ale was so like the old heathen festival that it was really the same thing" (p. 84, *note*). "The rapid growth of the legend of the Invention of the Cross is one of the most remarkable instances of the credulity of the fourth century. The Pilgrim of Bordeaux, who visited the holy places in 333, does not mention the Cross at all, nor does Eusebius. Cyril of Alexandria says that the Cross had often been discovered (*Comm. in Proph.*, ed. Pusey, Vol. II, 540)," p. 41 (Bigg, "Paulinus of Nola," in *Sketches of Ecclesiastical History*).

[A caveat must be entered against Lord Acton's almost unmeasured denunciation of the persecutions of the early Christians in the Roman Empire. As is now known for a certainty, the motive was political rather than religious, and even the most ruthless of the penal laws against Christians was mildness itself compared with the savageries inflicted by the orthodox Church upon heretics, which was inspired and actuated by the precedents in the Old Testament which commanded and enforced the Jewish law of death for the blasphemer. Despite the doctrine that under the New Dispensation all things were made new, this relic of barbarism was preserved, and put to murderous use.—AUTHOR.]

"Virgil . . . ranks among the great ones of all ages. No man so clearly shows that even in evil times the way to abiding fame in the kingdom of letters is to lift up the reader to dignified

and beautiful conceptions of life and duty" (Bigg, *The Church's Task*, pp. 91-2). "We may see the very faces and figures of the people who made his fame in the broken frieze of the *Ara Pacis*. . . . They look fit to be the Masters of the World" (p. 92). "People brought cattle and sacrificed them before the Church of Felix, just as they had done before the temple of Venus" (Charles Bigg, *Wayside Sketches in Ecclesiastical History*, Longmans Green; 1906, p. 49). "The heart is a dangerous guide, because sooner or later its tender imaginations fall into the hands of logicians, who petrify them into stony absurdities" (p. 54). "You may find in Paulinus without difficulty the germ of all that shocks us in Tetzel, but what in the first is the simple effusion of a childlike faith has been hardened into a system in the other, by the perverse labour of the mediaeval theologians" (p. 55). "The long Arian dispute was silenced, not by the arguments of Athanasius or Basil, nor by the wise decisions of the Council of Constantinople, but by the terrible laws of the first persecuting emperor, and from that time onwards the agreement of the Church had rested in the last resort upon the sword and the stake" (p. 159).

"In less than eighty years, whether by ignorance or fraud, the canons of Sardica came to be regarded at Rome as canons of the first great Ecumenical Council of Nicæa, and were quoted as such by Pope Zosimus, in a famous case. . . . This was the beginning of a long series of forgeries and interpolations" (p. 187). "Even then, in the fourth and fifth centuries, there was a party in the West which was quite prepared to accept the *Vaticanicum*" (p. 187). "It was the time of the establishment of Christianity, of the four great Councils and of the ruin of the Western Empire. During the lives of these three men, Christian doctrine assumed its permanent shape, Paganism was destroyed, and every vestige of independent thought was crushed out by the terrible laws of Theodosius and his sons" (p. 2). "It is in the fourth century, in Prudentius, and in the West, that we first detect this lamentable decline of intelligence" (p. 16). "Vigilantius, a countryman of Prudentius, raised his voice in protest, but was overwhelmed by Jerome with spouts of acrid abuse" (p. 17). "Thus it is the perpetual tragedy of the higher religions to be vulgarized as

they become popular, and to be ruined by success. When the apostle has converted the crowd, he becomes a bishop" (L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, 2nd ed., 1915, p. 346).

"It is a delusion to think that the Church of Luther, Calvin, or Jewel was the church of the first six centuries. They themselves knew that it was not so. It was not possible for any learning or sincerity to reproduce that vanished age. Very fortunately it was not possible. It was an age of growing barbarism and ignorance" (Bigg, *Wayside Sketches in Ecclesiastical History*, p. 189). "Later theology is largely occupied with providing a basis in Scripture and philosophy for opinions which have no real connection with either one or the other, which have indeed no other source than the irresponsible and unrestrained devotion of the people" (p. 53).

"The nucleus for the legends, if legends there were, must be sufficiently great to have gained acceptance for the legends" (Mason, *Essays on Theological Subjects*, p. 432). "The Acts of the Apostles, if not as a whole the work of St. Luke, the companion of St. Paul, must of course be ascribed to some later writer, to whom doubtless the Pauline Christology was familiar and accepted: but his picture of the historic life, in the speeches which he records, is simplicity itself" (p. 432). "The three speeches, from which these words are taken are attributed to the Apostle Peter, and their delineation of the person and function of Christ is in close agreement with that which is displayed by the Gospel which ancient tradition connects with St. Peter and his interpreter. Even in reading St. Mark's Gospel it may be necessary for the critical student to be on the watch for occasions where the opinion of a second generation of believers may have influenced the narrative and caused it to deviate from historical exactness. But all attentive readers can recognise the primitive character of this precious document as a whole" (p. 433). "The figure which he presents to us is that of 'a man approved of God.' . . . It would scarcely be doing violence to the language of the Evangelist to say that for the moment he describes Him as under the influence of terror. Only an agonizing struggle with Himself brings Him into frame to go on with the work which He had taken in hand, the cost of which is suddenly seen to be so great" (p. 435).

"He brings back to life a little girl who was believed to be dead. Above all other forms of disease He wages war upon that half mental, half bodily ailment which was known at the time as being possessed of devils. Jesus Himself treats the possession as a reality. He speaks to the evil spirits. It ought, however, to be observed that in St. Mark's Gospel He also 'rebukes' the wind and speaks to the sea as to a living being, and treats the barren fig-tree as a thing which had a duty and had left it undone. In St. Luke, He 'rebukes' a fever" (p. 437 and note).

Does the writer mean that such terms are mere figures of speech? He speaks of curing "leprosy" with apparently no knowledge of the fact that the disease defined in the Bible is a composite of miscellaneous skin affections, some nervous, some the effect of real causes which do not depart at the bidding of any man. *Ergo*, He was not man, or the tales are false. The latter view, curiously, is now generally held by theologians. A third possibility is that the diagnosis was erroneous; but divines do not like to admit this of the Divinity, though they are ready enough to attribute fallibility to St. Paul, or Luke, or Moses, or the unknown writers of the exilic age who are responsible for the present version of Hebrew Scriptures. There is something very droll in this theory of inspiration which was at times infallible, and, again, at others liable to unaccountable lapses as to common events and everyday knowledge. In practice we do not find that the skill of a surgeon or the acumen of a man of science bears any relation to his moral tone. Even in literature orthodoxy does not confer special talent, of which there is a marked example in the fact that even the Romish Church has found it judicious to adopt to great extent the authorized English of the Bible, and the words of the Church service compiled by the Reformers whom she burnt as heretics. There is no ground whatever for supposing that sinlessness would give enhanced power over nature. This is one of the gratuitous assumptions that clerics always resort to when pushed into a corner. It is the last dregs of the superstition that men could work miracles by fetishes, mascots, and magical formulæ; for in the end saintship always consists in observation of bygone virtues.

It is one of the many anachronisms of our so-called civiliza-

tion that prayers for fine weather or rain are still occasionally employed in State and Free Churches. As Mark Twain long ago satirically pointed out, prayers for a favouring wind from a vessel sailing westwards would be neutralized by prayers from one voyaging eastwards unless the Almighty contrived to give each ship a lane for itself. What, then, are we to think of the following solemn farce?

“The stadium was attended by a [vast crowd of] Anglo-Catholics for High Mass in connection with the Oxford Movement Centenary celebrations. The service, which began at 11.30, was the largest ever held in England. *Anglo-Catholics throughout the land had prayed on Saturday night for fine weather*, and when the celebration started sunlight glittered on the gold and red robes of bishops, deacons, and priests, and played upon the brilliance of the golden Gospel and Epistle pulpits and upon the giant golden canopy over the altar. Twenty minutes later priests were standing bare-headed in the rain, the Bishop of Colombo sheltering under a golden canopy, and the Bishop of St. Albans presiding on his throne at the rear of the altar finding protection only from a small covering. *Priests drenched to the skin* stood an hour and a half in the rain. *Thunder shook the Stadium* as the Bishop of Colombo pronounced the final blessing.”

“Jesus soon showed that He had no intention of inculcating only a reformed Judaism. To those who complained of Him for not making His disciples fast at a time when the Pharisees and even the disciples of John were fasting He answered that it would spoil both Judaism and the new religion to seek to combine the two” (*Essays on Theological Subjects*) (p. 439). It did not tie them down to any fixed presentation of the truth; they were to give their own account, and it was to struggle and make its way by survival of the fittest. But the Church thought it knew better. Like the Israelites, it would have a king, and rejected the methods of wisdom. The upshot has been “envy, hatred, malice, and all uncharitableness,” stereotyped in exploded dogmas. In this way commonplace and mean bigots have always vitiated and hampered the work of the saviours of man. They have ever thought that their own petty conceptions and starveling ideas were adequate

and final interpretations of the living word which speaks to the spirit, and draws out from it new meaning and fresh views. "Feeling hearts, touch them but rightly, pour a thousand melodies unheard before"; but these purblind pedants, lacking the spirit of good, seek to bind, with windy, wordy nothings, the harmony of the soul. "Thus ever the world has rejected its wisest, its noblest, its best. Thus man has never respected those who have loved it most. Conquerors, kings, and kaisers are laden with crowns of gold, but Christ was despised and rejected, and his crown was a crown of thorns. Therewith He ascended to heaven, and sits on the throne of God. And they who would follow Him thither must tread the path He trod" (*Ruth*; a poem).

"He [Christ] cared little what offence was taken by strict people at the company which He kept, but St. Mark's Gospel never shows us, like those of St. Matthew and St. Luke, Jesus at meat in the house of a Pharisee. . . . Immediately after the record of the Baptist's words we are told how the Holy Spirit came upon Jesus Himself, and how He was immediately led forth by the Spirit to His great conflict in the wilderness" (p. 441). "Perhaps if we still had the original ending of St. Mark we should have found in it the institution of Christian Baptism; but this is only conjecture however probable" (p. 442). "In the unfinished state of the Gospel, arguments from silence are unusually precarious. It would be rash to rest anything even on the authority of the express statement in the broken sentence. It is impossible to take it *au pied de la lettre*" (*Murray on The Spiritual and Historical Evidence for Miracles*, p. 333). Here we are denied the right, which seems legitimate, of urging Mark's silence as to many things later assumed, and urged to accept an wholly unwarranted postulate, prompted by the wish which is proverbially father to the thought. This habit of reading things into documents is the bane and opprobrium of theological argument.

"It is now generally agreed that the account in Mark xvi. 1-8 was published first, and was actually in the hands of the other three Evangelists, substantially in its present shape" (*loc. cit.*, p. 333). "It is perhaps worth while to call attention to the fact that St. Mark has a curious habit of qualifying

his universal negatives" (p. 333). [Yet for years I contended that it was obvious that a Greek Mark was the basis of the rest, but could never get it admitted till Harnack and other Germans drove it home by force of facts.—AUTHOR.] "He accepted it [the title of Christ] at an earlier date from the lips of His disciples. The reason why He would not allow it to be published abroad lay, no doubt, in the ambiguous content of the title, which varied indefinitely with the speakers who used it, and in its liability to be distorted by the people" (Mason, p. 444).

[If the common meaning of words holds, the following surely implies a diametrical contradiction in our authorities.—AUTHOR.] "Never until the Resurrection does the fourth Gospel represent any of the disciples as discerning that God-head of the Lord Jesus which it begins by affirming" (p. 447). "It is true that if we wished to translate 'a human being' into the language which Jesus habitually spoke, we could find no other term for it than to say 'a son of man.' Perhaps no great part of the significance of the phrase would be lost if we were to admit that the 'Son of Man' means 'the human being'" (p. 450). "It is evident that Jesus lays claim to be 'the human being' beyond all others. He represents humanity as no other can do. He claims to speak in the name of humanity. . . . He looks on to the end of things, and sees in Himself the fulfilment of that prophecy of Daniel, which doubtless suggested the title, where, in contrast with the monstrous and inhuman figures which represent the empires of the world, the kingdom of God appears in the form of a Son of Man" (p. 451).

Is the writer here suggesting that Daniel wrote these words? If not, surely some warning should have been given. Above all others known to me, our author appears to have the habit, common with theologians, of admitting that a thing is not true, and then speaking of it as if it were—e.g.: "The title of 'the Son of God,' from one point of view . . . is less significant than that of 'the Son of man.' There is good evidence that in the Gospel days it was a current and conventional description of the Messiah. As such, it had lost force and meaning, as all complimentary language does. The origin of the title lies, of course, in the promise made to David in the Old

Testament concerning Solomon, ‘I will be to him a Father, and he shall be to Me a son,’ and in the Psalms which are based upon it. Thus the King who was expected to come was designated ‘the Son of God.’ . . . It lies open for the Christian to believe that the promise was more completely fulfilled, and the Divinely prophetic phrase charged with a profounder meaning, than was understood by those who first uttered and received it or by those later generations who singled it out and made a technical use of it” (p. 452). “A voice came out of the cloud, “This is my Son, my beloved Son; hear Him,” and suddenly, when they looked around, they no longer saw anyone, but Jesus only with themselves ” (p. 453). “He speaks of Himself absolutely as ‘the Son.’ It makes the dividing line not only between Himself and other men, but between Himself and those spiritual agencies above mankind who are sometimes described in Old Testament language as ‘the sons of God’ ” (p. 454). I understood that Hebraists were all agreed that this is a familiar expression in Hebrew folklore, so not to be pressed.

Again: “That anonymous document which, as most students believe, has been employed by St. Matthew and St. Luke in common, and which may even have been in the hands of St. Mark . . . contained the words which Jesus uttered on the return of the Seventy from the mission on which He had sent them ” (p. 455). [If this be true, the compilers of the Gospels were morally guilty of the loss of this precious record, for which has been substituted their own feeble fabrications.—AUTHOR.] “It has been reserved for a priest of the French Church to suggest that these words were never really uttered by Jesus Christ, but are the product of a later time, a specimen of the inspired ‘prophecies’ of the primitive Church which came by mistake to be attributed to our Lord Himself (Loisy, *L’Evangile et l’Eglise*, p. 74 ff.) ” (p. 455). “There are indeed important differences between the aspect presented to us by the Lord Jesus in the pages of St. John and that which He wears in the Synoptic Gospels ” (p. 457). “The Mother of Jesus. . . . In St. John’s Gospel, she is His companion in life and in death ” (p. 458). “The humanity of his Christ is not a make-believe ” (p. 459). “It is of no great importance to know whether anything of the speculations

of Philo had reached St. John in his old age, as it well might have done; or whether, historically speaking, his use of the term was derived wholly from its use in the rabbinic schools of Palestine; the Word of St. John's Gospel is unmistakably a personal agent from the beginning, and the Gospel consists in a delineation of His personal life as a man on earth. . . . Christ in the Apocalypse is the same in every essential feature as in the Gospel of St. John" (p. 462). "'His name is called the Word of God.' . . . It is impossible to make history out of the Gospels if we start with the assumption that Jesus was nothing more than an inspired man. On that assumption, much that the Gospels contain must be discarded as most improbable" (p. 463).

"We must freely admit that we have not the means for harmonizing completely these different accounts" (Murray, *The Spiritual and Historical Evidence for Miracles*, p. 334). "It is in fact only in the account of the appearance to the assembled Apostles on the night of the Resurrection that we can be sure that any two writers (leaving out of account the last twelve verses of St. Mark) are describing the same appearance" (p. 336). [He accepts St. Mark's version as being that of an eye-witness, and says it is the account of St. Peter.—AUTHOR.]

"These differences are due . . . perhaps to ignorance on the part of one or other of the Evangelists" (p. 337). "It seems natural, if not inevitable, to regard the whole of the material side of these phenomena as a condescension to our limited powers of apprehension" (p. 338). "There is no likelihood that any of them was put into writing till ten years after the writing of I Corinthians" (p. 339). "If we accept the fact, difficulties and perplexities in detail no doubt remain for which we can at present suggest no certain solution, both in the documents themselves and in the phenomena they describe. . . . No one can wish anything but God-speed to those who press onward in the hope that a fuller knowledge of the constitution of matter and a closer study of physical phenomena may enable them in the end to lift the veil" (pp. 339-40). [O my prophetic soul! Surely a most impotent conclusion. If the assertions of spiritists are credible (Richet, *Thirty Years Psychic Research, supra*), the appearances of Jesus are without evidential value as regards the divinity of Christ.—AUTHOR.]

" Regarded merely as the story of an institution the history of the Church often proves most disappointing. The human passions displayed, the apparent triviality of the causes which led to the most embittered disputes, the unfavourable light in which some of the most venerated names perforce appear, make the record of Christianity a sad one, and lead to painful disillusionment" (F. J. Foakes Jackson, "Christ in History," *loc. cit.*, p. 475). " The acceptance of the principle of evolution has caused great changes in our views regarding the history of Christianity, as it has in every other department of modern thought" (p. 475). " Dobschütz says (*Christian Life in the Primitive Church*, pp. 372-4): 'The real moral status of the Churches is raised in spite of all so-called secularization, or rather, to some extent in consequence of the abatement of enthusiasm. Excesses like those with which Paul had to contend in Corinth are to be met with only in quarters which the Church had cut off from herself' " (p. 476, *note*). " It may be frankly acknowledged that the personal disciples of our Lord shared in the misconceptions of the age in which they lived. Indeed, the candour of this admission is characteristic of the Gospel narrative" (p. 479). " We must make due allowance for the limitations of the age as compared with the knowledge of nature to which we have attained" (p. 479). " In the Gospels we see practically nothing of the Twelve but their faults and failures" (p. 480). " Nothing is more remarkable than the gradual manner in which mankind has advanced in the path of moral progress" (p. 481). " From Moses to Amos the Israelites were learning what seems to us the elementary truth that right conduct is more important than the performance of ritual acts of worship" (p. 481). " The Monophysite heresy was every whit as dangerous to Christianity as ever Arianism had been. . . . The cultus of the Madonna, of the Bambino, and of wonder-working images is traceable to the feeling that Christ's Divinity had absorbed His Humanity altogether" (p. 490).

" John Chrysostom stands absolutely alone as the finest moral character in the Greek Church. Other men won a title to sanctity by founding monasteries or refuting heresies; but Chrysostom dared to stand up boldly for righteousness against the practical Paganism of Constantinople" (p. 490). " Modern

Christian Apologists have perhaps pressed too strongly the contrast between the morality prevalent in the days of Imperial Rome and that inculcated by Christianity. They seem not to recollect that there are certain periods in the history of the greatest Christian nations which rival the worst days of pagan Rome" (p. 493). "So repugnant is the ideal of the monk to the modern mind that it is not easy to realize that unless it had been adopted the Christian religion could scarcely have survived the overthrow of the Empire" (p. 496). "At times she nearly succumbed, and it cannot be denied that the majority of her clergy tolerated some of the worst abuses of their time" (p. 502). "So completely did its spirit incorporate itself in the Church that for upwards of a thousand years it formed the ideal of perfect Christianity" (p. 497).

"The Confessions of Faith, Catechism, Articles of Religion, which mark the course of the Reformation, are singularly out of harmony with the spirit of our age, and now that the facts are more accurately known neither Protestant nor Roman controversialists seem to emerge with much credit" (p. 508). "This condition of affairs had perhaps become caused by the way the practice of religion had been reduced to a scheme of salvation. The medieval Church, with her elaborate classification of sins and virtues, her catalogue of penances, her doctrine of merits and indulgences, had to the majority of Christians made religion almost a matter of commerce" (p. 512). "The history of the Middle Ages is a record of boundless credulity combined with a widespread distrust of spiritual methods. If men believed in the constant intervention of the miraculous, they acted as though the very existence of the Church depended on her retaining her wealth and prerogatives" (p. 516). "A superficial acquaintance with the history of the fourth century is sufficient to convince us that it would not be possible for us to see eye to eye with those who brought about the triumph of the Nicene Faith. Their standpoint, their methods, their interpretation of Holy Scripture, are not ours; and though the *formulae* must be retained and cherished by the Church, the spirit in which we interpret them cannot be precisely the same as that of the age in which they were drawn up" (p. 518). "'C'est comme homme, non comme Dieu, que Jésus est entré dans l'histoire'

des hommes' (*Loisy, Autour d'un petit Livre*, p. 11)" (p. 520, note).

"In process of time, as the first century drew to a close, Jesus was better understood. And, if this be the case, there can be no finality about the knowledge of His Person. History and theology point to a fuller conception of Him in the future" (p. 522). "To dwell solely on the connection of Christ with the Unseen God may clear away heresy, but it also tends to put mere assent in the place of a vital faith, orthodoxy before a life in Christ, and to substitute for Christian freedom a scheme of salvation resting on a supposed bargain between God and man" (p. 524). "How few thinking people, to take but the simplest of instances, are now able to accept the Mosaic cosmogony as literally true, or to acknowledge the inerrancy of Holy Scripture in the sense which would have satisfied our forefathers" (p. 525).

"One aspect of the facts of which account must be taken is doubtless expressed when it is said that, 'In the forefront of the teaching of Jesus Christ stands an ethical sermon,' while 'in the forefront of the Christianity of the fourth century we have a metaphysical creed'" (Rev. J. Franklin Bethune-Baker, *Christian Doctrines and Their Ethical Significance*, p. 543). "If, as may be, we are even now on the eve of another great development, it can only be in so far as the traditional explanations of the Person and work of Jesus, and of His and our relations to God and the universe in which we are placed, no longer seem to correspond to the realities of our intellectual, moral, and spiritual needs" (p. 549). "That these doctrines commended themselves to the minds of earnest and spiritual men of the past, as true to their experience, is the attestation with which they come at first to each fresh generation in turn. But they must be capable of verification in individual experience, as embodying a theory of life that works. So far as the theory, when honestly applied, is not found to work, so far for the individual at least, it is in some way or other inadequate" (p. 549).

"The question whether the Gospels record events as they actually happened, or not, is and always has been of secondary importance: For in any case it is certain that they and the Epistles of St. Paul reflect the actual impression which was

made by Jesus and His acts and teaching upon contemporaries" (p. 550). "Even when the New Testament came to be regarded as the only test of the truth of doctrine . . . new doctrines were often justified by isolating from their context particular images or even phrases, employed by the writers of the New Testament, and treating them as an immediate source of doctrine in detail, ignoring the historical conditions in which the writings originated, and by reference to which alone their evidence can be safely used" (p. 552). "It is, however, worth noting, as germane to the question, that such theories were regarded by the Church—the *communis sensus fidelium* which was in all these matters the ultimate court of appeal—not only as inadequate and false interpretations of the facts . . . but also as subversive of the recognized principles of Christian morality" (p. 555).

"To be reverent and to be rational, to bring the evidence of the spiritual instinct into accord with the requirements of the intellectual judgment, that is the problem which is before us more distinctly than ever" (Rev. Arthur William Robinson, *Prayer in Relation to the Idea of Law*, p. 266). The classical peoples of the West "'began nothing without prayer for Divine aid; journeys were not commenced without supplication, nor voyages without sacrifice; the opening of popular and senatorial assemblies was preceded by religious rites'" (p. 267: quoting Bishop Wordsworth, *Discourses on Public Education*). "Bishop Reichel boldly asserted that 'we can have no knowledge of the hearing and answering of prayer, *such as shall be capable of being proved to others*. All attempts to demonstrate the efficacy of prayer must fail'" (p. 269). "It is for us to enquire whether prayer, so understood, is in opposition to, or in harmony with, what we may reasonably think we know of the arrangements which prevail in the universe" (p. 271). "'What a man will pray for depends precisely on the extent of his intelligent acquaintance with the phenomena around and within him'" (p. 290). "The proper proof that an 'extremely wonderful event' may be rightly ascribed to the action of God is derived directly from the teaching conveyed by it. We accept a miracle to-day on the strength of the revelation that it brings" (p. 318; *vide* p. 329).

"St. Paul regards his own experience on the way to Damascus,

in spite of some abnormal features, as substantially the same kind as that of the other Apostles, and that he uses the list as a whole . . . though he has to strain language almost to the breaking point to find a phrase ‘a spiritual body,’ to intimate his conception of the new organism” (p. 331). “He begins with the Death, ‘for our sins, according to the Scriptures’ and the Burial . . . he then passes on to the Resurrection on the third day, this also being ‘according to the Scriptures’” (p. 329).

He then gives several “appearances” that it is difficult if not impossible to reconcile with the other Scriptures. As Dr. F. Conybeare says, he uses the word *ωφθη* for them all; and this is the regular term for a vision, not (to quote the Thirty-nine Articles) a “real presence,” with flesh and bones, and all things pertaining to man’s nature. He also calls the Apostles “the Twelve,” and makes an ambiguous allusion to James, not saying if it was the Apostle or the brother of the Lord. Finally he asserts that a seed cannot be quickened unless it die; which is also put into the mouth of our Lord (John xii. 20). This contradicts all human experience, or the dictum that if a seed does not sprout it is dead, and is as meaningless to-day as the words about “Baptism for the dead” and “spiritual bodies.” As a fact, it is this notion of a spiritual body that has misled the Church through all ages. Hallam says of the consecrated elements: “Either they are the body and blood of Christ or they are not; there is no intermediate term.” The early Christians were obsessed with the notion of mysteries; hence in place of defining the Trinity as three minds so wholly in unison that they were in truth one, a quite reasonable and philosophical position, they were led by the semi-materialism which they imbibed from Greek Personification to talk about persons and substance, and produced the illogical farrago that goes by the name of the Athanasian Creed. It was open to them to have given a completely satisfactory account of the matter by asserting that the body was of earth, the offspring of humanity; but the mind was of heaven, inspired by and even embodying the Holy Spirit.

But such a common-sense explanation would not suit the miracle-mongering imagination of divines; they must have an Almighty with a body and intellect like man; they must

needs take the earthly body of Christ into the substance; they must even make the Spirit also a body. When they had got three bodies, their wit failed them how to make one of three; hence they floundered in the "Incomprehensible." To us to-day the problem seems simple. In mind Christ was completely united with God; we should ask no impertinent, irrelevant questions as to his body; that was of earth earthly, and as with all mortals it "returned to its mother earth." There is good reason to think the first accounts given did not speak of an empty tomb. The Bishop of Durham, I believe, held that a real spiritual resurrection carries with it the leaving behind of the flesh in the sepulchre, the mind thus free from the trammels of the body could soar to heaven; even St. Paul assumes a spiritual body as essential. But bunglers thought they could improve facts by lies. The "Guard at the tomb" is now generally pronounced to be unhistorical; the account of the women is looked on with just suspicion; it is confused and does not hang together. The whole story is inconsistent and contradicts itself on crucial points. According to one authority the appearances are in Galilee, by another they are confined to Jerusalem; in one they last forty days, in the oldest apparently only one. Reconciliation of these differences has proved hopeless, and is expressly given up in the above-named Essays. St. Paul regards his "appearance" as equal to the rest; so do I. They were all of the same kind: that on the journey to Emmaus is very much on a level with the tale of the Ethiopian Eunuch, and Philip being carried by the Spirit to Azotus; and what does that mean? Luke seems not to have been certain as to his facts; Mark is silent; Matthew is the Church's version of the "record" some half-century after the events.

The stories there given of the phenomena of the Birth do not inspire confidence—the book is clearly one that has been edited and "improved" for the edification of believers; yet there is no difficulty in tracing the additions to the old fabric; it is just like a geological formation or an ancient building. Those who can see have no hesitation in recognizing the history of its composition; but those who lack the acumen and knowledge needed to distinguish its later additions and various strata will fail altogether to understand the reasons

which make its evidence doubtful and of insufficient value to support the extraordinary conclusions that it would make inevitable, if received as a book worthy of complete confidence and of indubitable weight as a contribution to the truth of history.

"Between these pairs and especially between Matthew and Mark, there will be found to be close similarity, amounting frequently to identity, saving a few words here and there, in sentence after sentence, and passage after passage." "If the additional matter in Matthew and Luke be omitted, there will be found remaining in each of them, with, comparatively speaking, very few exceptions, the contents of Mark given in exactly the same order, the same sequence being maintained not merely in respect to events which stood in close historical connection, but also in respect to sections which do not appear to have been so united. This seems clearly to point to the use of a common document. It is specially difficult to understand how, after insertions sometimes of considerable length, the common thread could again and again have been taken up in the first and third Gospels exactly where it had been dropped, solely under the operation of tradition." "The correspondences between the Synoptics in words and phrases show that they are connected by derivation from common sources of information, which were in Greek" (H. V. Stanton, *H.D.B.*, Vol. II, p. 239). "Most will agree with Dr. Salmon that Matthew xxvii 'copied the narrative as we find it in St. Mark, interpolating in it different passages founded on knowledge derived from some other source'" (Bartlett, *H.D.B.*, Vol. III, p. 301).

In the Gospels Christ is represented, especially in St. Mark and St. Luke, essentially as a man. His pedigree is traced to Joseph; he is the Carpenter's son; his brethren are well known; his childhood is like that of other children, except perhaps for one apocryphal incident. His knowledge is a man's and his thoughts are those of a man of his age; he makes mistakes as to the meaning and wording of the Old Testament, due to the fact that the interpretation of the ancient Hebrew had been lost by the lapse of time and the change of language. He takes as real and as facts of Nature any history events of which to-day science has made reality

impossible. M. Sabatier and Sir F. Younghusband assert that the Bible does not profess to teach worldly things; but no one but a casuist ever thought of the beginning of Genesis as anything but a record of facts till growing knowledge forced on a reluctant clergy and an unwilling people recognition of the truth. The Apostles believed clearly that Christ spoke the truth, and the truth only, as to physical and natural and historical things. It has been reserved for the last half century or so to show that this does not correspond to the facts of the case.

Like many others, this view has been maintained in spite of the clear evidence of the Bible itself. Nobody doubts that a complete error has been put into the mouth of Jesus as to Zacharias, son of Barachias; no one questions that he was mistaken as to the end of the world. M. Sabatier readily admits this, and acknowledges that the first Christians were misled altogether as to the course of events by their reliance on the Lord's eschatological teaching. Again, the maxims put into the mouth of Jesus on political and ethical subjects are, as Canon Sanday owns, quite impossible as practical guides in life. They have ever and anon through history produced ludicrous and alarming results: the Anabaptists, the Fifth Monarchy men, the Quakers and Puritans, the Ascetics and hermits of Syria and Egypt, the Revivalists and the Crusaders, the Calvinists, and the Church of Rome have alike appealed with more or less reason to the precepts and injunctions of the Master. Aristotle's "doctrine of the mean" has perforce been brought in to reconcile and counterbalance the extreme pronouncements of the Gospels and to give ballast and rigidity to the ship of religious faith.

At the very beginning St. Paul found himself compelled to retreat from the position he had taken up, and to oppose the decrees and teaching of Christ's original followers, because these precepts were not feasible as the rules of an orderly and sane communion. He had to set his face strongly against the notion of miraculous inspiration and heavenly gifts; he was forced to preach a doctrine of common sense and quiet everyday conduct to the subjects of fanatical hopes and impossible beliefs, because, to one of his shrewd understanding, it quickly became clear that these ideas were not founded in

truth and could not be expected to form the basis of a lasting or consistent religion. The course of history has demonstrated his wisdom. We Protestants at least cannot fail to acknowledge that he foresaw the needs of the future, as the personal followers of Jesus had not; that he brought to bear the insight of a man of the world on problems which rustics and fishermen were wholly incapable of dealing with in a prudent and far-seeing spirit. This was not due to lack of religious depth or grasp of divine things in any way, for he excelled all of them perhaps in spiritual acumen. He was the real heir of Christ, even more than St. Peter, St. James, or St. John, though in points he fell far below Christian charity.

Like the Chief of the Apostles, he was of more energy than discretion, more driving power than calm judgment to direct; but he had the knowledge that enables a man to yield to circumstances, and the humility which saves him from forcing his views to the danger point. St. Peter, if we may rely on the picture given of him by the earliest writers, seems to have been conspicuously wanting in this essential gift; St. James also appears a somewhat rigid formalist who thought that they could decide, once and for all, the polity of the Church. If we accept the writings attributed to St. John as witnesses, he was a dreamer rather than a practical strenuous teacher of workaday faiths. Of the rest of the Apostles we know little: St. Thomas and his scepticism, St. Andrew and his materialistic outlook, St. Jude's dubious interpretations and the questionable exegesis, and the still more absurd practical deductions of the unknown author of Hebrews.

To these considerations we may add the repeated mistakes of St. Stephen's speech, the impossible orations put into the mouth of Paul and other Christian leaders by the writer of Acts, the failure to grasp or report the essential spirit of Christ in the Gospel of Mark, the omission there of the most beautiful and telling of the words assigned to Him by the other evangelists, the slavish copying of this meagre and unsatisfactory account of men who showed themselves capable of higher literary efforts. But this very ability has caused them seemingly to betray their duty as accurate historians and scientific reporters of the events they narrate: if it is a fact that behind St. Matthew there is an Aramaic record of the

words of Jesus which was known also to Luke, and that this has been deliberately set aside because it was thought lacking in style and deficient in elegance, and could be improved by adding to it tags and ornaments, from the manners of Greek classical authors, what more forcible indictment of the mental position and judgment of the primitive Christians could possibly be conceived? It is an example of the obtuseness of German intellect to have urged so fatal a theory in defence of an impossible position. We may take it then that the original teaching of Christianity was not free from the failings of human understanding and so far from being a defence, the whole case is simply given away when it is alleged that this is due to the man through whom our testimony of it has come to us.

The feigned miracle of an infallible written record, inspired and dictated by the Holy Spirit to authors whose personal qualities might tinge and colour their narratives, but could not materially affect their contents or vary their correctness, has been pushed back, and redrawn as a misty and vague perfection in an unknown past. It is pretended that the stream issued from its source pure and uncontaminated by earthly contact; that it was only upon encountering the unruly wills and feeble intellects of mortal men that it gathered some of the soil from the surrounding rocks and earth. As a result, it needs filtering by the criticism of floundering scholars and blear-eyed archaeologists. There would seem in this method an unnecessary care of the origins and a needless carelessness of the sequence. It recalls the view of Creation as a perfect work of the All-wise and All-knowing that was rendered nugatory by a mysterious enemy who escapes his notice. This notion, though adopted by Milton, is essentially Oriental, illogical and inconsistent, but in keeping with Eastern ideas of genii, demons, and spirits, good and evil, that struggled together and conquered or failed by some magical use of the divine name or other necromantic formula.

In the *Arabian Nights* and other indigenous stories, in the Koran and similar religious books, this process can be seen in a clear light. The seal of Solomon, the true pronunciation of "Jahveh," enables a man to work miracles and enchain devils. Faith will procure the removal of mountains and

turn rivers aside; the faithful will walk through fiery furnaces and the Valley of the Shadow of Death and fear no evil, for they know the infallible name, and the spirits obey the possessor of it. He has only to adjure them in the title of God and they shrink cowed before a superior power. Every natural event that surpasses the knowledge of beholders is attributed to some preternatural force: the effect of quinine on ague, of opium on cholera, of antitoxin on microbic disease is set down to the immediate action of the Almighty; "God is the cause of everything, but the explanation of nothing" (Sabatier). In the East, the name of the Deity is used to account for everything; but, with strange inconsistency, his power is thwarted constantly by inferior agents. Prayer, they say, will conquer all things; yet it may be caught and carried away by evil genii on its way to heaven. The whole system hangs on a defective philosophy and science. A god is assumed who is not all-powerful, a divinity who goes to sleep and can be tricked, or may be hoodwinked in the same way as mediæval priests asserted the devil was by a timely sprinkling of Holy Water or the opportune ringing of a church bell.

Even as dramatized in Goethe's *Faust* these superstitions did not seem quite absurd to an otherwise logical and deep-thinking generation. In Shakespeare's plays there is clear evidence of popular belief in similar agencies, and it is not surprising that the Reformers held views that had been strenuously upheld by the Church for ages, especially when men like Bacon and judges of much later times, apparently not wanting in common sense, maintained that it was essential at all costs to free the land from witches. Even in our own times, in country parts of Italy, France, and Scotland, and also in Austria, Russia, and Spain, it would be easy to excite, and not hard to discover similar beliefs. Indeed, they have had sinister effects within recent years in Ireland and other places. An active exploitation of delusions of this kind is carried on by the Church authorities of all Romanist countries. For a few francs the faithful may obtain advantages that by implication carry injury to others, and may gain business or appointments by the intervention of the "Holy Mother" or of the "Father of Christ" for a trifling sum. According to the representations of those who work the system, if this

is not paid, you may find yourself or your friends the victims of a loathsome disease. The Frenchman who reports this says, "The Devil is more of a gentleman than to send a hideous infliction on a lady because her husband is slow in paying his debts"; but St. Joseph is so put out over the loss of a few shillings that he altogether forgets his manners, and lapses from Christian charity. This notion of escaping evils by divine favour permeates the whole of the Scriptures, from the sacrifice of Cain and Abel, which clearly typifies the contest between agricultural and pastoral pursuits, and the offering of first-fruits of the one and of animal sacrifice by the other in which the "garden-tilling" habit, assigned to primitive man, is made to turn the scale in favour of the older notions. Other Biblical examples of this incurring or averting of divine wrath and retribution occur in the election of Enoch, the reason for which is obscure; the legendary sparing of Noah and of Lot, the banishment of Cain, the petrification of Lot's wife, Lamech, Ishmael, Abraham, and Jacob, David, Solomon, Rehoboam, Samuel, Zadok, Jehu, Ephraim, Gideon, Barak, and Jephthah.

It is partly because modern thought could not tolerate this materialistic view of prosperity as the direct favour of the All-loving, who sends his rain on the just and unjust alike, that the Epistle to the Hebrews has been rejected as the work of St. Paul, and partly because the language is irreconcilable with his genuine epistles in idea, in words, and in construction. Above all, it is felt that the whole representation of Jewish history hangs on a faulty exegesis and a purblind grasp. It accepts the popular prejudiced notion of one nation being selected by the All-just to the detriment of all others; of blessings being showered on them, regardless of the claims of others to fair and considerate treatment. The All-wise is represented throughout as a man swayed by favouritism and unmerited preferences; His fatherhood is confined to a single race, which on its own showing was far from faithful or thankful for its benefits. This picture of a partisan God may satisfy ultra-Nationalists, and convince "chosen" peoples of their own immaculate goodness and the complaisant tolerance of the Almighty for their peccadilloes, but it does not carry conviction to the mind of mankind.

The time was when we Britons harboured a like delusion; but, except for occasional hints on the part of clerics that we have forfeited the Lord's love by our perverse and blind social and political maxims, we seldom hear this tribal godism invoked now. At one stage or other of their culture all races are obsessed by this chimera. Probably the mass of mankind are apt to fancy they are beloved of heaven, that their thoughts are the quintessence of wisdom and the God-sent standard of right; but to most contact with the world and the hard lesson of failure bring home the feeling that they have overrated their importance and set their value in the world too high, and that a back seat becomes their merits and more nearly suits their worth. Probably even the Jews have come to this level of sanity in the twentieth century of our era; yet it is manifest that the Church, including all Protestants down to recent times, accepted Hebrews as Paul's writing; but its use of the Old Testament, that with one exception is almost always from the Greek of LXX, is open to serious question. It is true that St. Paul is subject to like criticism; that Rabbinic and Haggadist views are common in his writings; that constructions are put on Hebrew phrases that cannot be justified by any rules of grammar or right reasoning. Hence a growing conviction that the chief of the Apostles was not led into all truth by the Holy Ghost. The spirit exhibited by him in Galatians and elsewhere is far from commendable, and very human defects are to be found in his conduct. No one who makes a candid survey of the conditions of early Christianity will be at all surprised or put out by this discovery. The picture is one of men who differed and disputed, who quarrelled and were not courteous in their words to one another. It is a view of earth, and not of heaven. Nobody has a right to expect anything else, and as we advance down history the same fact becomes more and more patent. We soon realize that we are in the presence of men like ourselves, of creatures of like wilfulness and error. In fact, we cannot help feeling that the Saints, however convinced they may have been of their own righteousness, fell below the standard of honour and honesty commonly looked for among the refined in this present time; their sanctity was very like

that of the Pharisees, in that it existed chiefly in their own eyes, and affects a distant looker-on with doubtful approval; even nowadays one is not quite certain that the self-satisfaction of firm believers always results in a high tone of morality. No doubt, up to a point they do their duty scrupulously, but there is a narrow-minded confidence in themselves and the rightness of their opinions and methods that does not exactly produce conviction or assent.

According to M. Sabatier, common religious ideas are hopelessly in conflict with the settled convictions of mankind. "So much the worse for them," is the retort direct, but the expressions in question are ambiguous. When we go backwards, the whole life of Jesus, as portrayed in the Gospels and as Sabatier, Harnack, and Canon Sanday agree in concluding, is plainly that of a man. It is understood that Jowett and Sanday essayed to write a life of Jesus, but both failed to do so, even though Sanday propounded a theory of his divinity that was ingenious and not unscientific, but did not meet with much approval. The task is beyond the ingenuity of any one who will not combine the Deity with human weakness. Lacking this liaison, the whole becomes unreal; the crucifixion, for instance, could be of no moment to a God; it would be a triumph, a proof that He was inaccessible to all the attempts of enemies. According to the legend even St. John was not any the worse from being boiled in oil, and St. Catherine, ground at with toothed wheels, escaped unhurt.

"As a rule, we obtain the impression that theology could have dispensed with all the facts of Christ's life" (Harnack's *History of Dogma*, Vol. III, p. 305). "In each of us a Christ is born. The thought that Christ assumed the general concept of humanity occurs, though mingled with distinctive ideas, in Hilary, who was dependent on Gregory. We find it also in Basil, Ephraem, Apollinaris, Cyril of Alexandria" (pp. 300-1). "The attempt was made to explain redemption in terms of a mystical realism" (p. 107). Adam (mankind before Christ) was in a plastic condition, capable of receiving any impression. Sin, which had exclusively an external source, had then an easy task: humanity was first consolidated by Christ. *Every believer, through participation in Christ, must be born as a Christ.* "When he philosophized and took his own way

Gregory said little or nothing of the Christ of history" (Harnack, *loc. cit.*).

It is futile to allege the pains and agonies of Christ and at the same time to posit his perfect Godhead. All through the theology of the Church a similar wooden-headed and illogical method prevails. Apparently they could not conceive three minds so completely in unison that they would have been one in all respects. The casuists set themselves to define three persons of one substance, and produced a wholly materialistic piece of hocus-pocus that can be defended by Canon Sanday only on the ground that it embodies an antiquated system of philosophy which to-day is utterly exploded, and has to be explained by elaborate provisos and exceptions to make it fit in with our more scientific views. Throughout the whole process the same trail of the serpent prevails. We are assured that all this rigmarole was specially contrived under the influence of the Holy Spirit; that these illogical forms which have resulted in envy, hatred, and malice, that have been the cause of persecution and strife, the object of religious wars and ostracism of the most unchristian kind, have been the peculiar care of God, and have been kept from error by His all-prevading power. It is strange if the Church which, according to Protestant confession, was mistaken "not only in its practice, but even in matters of faith," was thus exempted from error when it put beliefs into the words of a very fallible human philosophical formula; but apparently was not kept from decreeing ephemeral ordinances at a meeting in which St. Paul and all the Apostles, fresh from the unction of the Holy Spirit and fortified by urgent prayer, came together to settle matters for the pacification and edification of all Christians.

We cannot accept these pronouncements of Councils of the third century or later with any consistence or logical theory, and yet reject those of earlier or later periods. The sole ground of acceptance is the same doctrine that whatever is, is right; that the things which prevail in the end are true. This may be so if the conquest is the result of free and open contest, and the struggle for existence is complete; but nobody has any right to place a limit upon it. No one can say "Thus far and no further"; to ask us to accept things decreed 1500-

1600 years ago on the ground of their age, and to deny us the privilege of canvassing them ourselves, is to contradict hypothesis of the survival of the fittest.

It is as if there were set up a close borough of selected voters to decide what every man has a right to have a voice in. The spirit to which appeal must be made is that of man, and this is not less competent or less able to judge now than it was then. Man has the duty and office of deciding his beliefs for himself, and he will, in the long run, so settle them. Churches may issue anathemas, Councils and popes may excommunicate, but in the end it is they that will be thrust out of the circle of humanity into the outer darkness that they have loved and striven to perpetuate.

As late as 1859, Darwin had to avoid any reference to man in his *Origin of Species*, and as late as 1865, in *Genesis* Bishop Christopher Wordsworth has, *εἰ τις τὸν νᾶον Θεοῦ φθείρει, φθερεῖ τοῦτον δὲ Θεός*: "As to the ark of Moses, the history is confirmed by the marine remains found in almost all parts of the world." Would a year account for them by any stretch of imagination, e.g. thousands of feet of marine animalcula in the chalk cliffs and fossil-bearing strata hundreds of yards thick in mountains? The good Bishop was nodding, or was ignorant of the actual facts. He accepts "permutation of species" to get them all into an ark of the size stated, and suggests that in "the sheet let down" in Acts x. 12, and ark, there were only primitive typical specimens, and gives a lot of world-wide legends, oblivious that these are the source of the Bible stories. He says that it was 1655 years after the Creation that this occurred i.e., 4004-2349. Of course, no educated person now accepts this fantastic chronology; but these figures were actually given in the Bishop's *Bible for English Readers* (1865), and it is the same "high" authority who asks us to believe that St. Paul wrote the Epistle to the Hebrews, a dictum that even in his time received no accredited support from Biblical scholars.

We have now surveyed the views of three men of eminence—Sabatier, the Dean of the Protestant Theological Faculty at Paris (of whose book a digest is given in the Appendix); Canon Bigg of Christ Church, Oxford; and Harnack, the Professor of Ecclesiastical History at Berlin—as to the

character and worth of the men who composed the councils of the Fourth Century, at which the dogmas of the Church were decided and the doctrines of Christendom laid down. Generally there seems to be an unwillingness to look closely at the methods pursued or the results so obtained. In Scotland the clergy who know appear to be afraid to speak out because of an indifferent and prejudiced laity; the layman who understands is awed by the pretended unanimity of his pastors and teachers. In England the position of the established Church forbids change, however much its component members may see the need of it.

*Quieta non movere* is the motto of all. In France and Germany no greater freedom of movement is seen; men may speak clearly, but they cannot carry the mass with them—the inertia of the many overrides the knowledge of the few. It is useless, then, to look to the formal expressions of doctrine. The Church of Rome has been accused of preaching dogma which its clergy do not really believe; but this charge may be brought with equal truth against all confessions: they are old clothes made to fit other times and other persons and cannot suit all, or apply to all conditions. It follows that this triple witness of an Englishman, a Frenchman, and a German cannot well be rebutted, but, significantly enough, each makes it work out in favour of his own Church: the Frenchman for Calvinism, the German for Lutheranism, the Englishman for the Anglican Church. All three render Christianity quite unlike historic fact or reality, because they are rigidly confined to preconceptions. Contrary to their own theory, they maintain the correctness of the Church's evolution up to a certain point, thus mistaking the whole theory of development. For instance, Sabatier's book rests on a false analogy; he compares religion to a seed planted in the soil from which it gains the substance of its increase, and by which it is of necessity limited and conditioned. This does not express the facts of science; two seeds put side by side in the same pot will become one a poisonous weed, the other a wholesome plant; the result depends on the intrinsic nature of the organism wholly and in no way on that of the soil. Both may be starved, each may have bits of earth clinging to it; but one is a fungus, the other in its entirety a fern. The smallest part of each will

produce another like itself, perfect in its kind, but imperfect as compared with others.

In fact, each animal is different in its flesh and in its fat; an inordinate diet of suct and nothing else will give only dog's fat in a dog. The faeces of a dog, a cat, an ape, of a horse, a cow, a sheep, are quite distinct, though their food is the same. Each acts on its provender in a specific way, and if the Church had borne any resemblance to a natural organism, it would not be affected by its surroundings, or modified by them in essential matters. It would have evolved in its own line and "bred true," and not produced a mongrel offspring. Obviously Sabatier was influenced by Lamark's theory of evolution, which no longer holds. Either the Church is altogether wrong or the Catholic theory is right; you can set up no limit of infallibility, no decreasing power of it. You must not draw bonds tight to a certain point and then think the rest will develop naturally. The Church, if it is to be constricted anywhere, will not be a natural development, nor display the beauties or graces of a divine origin. M. Sabatier confuses seed and leaven: a seed is perfect in itself after its kind, and reproduces this perfectly; but in appropriating what is needed for its perfection it rejects part of what comes to it. Alcohol has been called "the urine of fungi." The yeast plants are perfect; but the result of their action is open to the well-grounded objection that it makes man see double and is delusive.

The illustration holds from another side. A tree as it grows is subject to atmospheric and other conditions which blast and injure it, so that the perfect whole foreshadowed in the seed does not result. But this is quite different from what M. Sabatier suggests—namely, that external influences enter into the substance of an organism and become part of its being, as the doctrines and practices he objects to have become part of the life and being of the Church. For instance, when he writes of "inspiration making a prophet in perfect harmony with the divine spirit," he either forgets the Scriptures or mistakes the spirit. The bulk of prophetic messages was not, certainly, "for all time." Nothing can exceed the wearisomeness of prophetic harpings on the burden of Tyre, of Moab, and of Ammon. It is really the pettiness of

small, provincial, narrow minds which can see nothing beyond the little parochial politics of their own neighbourhood and their own people. There is no breadth of view, no expansive thought; the very holiness and justice they sometimes bring in are really a regard for the law, the prejudice of the nation, the taboos of their race. They believe there is something sacred in the absurd regulations of forgotten rabbis as to leprosy, of which they had no real knowledge, and ritual which they did not understand or recognize the origin of in the exploded ideas of semi-savage or altogether barbarous ancestors; worked over by priests and scribes for their own advantage in pocket or power. There has recently been a tendency in the attitude of a few theologians to exaggerate the importance of the Hebrew prophets, as an offset to the depreciation of the historical documents. The common verdict of mankind is clearly shown by *the public neglect* of the Biblical prophetic books. Only small portions of them are ever read in the services of the churches, and curiously enough many of these are of dubious authenticity, as additions by later hands.

Again, few clerics and still fewer laymen have ever given these books serious attention. In spite of the faking and doubtful translations of the Authorized Version, in many places they are barely intelligible, and in considerably more quite uninteresting. Events of local and unimportant history are magnified into wholly unreal proportions, and are represented as the special care of the Deity, who is dealt with much as a stage property to be worked for the benefit of a peculiar race; and the spirit in which this is done is not in itself commendable. We can see that when Germans appropriate the deity, and invoke his particular aid for confounding their enemies, they know not of what manner of mind they are; but we are blissfully unaware that our own National Anthem and Church services wear a similar oriental aspect. In both these cases the origin of such self-satisfied egotism is clearly to be traced to the writings of the Hebrew seers. They had no doubt that Jahveh, their own God, their national deity, fought on their side and favoured their cause; they had no misgiving as to the wickedness and supreme selfishness of other people; they never feared their own failings, except so far as

these were defects in their devotion and adhesion to the Lord, who was the personification of their own race.

History has conclusively shown this narrow view to be false—the fond imagination of peoples that they have a monopoly of the care and love of the All-wise is a sign of a young and foolish era. Experience shows that the Almighty sends his sunshine and rain impartially on the just and the unjust; that wickedness, one-sided and prejudiced, like orthodoxy is, in these questions, very much a matter of prejudice in favour of your own righteousness; and that those who are most positive are likely to be most mistaken; that to do justice and love mercy, and walk humbly with your God, are more apt to lead in the right way than pride and overweening self-confidence. Add to this a conviction that God never did speak clearly to any race, that he never chose or selected any people as favourites, or gave them any covenant or testimony which was not free to all other people, and that the methods by which all such communications were supposed to be effected are common to all nations and now generally discredited. Dreams, omens, divinations, signs, wonders, and voices are known not to be in any way the expression of heavenly messages, but may be joined to sentiments of intolerance and cruelty which owe their origin to very different sources. Humanity speaking in the hearts and mouths of men as a protest against barbarity and the callousness inherited from bestial and savage forefathers is preferable to any divinity, pretended to be founded on miraculous revelation, which enjoins and countenances cruel and revengeful actions. The supposition that these iniquities have the warrant of heaven because they are exercised on enemies is a doctrine very congenial to the unregenerate heart, but one which enlightened piety cannot entertain as the word of God. In a similar spirit the Church declared itself the organ of divine favour; it shut out all who did not come to God by its offices; it translated the physical exclusion of old Jewish notions into a spiritual preserve of priests and monks; it built up a colossal system of councils and dogmas which except a man hold he cannot be saved. This was the logical outcome of the old narrow, national jealousy and petty, provincial views; to appropriate the Father of Heaven has become a traditional policy among the pseudo-

religious. It is probably not true that Hebrews demanded a King against the divine ordinance; but it is a fact that the Romish Church constituted a dictator against the spirit of truth. As Sabatier says, without meaning to be ironical, "It petrified the mouth of the human mind"; but even petrifications yield in process of time to the solvent action of truth, the universal solvent, and its erosive effects on dogma old and new are slowly but surely transforming the whole configuration of human thought and destiny. The age-long aphorism *Cui regio, illi religio*, is now a *non sequitur*.

## APPENDIX

As left in manuscript by the author, the final chapter of Part II consists of an almost continuous catena of quotations from *Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion d'après la physiologie et l'histoire*, 1897, par Auguste Sabatier, Professeur de l'Université de Paris, Doyen de la faculté de Théologie Protestante, special translation compared with and amended from that of the Rev. T. A. Seed. We have failed to trace the special translation, and, as it would not be fair either to Sabatier or to our author to use quotations from Seed's English translation, which he does not think does justice to the French text, and as we cannot compare the citations from the special translation with their source, it has been decided that the only equitable course is to substitute a précis of the thesis of Sabatier's book as indicated by the quotations adduced.

### PRÉCIS

Religion at first awakened in the heart of Man under the impress of terror caused by the disordered and destructive forces of Nature. The original conception of Nature is always animistic. Faith in religion is primarily one in the existence of supernatural wills and of their intervention in human life and destiny. The idea of miracle in the Bible is of the same kind and order as that in all the ancient world—*e.g.*, the Deluge, eponymous founders of nations and religions Abraham, Moses, who wrought upon behalf of their people miracles such as the Plagues of Egypt, the Manna in the Wilderness, and the siege of Jericho. The New Testament miracles are not those of Jesus, but have been ascribed to him by the compilers of the Gospels—Jesus did not come to the earth to give knowledge. He used current notions which formed the science of the little circle in which he moved, without

troubling himself whether such beliefs were correct or not. Miracles rest on faith, and not faith on miracles.

Biblical prophecy and its interpretation rested on the assumption that ancient texts had an oracular meaning *e.g.*, the Messianic adumbrations. So-called prophetic inspiration is a morbid phenomenon. From this source was derived the dogma of Scriptural infallibility. When he became moral, Man made his gods correspondingly moral. The last step of philosophy fuses with the earliest prototheistic thought. Prayer is not religious in origin apart from naïve faith in its efficacy. Primarily it was practised, and to a certain extent is still employed, as a sort of power which the worshipper supposes he can wield over the spirit or spirits he wishes to serve his purposes. Sacrifice, at first, was a form of prayer, a species of bribe or thanksgiving to the object worshipped and invoked.

The sacred literature of Israel is not unique, and its cult is not essentially differentiated from the cults of earlier or contemporary Oriental peoples. It was simply a variant of the tribal type, and this is true also of its Prophetism. In its more developed phase this amounted to obsession by a great thought; but even then it did not transcend the narrow limits of a national Messiah.

In the genesis and early spread of Christianity the person of Jesus of Nazareth as its teacher and witness meant no more to its constitution and propaganda than did that of Plato to his system of philosophy. This separation of doctrine from Christ tends to make Christianity positive, abstract, and lifeless. Catholicism and Protestantism avoid this horn of the dilemma only by impalement on the horn of Christ as the second person of the Trinity; thus abducting him from history, and transporting him into the remote and ineffable recesses of philosophy and metaphysics. In so deifying the history these Churches destroy it.

If, in order to be a Christian and to persuade oneself that Christianity is the perfect religion, it is needful to hold that the whole history of the Evangelists is true, and if, in truth, the traditions and legends about Christ are essential parts of Christian faith, the dilemma is insoluble. The Kingdom of God is manifest in a pure and free spirit of justice and love, actuated by the initiative consciousness of Christ. There are

excellent Christians who know nothing of Christ except that by him they have become the children of the Father.

Historic criticism has all the rights of legitimate science; it is worthy of high respect; but it has not power to weaken or confirm the Christian principle. That is grasped only by the religious conscience.

The dogma of a metaphysical divinity, besides making Christ's life as a man a mere false seeming, divides him for ever from man. One may not know whence he came, or how he entered the world; but this one can and does know: as a brother in spirit and in flesh one belongs to all mankind, like all other children of women. If the gospel of Jesus were something definite and changeless, like a code of laws or collection of forms, it would no longer be a power of life. All non-Christian cults without any element of moral holiness are so many corruptions of Christian principle as a universal force, and an expression, in varying degrees, of the paganism always latent in the human heart. Catholicism began in the second century, when the Church was under the unconscious action of tradition and pagan customs. It felt the need of making the Christian principle objective and natural in an external fact, and so imprisoned the Kingdom of God in a visible institution, the immanent revelation of the Holy Spirit in the decisions and acts of a priesthood.

In Protestantism, Christianity is brought back from the external to the internal. Science is freed at the same time as the conscience, the political life of the peoples as well as the inner life of Christians. The Calvinist pastors of New England were the founders of modern liberty; the Jesuits were the precursors of all tyranny.

To-day our ideas, even of the highest, no longer have for us a persistent character. They come to us as the relative product of a mental development which we trace in history. The mind of man changes. Our views are psychic facts which must be explained by similar events in times past. In other words, the historic method has made the point of view of evolution everywhere triumphant. We need to learn that God is a spirit, instead of binding ourselves to some fetish of human workmanship. Christianity is an organism whose soul is deathless, but its body renews itself constantly by the

fact that its material is always in motion and is borrowed from the various conditions through which it passes. Whoever does not feel God in his heart will find him nowhere. To feel thus in our personal and practical actions the influence and presence of the spirit of God within our own spirit is the mystery, but it is also the source of religion.

In psychology the object and effect of religious inspiration is neither to receive nor to give to men definite thoughts or ready-made aims in things which are, by nature, impossible to know by scientific methods; but it is a raising and enrichment of the inner life of the recipient. "*L'anthropomorphisme n'est qu'un symbolisme d'espèce particulière.*" To represent God men had choice of all kinds of nature—mineral, organic, the human figure, the moral order. As a fact, he used all these. Symbols drawn from the moral order are best, and can be alone tolerated at a certain stage of development. "*L'image n'est jamais une définition de l'être.*"

There are symbols, such as "Heavenly Father," "The Reign of God," "New Birth," the "Outpouring of the Holy Spirit," so closely tied to our religious life, to its origin, its course, and its end that we cannot believe they will ever disappear, unless, indeed, the spiritual life of humanity should itself grow feeble. Of these we can confidently say without risk of being belied by the lapse of time: "Heaven and earth pass away, yet my words will not pass." One may be orthodox without being religious; authority makes peace by enjoining silence. Dogmas exist because no one cares about them. Symbolism allows of veneration for time-honoured creeds, but permits believers to hold to tradition with such sincerity and earnestness as each finds needful for religious faith.







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